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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the everyday realisation of rights in India’s school-feeding programme, the 
Midday Meal Scheme. The commitment to realising the right to food in India is well-established. In 
2001, a petition to the Supreme Court and subsequent orders made existing food-based schemes 
(including the Midday Meal Scheme) a legal entitlement under a right to food. These schemes then 
became the core components of the National Food Security Act in 2013. In consequence, eligible 
children in India have a right to a MDM that adheres to specific guidelines and have a broader right to 
food. Despite these commitments to rights, the extent to which India’s food-based social protection 
schemes reflect a rights-based approach has not, hitherto, been explored. Indeed, although the 
importance of state-led, rights-based social protection schemes to address food insecurity is now widely 
recognised, the relationship between these means and ends has been insufficiently explored. 
 
In this context, drawing on nearly one year of mixed-methods research in the Indian state of Rajasthan, 
I examine the extent to which India’s Midday Meal Scheme adheres to a rights-based approach to 
realising food security. To do so, I examine three components of a rights-based system in the context 
of the scheme: rights-holders and their entitlements; duty-bearers and their duties; and the mechanisms 
through which duty-bearers can be held to account for the non-fulfilment of their obligations. I draw on 
detailed field research in two districts to show that, in its present form, the scheme is limited from the 
perspective of rights. Not all those in need are necessarily included in the scheme; the food that rights-
holders receive often does not meet their needs, duty-bearers fail to adequately fulfil their duties; and 
accountability mechanisms fail to hold them accountable. Consequently, rights-holders often do not 
receive their entitlements and the right to food remains unfulfilled. Overall, I show that the realisation 
of rights to depends on the capabilities of rights-holders to realise their rights and on the capacity and 
motivation of duty-bearers to fulfil their duties.  
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction  
 
 
1.1 The Research   
 
The paradoxes of the world food system are well-known and well-rehearsed. Put briefly, although more 
food is now produced than ever before (Patel, 2013), hunger persists on an unacceptable scale. 
According to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), 793 million or 10.9% 
of the world’s population are undernourished1 (2015: 8). At the same time, and indeed a product of the 
same system (Patel, 2013), a further 1.9 billion adults are overweight, of which 600 million are obese2 
(Word Health Organization [WHO], 2016). Of particular concern here is child malnutrition. Globally, 
half of all deaths of children under five are the result of undernutrition, equivalent to an annual loss of 
3 million lives (United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund [UNICEF], 2017). Those that 
survive live ‘short and limited lives’ (Li, 2010: 1); physical and cognitive development can be impaired, 
to the detriment of education, future economic productivity and health. Hunger, malnutrition and want 
thus continue to exist amid plenty.3 
 
Nowhere are these contradictions more striking than in India. The country is self-sufficient in grain 
production (Dev and Sharma, 2010) and is the world’s largest exporter of rice (Chandrasekhar, 2012). 
Technically, there is enough food for all. Furthermore, in recent decades India has experienced rapid 
economic growth; Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita increased from US$309 in 1991 to 
US$1,581 in 2015 (World Bank, 2016). The prevalence of obesity and obesity-related diseases has 
risen, particularly for higher income groups in urban areas (Kalra and Unnikrishnan, 2012; Kmietowicz, 
                                                        
1 See Appendix A.1 for a discussion of the FAO’s methodology. 
2 Defined using standard Body Mass Index (BMI) cut-offs, outlined in Section 2.2.1.   
3 The inclusion of ‘want’ reflects Poppendieck’s (1998) argument that using only ‘hunger’ obscures causes and 
other needs and thus that ‘want amid plenty’ was a more appropriate description of the problems in the US.  
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2015; Wang et al., 2009). Yet, the decreases in hunger and malnutrition that typically accompany 
economic growth have not been observed (Haddad, 2013; Pritchard et al., 2014; Ruel and Alderman, 
2013; Subramanyam et al., 2011). To illustrate, the prevalence of underweight-for-age children is 
expected to fall at half the rate of GDP growth (Pritchard et al., 2014). Given that India’s GDP grew on 
average by 4.2% per annum between 1990-2005, one would predict the prevalence of underweight 
children to have fallen by 27% during this period (Gillespie and Kadiyala, 2011). Instead, prevalence 
decreased only by ~10% (ibid). Although recent data show improvements, it is still estimated that 39% 
of children under five are stunted, 30% are underweight and 15% are wasted4 (GOI, 2016c). In the words 
of Haddad (2009: 1): ‘India is an economic powerhouse and a nutritional weakling’.  
 
Increasingly, efforts to address hunger, malnutrition and food insecurity draw on the concept of a right 
to food, commonly defined as the right of all people to have access to ‘food in a quantity and quality 
sufficient to satisfy the dietary needs of individuals, free from adverse substances, and acceptable within 
a given culture’ (Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights [CESCR], 1999). A rights-based 
approach (RBA) recognises that people have rights and are rights-holders and that the state and, to a 
lesser extent other actors, have a duty to respect, protect, and fulfil the right to food (Eide et al., 1984). 
Fulfilling the right to food has two dimensions. States must facilitate the right by strengthening people’s 
access to means of livelihood. For those unable to enjoy the right to food by the means available, states 
must directly provide the right to food (CESCR, 1999). It is the state’s responsibility to provide a right 
to food that is the focus of this thesis. Direct provision by the state includes those initiatives which 
enable access to food, such as subsidies and employment schemes, and the direct provision of food, 
such as supplementary and school-feeding programmes. The importance of grounding these social 
protection schemes in a RBA is also increasingly recognised (Ajemian, 2014; FAO, 2004; 2012; 2014; 
High Level Panel of Experts [HLPE], 2012). 
 
Not only is India a prime example of the problems of hunger, malnutrition and food insecurity, it is also 
an exemplar of the recognition of the right to food. In 2001, the contradictions of India’s food system 
came to a head. As starvation deaths occurred in areas of Rajasthan which were facing drought for a 
third consecutive year, government warehouses were overflowing with grain (Guha-Khasnobis and 
Srinivasan, 2007; Srinivasan and Narayanan, 2007). Consequently, the People's Union for Civil 
Liberties (PUCL) launched a petition in the Supreme Court of India on behalf of the poor of Rajasthan 
(People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 196 of 2001). The 
petition sought the provision of relief stipulated under the 1962 famine codes and the enforcement of 
the constitutional right to food (Birchfield and Corsi, 2010; Hassan, 2013).5 In response, the Supreme 
                                                        
4 These terms are defined in Chapter 2 and discussed further in Appendix A. 
5 The petition and relevant orders are outlined in Appendix B.2.  
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Court made existing food-based government schemes a legal entitlement. These schemes included the 
provision of subsidised grain under the Public Distribution System (PDS), the provision of food to 
children below the age of six and pregnant and new mothers under the Integrated Child Development 
Services (ICDS) programme and the provision of free cooked lunches to children at school under the 
Midday Meal Scheme (MDMS). The petition and Supreme Court Order ‘transform[ed] the policy 
choice of the Government into enforceable, justiciable rights of the people’ (Ziegler, 2006: 11). The 
petition and subsequent orders, known as the ‘right to food case’, have been widely lauded and hailed 
as a ‘landmark initiative’ (Birchfield and Corsi, 2009: 693), not just for the right to food in India, but 
for RBAs in general (Guha-Khasnobis and Srinivasan, 2007). The right to food case paved the way for 
the 2013 National Food Security Act (NFSA). The Act aims to ‘provide for food and nutritional security 
in human life cycle approach, by ensuring access to adequate quantity of quality food at affordable 
prices to people to live a life with dignity’ (NFSA, 2013). The Act specifies the entitlements and duties 
in the PDS, ICDS and MDMS. 
 
As the figures on child malnutrition in India indicate, a legal commitment to realising a right to food, 
even when coupled with economic growth and long-running social protection schemes, does not 
automatically guarantee a right to food. As Gupta (2012) asked: ‘After more than sixty years of 
development efforts by the postcolonial state, why do so many of India’s citizens continue to be 
subjected to the cruelties of endemic hunger and malnutrition and to be deprived of… basic 
necessities…?’ (3). One must also ask why is the right to food in India far from being realised? 
Commentators recognise the difficulties in realising the right to food. Drèze (2004a: 1726) noted that 
‘difficulties arise as soon as we try to flesh out this broad definition [of the right to food] and translate 
it into specific entitlements and responsibilities’. Li (2010: 18) wrote that ‘in the context of the autonomy 
of states, difficulties in determining beneficiaries and reaching them and corruption, the aim of “making 
live” hundreds of millions of deeply impoverished Indians is very difficult to accomplish’. Yet, the 
practical question of realising the right to food has not been studied further. Previous studies of the right 
to food in India (e.g. Birchfield and Corsi, 2009; Guha-Khasnobis and Srinivasan, 2007; Srinivasan and 
Narayanan, 2007) have typically focussed on the right to food case, not whether legal entitlements are 
realised or the extent to which rights are reflected in the design and realised in the implementation of 
specific schemes.  
 
My research goes beyond praising India for its legal recognition of the right to food, to examine the 
everyday realisation of rights, both the right to specific entitlements and the broader right to food. To 
do this, I focus on India’s MDMS. Following the 2001 Supreme Court Order, the MDM became a legal 
entitlement. The scheme is now the largest school feeding programme in the world, providing lunch to 
over 100 million children each day. I focus on the MDMS as it has been less extensively researched 
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than the ICDS6 and is often absent from discussions on the right to food and food security (for example 
Desai et al., 2016b; Devereux et al., 2008; Pritchard et al., 2014). The greater volume of research 
concerning the ICDS compared to the MDMS is not surprising; adequate nutrition is particularly 
important in the first 1000 days of life (Black et al., 2013) and therefore the ICDS has a greater potential 
nutritional impact. Nevertheless, the MDMS is still important from the perspective of nutrition and food 
security as studies have shown the potential for growth catch-up in later childhood (see Appendix A). 
Moreover, the MDMS is an important part of the life-cycle approach of the NFSA and is the only 
scheme targeted at children aged six and above. The MDMS costs the Indian government more than 90 
billion Indian Rupees (INR)7 per annum and affects more than 100 million children. Given the scale 
and importance of the MDMS, there is an urgent need for in-depth study of the scheme.  
 
Every rights-system has three components: rights-holders and their rights; duty-bearers and their duties; 
and the accountability mechanisms by which the duty-bearers can be held accountable for the non-
fulfilment of duties (Kent, 2005). In this thesis, I examine these three components in both the design of 
the MDMS and, using empirical evidence from two districts in Rajasthan, in the implementation of the 
scheme. I also examine whether duty-bearers fulfil their duties and thus whether rights-holders receive 
their entitlements. RBAs also concern both outcomes and processes (Jonsson, 2003; 2005). Thus, I 
consider whether the MDMS contributes to the realisation of the right to food and whether the MDMS 
adheres to the principles of human rights: participation, accountability, non-discrimination, 
transparency, human dignity, empowerment and the rule of law.  
 
1.2 Outline  
 
This dissertation is divided into nine further chapters. In Chapter 2, I begin by reviewing the literature 
on social protection and school feeding programmes including the MDMS, RBAs and the right to food. 
I then bring together literature from a range of disciplines to explore the three components of a rights-
system in more depth. I then examine literature on power and public policy and outline the questions 
guiding this study. In Chapter 3, I present an overview of the geography, socio-economic and cultural 
environment and food security situation in Rajasthan and the two study districts. I then profile the four 
administrative blocks and the 43 sampled locations in which I conducted research. I outline the 
practicalities of the fieldwork and the methodology used to answer my research questions. 
 
                                                        
6 I review studies on the ICDS and MDMS in Appendix B.4 and B.8 respectively.  
7 At present (Spring, 2017), US$1 is approximately INR 64.69 and £1 is INR 83.6, meaning the annual budget for 
the MDMS is equivalent to US$1.39 billion and £1.07 billion (one billion being understood as one thousand 
million). However, at the time of fieldwork in 2014-2015, £1 was equivalent to approximately INR 100. Due to 
this fluctuating exchange rate, all references to currency are provided in INR.    
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Having set out such necessary background and context, in Chapter 4 I examine the MDMS ‘on paper’; 
how the MDMS should be organised and function according to policy. I outline the scheme’s objectives 
and detail the three components of the rights system. In Chapters 5-8, I examine the extent to which 
these norms and guidelines are adhered to. In Chapter 5, I consider who is eligible to consume the 
MDM, who consumes the MDM in practice and the impacts of inclusion in and exclusion from the 
scheme. Overall, I demonstrate that the needs of rights-holders vary, that multiple factors beyond 
eligibility determine MDMS consumption and that many children who need the scheme are excluded. 
In Chapter 6, I focus on entitlements; the food that rights-holders receive. Taking the standard 
definitions of food security and the right to food as starting points (see Sections 2.2.2 and 2.3.3), I 
examine the quantity, quality, safety and cultural acceptability of the food served in the MDMS. I 
demonstrate the varying but limited extent to which the guidelines and norms on these issues are 
followed. In Chapter 7, I consider the duty-bearers at the school-level. I examine the duties of school-
management committees, teachers, cooks, the community and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
and reflect on issues relating to and stemming from their involvement. I show how the fulfilment of 
duties is dependent on multiple factors that determine the capacity of duty-bearers to fulfil their duties. 
Throughout Chapters 5-7, I repeatedly demonstrate empirically the non-fulfilment of entitlements. In 
Chapter 8, therefore, I examine how accountability mechanisms operate in practice. I consider both 
internal accountability from within the government and external accountability from rights-holders and 
their representatives. I show limitations in both forms.  
 
In Chapter 9, I bring together these empirical findings and address my research questions. I show that 
the realisation of the right to a MDM and the right to food depend on multiple factors; the capabilities 
of rights-holders to realise their rights; the demands placed on duty-bearers and their capacity to fulfil 
these demands, as determined by structure and agency. To conclude, in Chapter 10 I outline the 
methodological, empirical and theoretical contributions that the thesis has made. 
 
 
 Chapter 2 
Conceptual 
Framework  
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Chapter 2 
 
Conceptual Framework 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This thesis is concerned with the ability of rights-based social protection to address food insecurity and 
concentrates on India’s school feeding programme. Eligible children in India have a right to a MDM, 
which is part of a larger right to food. Therefore, I begin this chapter by reviewing the literature on 
social protection and school-feeding programmes including the MDMS. I then review the literature on 
the right to food and RBAs. As Kent (2002: 7-8) wrote: ‘To describe a rights system, we need to know...:  
 
A. The nature of the rights holders and their rights;  
B. The nature of the duty-bearers and their obligations corresponding to the rights of the rights 
holders; and 
C. The nature of the agents of accountability, and the procedures through which they assure that 
the duty bearers meet their obligations to the rights holders.’ 
 
Although the literature on social protection, the right to food and RBAs is necessary to understand the 
context of this research, it provides little insight into the three dimensions of a rights system and thus 
the realisation of a right to food. Consequently, I draw on literature from a range of disciplines including 
development studies, sociology and political science to consider these three elements in turn. I then 
review the literature on power and public policy. I end by outlining the research questions guiding this 
study.  
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2.2 Social Protection and School-Feeding Programmes   
 
2.2.1 Social Protection 
 
Social protection has rapidly although ‘quietly’ become part of development policy since the beginning 
of the 21st Century (Barrientos and Hulme, 2008). In contrast to safety nets which fell out of favour in 
the 1990s, social protection schemes not only prevent people from falling into destitution in response 
to shocks, but have broader aims to reduce poverty and protect against vulnerability. Although ‘social 
protection’ is used in a variety of ways, here I use Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler’s definition (2004: 
iii):   
 
Social Protection describes all public and private initiatives that provide income or 
consumption transfers to the poor, protect the vulnerable against livelihood risks, and 
enhance the social status and rights of the marginalised; with the overall objective of 
reducing the economic and social vulnerability of poor, vulnerable and marginalised 
groups.  
 
Social protection measures are commonly categorised by their objectives (Kabeer, 2010b), as outlined 
in Table 2.1. As schemes can have more than one objective, these categories can overlap (Devereux 
and Sabates-Wheeler, 2008).  
Table 2.1: Categories of social protection, based on Guhan (1994) and Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler 
(2004; 2008) 
Type Function Examples  
Provisional Provide relief from poverty 
and deprivation 
Social assistance, such as social 
pensions and disability benefits. Social 
services, such as orphanages. 
Preventative Similarly to safety nets, these 
prevent people from falling into 
deprivation.  
Social insurance such as maternity 
benefits and unemployment benefits. 
Promotive Enhance incomes and 
capabilities. These can be 
targeted at households or 
individuals. 
School feeding, microfinance and 
public works that provide food or cash. 
Transformative Address issues of social justice 
and exclusion 
Collective action for workers’ rights, 
protection for socially vulnerable 
groups.  
Social protection can be transformative, altering social relations and structural inequalities (Devereux 
et al., 2011). Transformative social protection is thus closely linked to rights and consequently India is 
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commonly cited in discussions of social protection and social justice (e.g. Chopra & te Lintelo 2011; 
Devereux et al., 2011). However, as Chopra & te Lintelo (2011) acknowledge, a multitude of actors 
and the interactions between them affect social protection programmes and the realisation of rights 
depends on the framing and recognition of rights and on the ability of citizens to assert and claim rights. 
Although this is recognised, how these factors affect the realisation of rights has not previously been 
explored thoroughly.  
 
2.2.2 Social Protection in India 
 
Social protection schemes in India are well-established, although are not typically discussed using the 
language of social protection (Chopra, 2014)1. The focus in this thesis is food-based instruments 
included in the 2001 Supreme Court Order and the NFSA. The entitlements these schemes provide are 
outlined in Table 2.2.  
 
Table 2.2: Food-based schemes in India 
Scheme Year Launched Entitlements (NFSA, 2013) 
Targeted Public 
Distribution 
Scheme (TPDS)  
PDS since pre-
independence,  
revamped PDS 
in 1992, TPDS 
since 1997.  
5kg of grain per person per month in each priority 
household at a maximum price of INR 3 per kg of rice, INR 
2 per kg of wheat and INR 1 per kg of coarse grain. Priority 
households can constitute up to 75% of the rural population 
and 50% of the urban population. 
Antodaya Anna 
Yojana  
(AAY) 
2000 Ration card to the poorest of Below Poverty Line (BPL)2 
households, entitling them to 35kg of grain per household 
per month at the subsidised prices of the PDS. 
Integrated Child 
Development 
Services (ICDS) 
1975 Children below the age of six should receive food equal to 
500 kcal and 12-15g of protein. Pregnant and lactating 
women should receive food equal to 600 
kcal and 18-20g of protein. Malnourished children should 
receive 800 kcal and 20-25g protein. 
Midday Meal 
Scheme (MDMS) 
1995 Free hot, cooked lunched meal every day except school 
holidays to children in grades I to VIII or aged six to 14 in 
government and government-assisted schools. The lunch 
should contain a minimum of 450 kcal and 12g of protein 
for lower primary (grades I-V and approximately ages 6-
10) and 700 kcal and 20g of protein for upper primary 
students (grades VI-VIII, approximately age 11-14). 
                                                        
1 The multiple schemes are outlined in Appendix B.4 
2 Households can be categorised as BPL or Above Poverty Line (APL).    
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One must distinguish between the existence of rights and the realisation of rights (Kent, 2007). Thus, it 
is imperative to understand whether the rights outlined in Table 2.2 are fulfilled and the determinants 
of this fulfilment are understood. The literature on the outcomes of the schemes listed in Table 2.2 
(excluding the MDMS) is outlined in Appendix B.6. Notably, in the literature, the outcomes of these 
schemes are not discussed in terms of the realisation of rights.  
 
2.2.3 School Feeding Programmes  
 
School feeding programmes (SFPs) are a type of social protection scheme. After the introduction of 
compulsory elementary education in the UK and US in the late 19th Century, educators and social 
reformers recognised that hungry children could not concentrate in school and consequently, school-
feeding was introduced (Poppendieck, 2010; Vernon, 2007). In the UK and US, school meals were 
initially provided by charitable organisations before becoming government-funded national schemes in 
the 1940s (Poppendieck, 2010; Vernon, 2007). National SFPs did not begin ab initio, but rather 
accumulated ‘from practical rationalities already developed in particular sites’ (Rose 1999: 275). In 
recent years, school feeding has re-gained prominence as a social protection strategy, particularly 
following the food and financial crises (Bundy et al., 2011). Between 2008-2013, SFPs were used to 
respond to food crises in 13 countries, to armed conflict in 12, to natural disaster in eight and to financial 
crises in five (WFP, 2013: 44). Now, almost every country in the world that can afford a SFP has one 
(Bundy et al., 2009; Drake et al., 2016).  
 
SFPs take three forms: on-site feeding, typically lunch but sometimes breakfast; snacks distributed at 
school, such as high-energy fortified biscuits; and take-home rations such as flour.3 SFPs, particularly 
in low-income countries, may be externally managed and funded such as by the WFP or funded and 
managed by national governments, as the MDMS is.  
 
The objectives of SFPs are typically educational, nutritional and/or agricultural (Drake et al., 2016).4 
Food at school can compensate parents for the direct and opportunity costs of education and has been 
found to increase enrolment and attendance (Ahmed and Ninno, 2002; Gelli et al., 2007; Kazianga et 
al., 2009; Kristjansson et al. 2009; Vermeersch and Kremer, 2004). SFPs, especially breakfast 
programmes, reduce classroom hunger and, consequently improve concentration and educational 
performance (Ahmed, 2004; Ahmed and Del Ninno, 2002; Grantham-McGregor et al., 1998; Powell et 
al., 1998; Simeon, 1998; Wesnes et al., 2003). SFPs can also be linked to local agriculture to benefit 
local food producers, of which ‘home-grown feeding programmes’ in sub-Saharan Africa are the prime 
                                                        
3 Examples of different SFPs are outlined in Appendix B.6 
4 A tabulated bibliography of the literature on the outcomes of SFPs is provided in Appendix B.7.  
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example (Alderman and Bundy, 2012; Drake et al., 2016; Sumberg and Sabates-Wheeler, 2010).  
 
SFPs have been found to reduce anaemia (Alderman and Bundy, 2012), increase BMI (Ahmed, 2004) 
and increase weight (see Kristjansson et al., 2009). The nutritional impact of SFPs depends on the extent 
to which the SFP adds to consumption. If the food provided substitutes rather than supplements the 
food that beneficiaries would already consume, the net effect of the SFP on nutrition is reduced (Rogers 
and Coates, 2002). If the food in a SFP is nutritionally inferior to the food that would be consumed 
otherwise, overall food intake is reduced (ibid). Jacoby’s (2002) study of school snacks in the 
Philippines, however, found that each calorie provided in school increased consumption by one calorie. 
Ahmed (2004) in Bangladesh and Gewa et al. (2012) in Kenya also found that snacks were a 
supplement. However, meals are more likely to be substituted than are snacks (Jomaa et al., 2011). The 
likelihood of school meals acting as a substitute may also depend on the timing of the meal, the 
recipient’s age, a household’s understanding of school meal content and the household food situation 
(Essuman and Bosumtwi-Sam, 2013; Jomaa et al., 2011). Substitution has significant implications for 
nutritional outcomes and thus needs to be studied for each SFP. Substitution of the MDM in the study 
area is considered in Chapter 6.   
 
Increasingly, SFPs are seen as part of a social protection strategy, that provides an income transfer to 
households. Bundy et al. (2009) estimate that the average contribution of school meals to household 
expenditure is 10% assuming that, following Jacoby (2002), the food will not be redistributed. 
Moreover, SFPs are seen as a means to increase human capital (Alderman and Bundy, 2012; Bundy et 
al., 2009; WFP, 2013). In this view, the objective of a SFP is not to fulfil a basic human right or even 
a basic need, but rather it is an investment which increases productivity; ‘The poor individual is in this 
way conceived, in classic neoliberal fashion, as a kind of micro-enterprise, earning a rate of return on 
invested capital’ (Ferguson, 2009: 176). 
   
Notably, the outcomes of SFPs are rarely discussed in terms of food security. Food security became 
part of official discourse at the 1974 World Food Conference and is now widely understood as ‘when 
all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that 
meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life’ (FAO, 1996).5 Food 
security is considered to have four dimensions (Table 2.3). 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
5 The history of the term is detailed further in Appendix A.2.5.  
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Table 2.3: The four pillars of food security (adapted from FAO, 2010) 
Pillar Description  Determinants 
Availability The amount of food that is 
available 
Production, stocks, trade and aid. 
Access Physical and economic access 
to food 
Incomes, prices, access to markets and 
safety nets 
Utilisation The use of nutrients by the 
body 
Diet including quality, food safety and 
whether the nutrients can be absorbed as 
determined by health 
Stability The stability of the other three 
dimensions over time.  
Food insecurity can be chronic (long-
term) resulting from prolonged poverty 
or lack of access, or food insecurity can 
be transitory (short-term) caused by 
sudden fluctuation in food availability or 
access. Food insecurity may also be 
seasonal. Instability can be caused by 
adverse weather, political instability or 
economic factors such as rising prices.   
 
The HLPE noted that ‘drawing generalised conclusions on the food security impacts of school feeding 
is tricky because of marked variations across programmes in the quantity and quality of food provided' 
and whether the food is fortified with micronutrients’ (2012: 43). However, they noted the positive 
impact of SFPs on food intake and nutrition. Bartfeld and Ahn’s (2011) study of the US school breakfast 
programme, however, showed that examining SFPs using a broad notion of food security is possible. 
Bartfeld and Ahn found the breakfast programme reduced food insecurity, albeit only for families with 
low levels of food insecurity.  
 
If SFPs are considered using the established framework of food security (see Section 2.3.4) numerous 
questions arise. Firstly, typically SFPs do not provide stable access to food as they cease during 
vacations (Lentz and Barrett, 2013; Nord and Romig, 2006; Russell, 2005). Studies in the US have 
found increased food insecurity and hunger in the summer (e.g. Andrews et al., 2000; Nord et al., 2001; 
Nord and Romig, 2006). As Russell (2005) wrote: ‘Everyone in the hunger business knows that children 
go hungry in the summer’ (35). For this reason, the US introduced a Summer Food Service Program to 
provide lunch to low-income children during the summer, reducing food insecurity and hunger (Nord 
and Romig, 2006). This issue has, however, received little attention outside of the US. Second, the 
qualitative dimensions of food security are rarely explored. The inclusion of nutritious and culturally 
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acceptable food in SFPs has received little attention, especially in developing countries. Both issues are 
considered in this research.  
2.2.4 India’s MDMS 
 
Similarly to SFPs in the UK and US, the MDMS did not begin in a single place. The first school lunch 
programme for disadvantaged children began in Madras in 1925 and school lunch initiatives were 
subsequently established in Kerala in 1941, Mumbai in 1942, Bangalore in 1946 and Uttar Pradesh in 
1953 (GOI, 1995). In the 1950s, school lunches were introduced in several states with the support of 
international agencies including the FAO and UNICEF (ibid). In 1982, the Chief Minister of Tamil 
Nadu launched the Noon Meals Scheme, largely as a political tactic to secure votes from women 
(Harriss, 1991). Indeed, although social protection schemes may have seemingly laudable objectives, 
they are not necessarily a product of benevolence.  
 
By 1994, 20.48 million children in India were receiving a free school lunch, 7.4 million of which were 
in Tamil Nadu (ibid: 17). A national programme was launched in 1995, known formally as the National 
Programme of Nutritional Support to Primary Education (NP-NPSE). The programme started in a small 
number of blocks6 and was introduced nationally in 1997-1998 (GOI, 2016b). However, the scheme 
was not universally implemented. Consequently, in November 2001, the Supreme Court directed all 
State Governments and Union Territories (UTs) to implement the MDMS. Not all states complied. 
Therefore, in April 2004 the Supreme Court ordered implementation by 1 September 2004.7 The 
Guidelines also changed, requiring the meal to be provided in the summer vacation in drought-affected 
areas. Following this order, the MDMS became almost universally implemented across eligible schools 
(Khera, 2006). In 2007, the scheme’s name was changed to the ‘National Programme of Mid Day Meal 
in Schools’ (Ministry of Human Resource Development [MHRD], 2007), widely referred to as the 
Midday Meal Scheme. With its inclusion in the NFSA in 2013, the scheme also became a key part of 
realising food security. The NFSA takes a life-cycle approach, within which the MDMS focuses on 
children of school-going age.  
 
The Supreme Court Orders therefore changed the MDMS to become part of the right to food for all 
eligible children (Jayaraman, 2009). Due to the rapid expansion of the scheme, the MDMS has been 
described as ‘one of the biggest success stories of the right to food litigation’ (Guha-Khasnobis and 
Srinivasan, 2007: 9) and ‘an excellent example of the power and utility of the PUCL case’ (Birchfield 
and Corsi, 2010: 17). Yet, in-depth discussion of the scheme is often absent from literature on the right 
                                                        
6 India is divided into states, which are, in decreasing order of size, divided in districts, tehsils and, in rural areas, 
blocks and villages. In the study state of Rajasthan, tehsil and block are used interchangeably.   
7 These orders are detailed in Appendix B.2. 
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to food and social protection in India. Moreover, far less research has been conducted on the MDMS 
compared to the ICDS programme (see Section 1.1).  
 
Studies have shown the positive impact of the MDMS on school enrolment especially for grade I, girls 
and Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs)8 (Drèze and Goyal, 2003; Garg and Mandal, 
2013; Jain and Shah, 2005; Jayaraman and Simroth, 2015; Lok Adhikar study, 2002). The MDMS has 
been found to increase school attendance (Afridi, 2011; Drèze and Kingdon, 2001; Jain and Shah, 
2005). However, the sample size of these studies is small. The conclusion that the MDMS increases 
enrolment is typically based on four studies (Drèze and Goyal, 2003; Jain and Shah, 2005; Lok Adhikar, 
2002) and thus the analysis of just 214 schools in four states. Moreover, few studies robustly show that 
increased enrolment and attendance are the result of the MDMS; Afridi (2011) and Jayaraman and 
Simroth (2015) are exceptions. The MDMS has also been found to remove classroom hunger and 
consequently improve concentration and educational performance (Afridi et al., 2013; Singh, 2008). 
 
A small number of studies have examined the nutritional outcomes of the MDMS. Afridi (2010) found 
that the MDMS decreased daily deficiencies in calories, protein and iron by 100%, 30% and 10% 
respectively. Garg and Mandal (2013) found that the MDMS increased food intake for ST children. 
Singh (2008) found that the MDMS compensated for the negative effect of drought on height and 
weight. Studies have examined whether the MDMS is a substitute or supplement (Garg and Mandal, 
2013; Mehta et al., 2013; Mittal, 2006; Samson et al., 2007); however, the results are varied and 
collectively inconclusive. 
The MDMS also aims to foster equality, achieved by children eating together, the employment of                                                                                                       
‘lower’ caste cooks, the increased attendance of girls and the provision of food to those in government 
schools who are typically from the more disadvantaged section of society (Drèze, 2004b). The MDMS 
therefore has potential transformative effects. Yet, beyond the increased attendance of girls, these 
outcomes have not been rigorously shown. Moreover, studies have found caste-based discrimination in 
the scheme towards children and cooks (Drèze et al., 2015; Drèze and Goyal, 2003; Jain and Shah, 
2005; Lok Adhikar, 2002; Thorat and Lee, 2005).9  
Despite the inclusion of the MDMS in the NFSA, no studies have considered the scheme from the 
perspective of food security. The link between the two is therefore unknown. For example, food security 
requires temporal stability (Table 2.3). Food security in India is known to vary seasonally (e.g. Agarwal, 
                                                        
8 SCs, STs and OBC are those castes and tribes officially designated in the Constitution of India. These are 
traditionally disadvantaged groups.   
9 Reviewed in Appendix B.9.4. 
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1990; Hoddinott and Yohannes, 2002; Ramachandran, 2014; Saxena, 2013; Singh et al., 2006). The 
absence of SFPs in the summer is also known to be a problem elsewhere (Section 2.2.3). Yet, the 
consequences of the absence of the MDMS in the summer have not been examined; a gap this research 
seeks to address.  
 
Beyond outcomes, studies have repeatedly found problems with the implementation of the MDMS, 
particularly inadequate infrastructure and the provision of food inadequate in both quantity and quality 
(Afridi, 2005; Blue, 2005; Goyal and Drèze, 2003; Jain and Shah, 2005; Planning Commission, 2010; 
Pratichi Trust, 2005; Samson et al., 2008; Shankar and Natasha, 2010; Shukla, 2014). Yet, these studies 
lack depth. For example, Goyal and Drèze (2003) reported that 86% of parents thought the quality of 
food was satisfactory and Drèze et al. (2015) found on average that 80% of people were satisfied or 
partly satisfied with the quality of the MDM. However, these studies did not consider why parents were 
or were not satisfied or the underlying determinants of MDM quality. I consider both in this research.  
 
There are numerous limitations and gaps in the literature on the MDMS. Studies on the MDMS typically 
have small sample sizes. Only eight studies are based on samples of more than 20 schools: PROBE, 
(1999) in Drèze and Kingdon (2001), Centre for Equity Studies Survey in Drèze and Goyal (2003), Jain 
and Shah (2005), Jayaraman and Simroth (2015), Lok Adhikar (2002), Planning Commission (2010), 
Pratichi Trust (2005) and Sikligar (2011). There is also a lack of recent literature on the MDMS. Only 
five studies are based on fieldwork completed in 2010 or later: Afridi et al. (2013), Drèze et al, (2015), 
Paul and Mondal (2012), Mehta et al. (2013) and Shankar and Natasha (2010). Here, I seek to enhance 
this literature by providing a contemporary insight into a larger sample of schools. 
 
2.3 The Right to Food and Rights-based Approaches 
 
2.3.1 Rights-based Approaches to Development  
  
Since the 1990s, the boundaries between human rights and development have eroded, giving rise to 
RBAs to development. RBAs are based on the principles of human rights and the creation of rights and 
duties (Gready, 2008). RBAs transform how development is perceived; from an act of charity to a 
system of duties and claims (Gready, 2008; Uvin, 2004). Those benefiting are no longer passive 
beneficiaries receiving paternalistic hand-outs, but are active participants and claimants (Molyneux and 
Lazar, 2003). Consequently, those benefiting are labelled ‘rights-holders’, not ‘beneficiaries’ or 
‘recipients’. Thus, development becomes political and development issues are seen as the failure of 
duty-bearers to fulfil their duties (Hickey and Mitlin, 2009). 
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In the 2000s, a considerable amount of scholarship focused on the potential strengths and weaknesses 
of RBAs (e.g. Archer, 2009; Gready, 2008; Hickey and Mitlin, 2009; Piron, 2005; Uvin, 2004). The 
strengths and weaknesses of RBAs outlined in Hickey and Mitlin (2009) are summarised in Table 2.4. 
In addition to the potentials listed in Table 2.4, the strength of a RBA is evident when compared to the 
main alternative, the basic-needs approach. In the basic-needs approach, development is conceptualised 
as an act of charity and the focus is on the realisation of basic needs only, without any indication of 
who has a responsibility to act (Jonsson, 2003). RBAs also differ from the poverty agenda, by focussing 
on rights as universal instead of poverty and the worst off (Archer, 2009; Hickey and Mitlin, 2009).  
 
Table 2.4: The potentials and pitfalls of RBAs from Hickey and Mitlin (2009: 211-212) 
 Potential Pitfall 
Conceptual 
- Politically informed insights 
into problems and solutions 
- The legal perspective adds 
rigour and discipline 
- Development becomes for all 
rather than for just the poorest 
- Analysis by analogy, not history 
or process 
- Idealistic and “western” solutions 
- Simplifies complex problems 
- Difficult to consider trade-offs 
- The focus on individuals distracts 
from the relational basis of 
poverty and social change 
Organisation 
and Strategic 
- Adds clarity and rigour to 
planning 
- New partnerships 
- Holistic approaches  
- Engages with political 
challenges 
- New resources and approaches 
to local organisation 
- Difficult to prioritise 
- Partnerships may be uneasy 
- Does not resolve divides between 
social and economic interests 
- Focus on politics may 
compromise development agency 
Political 
- Clear obligations on duty-
bearers 
- Focus on the state 
- Strengthens local struggles 
- Recipients become active 
claimants 
- Can overburden the state 
- May undermine collective 
struggles 
- May be too confrontational for 
vulnerable groups 
- Exaggerates the agency of the 
poor and marginalised 
- May adversely incorporate people 
into political formations 
Ideological  
- Repositions development as a 
progressive struggle against 
discrimination and exclusion 
- Could reposition development 
within struggles for social 
justice 
- Can reinforce a neoliberal agenda 
due to the focus on individuals, 
property rights and markets. 
- Western ideas may not be 
appropriate 
- Rights as ends are open to co-
optation  
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Molyneux and Lazar (2003), Gready and Ensor (2005) and Hickey and Mitlin (2009) present a series 
of case studies of RBAs that typically consider the experiences of NGOs. These range from NGOs 
declaring that they have adopted a RBA to actors using the language of rights to make claims (Hickey 
and Mitlin, 2009). This plurality highlights that a single RBA does not exist (ibid) and thus that there 
is a need to explore what is meant when an approach is described as ‘rights-based’. Moreover, whilst 
the renewed emphasis on the state is a key potential of a RBA, the adoption of a RBA by states 
themselves and the potential and pitfalls of this approach are rarely considered. The extent to which 
RBAs are and can be incorporated into national, government-led development projects requires further 
exploration. Consequently, in Chapter 9 I reflect on the adoption of a RBA by the Indian government 
and in Chapter 10 I consider the potentials and pitfalls of RBAs.     
 
The most developed insight into RBAs in practice is the UN’s Human Rights Based Approach to 
Programming (HRBAP) outlined by Jonsson (2003; 2005). Jonsson asserted that rights-based 
development is based on both desirable outcomes in the form of human rights standards and adequate 
processes that adhere to human rights principles (participation, accountability, non-discrimination, 
transparency, human dignity, empowerment and the rule of law). Jonsson outlined a five-step method 
for HRBAP, visualised in Figure 2.1, which focuses on the community. Capacity-gaps within 
communities are identified and programmes are designed to address these gaps. The approach rests on 
the assumption that ‘rights are violated because claim-holders lack the capacity to claim the right, and/or 
duty-bearers lack the capacity to meet their duties’ (Jonsson, 2003: 54). What is meant by ‘capacity’ is 
elaborated on in Section 2.5.6. 
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Figure 2.1: A depiction of Jonsson’s (2003) Human Rights Approach to Programming 
 
As will be shown in this thesis, the emphasis placed by Jonsson on the relationships between claim-
holders and duty-bearers and on the capacity of duty-bearers to realise their duties is useful. Jonsson 
(2003) asserts that in a RBA, rights-holders must be ‘capable of claiming their right’ (20). Although 
Jonsson uses the language of capabilities, these are not discussed in reference to the capability approach. 
Whilst I agree with Jonsson that RBAs require claim-holders to have the capability to realise their rights, 
what is meant by capability and how capability affects the realisation requires further attention. Thus, 
to supplement Jonsson’s ideas, in Section 2.4.3 I review the capability approach. Jonsson’s 
conceptualisation of capacity is explored further in Section 2.5.7.    
 
1. Causality Analysis 
Awareness of a problem, analysis of the causes of the 
problem and measurement of the extent of the problem. 
Creation of a conceptual framework. 
2. Pattern Analysis 
Analysis of the claim-duty relationships, recognising one 
actor can be both a duty-bearer and a claimant. 
3. Analysis of Capacity Gaps 
i. Responsibility, motivation, leadership, commitment- 
acknowledge that they should do something 
ii. Authority- may do something 
iii. Resources: Human, economic, organisational- Can 
do something because of sufficient resources 
iv. Make informed decisions and learn from results 
v. Communication Capacity 
4. Identification of Candidate Actions 
The identification of actions to remove or reduce the 
capacity gaps of claim-holders and duty-bearers. 
5. Programme Design 
Priority actions integrated into policy and programmes. 
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2.3.2 Rights-based Approaches to Social Protection 
 
Rights have increasingly become the rationale for social protection (Munro, 2008) and the importance 
of social protection in realising food security and a right to food has been recognised (e.g. Ajemian, 
2014; Cruz, 2012; HLPE, 2012). From a rights-based perspective, social protection is not an investment 
in human capital, but is the manifestation of the obligation of the state to fulfil rights. The HLPE stated 
that: ‘implementing social protection policies and programmes using a rights based approach is not only 
morally and legally appropriate but is likely to lead to improved food security outcomes’ (2012: 11).  
Despite the recognised importance of rights in social protection, there has been little discussion of social 
protection schemes from the perspective of rights. As Sepúlveda (2014: 1-2) argued:  
 
One clear omission in the global discussion about social protection thus far has been 
the lack of a deeper analysis of the human rights foundations, implications and 
outcomes of social protection…The emerging debate on the need for a rights-based 
approach has given rise to questions of precisely how a rights-based approach to 
social protection can best be achieved – that is to say, how the norms and principles 
of human rights can best be implemented.  
Although the FAO have analysed the right to food in policy and legislation (e.g. Chapagai, 2014; 
Immink, 2014b) there has been little exploration in the academic literature of specific social protection 
programmes from the perspective of rights. Here, I examine the MDMS from a rights-based perspective.  
 
2.3.3 The Right to Food 
 
Modern human rights have their origin in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). 
The Declaration was later combined with the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (IESCR). These two 
covenants exemplify the categorisation of rights as either civil and political or economic, social and 
cultural (ESC). Civil and political rights include the right to life and the right to freedom of speech. 
These are considered first generation rights (Vasak, 1977) and are ‘negative rights’, requiring the state 
to refrain from doing things. ESC rights or second generation rights include the right to health, education 
and food and are ‘positive rights’, requiring the state to act. For this reason, ESC rights have traditionally 
been considered non-justiciable, i.e. they cannot be used in a court or be the basis of legal action 
(Courtis, 2007; Uvin, 2004) and have received less attention than civil and political rights. Over time, 
however, the distinction between the two types of rights has eroded. Consequently, ESC rights including 
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the right to food have received greater attention in recent years (Robinson, 2004). The right to food was 
recognised in the UDHR, ICESCR, the Vienna Convention and the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child (CRC). For example, the latter recognised ‘the right of the child to the enjoyment of the highest 
attainable standard of health’ and the right ‘to combat disease and malnutrition, including … the 
provision of adequate nutritious foods and clean drinking-water’ (CRC, 1989: Article 24).  
 
The right to food is therefore an older concept than food security; however, unlike food security the 
right to food remained vague for decades (Eide and Kracht, 2005) until General Comment 12 on the 
ICESCR in 1999. In the Comment, the right to food is defined as: 
 
The availability of food in a quantity and quality sufficient to satisfy the dietary needs 
of individuals, free from adverse substances, and acceptable within a given culture; The 
accessibility of such food in ways that are sustainable and that do not interfere with the 
enjoyment of other human rights. (CESCR, 1999: point 8).  
 
The key terms used in this definition were explained in Comment 12, outlined in Table 2.5. 
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Table 2.5: Dimensions of the right to food defined in Comment 12 (CESCR, 1999) 
Dimension  Meaning as defined in Comment 12 
Dietary  
needs 
The diet as a whole contains a mix of nutrients for physical and mental growth, 
development and maintenance, and physical activity that are in compliance with 
human physiological needs at all stages throughout the life cycle and according 
to gender and occupation. (Paragraph 9). 
Free from 
adverse 
substances 
Requirements for food safety and for a range of protective measures by both 
public and private means to prevent contamination of foodstuffs through 
adulteration and/or through bad environmental hygiene or inappropriate handling 
at different stages throughout the food chain; care must also be taken to identify 
and avoid or destroy naturally occurring toxins. (Paragraph 10)  
Cultural 
Acceptability  
Perceived non-nutrient-based values attached to food and food consumption and 
informed consumer concerns regarding the nature of accessible food supplies. 
(Paragraph 11) 
Availability The possibilities either for feeding oneself directly from productive land or other 
natural resources, or for well-functioning distribution, processing and market 
systems that can move food from the site of production to where it is needed in 
accordance with demand. (Paragraph 12)  
Accessibility  Economic accessibility implies that personal or household financial costs 
associated with the acquisition of food for an adequate diet should be at a level 
such that the attainment and satisfaction of other basic needs are not threatened 
or compromised. Economic accessibility applies to any acquisition pattern or 
entitlement through which people procure their food and is a measure of the 
extent to which it is satisfactory for the enjoyment of the right to adequate food. 
Socially vulnerable groups such as landless persons and other particularly 
impoverished segments of the population may need attention through special 
programmes. Physical accessibility implies that adequate food must be 
accessible to everyone, including physically vulnerable individuals, such as 
infants and young children, elderly people, the physically disabled, the terminally 
ill and persons with persistent medical problems, including the mentally ill. 
Victims of natural disasters, people living in disaster-prone areas and other 
specially disadvantaged groups may need special attention and sometimes 
priority consideration with respect to accessibility of food. A particular 
vulnerability is that of many indigenous population groups whose access to their 
ancestral lands may be threatened. (Paragraph 13) 
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Comment 12 asserts that the right to food is more than ‘a minimum package of calories, proteins and 
other specific nutrients’ (paragraph 6) and that it is the responsibility of the state to realise the right 
progressively. Drawing on Shue (1980) and Eide (1987), Comment 12 (CESCR, 1999: paragraph 15) 
asserts that states must respect, protect and fulfil the right to food, and that:  
 
The obligation to fulfil (facilitate) means the State must pro-actively engage in 
activities intended to strengthen people’s access to and utilization of resources and 
means to ensure their livelihood, including food security. Finally, whenever an 
individual or group is unable, for reasons beyond their control, to enjoy the right to 
adequate food by the means at their disposal, States have the obligation to fulfil 
(provide) that right directly.   
 
It is not only states that are responsible for realising a right to food:  
 
All members of society – individuals, families, local communities, non-governmental 
organizations, civil society organizations, as well as the private business sector – have 
responsibilities in the realization of the right to adequate food. (ibid: paragraph 20).   
 
Although similar, the right to food and food security are distinct. As the FAO (Immink, 2014a: 5) 
explains: 
 
The right to food includes additional requirements, namely that (a) the food security 
of those food-insecure and those vulnerable to food insecurity should be afforded the 
highest priority, and (b) the processes by which food security is achieved should 
conform to right to food principles. The first requirement is based on equity 
considerations. This means that food-insecure households and those vulnerable to food 
insecurity, as well as persons suffering from malnutrition, are clearly identified, and 
the reasons for their food insecurity are clearly understood. The second requirement 
signifies that the means of achieving food security and good nutrition are as important 
as the outcomes. Thus, right to food principles…should be applied in all actions 
undertaken towards achieving food security and good nutrition.   
 
Food security has therefore become ‘the corollary of the right to food: The State must take the necessary 
measures to ensure food security for everyone under its jurisdiction’ (Eide, 2005: 85). Eide concludes 
that ‘Food security is not out, but the right to food is fully in’ (ibid: 91). Indeed, over the last 15 years, 
the right to food has been increasingly used in legal practice (Claeys, 2015). By 2011, the right to food 
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was recognised explicitly in the constitutions of 23 countries (Knuth and Vidar, 2011). The justiciability 
of the right to food has also been demonstrated (de Schutter, 2010), beginning in India in 2001. As is 
all too clear from the high levels of malnutrition in India (see Section 1.1 and Appendix A), formal 
commitments to rights do not necessarily lead to their realisation (Kabeer, 2003). Considering the 
realisation of rights in practice is therefore imperative (Haug and Rauan, 2002).  
The FAO has led the way in considering the right to food in practice. In 2004, the FAO adopted 
voluntary guidelines on the right to food to guide practical implementation (Vidar et al., 2014). In 2014, 
the FAO outlined three ‘action areas’ to facilitate the realisation of the right to food: one should 
understand the causes of food insecurity and malnutrition, including knowing who the hungry, 
malnourished and food insecure are, where they are and why they face these problems; policy should 
adhere to human rights principles and marginalised people should be progressively empowered 
(Immink, 2014a). Yet, the FAO (Immink, 2014b) notes that the right to food only weakly underpins 
food security policies, particularly in Africa and Asia, and that such policies say little about either 
human rights principles or addressing the causes of food insecurity.  
 
2.3.4 The Right to Food in India 
 
The right to food in India is recognised by the ratification of international declarations (Section 2.3.3) 
and is enshrined in the country’s constitution (Drèze, 2004a). In the Constitution of India, there are nine 
civil and political rights defined as Fundamental Rights which are legally enforceable. ESC rights are 
listed in the Directive Principles and considered non-justiciable. The right to food is implicit in Article 
21 which asserts the ‘fundamental right to life’ and is more explicit in Article 47 of the Directive 
Principles which asserts that ‘the State shall regard the raising of the level of nutrition and the standard 
of living of its people and the improvement of public health as among its primary duties’ (ibid). Based 
on the inclusion of welfare rights in the Directive Principles, Jayal (1999) argued that state welfare in 
India was ‘grounded in ideas of charity, benevolence, and paternalism, and has therefore proved to be 
singularly unreceptive to challenges couched in the more egalitarian terms of claims to rights’ (2).  
 
Yet, since the beginning of the 21st Century, the distinction between the Fundamental Rights and 
Directive Principles has been somewhat eroded (Corbridge et al., 2013). Decisions made by the 
Supreme Court have reconceptualised some of the Directive Principles as non-negotiable and justiciable 
(Olowu, 2009), beginning with the Supreme Court judgement on the right to food. The writ petition to 
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the Supreme Court was filed in April 2001 utilising the Public Interest Litigation (PIL)10 mechanism 
(Birchfield and Corsi, 2009). The petition (Appendix B.2.1) argued that a right to food was part of the 
right to life under Article 21. On 28 November 2001, the Supreme Court ordered the full compliance 
of eight existing schemes; the provision of food under the PDS, Antodaya Anna Yojana, Annapurna 
Anna Yojana, the MDMS and ICDS and the provision of financial assistance under The Indira Gandhi 
National Old Age Pension Scheme, the National Family Benefit Scheme and the National Maternity 
Benefit Scheme.11 Consequently, these schemes became legal entitlements under the right to food. The 
Supreme Court has issued multiple interim orders to direct the implementation of these schemes12 and, 
in May 2002, appointed two commissioners on the right to food to report on implementation. The 
original petitioners formed the ‘right to food campaign’ which continues to work towards the goal of 
realising the right to food.  
 
The rulings of the Supreme Court ‘explicitly established a constitutional human right to food and 
determined a basic nutritional floor for India’s impoverished millions’ (Birchfield and Corsi, 2010: 15). 
Consequently, the 2001 petition and subsequent Orders are widely cited as the exemplary case of the 
justiciability of the right to food (e.g. Birchfield and Corsi, 2010; Devereux, et al., 2008; FAO, 2009); 
Golay, 2009; Guha-Khasnobis and Srinivasan, 2007; Ziegler et al., 2011). A ‘rights revolution’ 
followed (S.K.Das, 2013). The Right to Information Act and the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural 
Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) were passed in 2005, The Scheduled Tribes and Other 
Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act was passed in 2006 and The Right of 
Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act (RTE) was passed in 2009.13 The NFSA was passed 
in 2013, which seeks to realise food security using the PDS, ICDS and MDMS. The NFSA also entitles 
pregnant and new mothers to a maternity benefit of no less than INR 6,000. As Chopra (2014) noted, 
2004 ‘marks a historic break in the Indian state’s approach to poverty alleviation’ (85) after which rights 
became increasingly prominent. These Acts not only share the language of rights, but also were 
similarly established with the extensive involvement of non-state actors (ibid).  
 
Academic discussion of the right to food in India has largely focused on the right to food case and 
campaign (Birchfield and Corsi, 2010; Guha-Khasnobis and Srinivasan, 2007; Hassan, 2013; Hertel, 
2011). There has been little exploration of realising the right to food in practice. Despite the 2001 right 
to food case, the right to food in India is far from realised. In consequence, there is a pressing need to 
consider India’s food security schemes from the perspective of rights; to understand the extent to which 
                                                        
10 In India, a PIL can be introduced in a court by the court itself or by another party. This means that litigation 
does not have to be introduced by those who have had their rights violated, and can be introduced on their behalf. 
The PUCL launched the right to food case on behalf of the poor of Rajasthan. 
11 The schemes are detailed further in Appendix B.1.  
12 These orders are outlined in Appendix B.2.  
13 These Acts are explained in further detail in Appendix B.3.  
  
24 
they incorporate rights and can lead to the realisation of the right to food. This thesis aims to do just 
this.  
 
2.3.5 SFPs and the Right to Food  
 
Kent (2010: 154) noted that ‘in many school feeding programs, children don’t get what they should be 
getting’. Kent therefore argued for rights-based SFPs. The FAO (2008) have also stressed the need for 
SFPs to be rights-based and consequently developed 10 modules, each with several questions to ask, to 
assess the extent to which a SFPs reflect a RBA. I summarise these modules in Table 2.6 and outline 
them in full in Appendix B.8.  
 
Table 2.6: Summary of FAO Modules on rights-based SFPs (FAO, 2008: 150-157). 
    Module Summary of the key questions 
1. Food and 
Nutrition Security 
Situation 
- What are the main food and nutrition problems among the population 
and among school-age children? Where are these problems the most 
severe? What are the causes?   
2. Policy - What is the policy basis? What legislative mandate exists? 
- What are the budgetary allocations?  
3. Institutional 
Framework of the 
Programme 
- What institutions are involved and what are their roles? 
- Are mechanisms in place for the representatives of rights-holders 
and others to hold duty-bearers accountable? 
4. Normative Basis 
of the Programme 
- What are the norms for: Beneficiaries, nutritional guidelines, the 
menu, conformity with local eating habits, food delivery, school-
based infrastructure, food quality and safety, food acquisition, the 
allocation of funds per child and the handling of funds?  
5. Social Control 
Mechanisms  
- Is there a social control mechanism to monitor the quality of 
implementation?  
- Are there instruments for remedial actions or compensation?  
6. Recourse  - Are there recourse instruments available to students’ parents?  
7. Programme 
Design 
 
- What problems are to be addressed and what are the intended 
impacts?  
- Does the programme anticipate community participation? 
8. Programme Duty 
Bearers  
 
- Do duty-bearers understand and fulfil their responsibilities? 
- Have duty-bearers been asked to account for their performance? 
- Do duty-bearers and the representatives of rights-holders 
understand the norms?  
9. Programme 
implementation  
 
- To what extent does implementation adhere to the norms? What and 
where are the divergences and what explains them?  
- How well is the targeting scheme applied?  
- Does monitoring take place?  
10. Programme 
Impacts 
- What are the impacts and how do they compare with the objectives? 
Do impacts differ among various geographical areas and by gender, 
age group, or socio-economic levels?  
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There are two notable examples of SFPs being recognised as legal rights. The first is the MDMS. The 
second is the Brazilian school feeding programme, part of the Fome Zero (Zero Hunger) programme, 
launched in 2003 in recognition of the right of citizens to quality food (Sidaner et al., 2013; da Silva et 
al., 2010). Still, SFPs are rarely considered in relation to rights. In the overviews of SFPs by Alderman 
and Bundy (2012), Bundy et al. (2009) and Drake et al. (2016), a right to food is only mentioned in 
reference to the Indian right to food campaign. There is a pressing need to consider whether existing 
SFPs are rights-based and what rights-based SFPs might look like. In this thesis, I therefore consider 
the extent to which the MDMS reflects a rights-based approach. 
2.3.6 Summary  
 
There is increasing recognition of both the importance of realising a right to food and of the need for 
social protection schemes to be rights-based. India is considered the leading example of both. The 
recognition of a right, however, means little if that right is not realised. Consideration of the realisation 
of rights is lacking in the literature reviewed above. As has been established, any rights-system has 
three components: rights-holders, duty-bearers and their rights. However, it is not enough to merely 
acknowledge that these components exist; one must consider how each operates and affects the 
realisation of rights. Thus, in the next three sections I draw on literature from a range of disciplines to 
examine how each affects the realisation of rights.   
 
2.4 Rights-holders and Capabilities 
 
2.4.1 Targeting and Conditionality 
 
For any social protection scheme with a finite budget, a decision must be made as to who to target. 
Targeting is practically problematic due to the difficulty in determining the targets. Two errors may 
arise; inclusion errors when the non-needy are included and exclusion errors, when the needy are 
excluded (Cornia and Stewart, 1993). Indeed, this is a known problem in India’s PDS (e.g. Hirway, 
2003; Khera, 2008; Mane, 2006; Svedberg, 2012).  
 
In high and middle-income countries, SFPs typically target individuals by need (ibid). For example, 
America’s school lunch programme provides free, reduced-price and full-price (but still subsidised) 
meals, determined by poverty levels (Poppendieck, 2010). In low-income countries, non-universal 
schemes target by districts or schools by need.14 In contrast, the MDMS is targeted by age-group (grades 
I-VIII/6-14 years) and school type. There are three main types of school in India: government schools 
provide free education and are funded and managed by the government; private-aided schools are 
                                                        
14 See Appendix B.6.  
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mostly funded by the government and do not charge a fee, but are privately managed; and private-
unaided schools, which may or may not be recognised by the government, charge a fee and are privately 
managed and funded (Kingdon, 2007). Only children enrolled at the first two types of school are eligible 
to receive a MDM. Within this age group and these schools, the scheme is universal.   
 
Previous studies of the MDMS have provided some insight into the background of eligible children, 
including household occupation, caste, landholding size and income (Afridi, 2011; Garg and Mandal, 
2013; Jain and Shah, 2005; Si and Sharma, 2008). These studies demonstrate the benefits of the MDMS 
for poor and disadvantaged groups; however, they fail to present a comprehensive or contemporary 
analysis of who is entitled to receive the meal and, beyond calories, what their food-based needs are. 
Moreover, they fail to adequately consider exclusion from the scheme. In Chapter 5, I do just this.  
 
Beyond targeting, inclusion may also be determined by conditions; to receive some form of benefit, one 
must fulfil certain conditions. In recent years, conditional cash transfers, when the receipt of cash is 
conditional on some form of human capital investment such as education or health care (Rawlings and 
Rubio, 2005) have been increasingly used in developing countries, especially in Latin America. The 
attachment of conditions to social protection categorises people further still, into the deserving and 
underserving poor. Conditionality in SFPs takes a slightly different form to cash transfers, as the receipt 
of a meal is conditional on school attendance. Unenrolled or dropout children are not covered by SFPs, 
yet typically come from food insecure households and thus have a need for increased access to food 
(Bundy et al., 2009; HLPE, 2012). Bundy et al. (2009) suggested that to reach these groups either 
school-feeding should be expanded or alternative social protection schemes should be used. Bonnerjee 
and Koeher (2010) and Devereux (2015) have noted that the MDMS excludes out-of-school children; 
however, the nature, extent and consequences of such exclusion has not been empirically examined. 
The early draft of the NFSA allowed for any child under the age of 14 to be fed regardless of school 
attendance; however, this provision was removed before the Bill became an Act (Aggarwal and Mander, 
2013). In Chapter 5, I therefore explore the impacts of conditionality.    
 
Underlying the choice of targeting and conditionality, is tension between economic and social justice 
perspectives and the larger ethical question as to whether targeting should occur (Devereux, 2016). As 
Devereux (2016) outlines, there are two broad arguments for targeting. The first is pragmatic; that when 
there is a finite budget, targeting must occur. The second argument is ideological; targeting is necessary 
to transfer resources to those who need it. Opponents of targeting however emphasise the costs of 
targeting and the problems associated with dividing a population into the eligible and ineligible, 
including the arbitrariness of such divisions and the resulting stigma (ibid). Stigma has been shown to 
affect the use of SFPs, for example in the US (Poppendieck, 2010) and South Africa (van der Beerg et 
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al., 2010) and has been found to affect the use of social protection schemes more generally (see 
Devereux et al., 2015).  
 
Others have questioned the act of dividing the population for biopolitical purposes. The division of the 
Indian population into those above and below a poverty line by the state is a prime example. As is 
discussed further in Section 2.5.2, Gupta (2012) takes issue with the categorisation of the Indian 
population into those above and below the poverty line. Fernandez (2010) describes this categorisation 
as a political technology, through which the ‘governmental apparatus recasts a political problem as a 
scientific or technical problem’ (417). Applying this to the MDMS, by dividing children into those 
eligible and ineligible, scholars and officials interested in the MDMS concentrate only on the eligible. 
In doing so, the wider patterns of social exclusion which may lead to children not enrolling in or 
attending school are ignored. Instead, the focus shifts to the technical question of supplying meals. 
Consequently, in Chapters 4 and 5, I examine categorisation in the MDMS. 
There is an evident tension between targeting and conditionality and rights. On the one hand, 
governments recognise that people have human rights including to social protection and the right to 
food. On the other, governments deprive people of this right if they do not fall into eligible groups or if 
they fail to meet certain conditions (Freeland, 2007). If human rights are universal and the state is a 
duty-bearer, then logically there are no undeserving poor. Thus, opponents of targeting and proponents 
of the right to food may argue for universal schemes. In the drafting of India’s NFSA, some (e.g. 
Himanshu, 2011; Jha and Acharya, 2013; Swaminathan, 2008) called for a universal PDS system, 
arguing that targeting is ineffective and that the exclusion of groups such as non-citizens is contrary to 
the right to food (Mander, 2015). Opponents argued that a universal scheme would be financially 
unfeasible and that there is no justification for feeding non-citizens or the well-fed (ibid). In the context 
of the MDMS, the idea of a universal system is complicated by the scheme being delivered through 
schools; universalism undermines the potential impact of the scheme on enrolment. In Chapter 5 and 
Chapter 9, I explore this tension between targeting, conditionality and rights in the MDMS.  
 
2.4.2 The Politics of Needs 
 
For targeting and conditionality to occur, a decision must be made as to who is entitled. A decision as 
to what the entitled are entitled to must also be made. Fraser’s (1987; 1989) work on the politics of 
needs interpretation is useful for considering these decisions. Fraser (1987) characterised the US-
welfare system as a ‘juridical-administrative-therapeutic state apparatus’ (113). The juridical element 
of this system gives or denies rights, the administrative element means claimants must prove they meet 
administratively defined needs and the therapeutic dimension focusses on closing the ‘gaps between 
their culturally shaped lived experience and their administratively defined situation by bringing the 
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former into line with the latter’ (115). In consequence, ‘political issues concerning the interpretation of 
people’s needs’ are turned ‘into legal, administrative and/or therapeutic matters’. The system therefore 
‘executes political policy in a way which appears nonpolitical and tends to be depoliticizing’ (113).  
 
Fraser (1989) argues that identifying general or ‘thin’ needs is simple. For example, to live people need 
shelter and food and the government has a responsibility to provide for this need. However, unpicking 
what is required to meet these needs is far more complex. For example, as Fraser writes in the context 
of homelessness ‘does it go without saying that policy designed to deal with homelessness must not 
challenge the basic ownership and investment structure of urban real estate?’ (1989: 294). Fraser 
consequently argues thin theories of needs do not shed light on contemporary needs politics and 
consequently deflect attention away from political questions. Firstly, ‘they take the interpretation of 
people’s needs as simple and unproblematic’ (294). Secondly, they assume who interprets needs is 
unproblematic. Third, they assume that the ‘socially authorized forms of public discourse available for 
interpreting people's needs are adequate and fair’ (294). Finally, these theories do not focalise the ‘social 
and institutional logic of processes of need interpretation (294). 
 
Although Fraser focussed on the US, the discussion of needs is useful for thinking about rights and the 
right to food. The definition of a right to food goes beyond a ‘thin’ need for food, to emphasise the need 
for quantitatively and qualitatively adequate food, that meets dietary needs, is culturally acceptable and 
safe (Section 2.3.3). However, each of these requires further definition. For example, one must ask ‘in 
order to have food that meets dietary needs, what is required?’. Defining what constitutes the fulfilment 
of a right to food can be difficult. Drèze noted that ‘freedom from hunger', can be interpreted as having 
two square meals a day, meeting calorie norms or not experiencing malnutrition. Even if one interprets 
dietary needs as standardised recommended allowances such as those put forward by the Indian 
National Institute of Nutrition (NIN) (2011), dietary needs still vary depending on age, gender and 
activity level as well as health. Beyond this, defining the qualitative dimensions of the right to food, 
such as acceptability and preference is not only difficult but raises important questions as to who defines 
these needs and standards. Thus, behind the seemingly simplistic recognition of the need to realise the 
right to food, are political decisions about needs; who has what needs and how they can be met. In this 
study, I therefore consider the politics of needs in the MDMS.  
 
2.4.3 The Capability Approach 
 
Sen (2009) puts forward a ‘realization-focussed understanding of justice’ (10), which moves beyond a 
sole focus on the establishment of institutions and rules to consider realisations and accomplishments. 
Sen’s approach is useful in considering social protection, as it encourages one to move beyond a focus 
on theoretical eligibility and the intended inclusion to consider actual inclusion. Moreover, it 
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encourages a focus on the realisation of rights. The capability approach provides a means of analysing 
social protection through a realisation-focussed approach.  
 
The capability approach, advanced by Amartya Sen in the 1980s, moves beyond viewing development 
as the achievement of a minimum level of income, calories or standard of living, to view the goal of 
development as the capability to ‘accomplish what we value’ (Sen, 1992: 31). As Sen writes ‘living 
may be seen as consisting of a set of interrelated 'functionings', consisting of beings and doings’ (39). 
These ‘valuable’ functionings’ (Alkire, 2005) are the things that a person values doing or being and 
might range from being adequately nourished to being happy. ‘Achieved functionings’ are the 
functionings that a person has ‘successfully pursued and realized’ (ibid: 120). If only achieved 
functionings were considered, choice would be ignored. Thus, Sen introduces capabilities, ‘a person or 
group’s freedom to promote or achieve valuable functionings’ (ibid: 121). Capabilities are the ‘various 
combinations of functionings (beings and doings) that the person can achieve’ (ibid: 40). The focus of 
the capability approach is thus ‘on the freedom that a person actually has to do this or be that – things 
that he or she may value doing or being’ (Sen, 2009: 231-231). Central to this is agency (Walker, 2005). 
In this approach, development is perceived as the removal of the obstacles to ‘the substantive freedom 
to achieve alternative functioning combinations (or, less formally put, the freedom to achieve various 
lifestyles)’ (Sen, 1999: 75).  
The capability approach distinguishes between means (goods and services) and functionings and 
capabilities (Robeyns, 2005). Goods lead to functionings due to conversion factors of which there are 
three broad types: personal, social and environmental (ibid). The relationship between means, 
capabilities and functionings is shown in Figure 2.2.  
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Figure 2.2: The conversion of goods and services (adapted from Robeyns, 2005) 
Given its breadth, some have questioned the usefulness of the capability approach (e.g. Rawls, 1999; 
Sugden, 1993). Others, notably Nussbaum (2003; 2011) have criticised Sen for not specifying a list of 
core capabilities. However, it must be noted that Sen is not reluctant to specify important capabilities, 
of which the capability to be well-nourished is one (Sen 1992; 2005). Of particular relevance here, 
Nussbaum and Sen also differ in the emphasis they place on the government (Robeyns, 2005). 
Nussbaum (2003; 2011) focusses on core capabilities as demands to be placed on the government. This 
emphasis on the government is evident in Nussbaum’s more recent use of Wolff and de Shalit’s (2007) 
work. Wolff and de Shalit’s (2007) analysis of disadvantage introduces new terms to the capability 
approach (Nussbaum, 2011). First, through their concept of ‘secure functionings’, termed ‘capability 
security’ by Nussbaum (2011), they introduce a temporal consideration into the provision of 
capabilities, arguing that public policy should provide secure capabilities that can be relied on in the 
future (ibid). Second, they introduce the concepts of ‘fertile functionings’ and ‘corrosive 
disadvantages’. The former are ‘those functionings the securing of which is likely to secure further 
functionings’ and the latter are a ‘disadvantage the presence of which yields further disadvantages’ (10). 
Wolf and de Shalit argue that a good way of governments taking action that moves towards equality is 
by focussing on the removal of corrosive disadvantages and the advancements of fertile functionings. 
Nussbaum (2011) argued that legislative action should promote fertile functionings and dismantle 
corrosive disadvantages. Yet, as Fennell (2013) argued, it is unclear how governments and public 
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policies would overcome problems such as discrimination and change identities to enable the 
achievement of the capabilities that Nussbaum outlines. Thus, the nature of capabilities, functionings 
and disadvantages are wider in scope than the government, which reflects Sen’s broader approach to 
capabilities. Together, this literature raises two important questions. Firstly, how is the capacity of the 
state to realise rights affected by others? Secondly, is the language of ‘fertile functionings’ and 
‘corrosive disadvantages’ useful and valuable to an approach already characterised by awkward 
terminology? Both issues are considered in Chapters 9 and 10.  
Here, it is necessary to consider the applicability of the capability approach to three further issues; to 
hunger and malnutrition, to human rights and to children.  
Food and Nutrition 
The capability approach focuses on people’s lives rather than just the issue of food (Pritchard et al., 
2014). As Crocker (2008) summarised, Drèze and Sen (1989) put forward four reasons for moving 
beyond entitlements to the capability approach. First, by focussing on the functioning of being well-
nourished one can account for individual variability. Second, the capability approach allows 
consideration of social variability, by recognising that social factors such as taste and beliefs can 
influence the conversion of food. Third, the approach highlights the multi-dimensional approach to 
achieving the end of being well-nourished, that requires more than the provision of food. Finally, the 
capability approach helps us perceive nutritional well-being as connected to other aspects of well-being, 
such as being able to learn. Overall, being well-nourished or, as Burchi and de Muro (2016) term it ‘the 
capacity to be food secure’, depends on more than the provision of a good in this case food, but also on 
how this food is converted to nutritional functioning. As goods and services may include transfers in 
kind (Robeyns, 2003), following the capability approach, one can ask how the MDM is transferred to 
capabilities and the functionings of being well-nourished and food secure. Using this framework, one 
might also consider how a right can be claimed and realised. These ideas are explored further in Chapter 
9.  
 
Seeing food security through the capability approach also has implications for policy. In the capability 
approach, policies are examined according to their impact on people’s capabilities, for example, are 
people healthy and do they have the capabilities to be so, such as clean drinking water and access to 
health care (Robeyns, 2005). Following this, Drèze and Sen (1989) assert that public policy should not 
focus solely on the provision of a certain amount of food. Instead, the focus of policy should be ‘to 
make it possible for all to have the capability to avoid undernourishment and escape deprivations 
associated with hunger’ (13). Crocker (2008) therefore argues that: ‘Instead of identifying hungry 
people simply by a lack of food intake and mechanically monitoring individuals or dispensing food to 
them according to nutritional requirements, the focus should be on nutritional functioning’ (271). This 
  
32 
relates back to the earlier discussion of the politics of needs and raises the question of how narrowly 
needs should be defined; an issue explored in Chapter 4.   
 
Human Rights and Capabilities 
Human rights can be seen as ‘rights to certain specific freedoms’ (Sen, 2005: 152). Duty-bearers are 
obligated to respect, protect and fulfil (or expand) these freedoms (Osmani, 2005; Sen, 2005). However, 
Sen (2009) distinguishes between the opportunity and process aspects of freedom. The opportunity 
aspect is the ‘real opportunities we have of achieving things... no matter what the process is’ (Sen, 2002: 
506). The process aspect is the free decision made by a person, which includes the autonomy of 
decisions that are made and the ‘immunity from interference by others’ (ibid: 508). Sen argues the 
capability approach is useful for the opportunity aspect not the process aspect of freedom ‘since 
capabilities are characteristics of individual advantages, and they fall short of telling us enough about 
the fairness or equity of the processes involved, or about the freedom of citizens to invoke and utilise 
procedures that are equitable’ (2005: 156).  
 
This thinking can be extended to Jonsson’s work on RBAs. Jonsson differentiates between the outcome 
and the process of human rights (Section 2.3.1). The capabilities approach can inform understanding of 
whether rights are realised and outcomes are achieved, but it provides no insight into rights-based 
processes. Moreover, although the approach acknowledges the importance of ‘social opportunity’ in 
‘human agency and freedom’ and thus does not see ‘individuals and their opportunities in isolated 
terms’ (Drèze and Sen, 2002: 6), additional approaches are needed to uncover and examine the wider 
structures which affect agency and capabilities. Consequently, here I consider the determinants of 
capabilities. 
 
Pritchard et al. (2014) go beyond conceptual links between human rights and capabilities to discuss 
how capabilities can be used to examine RBAs. The focus on real, substantive freedoms in the capability 
approach means that rights are not considered as abstract notions but instead the focus is on the ‘enacted 
reality of how rights are delivered to individuals’ (Pritchard et al., 2014: 8). The effect of this is to 
‘assess rights-based initiatives by looking outwards from the lived realities of people, so that analytical 
efforts are anchored to their substantiation, not their promise’ (ibid: 8). In this research, I do this by 
examining the realisation of rights in the MDMS.  
  
Children 
Considering capabilities in the MDMS is complicated by the fact that children are the rights-holders. 
The capabilities of children are affected by others, complicating the use of agency and freedom (Saito, 
2003). Parents and teachers may make decisions that affect the ability of children to convert capabilities 
into functionings and the capabilities and functionings of parents can affect those of the child, such as 
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the link between maternal and child malnutrition (see Appendix A) (Ballet et al., 2011). Thus, Saito 
(2003) questions whether the approach can be applied to children. In response, Sen emphasises that for 
children freedom is temporal. For example, inoculation in childhood may increase freedom in the future 
by preventing ill-health (ibid). Indeed, the MDMS is capable of enhancing future freedom; by 
enhancing educational performance, health and nutrition, the scheme can act as a ‘fertile functioning’. 
Yet, here I focus on the present rather than future outcomes. I consider how children’s capabilities are 
affected by others and consider the extent to which children have agency. 
 
Use  
I agree with Pritchard et al. (2014) that although the language of the capability approach may seem at 
odds with the practical question of feeding India, it is useful in examining food insecurity and policy 
and social protection schemes more broadly. Although most of the literature on the capability approach 
is abstract in nature, the possibility of applying the approach to practical matters is evident. For example, 
de Herdt (2017) somewhat successfully uses the approach to uncover that in a food relief programme 
in Kinshasa, shame played a key role in determining why many that could make use of the scheme did 
not. Still, considerably more research is needed to consider how the approach might be operationalised. 
Following this, here I draw on the capability approach to unpick how rights are or could be realised 
through public policy. I will consider how the ‘good’ that is the MDMS is (or is not) converted into the 
functionings of being well-nourished and, more broadly, food secure. At the same time, in Chapter 10 
I consider what the analysis of the MDMS might add to the capabilities approach and the usefulness of 
the capability approach in analysing rights-based policy.  
 
2.5  Duty-bearers  
 
2.5.1 Perfect and Imperfect Obligations 
 
The previous discussions of rights and RBAs indicate that there may be different types of duty-bearers, 
those with formalised duties and those with more abstract duties. One can distinguish between those 
that have perfect obligations, ‘a specific duty of a particular agent for the actual realization of that right’ 
(Sen 2000: 495) and those that have imperfect obligations which are not clearly defined, but instead 
rest on the idea that if one can prevent the violation of a human right, then one has reason to do so (Sen, 
2009). Other obligations and concerns may prevent action, but they do not remove the reason. The 
nature of obligations in the MDMS and the degree to which they are specified is explored in Chapter 4. 
In the rest of this section, I consider the literature on three groups of duty-bearers: the state, NGOs and 
the community.  
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2.5.2 The State 
 
In many ‘developed’ countries, state-welfare has retreated, a product of ‘roll-back neoliberalism’ (Peck 
and Tickell, 2002). Consequently, charitable provisioning in the form of food banks and pantries has 
increased. At the same time, renewed emphasis has been placed on the state as the primary duty-bearer 
of the right to food. Asserting that the state is a duty-bearer, however, presents the state as a unified, 
single entity. This portrayal is at odds with scholarship on the state, which recognises that the state is 
not a well-defined, single actor separated from society (Fuller and Harriss, 2001; Williams et al., 2011). 
Scholarship on the state in India and more generally has shown that the state is both imagined and has 
impacts on the everyday lives of people (ibid). In India, increasing attention has been paid to the 
‘everyday state’, meaning the state encountered by citizens at the grassroots level (Corbridge et al., 
2005; Fuller and Benei, 2001). The presence and absence of the state particularly impact the everyday 
lives of the most marginalised (Williams et al., 2011).  
 
The everyday interactions between citizens and the ‘state’ are a core part of social protection schemes 
as people encounter the ‘state’ as they seek and receive entitlements. The interaction between state and 
society in the distribution of services has been particularly explored by Gupta (2012) in Red Tape. As 
detailed in Section 1.1, Gupta (2012) asks why hunger, malnutrition and poverty persist in India. He 
argues that ‘the poor are killed despite their inclusion in projects of national sovereignty and despite 
their centrality to democratic politics and state legitimacy’ (6). Drawing on ethnographic research 
including on the ICDS scheme in Uttar Pradesh, Gupta argues against perceiving India’s development 
programs as well-designed but poorly implemented, believing doing so would place the blame solely 
on low-level officials ‘who, for reasons ranging from corruption to poor training and education, are 
deemed incapable of implementing the wonderful programs thought up by metropolitan experts’ (2012: 
25). Instead, the nature of bureaucracy produces arbitrary outcomes. Gupta (2012: 14) writes:  
In the midst of this chaos, the allegedly rational apparatus of the state makes crucial 
decisions such as whether a poor person should receive what may be lifesaving aid. 
However, the procedural bases for these decisions were far from rational. 
Gupta argues that ‘bureaucratic action repeatedly and systematically produces arbitrary outcomes in its 
provision of care. While indifference does indeed play an important role in this story, the indifference 
to arbitrary outcomes is central’ (6). Gupta uses the example of a pension camp to illustrate this point. 
At the camp, doctors guessed applicants’ ages and a lack of information for example about 
landownership meant eligibility was largely determined by guesswork; arbitrary decisions were made. 
These decisions have no consequences for the officials making them, but can have grave consequences 
for those seeking a service. Due to these arbitrary decisions, different outcomes occur ‘for clients who 
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are in similar structural locations... who have very similar endowments of economic, social, educational, 
and cultural capital’ (24). Overall, Gupta argues that ‘structural violence is enacted through the 
everyday practices of bureaucracies, and one therefore needs to look closely at those everyday practices 
in order to understand why violence coexists with care’ (33). Gupta terms this violence as, following 
Galtung’s (1969) definition, people are prevented from achieving their capabilities and structural as no 
single actor is to blame.  
Gupta also draws on the concept of biopower to interpret state action. Gupta concludes that both the of 
ICDS and Mahila Samakhya ‘were heavily invested in the biopolitical goal of mapping the population 
so that it could be better served, managed, and controlled’ (272). In contrast to the sovereign’s right to 
‘take life or let live’, governments have the power to ‘make’ live and ‘let’ die’’ (Foucault, 1976 in 
Foucault 1997: 241). The object of government is ‘the welfare of the population, the improvement of 
its condition, the increase of its wealth, longevity, health, etc.’ (Foucault, 1991; 100). To do so, data on 
the population is required. In the eighteenth century, birth rates and rates of reproduction, ‘became 
biopolitics’ first objects of knowledge and the targets it seek to control’ (Foucault 1976: 243). In the 
ICDS programme examine in Red Tape, such mapping includes anganwadi workers recording the name 
and age of children and their nutritional status and the name and caste of their parents. Gupta (2012) 
also describes how statistics and the categories used to classify the population produce outcomes. Gupta 
argues that categorising the population into those below and above the poverty line, ‘converts the many 
facts of someone’s material deprivations into a category that can be enumerated and measured’ (156). 
Such categories become part of vocabulary, and thus researchers focus on the accuracy of data 
collection, ‘rather than on a sustained interrogation of the category itself as a form of state simplification 
(Scott 1998) or a thin description of a complex social reality (Broch-Due 1995)’ (Gupta, 2012: 66). 
Gupta also argues, notably with little evidence, that statistics on poverty have been accepted as normal. 
Although insightful, Gupta’s Red Tape is not without its flaws. Published in 2012, it is based largely 
on research from the early 1990s and thus does not reflect the significant changes to economic policy 
in India since. Harriss and Jeffrey (2013) offer a strong critique of Gupta’s work. They correctly argue 
that Gupta only partially explains the answer to the ‘puzzle’ of why hunger, malnutrition and poverty 
persist in India. Persistent poverty, hunger and malnutrition cannot solely be the result of arbitrary 
decisions at the low-levels of bureaucracy; other factors, notably economic policy and politics and 
existing patterns of power and privilege must also be considered. Harriss and Jeffrey also argue that 
Gupta’s use of the concept of structural violence ‘is of no analytical value; it avoids questions of moral 
responsibility; and it is politically disempowering’ (513). Whether ‘structural violence’ is applicable to 
the MDMS is discussed in Chapter 9. Finally, of the most relevance here, Harriss and Jeffrey argue that 
Gupta pays insufficient attention to the actions of officials, such as absenteeism and the fact that 
officials may be responsible for a large number of programmes. In contrast to Gupta, Harriss and Jeffrey 
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argue ‘bureaucratic functioning is by no means as arbitrary and confused as Gupta suggests: rather, it 
systematically reflects caste, class and gender privileges’ (519).  
In Chapter 9, I will contribute to this debate by considering the extent to which the actions of bureaucrats 
in the MDMS are arbitrary and whether the MDMS is characterised by arbitrary outcomes. To do so, it 
is first necessary to consider the literature on street-level bureaucrats; a body of literature surprisingly 
absent from Gupta (2012). 
 
2.5.3 Street-Level bureaucracy 
 
Writing about the US in 1980, Lipsky argued that policy is made by street-level bureaucrats, those 
‘public service workers who interact directly with citizens in the course of their jobs, and who have 
substantial discretion in the execution of their work’ (2010: 3). Street-level bureaucrats include teachers, 
police, welfare departments and legal services. Lipsky (2010: 3) writes: 
Whether government policy is to deliver "goods"-such as welfare or public to confer status-
such as "criminal" or "mentally ill"-the discretionary actions of public employees are the 
benefits and sanctions of government programs or determine access to government rights 
and benefits.  
Lipsky argued that these actors ‘make policy’ due to two characteristics. First, these bureaucrats have 
high levels of discretion; they can determine ‘the nature, amount, and quality of benefits and sanctions 
provided by their agencies’ (2010: 13). Second, street-level bureaucrats have ‘relative autonomy from 
organisational authority’ (13) and may not share the goals and perspectives of the agency for which 
they work. There are also common conditions in which street-level bureaucrats work: resources are 
inadequate relative to the task; the demand for services increases to meet supply; the goals of agencies 
are often ambiguous; performance related to goal achievement is difficult or impossible to measure; 
and clients are typically non-voluntary (2010: 27-28). Consequently, street-level bureaucrats must 
employ coping mechanisms; ‘the decisions of street-level bureaucrats, the routines they establish, and 
the devices they invent to cope with uncertainties and work pressures, effectively become the public 
policies they carry out’ (2010: xiii).  
Lipsky’s work introduced a new way of examining public policy, which focussed not on policy-makers 
but on the reality of those delivering policy (Brodkin, 2012). Lipksy’s work has consequently formed 
the basis of much scholarly discussion (see the reviews by Brodkin, 2012; Maynard-Mooney and 
Portillo, 2011 and Smith, 2012). This literature has shown that multiple factors can determine the 
decisions made by street-level bureaucrats, including their personal views, demographic characteristics 
and organisational factors such as the type of tasks performed the degree of authority given to street-
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level bureaucrats (see Hupe and Buffat, 2014 for a review). 
Central to understanding street-level bureaucrats and their actions is appreciation of both their agency 
and the structures in which they work. As Lipsky (2010: 221) writes:  
Street-level bureaucrats may indeed make policy in the sense that their separate 
discretionary and sanctioned behaviors add up to patterned agency behavior overall. But 
they do so only in the context of broad policy structure of which their decisions are a part.  
Maynard-Moody and Portillo (2011) suggest that there is the need to go beyond discretion which is 
commonly explored in the street-level bureaucrat literature, to develop a ‘robust concept of “agency”’ 
(21): 
Agency, or the irreducible ability to alter social encounters, is a constituent element of 
social structure. Therefore, appreciating street-level workers' understandings of policy, 
citizens, clients, and their roles—their work schemas—and appreciating when and how 
they interpret and choose to respond to.   
Maynard-Moody and Musheno (2012) also discuss agency. Drawing on Sewell (1992) and Giddens 
(1979), they emphasise that agency does not exist separately from structure. Rather, structure shapes 
and gives meaning to agency. Street-level bureaucrats exist in the context of ‘laws, budgets, rules, 
practices, positions, and authority’, ‘the resources that make up, with schemas, the nature of structure 
and give meaning to human agency’ (ibid: 520). In Chapters 7 and 9, I consider structure, agency and 
duty-bearers in the MDMS. 
Implicit in the street-level bureaucrat literature is the recognition that context matters; yet the influence 
of context is underexplored (Hupe and Buffat, 2014). Hupe and Buffat consequently introduce the 
concept of a ‘public service gap’; when what is being asked of public officials (the demand) is greater 
than the resources allocated to them (the supply). What is being demanded from public officials on the 
‘demand-side’ is affected by formal rules, norms and public expectations. What Hupe and Buffat term 
‘enablements’ enable public officials to supply what is being demanded from them on the ‘supply side’. 
Enablements may include training, education, time and financial resources. These factors can vary over 
time, causing public officials to have to ‘do more with less’, ‘do more with the same’ or ‘do the same 
with less’. In this thesis, I use Hupe and Buffat’s distinction between demands and enablements to 
consider the implementation of the MDMS. 
Despite its enduring popularity, the definition of ‘street-level bureaucrats’ is imprecise (Kosar and 
Schachter, 2011). The term ‘street-level bureaucrat’ can be used to refer to every frontline worker, or, 
as Lipsky originally intended, to refer to those who can exercise discretion and cannot do their job 
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exactly as they should due to the work structure. In this second approach, a teacher may be a street-
level bureaucrat, but is not necessarily one by virtue of being a teacher. Furthermore, the concept has 
been under-utilised in the developing world; the majority of studies on street-level bureaucracy focus 
on the US and social work. Scholars may use the term is discussion of public policy as Berenschot 
(2010), Joshi (1999) and Mathur (2012) do in India, yet, the applicability of the term in the Indian 
context remains under-explored. The absence of any discussion of street-level bureaucracy within 
Gupta’s Red Tape is perhaps the most surprising. Thus, in my analysis of the MDMS, I draw on the 
concept of street-level bureaucrats. I consider whether the term applies to those actors responsible for 
implementing the MDMS and I draw on the concept to explore the actions of the duty-bearers in the 
scheme and the influence of agency and structure. 
Since Lipksy first published his seminal work, public policy delivery has changed considerably 
(Brodkin, 2012). Increasingly, governments have relied on private and/or non-profit organisations to 
deliver services, rendering the workers in such organisations ‘new street-level bureaucrats’ (Smith, 
2012). In the following section, I consider this trend in the context of the rise of public-private 
partnerships (PPPs). In Chapter 7, I then consider whether those non-state actors responsible for 
implementing the MDMS can be considered ‘street-level bureaucrats’.   
2.5.4 Public Private Partnerships 
 
There has been increasing interest in PPPs since the late 1990s (Osei-Kyei and Chan, 2015), as states 
have engaged with private actors under ‘roll-out neoliberalism’ (Peck and Tickell, 2002). PPPs are 
increasingly used to provide services in the developing world (see Bennett, 1998; Fennell, 2007; Fizbein 
& Lowden, 1999; Widdus, 2001). In India, the GOI advocated the use of PPPs in the Twelfth Five-Year 
Plan (2012-2017) (Planning Commission, 2013) including in the MDMS.  
 
PPPs can broadly be defined as partnerships between the government and the private sector or anything 
outside of the public sector (Miraftab, 2004). PPPs involve two or more parties one of which is a public 
body. These parties have an enduring relationship, contribute resources, share responsibility for 
outcomes, and have a contract to enable continuity (Grimsey and Lewis, 2005: 13). PPPs can be created 
for many reasons, yet are often justified on the basis of one assumption and one presumption; the 
assumption that governments do not have the expertise and knowledge to fulfil responsibilities and the 
presumption that governments can access this expertise, assess cost-effectiveness and that private 
organisations are willing to partner governments (Forrer et al., 2010). This view sees PPPs as 
organisational and financial arrangements (Hodge and Greve, 2007). An alternative view of PPPs 
however, is that they are a ‘language game’ (ibid), in which ‘partnership’ may be used instead of 
‘privatisation’ and ‘contracting out’, to obscure meaning and to suit political objectives (Hodge and 
Greve, 2010). Linder (1999) argued there were ‘multiple grammars’ to PPPs, and outlined six uses of 
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the term ‘public-private partnership’ which are not mutually exclusive: as management reform, a fix 
for problems, as moral regeneration, as risk-shifting, as restructuring public service and as power 
sharing.  
 
Although the plurality of PPPs is recognised in academic literature, discussions of PPPs are often 
imprecise in their use of the term ‘public-private partnership’, introducing ambiguities as to the role 
and expectations of each partner (Miraftab, 2004). Moreover, one must consider the responsibilities of 
each actor within the partnership and the power relations between them. The rise of PPPs also raises 
the question of accountability. As Grimsey and Lewis (2005) write: ‘The fact that one of the participants 
in a PPP is a public body creates a need for the inclusion of mechanisms of accountability quite different 
from those that would exist if all the participants were private’ (13). Yet, at the same time the reason 
for a partnership may be to reduce the bureaucratic processes associated with government (ibid).  
 
PPPs are used in some SFPs and India is often used to illustrate the potential of PPPs in food-based 
safety nets. PPPs in the MDMS take the form of partnerships between the government (national and 
state) and NGOs. They therefore differ from typical PPPs which involve the private sector. 
Nevertheless, there are parallels between the rationale for the involvement of the private sector and 
NGOs. PPPs in the MDMS are advocated on the basis that they can provide a better service than the 
government can; reflecting the use of PPPs for problem conversion identified by Linder (1999). Bundy 
et al. (2009) cite centralised kitchens in the MDMS as a successful case of the use of the private sector 
in SFPs, noting that the scheme costs just US$28 per child per year. At first glance, this seems cheap, 
particularly as the average cost of as SFP is US$40 per student per year (Galloway et al., 2009). 
However, when the report by Bundy et al. was written, decentralised kitchens were providing the food 
at a cost of approximately INR 570 for primary students and INR 860 for upper primary students (GOI, 
2016a), equivalent to approximately US$11 and US$16. The cost of the MDM under the decentralised 
model was therefore considerably less than US$28.  
 
Other commentators have also noted the successful use of PPPs in the MDMS. Drake et al. (2016: 273) 
stated PPPs have ‘proved instrumental in improving the quality and reach of the program’ and that ‘the 
involvement of a number of bodies such as the Akshaya Patra Foundation15 has resulted in better 
performance and promotion of community participation through fundraising and volunteering’. The 
Government (GOI, 2016b), media reports (Pain, 2014; Singh, 2015) and the NGOs involved (Akshaya 
Patra, 2016) also consider PPPs in the MDMS to have been a success. There is, however, a distinct lack 
of evidence to support this narrative of success; only two studies have rigorously assessed the 
involvement of centralised kitchens in the MDMS. Shankar and Natasha (2010) compared the 
                                                        
15 See Section 7.6.1 for further discussion. 
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centralised model in Delhi with the decentralised model in Ahmedabad, Gujarat. They found that the 
decentralised model was infrequently monitored and affected by corruption, whilst the involvement of 
centralised kitchens lowered employment opportunities for women, decreased transparency and led to 
food spoilage. They found hygiene and monitoring to be problems in both models. Shukla (2014) found 
the food provided by NGOs in Delhi was both low in quality and quantity.  
 
Reflecting the wider trend in discussions of PPPs, the term ‘PPP’ in the MDMS is used without clarity. 
Previous studies have not examined which actors are involved in these partnerships, the division of 
responsibilities between them and the power dynamics. To begin to address these gaps, in this thesis I 
examine the NGOs involved in the MDMS, including their objectives, responsibilities and outcomes of 
their involvement. I also consider the extent to which these partnerships affect street-level interactions.  
 
2.5.5 The Community 
 
Whilst the state may be the primary duty-bearer for the right to food, other actors also have a 
responsibility. Indeed, Comment 12 asserts that all members of society have responsibility for the 
realisation of the right to adequate food. Yet, what these responsibilities or ‘imperfect obligations’ 
might be remain unexplored. State action to realise the right to food and indeed any right may be limited. 
Drèze (2004a) considered the case of a hypothetical girl who is undernourished due to uneven and male-
biased intra-household food distribution. Although the state has some responsibility to address the 
underlying discrimination, the family is also responsible, raising the question ‘where do the duties of 
the state start and those of the individual, family and local community end? (Mander, 2012: 15). Of 
relevance to SFPs including the MDMS, the literature on children and capabilities discussed in Section 
2.4.3 highlights that children’s capabilities are affected by the actions of others, namely their parents, 
raising the question of what duties parents may have in ensuring that their children can realise their 
right to food. Thus, here I consider the nature and extent of the roles of individuals, families and the 
local community in the MDMS. 
 
Since the 1980s, increasing emphasis within development has been placed on participation, which 
‘essentially concerns the exercise of popular agency in relation to development’ (Hickey and Mohan, 
2004: 3). In the 1990s, participatory approaches were criticised (e.g. Cleaver, 1999; Cooke and Kothari, 
2001) for focussing on the local rather than wider structures and injustices, for failing to consider power 
and how empowerment might occur, for failing to sufficiently consider structure and agency and for 
treating participation as technical rather than political (see Hickey and Mohan, 2005). The MDMS is 
not grounded in the theory of participatory development, yet literature on participatory development 
prompts a consideration of how participation might occur in the context of wider structures and power 
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relations. Thus, in Chapter 4 I consider the extent to which the community are expected to participate 
in the MDMS and in Chapter 8 I explore the degree to which they do. 
 
2.5.6 Capacity 
 
As Jonsson (2003; 2005) recognised, duty-bearers must have the capacity to fulfil their duties. Capacity 
is not, however, a self-explanatory term and thus what is meant by the term requires further exploration. 
Since the 1980s, development organisations have increasingly used the term ‘capacity-development’, 
in which capacity is typically defined broadly as the ability to identify and solve development problems 
(Jonsson, 2005). Beyond this vague definition, capacity is rarely defined. For example, Brinkerhoff 
(2001; 2004) repeatedly refers to capacity in discussions of accountability, both institutional capacity 
and the capacity of citizens for collection action without sufficient elaboration of what such capacity 
entails. Morgan (2006) and Brinkerhoff and Morgan (2009) have attempted to further characterise 
capacity by suggesting that the capacity of organisations and their networks is about five core 
capabilities; to commit and engage; carry out technical, service delivery, and logistical tasks; to relate 
and attract support; adapt and self-renew and to balance diversity and coherence. However, although 
Morgan (2006) acknowledge the link to Sen’s work on capabilities, in neither Morgan (2006) or 
Brinkerhoff and Morgan (2009) is the use of the term ‘capabilities’ explained. Moreover, their 
definition of capacity is of little use when duty-bearers are not coherent organisations.  
 
Far more applicable here in this analysis of a rights-based policy, is Jonsson’s (2003: 2005) work on 
RBAs. Jonsson writes ‘all individuals have both rights and duties, except for very young children (who 
have rights but no duties). All individuals, therefore, need capacity to both claim their rights and fulfil 
their duties’ (31). Jonsson argues that five things are necessary for the development of community 
capacity: responsibility, authority, access to and control of resources, communication capability and the 
capability for rational decision-making and learning. These are summarised in Table 2.7. Whilst useful,  
the HRBAP is limited by the failure to distinguish between agency and structure.  
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Table 2.7: Summary of Jonsson’s (2005: 31-32) conceptualisation of capacity 
Aspect of 
capacity 
Jonsson’s definition   
Responsibility ‘This refers to the acknowledgement by an individual (or organisation) that 
he/she should do something about a specific problem. It means acceptance and 
internalisation of a duty, and is often justified in legal or moral terms. Some 
individuals, such as “activists,” accept responsibilities far beyond what may be 
expected. They are often motivated by moral imperatives and provide 
leadership in movements.’  
Authority This refers to the legitimacy of an action; when an individual or group feels or 
knows that they may take action, that it is permissible to take action. Laws, 
formal and informal norms and rules, tradition, and culture largely determine 
what is or is not permissible. The structure of authority in a society reflects its 
power relations. 
Access and 
Control of 
Resources 
‘If an individual accepts that he/she should do something and may do it, it may 
still be impossible to act because the person lacks resources. Capacity must 
therefore also mean that the person or organisation is in a position to, or can, 
act.’  
Access and control of resources has three dimensions: 
‘1) Human Resources: Skills, motivation, will power, knowledge, experience, 
time, commitment, etc.  
2) Economic Resources: Land, natural resources, means of production (such as 
tools or equipment), technology, income, credit, etc.  
(3) Organisational Resources: Formal and non-formal organisations such as 
family, extended family, clan, CBOs, NGOs, administrative structures, 
institutions, etc. Organisational resources include formal and informal rules that 
structure certain patterns of interaction.’ 
Communication 
Capability  
 
‘The capability to communicate and to access information and communication 
systems is crucial for individuals and organisations in carrying out their 
responsibilities, and for “connecting” various key actors in the social fabric into 
functional networks able to address critical development issues’.  
Capability for 
Rational 
Decision-
making and 
Learning  
 
‘Rational decision-making requires evidence-based assessment and a logical 
analysis of the causes of a problem. Actions should be based on decisions 
informed by the analysis. After each action has been taken, a re-assessment of 
the result and impact will lead to improved analysis and better action in the next 
round. Such interactive learning-by-doing relies heavily on the capability to 
communicate. 
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Although useful, Jonsson’s approach provides little insight into the capacity of duty-bearers beyond the 
community. In light of the limitations in these approaches to capacity, in this thesis I consider the role 
of capacity in shaping the implementation of the MDMS and unpick what determines the capacity of 
duty-bearers to fulfil their duties.    
 
2.6 Accountability Mechanisms 
 
2.6.1 Conceptualising accountability  
 
Initially, accountability was narrowly conceptualised as holding actors to account. Mulgan terms this 
‘core accountability’ which includes ‘the right of the account-holder to investigate and scrutinise the 
actions of the agent by seeking information and explanations and the right to impose remedies and 
sanctions’ (2003: 10). Over time, this conceptualisation has expanded to include responsibility, control 
and responsiveness (ibid).  
 
Accountability has two components: agents of responsibility and accountability mechanisms. Agents 
of accountability can include, but are not limited to, the electorate, the judiciary, the public, the media 
and international institutions. Given this diversity, literature on accountability has focused on 
categorising these agents. As Schedler (1999: 23) wrote: ‘we may easily drown in a sea of innumerable 
agents of accountability unless we drop some conceptual anchor’. One means of ‘dropping an anchor’ 
is to distinguish between the source of accountability; internal or external. Internal accountability is 
based on an established hierarchy or informal relationships within an agency (Romzek and Dubnick, 
1987). External accountability derives from outside an agency, from established laws or informal power 
(ibid). Accountability can also be categorised by direction; horizontal or vertical (O’Donnell, 1998). 
Horizontal accountability involves holding someone of equal power to account and is typically intra-
state, whereas vertical accountability is between actors of unequal power such as the electorate and 
representatives and is thus external (Peruzzotti and Smulovitz, 2006; Schedler, 1999). Accountability 
can also be described as top-down/from above from political elites, or bottom-up/from ‘below’ from 
civil society (Schedler, 1999).  
 
A further means of categorising accountability is by degree of control. Romzek and Dubnick 
differentiated between a high degree of control ‘to determine both the range and depth of actions’ and 
a low degree (1987: 228). Romzek and Dubnick (1987) also differentiated between bureaucratic, legal, 
professional and political accountability. Bureaucratic accountability is between a superior and a 
subordinate, legal accountability is between a lawmaker and an official, professional accountability is 
between an expert and a layperson and political accountability is between a constituent and a 
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representative (ibid: 230). Romzek and Dubnick proposed a matrix of accountability types by source 
and control (Figure 2.3). 
 
  Source of agency control 
  Internal External 
Degree of 
control 
High Bureaucratic Legal 
Low Professional Political 
Figure 2.3: Types of accountability (from Romzek and Dubnick, 1987: 299) 
 
Mulgan (2003) subsequently proposed four questions to comprehend accountability systems: Who are 
accountable? To whom? For what? and How? (23). Mulgan (2003) considered accountability to have 
three stages: initial reporting and investigating (information); justification and critical debate 
(discussion); and the imposition of remedies and sanctions (rectification). Mulgan emphasised the 
importance of sanctions, stating: ‘Where institutions or officials are found to have been at fault, there 
must be some means of imposing remedies, by penalising the offenders and compensating the victims’ 
(2003:9).  
 
2.6.2 Accountability and Public Policy  
 
The types of accountability described above often focus on holding the state to account, whether 
horizontally such as through agencies to control corruption or vertically by the electorate (Ackerman, 
2004; O’Donnell 1998). Such public accountability can also be categorised as financial, performance 
or political/democratic accountability (Brinkerhoff, 2004). Society can also hold the government to 
account through other means. Paul (1992), one of the first to explore this form of accountability 
(Ackerman, 2004), presents a conceptual framework of public accountability based on Hirschman’s 
(1970) work on exit and voice. There are two factors that influence public accountability: whether there 
are alternative suppliers of a public service to enable exit and whether there is the opportunity to 
exercise one’s voice to influence the outcome of a service. Paul explores the different degrees of both 
exit and voice in different services, summarised in Figure 2.4.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
45 
  Voice 
  Weak Strong 
Exit 
 
Low 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
High 
Exit - High spatial barriers - Local monopoly 
- Large economies of scale 
- High legal barriers to entry 
Voice - Low differentiability16 of 
services 
- High income barriers 
- High legal/institutional barriers 
- High information barriers 
- Low differentiability of 
services 
- Low income barriers 
- Low or moderate 
information barriers 
Examples - Rural primary education 
- Rural health 
- Urban water supply 
- electricity 
Exit - Legal barriers to entry 
- Low economies of scale 
- Low to moderate 
economies of scale 
 
Voice - High differentiability of 
services 
- High income barriers 
- High legal/institutional barriers 
- High information barriers 
- High differentiability of 
services 
- Low income barriers 
- High product involvement 
 
  Examples - Urban low income housing 
- Urban primary education (low 
income) 
- Welfare/ nutrition services 
- Urban transport 
- University education 
 
Figure 2.4: Conceptual framework of exit and voice in public services, 
 adapted from Paul (1992: 1052). 
 
To my knowledge, Hirschman’s work on exit and voice and Paul’s subsequent development have not 
been used to discuss SFPs. Given that SFPs are delivered in schools, one may expect the same degrees 
of exit and voice as for schools themselves (low exit, weak voice). Drawing on this literature, in Chapter 
8 I detail the types of accountability in the MDMS and assess the possibility for exit and voice.  
 
2.6.3 Accountability and NGOs  
 
Following the expansion in the number of NGOs in the 1980s and 1990s, scholars raised concerns 
regarding NGO accountability (e.g. Cernea, 1988; Edwards and Hulme, 1996). Vivian (1994) discussed 
how NGOs were often perceived as a ‘magic-bullet’, that, without much evidence can be fired in any 
direction and find their target (in Edwards and Hulme, 1996). Edwards and Hulme (1996) consequently 
                                                        
16 When products are non-differentiable, such as drinking water, and thus used by all, those with a weak voice 
may benefit from the voice of others. When products are highly differentiable, this effect does not occur (Paul, 
1992).  
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argued the need to take NGO accountability more seriously. From the expansive literature on NGO 
accountability which has emerged since, there are two key questions to consider. 
  
First, who are NGOs accountable to? Najam (1996) suggested there are three categories of NGO 
accountability: to patrons, to clients and to themselves. These categories can be discussed directionally 
as upward to donors, downward to clients and communities and internally to NGOs (Ebrahim, 2003). 
These categories can be disaggregated further: patrons can include external and internal donors and 
clients can include direct and indirect beneficiaries (Khan, 2003). Second, what are the mechanisms 
through which accountability can or does take place? Ebrahim (2003) discusses five broad categories 
of the accountability mechanisms used by NGOs: reports and disclosure statements, performance 
assessments and evaluations, participation, self-regulation and social audits. The first two are tools 
which might be used regularly, whereas participation and self-regulation are broader, indicating actions 
to be taken (Siddiquee and Faroqi, 2009). 
 
In RBAs, NGO accountability must be seen in terms of duty-bearers fulfilling duties. As Mayhew et al. 
(2006) argue: ‘service delivery NGOs, especially those claiming to be rights-based, should be seen as 
accountable duty-bearers, whether acting independently or on behalf of a national government. NGOs 
must ensure their three-way accountability - to government, to their clients, and also to other civil 
society groups’ (200). Previous discussions of NGOs in the MDMS have not discussed their 
accountability. Therefore, following the literature on NGOs and accountability, in Chapter 8 I will 
explore who NGOs are accountable to in the MDMS and what mechanisms are in place to enable 
accountability.   
 
2.6.4 Accountability and the MDMS 
 
Although scholars have studied the justiciability of the right to food, for example Golay (2009) in India, 
accountability to realise the right to food is rarely considered. Indeed, Haddad (2009) argued that there 
is a need for research on nutrition governance that considers voice, power and accountability. Thus, in 
Chapter 8, I therefore answer the four questions posed by Mulgan (2003): In the MDMS, Who are 
accountable? To whom? For what? and How? In addition, I explore the extent to which ‘exit’ and 
‘voice’ can be exercised in the MDMS.  
 
2.7 Conceptualising Power 
 
Although rarely discussed, at the heart of RBAs are power dynamics between duty-bearers and rights-
holders. To assist in understanding and interpreting the dynamics, here I provide a necessarily brief 
overview of the conceptualisation of power. 
  
47 
 
Lukes (1974; 2005) presented three faces or dimensions of power. The first dimension is based on Dahl 
(1957: 202-203), who stated ‘A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B 
would not otherwise do’. Bachrach and Baratz (1962) criticised this view, arguing that power had a 
second, hidden face as it may confine decisions. In this view, ‘A may exercise power over B by getting 
him to do what he does not want to do, but he also exercises power over him by influencing, shaping 
or determining his very wants’ (1974: 23). Lukes (1974) took this further, suggesting power may have 
a third dimension or ‘face’, where power may influence one’s desires, beliefs and judgments against 
one’s interests’; “A exercises power over B when A affects B in a manner contrary to B’s interests,” 
(Lukes, 2005: 30). Drawing on Lukes, Gaventa (1980; 2006) and VeneKlasen and Miller (2002) 
distinguish between three types of power: visible power is observable decision making, hidden power 
is the setting of the political agenda and invisible power is the shaping of meaning and what is 
acceptable. 
 
Gaventa (2003) presents a review of the conceptualisation of power since Lukes (1974). Here, I consider 
two: Foucault and Giddens. For Foucault, power was not something that was ‘wielded’, but rather was 
‘dispersed and subject-less, as elements of broad ‘strategies’ but without individual authors’ (Gaventa, 
2003). Foucault saw power as ubiquitous and as neither an institution or agent. Moreover, for Foucault 
power was not necessarily negative and exclusionary, but something that may also be positive or 
productive. As Gaventa (2003) argues, although it is useful to see agents as constructed through power, 
the agent-less concept of power is difficult to apply practically (ibid). Giddens’ (1984) structuration 
theory brings together discussions of agency and structure. In Giddens’ view ‘people are free to act, but 
draw upon and replicate structures of power through their own actions’ (Gaventa, 2003). Central to 
Giddens’ approach, is the recognition that actors can have the power to resist.  
Surprisingly absent from Gaventa’s (2003) review is a discussion of Hayward’s work. Drawing on 
Foucault, Hayward (2000) puts forward an alternative view of power to Lukes’ agent-centric approach. 
Hayward (2000) argues for a de-facing of power, ‘reconceptualizing it as a network of social boundaries 
that constrain and enable action for all actors’ (11). In Hayward’s view, those constraints on freedom 
that are labelled ‘structural’ are social in origin and therefore analyses of power must analyse structural 
constraints on freedom (Hayward, 2000; Hayward and Lukes, 2008). As outlined in Hayward and Lukes 
(2008), the central difference between the conceptualisations of power they present is the source of 
power; are only identifiable agents sources of power or should structural constraints on freedom be 
sources of power as well? As Lukes and Hayward (2008: 17) summarise:  
If we think of power, as Lukes urges us, in strictly agent-centric terms, then we may overlook 
some subset of significant and remediable social constraints on human freedom. Nevertheless, 
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if we think of power, as Hayward suggests, in structural terms, then we may lose sight of those 
particular agents who are responsible for the constraints we analyze and review.  
I do not consider Lukes’ and Hayward’s approaches to be incompatible. Rather, when read together, 
they highlight the need to consider both agents and structures. Thus, in this thesis and particularly in 
Chapter 8, I draw on work of Lukes, Hayward and the other authors cited in this section as to explore 
power in the MDMS.   
 
2.8 Public Policy  
 
Literature on public policy and development programmes has been drawn on throughout the previous 
sections; however, it is also necessary to consider this literature separately. Schaffer (1984: 188) 
describes public policy as ‘an aspect of state politics which is inherently involved in what Foucault calls 
‘governmentality’, that is: 
 
The ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, the 
calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex 
form of power, which has as its target population, as its principal form of knowledge 
political economy, and as its essential technical means apparatuses of security. 
(Foucault, 1991: 102-103) 
 
The analysis of governmentality requires the examination of political technologies, the ‘rational, modern 
structures, systems, relationship’s and practices of government that have disciplinary effects’ and 
technologies of the self, ‘the means by which disciplinary norms of institutions are internalized through 
self-surveillance’ (Fernandez, 2012: 23). Although indebted to Foucault, Clay and Schaffer (1984) 
presented new ideas of public policy (Fernandez, 2012). Having observed that policy was typically 
discussed as either a success or failure, Clay and Schaffer (1984: 1) argued:   
 
The more important question is not why public policy ‘fails’. It does not always 
necessarily or completely do so... Public policy is, after all, what it does. The point is 
to explain what that is, and then see if that explanation can itself be an instrument for 
change and improvement.   
 
Schaffer (1984) argued that public policy was commonly portrayed as linear and dichotomous; policy 
decisions are made to address a problem after which separate implementation occurs. Shaffer 
considered the separation between policy and implementation to not only be false but to have ‘grave 
consequences’, obliterating the ‘need or occasion for discussing or bringing to account, all aspects of 
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the actual construction of policy practice’ including allocations and calculations, strategies, therapies 
and other technologies, ‘which would be highly doubtful…were they ever brought to question’ (160). 
Moreover, Schaffer argued that separation permits the avoidance of responsibility: ‘If policy is a 
dichotomy each side can, and does, blame those who…can be treated as being on the other side of the 
line’ (ibid: 157).  
 
Clay and Schaffer therefore argued for a new way of conducting policy analysis, which examined ‘the 
process and practice of what governments actually do, to explain the linkages between intentions and 
outcomes’ (1984: 2). Schaffer argued that there are ‘three coincident zones in public policy: themes, 
authorizations and allocations’ (1984: 188). In the first ‘zone’, is the setting of agendas and strategy; 
‘the declaration of a theme, the very action of identifying a problem like that of malnutrition…implies 
a search for improvement, the ‘good purpose’’ (Clay and Schaffer, 1984:1). This theme, ‘the problem 
recognized and the search envisaged, constitutes a strategy’ (ibid). Second, is proceduralisation through 
laws and rules. Third is the distribution and allocation of resources, to which Harriss (1991) added the 
mobilisation of these resources. Clay and Schaffer (1984) also argued that to analyse policy requires 
closing off excuses and exits (‘escape hatches’) commonly used to explain the gap between intentions 
and outcomes. Commonly used escape hatches include a lack of political will, shortages such as of 
man-power and a missing ingredient such as the representation of a group in policy-making. 
 
There are two broad insights from Clay and Schaffer (1984) which have since been developed and are 
insightful here. First, Schaffer advocates moving beyond the distinction between design and 
implementation. It is not the case that no separation can be made between design and implementation; 
but rather that the policy process is more complex and the latter is closely tied to the former. Therefore 
problems with public policy are not merely a product of poor implementation; a point also made by 
Gupta (2012). The setting of agendas is closely tied to the outcomes of public policy. Li writes (2007: 
7): ‘Two key practices are required to translate the will to improve into explicit programs’. The first is 
problematisation; the ‘ensemble of discursive and non-discursive practices that make something enter 
into the play of true and false and constitute it as an object of thought’ (Foucault, 1994: 670), or put 
more simply, how a problem is defined over time (Kimura, 2013). Bacchi (2009) advocates asking 
‘what’s the problem represented to be?’ in public policy. Sridhar (2008) shows this in practice. Sridhar 
finds discord between the World Bank’s biomedical approach to the problem of nutrition which 
attributed poor nutrition to inadequate knowledge and child caring practices and the experiences of 
malnutrition in Tamil Nadu which was affected far more by inadequate purchasing power and gender 
inequality’ (ibid: 153). Although firmly connected, the second practice is ‘rendering technical’; when 
political problems are reposed as technical problems to which technical solutions can be offered 
(Ferguson, 1994; Li, 2007). In the process, development is depoliticised.  
  
50 
Second, is the need to go beyond ‘success’ and ‘failure’. In Seeing Like a State: Why Certain Schemes 
to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed, Scott (1998) examines why ‘well-intended schemes to 
improve the human condition have gone so tragically awry’ (4). Scott explains failure as arising from 
the state simplifying what they seek to improve through standardisation and homogenisation, neglecting 
to account for ‘practical knowledge, informal processes, and improvisation’ (6). However, Ferguson 
(1994) in his seminal study of the Thaba-Tseka Development Project in Lesotho showed that ‘success’ 
and ‘failure’ do not adequately capture programme outcomes. Drawing on Ferguson, Li (2005) argues 
instead of asking why schemes succeed or fail, instead we should ask ‘What do these schemes do? What 
are their messy, contradictory, multi-layered, and conjunctural effects?’ (384). Li (2007) examines how 
programs are configured and focuses on those at the ‘receiving end’ of government schemes, overall 
arguing ‘that engaging with the ‘‘messy actualities’’ of rule in practice is not merely an adjunct to the 
study of government—it is intrinsic to it’ (283). I do not believe it is the case that the terms ‘success’ 
and ‘failure’ are entirely redundant; they are useful in discussing whether a policy or scheme achieved 
its aims. However, following Ferguson (1994) and Li (2005; 2007) it is necessary to also go far beyond 
these terms.  
 
Literature on public policy has not been drawn on to examine the MDMS or Indian food security policy. 
The dichotomous view of policy of which Schaffer speaks is all too evident in discussions of India’s 
food programs. For example, Cheriyan writes: ‘Food security schemes, although well designed, have 
not been successfully implemented’ (2006: 13). Studies consequently typically focus on the 
implementation of these schemes rather than their design. Furthermore, the pre-occupation with success 
and failure is still evident in discussions of the MDMS. Some consider the MDMS “successful”, 
especially relative to the PDS and ICDS, which have far higher levels of corruption and leakage and 
generally function more poorly (Bonnerjee and Koehler, 2010; Khera, 2013). In the media, however, it 
is not unusual for the scheme to be labelled a failure (e.g. Bhowmick, 2016; Varkey, 2017). There is 
however, the need to consider what the MDMS does; how the different aspects of the policy process 
relate to the realisation of a right to food. Thus, in Chapter 4 I briefly consider what ‘success’ might 
mean in the MDMS; however, the main focus of this thesis is the messiness of the design and 
implementation of the MDMS and its intended and unintended consequences.  
 
2.9 Research Objectives  
 
In the previous review, I have shown the increasing emphasis being placed on both the concept of a 
right to food and on the need for rights-based social protection. India is the exemplar of both; under a 
right to food, eligible citizens have a legal right to entitlements provided by the state. However, a clear 
distinction must be made between having a right and the realisation of this right (Kent, 2007). The 
difficulty in realising the right to food in India has been recognised (Drèze, 2004a; Li, 2010), yet, the 
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everyday realisation of rights has not been studied. More generally, little attention has been paid to how 
a rights-based approach to social protection can be achieved (Sepúlveda, 2014). In this context, I 
examine the everyday realisation of rights in India, focussing on the right to a MDM and the broader 
right to food.  
 
As has been established, a rights-system has three components. For rights to be fulfilled, duty-bearers 
must fulfil their duties to rights-holders and mechanisms must exist for these duty-bearers to be held 
accountable should they not fulfil their duties. However, the literature relevant to rights-holders, duty-
bearers and accountability mechanisms (Sections 2.4-2.6) indicates that the task of realising rights is 
more complex. Rights-holders must have the capability to claim their rights, duty-bearers must have 
the capacity to fulfil their duties and rights-holders, their representatives and other actors must be able 
to hold duty-bearers to account. To comprehend the realisation of rights, one must understand these 
dynamics and how these actors exist in the context of ‘laws, budgets, rules, practices, positions, and 
authority...the resources that make up, with schemas, the nature of structure and give meaning to human 
agency’ (Giddens, 1979: 520). To understand the realisation of rights, one must understand these 
structures.  
 
Furthermore, for the fulfilment of rights, the process of realisation must adhere to rights-based 
principles. Therefore, one must focus not only on the end of rights realisation but also the process. To 
understand the relationship between a right to a MDM and a right to food, one must understand the 
design and implementation of the MDMS. Both the FAO literature on rights-based SFPs and the 
literature on public policy highlights the need to consider both design and implementation. One must 
consider the agenda, proceduralisation and allocation and distribution of resources (political strategies 
and technologies).  
 
In this context, the overarching objective of this research is to examine the everyday realisation of rights 
in India’s MDMS, both the right to entitlements in the MDMS and the wider right to food. Drawing on 
the literature on RBAs and public policy, I suggest that examining the three components of a rights 
system and rights-based principles and how these exist both ‘on paper’ and in practice is an effective 
means of examining rights-based social protection schemes. The specific research questions guiding 
this study are:  
 
1. To what extent does the MDMS contribute to the fulfilment of a right to food? 
 
i. What problems is the MDMS intended to address? What are the objectives of the 
scheme? How do these objectives relate to the problems?  
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ii. Are all those who are food insecure or vulnerable to food insecurity included in the 
MDMS? 
iii. Are the needs of the rights-holders reflected in the design of the MDMS? Does the food 
meet their dietary needs? 
iv. What are the norms regarding food quantity, quality, safety and cultural acceptability? 
Are these norms fulfilled in practice and if not, why?  
 
2. Does the MDMS reflect the principles of participation, accountability, non-discrimination, 
transparency, human dignity, empowerment and the rule of law? 
 
i. To what extent are these principles reflected in the design of the scheme? 
ii. To what extent are each of these principles adhered to in the operation of the MDMS?  
  
Although concerned with the design, implementation and consequences of the MDMS, this thesis does 
not consider the impacts of the scheme in terms of whether the stated objectives (to increase nutritional 
status, to increase attendance and to provide nutritional support during the summer) are realised. Such 
research would require longitudinal data, impossible to collect given the time-constraints of this 
research. To determine causality, a control study would also be required, impossible given the near 
universality of the scheme. Instead, concern is with the consequences for the realisation of the right to 
food. 
  
The research questions are not answered in turn. Doing so would produce a far too fragmented depiction 
of the MDMS, obscuring trends and underlying causes. Instead, I consider the problems (Chapter 3), 
the design (Chapter 4) and implementation (Chapters 5-8). Based on the three components of a rights-
system (Kent, 2002), in the empirical chapters I focus on rights-holders (Chapter 5), their rights 
(Chapter 6), duty-bearers (Chapter 7) and accountability (Chapter 8). I provide an overall analysis and 
answer the research questions in Chapter 9. 
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Chapter 3  
 
The Study Area and Methodology 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
An understanding of the context in which research is conducted is necessary in any study, but is 
particularly pertinent here for two reasons. Firstly, to analyse a social protection scheme it is 
necessary to understand the problem; the food and nutrition security situation of the area in which 
that scheme is implemented (FAO, 2008; Jonsson, 2003; 2005). To examine a SFP, one needs to 
understand the problems facing school-aged children specifically (FAO, 2008). Secondly, to begin to 
comprehend capabilities and capacity and the overall implementation of SFPs, it is necessary to 
understand the context in which SFPs are implemented. In Section 3.2, I provide such context. I 
discuss the choice of location and provide a profile of the study state, Rajasthan, as well as the 
sampled districts, blocks and locations. In Section 3.3, I detail the methodology used in this study. I 
begin by outlining the practicalities of conducting this research and subsequently explain the approach 
taken and methods used. I then outline the ethical considerations that guided the study before finally 
reflecting on the influence of my position on the research.  
 
3.2 Study Area 
3.2.1 Choice of Location  
 
Although a central Government scheme, the MDMS is implemented at the state level. Implementation 
therefore differs considerably between states (Drèze and Goyal, 2003; Khera, 2006, 2013; Planning 
Commission, 2010). For example, Tamil Nadu is considered an exemplary implementer of the 
MDMS, whereas Bihar is considered to have implemented the scheme poorly. The state is therefore 
an appropriate unit of analysis. Given the size of states and the personnel, financial and time 
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constraints of PhD fieldwork, a multi-state study was impossible. Therefore, I focused on one state: 
Rajasthan. As outlined in Chapter 2, I sought to examine PPPs in the MDMS. Centralised kitchens 
run by NGOs operate in 15 states and the UTs of Delhi and Chandigarh (see Section 4.6.3). I excluded 
the UTs as they would not enable research to be conducted into different geographical contexts. 
Second, I knew that proficiency in an Indian language would be required to conduct the fieldwork. I 
therefore learnt Hindi, beginning in 2012. I chose Hindi as it is widely spoken and therefore would 
not limit my choice of study state as a state-specific language would. Once the non-Hindi speaking 
states were excluded, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Haryana, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Uttar 
Pradesh remained. Third, I excluded states that would affect the wider applicability of the research; 
Haryana was excluded due to its proximity to Delhi and relative wealth and Bihar was excluded due 
to the poor implementation of the scheme in the state. Fourth, I needed a state in which I would be 
safe conducting fieldwork in rural areas. I therefore excluded Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand.  
 
From the list of 15 states, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh remained. From these, I 
selected Rajasthan for three reasons. First, Rajasthan is considered an exemplar of the use of PPPs in 
the MDMS (MHRD, 2016h) and thus could provide an insight into the PPP model. Second, although 
Rajasthan did not begin to implement the MDMS until 2001, it is considered to have implemented 
the scheme well (Khera, 2013; Planning Commission, 2010). Implementation of the MDMS in 
Rajasthan is therefore a direct result of the right to food case. Third, Rajasthan is a relatively safe 
state; there is a widespread presence of NGOs and in certain areas there are many tourists. It was thus 
a sensible choice practically, as well as academically. Although not a factor in my decision, Rajasthan 
provides an interesting setting for a study on the right to food as the 2001 PIL was launched on behalf 
of the people of Rajasthan (Section 1.1). 
 
Rajasthan has a population of more than 68 million and is India’s largest state by area. It was therefore 
necessary to focus on a sub-section of the state. Rajasthan is divided into 33 districts. I initially 
decided to focus on one district. Cross-referencing the presence of centralised kitchens and urban and 
rural locations, the two potential districts were Dungarpur and Udaipur. Udaipur city is larger than 
Dungarpur city with a population of almost 600,000 compared to 50,000. As I wished to examine the 
scheme in different contexts, a reasonably large urban area was preferred. I therefore selected 
Udaipur. On arrival in Udaipur, it transpired that the centralised kitchen run by the NGO the Naandi 
Foundation had closed (see Section 7.6.1). I therefore expanded the study area to include the 
neighbouring Rajsamand district, which has a centralised kitchen in the town of Nathdwara.  
 
Udaipur district has a population of 3.1 million and Rajsamand district has a population of 1.2 million 
(GOI, 2011a). It was therefore necessary to focus sub-sections of the districts. Udaipur district is 
divided into 11 tehsils (blocks) and Rajsamand into seven. One block in each district would have been 
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insufficiently representative; however, blocks are sizable both in terms of population and area. 
Therefore, I selected four blocks: Girwa and Kotra1 in Udaipur district and Khamnor and 
Kumbhalgarh in Rajsamand district (see Section 3.2.3). Girwa was selected to provide insight into 
the change from centralised to decentralised provision and the functioning of the MDMS in an urban 
area. Khamnor was selected as the MDM in the block is supplied from a centralised kitchen in 
Nathdwara. Kotra and Kumbhalgarh were selected to provide insight into the functioning of the 
MDMS in rural areas. This choice of blocks allows comparisons to be made. 
  
3.2.2 Rajasthan and the Study Districts  
 
Geography  
Rajasthan is a state in the north west of India (Figure 3.1), bordered by Punjab, Haryana, Uttar 
Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat and Pakistan. The largest city and state capital is Jaipur, which 
has a population of 3.05 million (GOI, 2011a). In total, one quarter of Rajasthan’s population reside 
in urban areas (ibid). As shown in Figure 3.1, Rajasthan’s geography is diverse. The Thar desert is in 
the west and the Aravalli Mountain Range extends across the state from southwest to northeast. 
Rajasthan has the lowest annual rainfall of all states and is particularly susceptible to drought (WFP, 
2009). Drought renders farmers incapable of meeting their food consumption needs (Bhargava, 2001), 
children more prone to PEM (Singh et al., 2006) and makes transitory food insecurity a problem 
(Sagar, 2000). 
                                                        
1 Both Kotra and Kumbhalgarh are the names of settlements as well as blocks. Throughout this thesis, I use 
‘Kotra’ and ‘Kumbhalgarh’ to refer to the blocks only.   
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Figure 3.1: A map of Rajasthan 
 
The districts of Udaipur and Rajsamand are in the south of Rajasthan (Figure 3.1). Udaipur is the 
larger of the two, both geographically and by population. The Aravalli hills run through both districts. 
The summer months (mid-March to June) are hot and dry, with an average maximum temperature of 
39 °C (GOI, 2013b). Rainfall increases in June with the arrival of the Monsoon and continues into 
July, August and September (ibid). Winters are cooler, although the average maximum temperature 
is still 24.2°C (ibid). For the duration of the fieldwork, I was based in the city of Udaipur. 
 
Demography and Socio-economic Characteristics  
Table 3.1 summarises the gender, religion and caste characteristics of the population of India, 
Rajasthan and the study districts. Compared to the national averages, a higher proportion of the 
population in Rajasthan is male, Hindu and belongs to SCs and STs. Compared to Rajasthan, the 
districts have a more even sex ratio and a higher proportion of Hindus and STs. Notably, almost half 
of the population in Udaipur district belong to STs. The prevalence of disadvantaged and vulnerable 
groups in the study area is significant in the context of the NFSA, which states that a ‘special focus’ 
should be given to ‘the needs of the vulnerable groups especially in remote areas and other areas 
which are difficult to access, hilly and tribal areas for ensuring their food security’ (NFSA, 2013).   
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Due in part to its religious composition, Rajasthan is predominantly vegetarian2 and has more 
vegetarians as a proportion of the population than any other state. In India, 28.4% of men and 29.3% 
of women are vegetarian, whereas in Rajasthan, these figures are 73.2% and 76.6% respectively (GOI, 
2016d). 
 
Table 3.1: Characteristics of the population (GOI, 2011a) 
Characteristic India Rajasthan Rajsamand Udaipur3 
Gender 
% population male 51.5 51.8 50.3 51.1 
Sex ratio (total) 940 928 990 958 
Sex ratio (rural) 947 933 998 966 
Sex ratio (urban) 926 914 948 929 
Religion 
(% of the 
population) 
Hindu 79.8 88.5 95.6 93.5 
Muslim 14.2 9.1 2.9 3.4 
Christian 2.3 0.1 0.1 0.2 
Sikh 1.7 1.3 0 0.1 
Buddhist 0.7 0.02 0 0 
Jain 0.4 0.9 1.3 2.6 
Other/Not stated 0.9 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Caste 
(% of the 
population) 
SC 16.6 17.9 12.8 6.1 
ST 8.6 13.5 13.9 49.7 
  
 
Rajasthan has a lower literacy rate than the national average (Table 3.2). Rajasthan’s female literacy 
rate is the second lowest in India, surpassed only by Bihar at 51.5% (GOI, 2011a).  
 
 
                                                        
2 In India, vegetarians consume neither meat, fish nor eggs.  
3 The total sample sizes used here and in every other table in this section (unless otherwise stated) are the total 
populations of these locations: India, 1,210,854,977; Rajasthan 68,548,437; Rajsamand district 1,156,597 and 
Udaipur district, 3,068,420. 
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Table 3.2: Percentage of the population (+7 years) that are literate (GOI, 2011a) 4 
 India Rajasthan Rajsamand Udaipur 
Population 73.0 66.1 63.1 61.8 
Male 80.9 79.2 78.4 74.7 
Female 64.6 52.1 48.0 48.5 
Urban 84.1 79.7 81.9 87.5 
Rural 67.8 61.4 59.5 54.9 
Urban Male 88.8 87.9 91.1 93.4 
Urban Female 79.1 70.7 72.8 81.2 
Rural Male 77.2 76.2 75.9 69.6 
Rural Female 57.9 45.8 43.3 39.8 
 
Nationally, 39.7% of India’s population work.5 Table 3.3 details the percentage of the population 
engaged in employment and the nature of the employment. The overall work participation rate is 
higher in the study districts than the state and national averages. A smaller proportion of workers in 
Rajasthan are engaged in main work than the national average. An even smaller percentage of the 
workforce are engaged in main work in the study districts. An absence of permanent work for almost 
40% of the workforce in Udaipur and 34% in Rajsamand is likely to have implications for labour-
based entitlements and thus for food security. A greater proportion of the workforce are engaged in 
agriculture in Rajasthan than the national average and in the study districts than in Rajasthan. In 2013-
2014, the average per capita annual income in Rajasthan was INR 65,974; higher than neighbouring 
Uttar Pradesh (INR 36,250) but considerably lower than in Punjab (INR 92, 638), Gujarat (INR 
106,831) and Haryana (INR 133,427) (GOI, 2015b).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
4 The sample sizes (the population above seven years) are: India, 1,046,339,724; Rajasthan, 57,898,933; 
Rajsamand district, 980,556; Udaipur district, 2,559,870. 
5 The GOI (2011) define work as performing any economically productive activity (for or not for 
compensation) within the previous year.  
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Table 3.3: Employment (GOI, 2011a) 
 India Rajasthan Rajsamand Udaipur 
The population that work (%) 39.8 43.6 47.6 44.5 
Workers in main work (6-12 months) (%) 75.2 70.5 65.8 60.2 
Workers in marginal work (3-6 months) (%) 20.1 23.5 27.6 31.3 
Workers in marginal work (0-3 months) (%) 4.6 6.1 6.5 8.5 
Workers that are cultivators (%) 24.7 45.6 37.7 39.5 
Workers that are agricultural labourers (%) 30.0 16.5 19.4 22.2 
Workers in household industries (%) 3.8 2.4 2.5 2.5 
Workers in other employment (%) 41.6 35.5 40.5 35.9 
 
The mean household size in India is 4.8, compared to 5.4 in Rajasthan, 4.7 in Rajsamand and 4.9 in 
Udaipur (GOI, 2011a). Table 3.4 shows indicators of living conditions. Generally, living conditions 
are poorer in Rajasthan than nationally, and worse in Udaipur district. The percentage of households 
with a latrine and with tap water is especially low in the study districts, likely to result in problems 
for utilisation (see Appendix A.2). 
 
Table 3.4: Indicators of Living Conditions (GOI, 2011a) 
Indicator Percentage of census households  India Rajasthan Rajsamand Udaipur 
Wall 
material 
Stone with mortar 10.8 38.4 72 31.5 
Stone without mortar 3.4 6.9 12.5 7.4 
Burnt brick 48.1 28.5 6.4 21 
Mud/unburnt brick   21.8 22.1 7.6 38 
House 
condition 
Good 53.2 51 45.1 44.1 
Liveable 41.5 45.1 51.2 52.6 
Dilapidated 5.3 3.9 3.7 3.3 
Water 
source 
Tap 43.5 40.6 35.4 24.5 
Well 11 10.8 19.1 23.8 
Tubewell/handpump 42 37.5 43.1 49.1 
Other (spring, river etc.)  3.5 11 2.3 2.6 
Latrine 
Latrine in home 46.9 35 20 24.4 
Public latrine 3.2 0.7 0.7 0.8 
Defecate in the open  49.8 64.3 79.3 74.8 
Main source 
of lighting 
Electricity 67.2 67 78.7 57.9 
Kerosene 31.04 30.9 19.4 39.5 
Other 0.8 1.2 1.3 2 
No light  0.5 0.8 0.6 0.5 
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Given these socio-economic trends, it is unsurprising that Rajasthan fares worse than the national 
average in terms of development indicators. The Human Development Index (HDI) is calculated 
based on life expectancy at birth, mean and expected years of schooling and per capita income. In 
2011, the United Nations Development Programme calculated the HDI for each Indian state 
(Suryanarayana et al., 2011). India had an HDI score of 0.504. Rajasthan had a lower score of 0.468, 
the fourteenth lowest of 19 states and between Bangladesh (0.469) and Ghana (0.467) (ibid).  
 
Food and Nutrition Insecurity 
There have been three state-level assessments of food security in India: Athreya et al.’s (2008) index 
of food insecurity in rural India, Athreya et al.’s (2010) index of food insecurity in urban India and 
Menon et al’s. (2008) State Hunger Index. Figure 3.2 illustrates Athreya et al.’s (2010) results. The 
highest rates of food insecurity in urban areas are found in Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa and 
Rajasthan. Together, with the other two indices (Appendix A.3.1), these studies show a noticeable 
geographical pattern in food insecurity; a belt of states in the north, from Gujarat to Bihar, have the 
highest rates of food insecurity whereas states such as Kerala and Punjab have low levels.  
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Figure 3.2: A map of urban food insecurity (data from Athreya et al., 2010) 
 
Rajasthan is not the most food insecure state. Rajasthan had the twelfth highest level of food 
insecurity in rural India (n=19 states), the fourth highest level of food insecurity in urban India (n=14 
states) and the eleventh highest level of food insecurity in the State Hunger Index (n=16 states). 
Rajasthan is, however, considered to have a ‘seriously alarming’ level of hunger (Menon et al., 2008) 
and to be moderately food insecure (Athreya et al., 2008).  
 
Food insecurity levels vary within Rajasthan. The WFP Food Security Index6 (2009b) for rural 
Rajasthan classified Udaipur as extremely food insecure and Rajsamand district as severely food 
insecure (Figure 3.3). Consequently, they are two of 22 districts in Rajasthan considered priority areas 
for intervention (ibid). The WFP’s (2009a) study of rural food security identified the western region 
of Rajasthan as one of three priority areas for action in India.  
                                                        
6 The Index was based on indicators of availability, access and absorption, which are outlined in Appendix 
A.3.1. 
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Figure 3.3: A Food security map rural Rajasthan (data from WFP, 2009b) 
 
Although useful, these indices use data from the 2001 Census, the 2005-2006 National Family Health 
Survey (NFHS) and the 2004-2005 National Sample Survey (NSS) and are therefore now dated. 
Furthermore, aggregating indicators obscures the prevalence of specific problems. Considering these 
limitations, the following discussion examines malnutrition levels drawing on the most recent data.7 
I use data from three-national level surveys: the NFHS-4 (2015-2016), the 2013 Rapid Survey on 
Children (RSOC) and, to permit comparison, the NFHS-3 (2005-2006)8. I also use data from the 
Annual Health Survey (AHS) which is conducted by the GOI in nine states including Rajasthan. 
 
Since 2005-2006, the prevalence of stunted and underweight children in India has decreased (Figure 
3.4). The extent of progress and whether wasting has decreased or increased, however, depends on 
the survey used. 
 
                                                        
7 The different sources of malnutrition data are discussed in Appendix A.3.2.  
8 The findings from the NFHS were published by the International Institute for Population Sciences in Mumbai 
(IIPS). NFHS-3 was published in 2006 and NFHS-4 in 2016. The results from the RSOC (2013) are published 
in a national report by the GOI and UNICEF (2016) and in state-level fact sheets by the GOI (2016c). Results 
from the AHS survey used here were published by the GOI (2014).  
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Figure 3.4: The prevalence of stunted, underweight and wasted children under five in India 
 
Regardless of the survey, the prevalence of malnutrition in India is still high and compares 
unfavourably to other countries (Dasgupta et al., 2016). Only five countries outside of South Asia 
have a higher rate of underweight children than does India (29.4%): Djibouti (29.8%), Chad (30.3%), 
Sudan (33%), Niger (37.9%) and Timor Leste (45.3%) (ibid).9 Although India has higher levels of 
economic development and lower levels of mortality than sub-Saharan Africa, India still has higher 
rates of child malnutrition, known as the ‘Indian’ or ‘South Asian’ enigma (Gillespie and Kadiyala, 
2015; Haddad, 2013; Headey et al., 2015; Pritchard et al., 2014; Ramalingaswami et al., 1999). 
 
The prevalence of PEM varies by state.10 To illustrate, Figure 3.5 shows the prevalence of 
underweight under-five year olds by state. Echoing the pattern in Figure 3.2, prevalence of this PEM 
indicator is highest in a band of states across north India, including Rajasthan.  
                                                        
9 The comparison is slightly limited by the different dates of the surveys.  
10 See Appendix A.3. 
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Figure 3.5: Percentage of under-fives in India that are underweight  
(data from GOI and UNICEF, 2016) 
 
Of the 28 states/UTs covered by the RSOC, Rajasthan had the eleventh highest prevalence of stunting, 
the seventeenth highest prevalence of wasting and the eighth highest prevalence of underweight 
children. Of the 26 states/UTs for which NFHS-4 data is available, Rajasthan had the fifth highest 
level of stunting, the ninth highest level of wasting and the sixth highest proportion of underweight 
children. As shown in Figure 3.6, findings from the different surveys vary considerably.  
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Figure 3.6: Prevalence of PEM in under-fives in Rajasthan 
 
Due to ‘intersecting inequalities’ (Kabeer, 2010a), indicators of malnutrition vary socially as well as 
spatially. Table 3.5 presents the prevalence of PEM by caste, religion, wealth and mother’s education. 
Children are more likely to be stunted if their mother has no education, if they are Muslim, if they are 
SC or ST and if they are from poor families.  
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Table 3.5: Malnutrition in under-fives in India (GOI and UNICEF, 2016) 
 Percentage of under-fives  
Stunted Underweight Wasted 
Caste 
SC 42.4 32.7 15.5 
ST 42.3 36.7 18.7 
OBC 38.9 29.3 14.8 
Other 33.9 23.6 13.6 
Religion 
Hindu 38.6 29.7 15.5 
Muslim 42.1 30.5 13.4 
Christian  32.2 21.9 15.4 
Sikh 28.7 17.4 10.7 
Jain 20 15.9 11.9 
Buddhist 26.7 26.2 22.0 
Wealth 
Index 
Lowest 20% 50.7 42.1 17.0 
Top 20%  26.7 18.6 13.0 
Mother’s 
Education 
No Education 48.7 37.9 15.3 
Below Primary 44.1 34.3 15.2 
Primary 39.8 30.9 15.2 
Middle 35.4 25.8 15.2 
Secondary 31.3 22.4 14.5 
Higher 
Secondary 
26.3 18.7 14.5 
 
I analyse trends in child malnutrition in India further in Appendix A.3. Here, two things are germane 
to understanding the nutritional context in which the MDMS exists. First, malnutrition among school-
aged children is high in the study area. As detailed in Table 3.6, children with a below-normal BMI 
and children with anaemia are prevalent in the study districts. Rajasthan also has the highest 
proportion of girls aged 10-18 years with a below normal BMI.  
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Table 3.6: Malnutrition in school-age children 
Indicator Group 
(years) 
Survey Percentage of children in the age group experiencing 
the indicator 
India Rajasthan Rajsamand Udaipur 
Below 
normal 
BMI 
5-18 AHS  NA 32.5 36.6 39.0 
Girls 10-
18  
RSOC 62.5 74.5 - - 
Anaemia 5-9 AHS - 85.7 88.8 82.0 
10-17 AHS - 81.4 84.6 79.8 
 
Second, food intake among school-aged children in India is inadequate. Ramachandran (2016) used 
data from the National Nutrition Monitoring Bureau (NNMB) surveys to calculate nutritional 
requirements based on average weight and intake (Table 3.7). Although the needs for adults are 
largely met, there are considerable deficits for children, particularly adolescents.  
 
Table 3.7: Required intake based on weight and actual intake (Ramachandran, 2016: 27) 
Group 
Required 
Intake  
(kcal) 
Actual 
Intake  
(kcal) 
Required - 
actual intake 
(kcal) 
Men 1989 2000 +11 
Women 1656 1738 +82 
Pregnant women 1906 1726 -180 
Children 1-3 years 840 714 -126 
4-6 years 1095 978 -117 
7-9 years 1379 1230 -149 
Boys 10-12 years 1729 1473 -256 
13-15 years 2208 1645 -563 
16-17 years 2514 1913 -601 
Girls 10-12 years 1469 1384 -85 
13-15 years 2030 1566 -464 
16-17 years 2130 1630 -500 
 
Indian diets are also often insufficient in several food groups (Desai et al., 2016a). For example, the 
intake of certain food groups by girls aged 10-12 years11, such as milk and green leafy vegetables 
(GLVs) is particularly low (Figure 3.7).  
 
                                                        
11I present the data for girls only as the percentages for boys are similar.    
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Figure 3.7: Consumption compared to RDA among girls aged 10-12 years (data from NIN, 2012) 
 
Unsurprisingly, the NIN (2012) found the consumption of key nutrients across age groups was 
inadequate. To illustrate, Figure 3.8 shows the inadequate intake of many key nutrients among 
children aged 4-9. 
 
 
Figure 3.8: Percentage of children aged 4-9 years consuming more than 70% of RDA  
(data from NIN, 2012) 
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In this section, I have shown the nutritional context within which the MDMS in Rajasthan exists. In 
the state, by the time children enter school 33-44% are stunted, approximately one third are 
underweight and 14-23% are wasting. More than 35% of 5-18 year olds are undernourished and 
between 81-85% are anaemic. The diets of these students are also lacking in both quantity and quality. 
 
3.2.3 The Blocks and Sampled Locations  
 
Geography  
I conducted fieldwork in four blocks: Girwa, Khamnor and Kumbhalgarh neighbour one another and 
Kotra, is in the west of Udaipur district, bordering Gujarat (Figure 3.9).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.9: A map of the four study blocks, Kotra, Girwa, Khamnor and Kumbhalgarh  
(shown in brown) 
 
Demography, Education and Employment 
A summary of the key characteristics of the population of each block is presented in Table 3.8. The 
proportion of STs is higher than the district average in all blocks and is particularly high in Kotra. 
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Across all blocks, the literacy rate is lower than the district average (Table 3.2) and is strikingly low 
in Kotra, where just 20.1% of the population and 12.5% of women are literate. The proportion of 
people engaged in main work is also lower in Girwa, Kotra and Kumbhalgarh than in India, Rajasthan 
and the study districts.  
 
Table 3.8: Characteristics of the population of each block as a percentage of the total population 
(GOI, 2011a) 
 Girwa Kotra Khamnor Kumbhalgar
h 
Population 289,070 230,532 202,715 144,231 
Location 
(% of the 
 population) 
Urban 1.5 0 2.2 0 
Rural 98.5 100 97.8 100 
Gender  
(% of the 
population) 
Male 51 50.6 50.2 48.8 
Female 49 49.4 49.8 51.2 
Caste  
(% of the 
population) 
SC 4.5 0.7 10.1 9.0 
ST 58.9 95.8 24.8 29.9 
Household size 4.8 5.5 4.7 4.4 
Literacy Rate  
(% of the 
population) 
Total  49.6 20.1 51.5 43.7 
Male  61.4 27.5 64.2 56.6 
Female 37.3 12.5 38.7 31.5 
Urban 63.2 - 66.8 - 
Rural 49.4 20.1 51.2 43.7 
Male rural 61.2 27.5 63.9 56.6 
Female rural  37.1 12.5 38.4 31.5 
Workforce  
(% of the 
population) 
Participate  41.7 51.4 53.8 51.2 
Main work 64.2 56.3 60.2 57.4 
 
Overall, one can say that Kotra is the least ‘developed’ block, followed by Kumbhalgarh, Khamnor 
and Girwa. 
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3.2.4 The Sampled Locations  
 
I sampled 43 schools and their respective catchment areas (see Section 3.3.4). Of the 43 schools, five 
were in Udaipur, two were in the town of Nathdwara and the remaining 35 were in rural locations. 
Figures 3.10-3.13 illustrate the geography of the sampled rural locations. 
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Figure 3.10: Case Study 2: The view from the village located 7km from school 
 Figure 3.11: Case Study 2: The outskirts of the main village.  
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Figure 3.12: Case Study 3, Kotra Block 
 
Figure 3.13: The area around School 40, Kumbhalgarh 
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In Table 3.9, I present a summary of the key characteristics of the population in the sampled locations. 
The table includes the range of values and the location for each and the average values by block. I 
provide a complete dataset in Appendix C.1. Notably, the majority of the population in the sampled 
locations in Kotra are ST and literacy levels are particularly low. At locations 14 and 15, female 
literacy was just 5.5%. In the six urban locations, on average 96.7% of people were engaged in ‘other’ 
occupations. Across the rural locations, on average 46.5% of the population were cultivators, 24.6% 
were agricultural labourers, 2.5% were engaged in household industries and 26.4% had other forms 
of employment.
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3.2.5 The Case Studies 
 
In the second stage of the research, I conducted four case studies of schools and their catchment areas. 
These case studies were selected from the 43 sampled schools. The case study (CS) schools were 
schools four (CS1), seven (CS2), 14 (CS3) and 26 (CS4). The four case study locations were chosen, 
in part, due to their different geographical contexts. CS1 was in Udaipur city. CS2 was in rural Girwa, 
one hour’s drive from Udaipur. CS3 was in Kotra and was the most remote of the four case studies, 
located 60km and a two-hour drive from Udaipur city. CS4 was in Khamnor, 44 km from Udaipur city. 
In Table 3.10, I present demographic and socio-economic information about the four locations. Notably, 
CS3 has the largest household size, the lowest proportion of females, the highest proportion of STs and 
the lowest literacy rates. In the first two case studies, the majority of people work for more than six 
months a year, whereas in the third and fourth the majority work for between three and six months. The 
main type of employment varies. 
 
Table 3.10: Comparison of the locations of the case studies (GOI, 2011a). 
  CS1 CS2 CS3 CS4 
Households 
Number of households 716 113 62 264 
Population 3,314 552 405 1,202 
Household Size 4.6 4.9 6.5 4.6 
Demographics 
(% of the 
population) 
Males  52.3 48.6 54.3 46.5 
< 6 years  11.6 12.7 24.9 17.1 
SC 1.6 38.8 0 0 
ST 1.6 0 99.5 22.3 
Literacy Rates 
Total (% of the population) 80.8 52.5 19.8 42.4 
Male Literacy rate (%) 85.5 69.0 29.5 55.1 
Female Literacy Rate (%) 75.8 37 5.5 31.4 
Employment  
(% of the 
population) 
Engaged in Work 32.4 48.7 46.9 57.3 
Main work 93.2 90 7.4 5.7 
Marginal work 3-6 months 6.6 7.4 78.4 64 
Marginal work 0-3 months 0.2 2.6 14.2 30.3 
Cultivation  0.7 52.8 1.1 52.1 
Agricultural Labourers 0.5 0 97.9 14.2 
Household Industry 6.1 8.9 1.1 0.1 
Others 97.2 38.3 0 33.5 
 
The above indicates potential variation in the severity of food insecurity between blocks and between 
sampled locations. The extent of food security in these locations is examined in Section 5.2.2. Overall, 
the indicators above show thatCS3 is the least ‘developed’, followed by CS4, CS2 and CS1. 
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3.3 The Methodology 
3.3.1 Introduction 
 
This research sought to explore the experiences and perspectives of the rights-holders, their 
representatives and the duty bearers in the MDMS. To do this, a range of methods were employed, 
including: surveys of households (n=724), teachers (n=43), cooks (n=31) and students (n=349); 
interviews with households (n=40); student essays (n=137); 24-hour food consumption recall with 
parents (n=424 cases)12 and students (n=389 cases); and focus groups (n=8). I also conducted interviews 
with experts (n=43). I supplemented this primary research with document and media analysis. In the 
following, I detail how this approach was implemented and explain why and how methods were used.  
3.3.2 Practicalities  
 
Language 
The lingua franca in the study area is Rajasthani. Mewari is the most commonly spoken dialect. Hindi 
is, however, spoken widely. Rajasthani and Hindi are similar; they use the Devanagari script, have a 
near identical grammar and share much vocabulary. Instruction in Rajasthani or Mewari is also difficult 
to access in the UK. Therefore, learning Hindi was a sensible choice. By the time I embarked upon 
fieldwork, I could read and speak Hindi confidently, though not fluently. Although this knowledge of 
Hindi proved invaluable, languages and dialects varied considerably between villages, to the extent that 
at school 16, teachers who were not from the village struggled to communicate with the cooks who 
were. To solve this problem, I employed two research assistants who acted as translators. Although 
translators make research more expensive and time-consuming, can inhibit flow and can detrimentally 
affect relationships with participants (Bujra, 2006; Müller, 2007; Watson, 2004), they were necessary 
for this project. Of course, translators are not neutral conveyors of information (Temple, 2002). To 
minimise this limitation as far as possible, I repeatedly told my research assistants to translate verbatim, 
and reflected on their influence throughout. Due to the similarities with Hindi, I could check what was 
being said. 
 
With the exception of the interviews with government officials, I conducted expert interviews in 
English. Hindi, Mewari and Adivasi languages were used for all other methods. My research assistants 
translated all questions from English into Mewari and then adapted them to local languages as 
necessary. Closed questions were recorded as codes and open-ended questions were recorded in 
                                                        
12 As the same respondent did three recalls (three days), the term ‘cases’ is used to denote the total number of 
days covered.  
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English, with the occasional word or phrase in Hindi. Student surveys and essays were asked and 
answered in Hindi.  
 
Assistants 
I employed two research assistants; one male and one female to ensure that both men and women could 
comfortably participate in the research. Having two research assistants also minimised the risks 
associated with the fieldwork and allowed research to be undertaken when I was not present. A local 
NGO helped me to find my first assistant, Pooja. She then introduced me to the second, Kamlesh. There 
was a brief period when Kamlesh could not work, during which I hired another assistant, Vinod. All 
three had previous experience working as research assistants. I also interviewed other candidates who 
were unsuitable. Although my research assistants lived in Udaipur, they were from ‘the village’ (i.e. 
rural Rajasthan) and were familiar with rural life. This meant the research participants were more likely 
to accept them and, by proxy, me. Although I did not consider caste when I employed them, they also 
belonged to different castes. On the odd occasion that caste was mentioned, participants were happy to 
learn an assistant was from the same caste as them. Pooja and Kamlesh’s knowledge of the local area 
also proved invaluable. 
 
Risks 
The Department of Geography at the University of Cambridge approved a risk assessment before the 
fieldwork began. Despite taking necessary precautions to minimise risks throughout the fieldwork, there 
were two occasions when risks were especially high. On arrival at school six, we were informed that a 
few days earlier cars on the only road to the village had been stopped and the passengers had been 
violently robbed. When we left, we encountered the aftermath of such an event. We got through 
unharmed and decided not to return. On the second occasion, we visited a hamlet where a potential 
respondent was drunk and aggressive. We quickly left and decided not to include the school in the 
sample.  
 
3.3.3 Research Design 
 
Approach 
To answer the research questions outlined in Section 2.8, quantitative and qualitative approaches were 
required. I therefore adopted a pragmatic mixed-methods approach. A pragmatic approach is based on 
the premise that quantitative and qualitative research are not inherently incompatible; that ‘all human 
inquiry involves imagination and interpretation, intentions and values but must also necessarily be 
grounded in empirical embodied experience’ (Yardley and Bishop, 2008: 355). In a pragmatic 
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approach, research questions drive the choice of methods (Onwuegbuzie and Leech, 2005) and 
quantitative and qualitative methods, techniques, approaches and concepts are combined (Johnson and 
Onwuegbuzie, 2004). The value of mixed-methods research has been recognised within geography (for 
example: Hamnett, 2003; McKendrick, 1999; Philip, 1998) as well as in the study of food security 
(Coates et al., 2006). I used mixed methods to triangulate information, for clarification and elaboration, 
to inform subsequent methods and to expand the inquiry to include all dimensions of food security and 
a right to food (see Greene et al., 1989). I used qualitative and quantitative methods equally and 
concurrently, taking a ‘fully interactive approach’ (Morse, 1990; 2003; Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2009). 
The research strategy was designed to provide triangulation not only of methods, but also of 
investigators and data (Denzin, 1978). 
 
Chronology 
Fieldwork was conducted between August 2014 and July 2015. I began my fieldwork in Rajasthan by 
visiting two schools with an NGO worker; one in Udaipur city and one in a rural location. These trips 
provided an initial understanding of how the scheme functions which informed my research strategy. 
After recruiting my research assistants, I undertook a pilot study in two locations. The pilot study 
highlighted that my initial questionnaire was too long and that some questions required revision. The 
main period of fieldwork followed a three-part sequential design. The first stage focused on gaining a 
broad insight into how the MDMS functioned and was perceived by rights-holders, their representatives 
and duty-bearers. Between September and December 2014, I visited 43 schools and conducted 
household surveys in their respective catchment areas. The second stage, conducted between January 
and May 2015, focussed on gaining a deeper insight into the scheme. To do so, I focussed on four 
schools and their respective catchment areas. I used household surveys and 24-hour recall. The third 
stage was undertaken between May and July 2015 and examined the implications of the MDMS not 
being served in the summer vacation. I supplemented the research with interviews with experts and the 
analysis of documents and media reports. The research design involved repetition, asking the same 
survey and repeating measures. Therefore, after a few months, my research assistants were experienced 
in using the methods and I left them to conduct research when I was not present. This enabled me to 
occasionally spend days conducting interviews and to return to the UK in December 2014 and May and 
June 2015, when the research assistants conducted the research without my presence. Quality was 
controlled by frequent checks of progress and the data, and in the case of interviews, by checking 
recordings. I returned to India in July 2015 to finish conducting expert interviews in Delhi.  
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3.3.4 Stage One 
 
School Interviews 
As there can be more than one school in a single location, schools rather than locations were chosen as 
the starting point for the research. To permit some degree of generalisation, I randomly selected schools 
from a list of all MDM-eligible schools in the four sampled blocks. I selected 13 schools in each block. 
My aim was to visit the first 10; the remainder acted as back-up options in case certain schools were 
closed, inaccessible or unsafe. In total, I visited 47 schools. Three were closed bringing the total sample 
to 44; 23 in Udaipur and 21 in Rajsamand. The seventeenth and eighteenth schools visited were 
technically separate but were on the same grounds and shared a MDMS. Therefore, for analysis, these 
two schools were considered as one (school 17), bringing the sample to 43. Three more schools were 
sampled than originally intended. School 11 in Udaipur district was included to provide insight into the 
MDMS in a Madarsa. In Kotra, the sample included a boys’ school. As households had children at the 
neighbouring girls’ school as well, I also included the girls’ school, bringing the total to 11. An eleventh 
school was included in Kumbhalgarh as, in my absence, my research assistants lost track of how many 
schools they had visited. A summary of the types of schools in the sample is provided in Table 3.11 
(further details are provided in Appendix C.2). This sample is larger than most other studies on the 
MDMS (Section 2.2.4); however, the number of schools sampled is an obvious limitation of this 
research. 
 
Table 3.11: The number of schools sampled 
Type of School Girwa Kotra Khamnor Kumbhalgarh 
Primary (1-5)  3 3 3 6 
Upper Primary (1-8) 1 4 4 1 
Girls Upper Primary*  2 1 1 1 
Secondary (1-10) 2 0 1 1 
Senior Secondary (1-12)  2 2 0 1 
Shiksha Karmi13  0 1 1 1 
Madarsa 1 0 0 0 
Total  11 11 10 11 
Total number of schools 
in the block (2014) 
433 359 301 397 
Percentage visited 2.5 3.1 3.7 2.8 
       *Mixed in grades I-V, girls only in grades VI-VIII. 
                                                        
13 Due to the difficultly of getting formally trained teachers to teach in remote areas, the Shiksha Karmi initiative 
was started in 1987. Shiksha Karmis (education workers), typically from the local area with only a school-level 
education, were employed as teachers (Ramachandran and Sethi, 2001). 
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I obtained permission to conduct research in schools from the District Education Officers (DEOs). I 
also informed each block education office about the research. On arrival at each school, we explained 
the purpose of the research and presented permission letters from the DEOs. After receiving permission 
from the head-teacher, we interviewed the head-teacher and/or the teacher responsible for the MDMS 
(known as the ‘Midday-meal-in-charge’). To collect standardised information, I completed a form 
(Appendix C.3), which covered the food served, the organisation of the scheme and teachers’ opinions. 
I followed up on certain topics, such as the closure of the centralised kitchen in Girwa, and recorded 
responses using supplementary notes.  
 
Cook Surveys 
At each decentralised school, we asked one of the cooks a series of questions to verify what the teacher 
had told us and to explore the cook’s perspective (n=31). As most cooks were busy and shy, a structured 
interview was used and answers recorded on a standard form (Appendix C.4). Where possible, surveys 
were conducted away from teachers to minimise the influence of the teacher on the cooks’ responses. 
 
Observation 
During each school visit, we observed the MDM being served. I completed an observation checklist 
(Appendix C.5), detailing the infrastructure, organisation and the type of food served. Observation 
provided new information and allowed me to verify the information provided by teachers and cooks. 
These checklists were supplemented by additional notes, such as whether anything seemed altered by 
our presence. When there was enough food, we tasted the MDM and took notes. 
 
Household Surveys 
Household14 surveys were conducted to assess parents’ opinions and to determine rights-holders’ 
backgrounds. I sampled students’ households within the school catchment area. Ideally, I would have 
randomly sampled from a complete list of the addresses of all households with children enrolled at the 
school. Such a list was not available. Furthermore, the surrounding area had no street names and often, 
no streets. As true random sampling was impossible, we instead gauged how many houses were in the 
catchment area and where they were located, both by observation and by asking teachers. We then 
selected the households as randomly as possible. This method worked well in villages with a single 
school; however, it was more difficult to implement in urban locations where children from one street 
went to several different schools.  
 
                                                        
14 Here, I use GOI’s (2011a) definition of a household: those living under one roof and sharing food from the 
same kitchen.  
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When sampling, one is faced with the question of breadth or depth (Flick, 2014). At this stage in the 
research, breadth was necessary. The objective was not to generate data that could be applied to the 
entire population, but instead, to gain insight into how the MDMS was functioning in each location. I 
chose to survey 10 households in each location. A larger sample would surely have improved the data; 
however, it would have compromised the breadth of research by limiting the total number of sampled 
schools. Fewer than 10 households may not have provided sufficient insight into each location. On 
reflection, I consider 10 households to have been sufficient. In total, 431 households were surveyed in 
the first stage. Access to households was negotiated individually. Households that did not wish to 
participate were not surveyed.  
 
All household surveys were conducted as structured interviews (Appendix C.6). Surveys conducted in 
this manner provide simple and straightforward insight into attitudes, allow generalisation and data 
standardisation and allow the interviewer to clarify points; however, the surveys can be affected by the 
interviewer’s competency and responses may be influenced by respondents not being anonymous 
(Robson, 2011). Despite these limitations, it was not possible to use written questionnaires due to high 
levels of illiteracy (see Section 5.2.1). We tried to minimise the limitations associated with interviews 
by standardising questions and emphasising anonymity. Typically, one of my assistants conducted the 
interview, one recorded the answers and I took notes. The surveys included classification questions 
about the respondent and household, factual questions concerning food consumption and MDMS use, 
opinion questions concerning the scheme and open questions regarding grievances and satisfaction with 
the MDMS (May, 2001). The survey was created following the widely recognised guidelines on 
wording questions (Robson, 2011); short, simple questions were used and leading or negative questions 
were avoided.  
 
To minimise risks, I conducted household surveys during daylight hours only. Consequently, 
households in which all adults worked during the day were excluded from the sample. This is a key 
limitation of all the household surveys conducted. 
 
3.3.5 Measuring Food Security  
 
As indicated in Section 3.2.2, existing measures of district-level food security are now out-dated. 
Moreover, here I aimed to examine the food security levels of the sample of rights-holders rather than 
the population. For these reasons, the household surveys included measures of food security. The 
multiple methods that can be used to assess food security are reviewed in Appendix C.7. In this study, 
I used the Food Consumption Score (FCS) and the Household Food Insecurity Access Scale (HFIAS). 
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Food Consumption 
The FCS method involves asking participants on how many days in the previous seven days they have 
consumed food from nine food groups. The frequency, between zero and seven is recorded. A weight 
is given to each food group (Table 3.12) that reflects the quantity of energy, protein and micronutrients 
(Jones et al., 2013). The frequency is multiplied by the weight and all are added to give a score. The 
food source (e.g. own production) is also recorded. 
 
Table 3.12: Food consumption score groups and weights (WFP, 2008) 
Food Group Weight 
Staples 2 
Pulses 3 
Vegetables 1 
Fruit 1 
Meat, fish and eggs 4 
Milk 4 
Sugar 0.5 
Oil 0.5 
Condiments 0 
 
The maximum score (when all food groups are consumed daily) is 112. Households can be placed into 
three categories according to their score (Table 3.13). When oil and sugar are homogenously consumed 
regularly, modified cut-offs are used (Jones et al., 2013; WFP, 2008). One can also conduct cluster 
analysis of the FCS data to determine whether there are trends in food consumption. 
 
Table 3.13: FCS cut-offs 
Food Consumption  Standard Modified 
Poor 0-21 0-28 
Borderline 21.5-35 28.5-42 
Acceptable  35+ 42+ 
 
The WFP have used the FCS method to allow quick decisions to be made regarding food security 
interventions, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa (Jones et al., 2013; WFP, 2008). I employed the FCS 
method as it provides insight into both dietary diversity and the frequency of food consumption (Jones 
et al., 2013; WFP, 2008), correlates with calorie intake and dietary diversity (Kennedy et al., 2010; 
WFP, 2008; Wiesmann et al., 2009), is standardised (WFP, 2008) and is easy for participants to 
understand (Wiesmann et al., 2009). Indeed, participants had no trouble understanding and answering 
the questions, even if they often found the process amusing.  
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Using the FCS method in this study, however, is complicated by the greater dietary diversity in South 
Asia than in sub-Saharan Africa, which may not indicate greater food security (Smith and Wiesmann, 
2007; Wiesmann et al., 2009). The Indian context also differs due to the high rates of vegetarianism. I 
discuss these issues further in Appendix C.7. Due to these limitations, the FCS data presented here 
should not be compared to results from other studies. Furthermore, due to the influence of greater 
dietary diversity on the overall scores, I have steered away from using the FCS to indicate poor, 
borderline and acceptable consumption. Instead, I use the FCS to show overall patterns of consumption. 
24-hour food consumption recall was also conducted (Section 3.3.6) to verify data from the FCS.   
 
Food Insecurity 
The HFIAS is an adapted version of the US Household Food Security Survey Module15, for use in low- 
and middle-income countries. The survey assumes that experiences of food insecurity share many 
commonalities across cultures. The survey assesses how frequently nine experiences of food insecurity 
were encountered in the previous four weeks. These nine questions are grouped into three domains 
(Table 3.14). 
Table 3.14: HFIAS questions (Coates et al., 2007: 5). 
Domain Questions 
1. Anxiety/uncertainty 
about food  
1. Did you worry that your household would not have enough food? 
2. Insufficient quality 
 
2. Were you or any household member not able to eat the kinds of 
foods you preferred because of a lack of resources? 
3. Did you or any household member have to eat a limited variety of 
foods due to a lack of resources? 
4. Did you or any household member have to eat some foods that 
you really did not want to eat because of a lack of resources to 
obtain other types of food? 
3. Insufficient food 
intake and its 
physical 
consequences. 
 
5. Did you or any household member have to eat a smaller meal 
than you felt you needed because there was not enough food? 
6. Did you or any household member have to eat fewer meals in a 
day because there was not enough food?  
7. Was there ever no food to eat of any kind in your household 
because of a lack of resources to get food?  
8. Did you or any household member go to sleep at night hungry 
because there was not enough food?  
9. Did you or any household member go a whole day and night 
without eating anything because there was not enough food? 
 
                                                        
15 An 18-question experiential survey used in the US.  
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If the person being surveyed answers affirmatively, the frequency with which the situation described in 
each question was experienced is recorded. Frequency is classified as rarely (once or twice), sometimes 
(three to 10 times) and often (more than 10 times). These frequencies are respectively allocated the 
numbers one, two and three. The sum of the frequencies generates a score. The lowest possible score is 
zero and the highest is 27 (Coates et al., 2007). Households are then categorised as food secure and 
mildly, moderately or severely food insecure based on the pattern of answers (Table 3.15). As the 
severity of the situation increases with each question, one expects that the number of people answering 
affirmatively and that the frequency reported decrease for each question. 
 
Table 3.15: Categories of food insecurity (access) from Coates et al. (2007: 20) 
Question Frequency 
Rarely Sometimes Often 
1 Secure Mildly Mildly 
2 Mildly Mildly Mildly 
3 Mildly Moderately Moderately 
4 Mildly Moderately Moderately 
5 Moderately Moderately Severely 
6 Moderately Moderately Severely 
7 Severely Severely Severely 
8 Severely Severely Severely 
9 Severely Severely Severely 
 
The HFIAS is a demonstrably valid measure of food security (Gebreyesus et al., 2015; Maes et al. 
2009) and provides results that are positively correlated with other food insecurity indicators (Desiere 
et al., 2015; Faber et al., 2008; Knueppel et al., 2009). The HFIAS has been found to provide a valid 
measure of food insecurity in India (Chatterjee et al., 2012) and has been successfully used by several 
researchers in India (Heylen et al., 2015; Srivastava et al., 2014; Tang et al. 2011). The method does, 
however, have limitations. In Burundi (Desiere et al., 2015) and Ethiopia (Maes et al., 2009), found 
that scores increased over time despite deteriorating access to food. The decreased scores were due to 
changing subjective assessments. This highlights the need to use more than one measure of food 
security. 
 
In this study, I first discussed the appropriateness of the HFIAS questions with my research assistants. 
My assistants were initially confused by the differences between questions two, three and four. Once I 
had carefully explained the differences, there were no problems implementing the method. Coates et 
al. (2007) suggest that the survey should be conducted with the member of the household responsible 
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for preparing food, typically a female adult. Although we attempted to speak to the mother, if a man 
was present, as was common, they usually preferred to answer; this was a limitation of this study. In 
total, in household survey one (HS1), 224 respondents (52.2%) were male. In household survey two 
(HS2), 79 (50%) were male. How gender affects perceptions of food security in the study requires 
further study.  
 
To assess validity, scores from the FCS and HFIAS were compared using a Spearman’s rank correlation 
coefficient. In HS1, HFIAS scores were found to be significantly related to the FCS scores in HS1(rs=-
.52, p=<0.001) and HS2 (rs=-.47, p=<0.001). 
3.3.6 Stage Two 
 
The second stage of the research focused on case studies. Multiple cases strengthen a study as they 
provide insight into different contexts (Yin, 2009). For this reason, I selected four case study schools 
and their catchment areas. From the list of schools sampled in the first stage, I removed schools that 
were in potentially dangerous locations, were more than two hours from Udaipur city or where the 
households had been very difficult to find. I then chose four that would permit comparisons between 
location and delivery mechanisms (Table 3.16).  
 
Table 3.16: Case study locations 
Characteristic CS1 CS2 CS3 CS4 
School Number  4 7 14 26 
School Type Girls’ upper primary Secondary Primary Upper Primary 
Enrolment 79 240 42 118 
Block Girwa Girwa Kotra Khamnor 
District Udaipur Udaipur Udaipur Rajsamand 
Urban/Rural Urban Rural Very rural Rural 
Delivery Model Decentralised 
(formerly centralised) 
Decentralised Decentralised Centralised 
 
School Visits 
At each case study location, we visited the school daily whilst we were conducting research in the 
catchment area. At the school, we recorded attendance, the number of students and adults eating the 
meal, the food being served and the quantity of the raw ingredients used (n=54 days). I also weighed 
three cooked servings of the meal. 
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Household Surveys 
Household surveys were conducted following the same selection procedure as in stage one. HS2 
(Appendix C.6.2) repeated some questions from HS1, including the measures of food consumption and 
security. Questions on income and expenditure and 24-hour food consumption recall were also 
included. The aim was to conduct at least 40 surveys in each case study. This was impossible in CS3 
because there were not enough households. In CS1 and CS2, more than 40 households were surveyed 
(Table 3.17); however, I deemed several surveys to be unreliable and removed them from the sample. 
I detail the proportion of households and children surveyed as a percentage of school enrolment in Table 
3.17. CS2 covers the lowest percentage of enrolled children; due to higher enrolment in the school and 
inflated attendance and enrolment figures (Section 5.3.3). In CS3, attendance figures were higher than 
enrolment figures, and it is probable that some students that attended the school had not officially 
enrolled. 
 
Table 3.17: Sample sizes, household survey two 
Case 
Study 
Household surveys Children at 
case study 
school 
School 
Enrolment 
 
% of enrolled 
children’s 
households 
covered by survey 
Original 
sample 
Final 
sample 
CS1 43 37 43 79 54.4 
CS2 41 38 46 240 19.2 
CS3 36 36 50 42 119 
CS4 50 50 75 118 63.6 
Total 170 161 214 479 44.7 
 
24-hour Recall  
I conducted 24-hour food consumption recall with parents to determine the food the students consumed 
at home and thus to examine the MDM in the context of overall food consumption. The recall method 
requires first asking the respondent to list everything they ate and drank in a certain reference period, 
in this case the previous 24 hours. Details of food preparation and the quantity consumed are then 
recorded. I chose to conduct 24-hour food consumption recall as it allows the direct measurement of 
recent consumption (Pérez-Escamilla and Segall-Corrêa, 2008) and therefore could be used to determine 
food consumption at home. The aim was not to accurately calculate the macro and micronutrient content 
of diets, as this would have required the recalls to be extremely detailed and therefore time consuming 
and would also have required the skills of a nutritionist. Instead, the aim of the recall was to determine 
overall patterns of consumption. 
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Due to reliance on memory, the recall method is prone to high levels of measurement error (ibid). For 
this reason, I conducted the recall three times at each stage. To permit comparison of the MDMS with 
lunch at home, one reference day was a Sunday, i.e. the recall was conducted on a Monday. In this 
study, respondents were asked what their child ate in the previous 24 hours. The quantity of dishes such 
as vegetables was standardised using measuring cups. We also recorded the typical size of rotis. In 
total, recall data was recorded for 424 cases; 93 in CS1, 60 from CS2, 99 from CS3 and 172 from CS4. 
To avoid atypical consumption, days surrounding festivals were avoided. At the end of each recall, the 
respondent was asked whether the consumption reported was typical. When respondents reported 
atypical consumption, for example due to attendance at a wedding, the recall was excluded.  
 
3.3.7 Research with Children  
 
Geographers (e.g. Holloway and Valentine, 2004; Jeffrey and Dyson, 2008) and those studying food 
security (Nord and Bickel, 2002; Nord and Hopwood, 2007) have increasingly recognised the 
importance of considering children’s views in research. Accompanying this surge of research on and 
with children, has been considerable discussion of appropriate research methods (e.g. Ansell et al, 2012; 
Barker and Weller, 2003; Morrow and Richards, 1996; Punch, 2002). Informed by this literature, my 
research with children considered the different interests and abilities of children and was flexible. 
During the preliminary and pilot visits to schools, I discussed the abilities of the students with teachers. 
From these discussions, it was apparent that the youngest children would be unable to participate as 
they could not write well and were shy. Research was therefore conducted with students in grade V and 
above.  
Student Surveys 
During the first stage of school visits, we asked one or two students in each school their opinion of the 
MDMS. This direct approach was unsuccessful as the students were shy and their answers were 
influenced by the teacher. I did not use this data. Instead, written questionnaires were used at the case 
study schools. The survey (Appendix C.8) collected information on the food consumption patterns of 
students and their opinions of the MDMS. Using a written method allows students to think about their 
answers and removes the pressure to provide a “correct” answer (Punch, 2002). The surveys were 
anonymous, to encourage honesty. Questions were simple to prevent confusion and the surveys short 
to prevent boredom. During the data entry process, I discarded any surveys that had been completed 
incorrectly. In total, 349 surveys were included in the analysis; 62 from CS1, 150 from CS2, 22 from 
CS3 and 115 from CS4.  
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24-hour Recall 
24-hour food consumption recall was also conducted with students. Students wrote down their recall, 
as asking each student directly would have been too time-consuming and our involvement may have 
affected their answers. We carefully explained the exercise to the students, who took to it quickly. As 
with the recall conducted with parents, we completed the exercise three times and one reference day 
was a Sunday. In total, 389 “days” of recall were included in the final analysis; 124 from CS1, 102 from 
CS2, 40 from CS3 and 123 from CS4. Partial, illegible and clearly dishonest forms were excluded. At 
CS4, a teacher had completed the forms. Consequently, I discarded these forms and repeated the 
exercise. Although inconvenient, this showed that the teacher had no idea what the students ate at home.  
 
Essays 
Essays can provide a large amount of data easily and have been shown to work well with literate 
children (Johnston, 2008). I therefore used essays to gain a deeper insight into children’s opinions of 
the MDMS. To encourage the students to give time and attention to essay-writing, I awarded a small 
prize for the most detailed essay. It was necessary to obtain permission from teachers to do all exercises, 
particularly the essay-writing which was time-consuming. Unfortunately, teachers in two schools used 
this warning to alter the results. In CS2, teachers told students in grades VI-VIII what to write (i.e. ‘The 
food in our school is very good’). These essays were easy to identify and were excluded. At CS4, one 
teacher wrote the essays himself whilst my research assistants were in another classroom. I excluded 
these essays and my assistants returned and repeated the exercise. The total number of essays collected 
and used are detailed in Table 3.18. An example of an essay is provided in Appendix C.9.  
 
Table 3.18: Number of essays collected and included in the sample 
Case study Total  Final sample 
CS1 41 41 
CS2 108 47 
CS3 12 12 
CS4 66 37 
Total 227 137 
 
Research was only conducted with children in school. Consequently, children not attending or not 
enrolled were excluded. Considering time constraints and practicalities, it was not feasible to try and 
locate these children. Including the voices of these children is a potential, and I believe, an important 
avenue for future research.  
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3.3.8 Stage Three  
 
Household Surveys 
 
To explore experiences in the summer, another household survey (Appendix C.6.3) was conducted with 
the same households as HS2. The HFIAS and FCS were also repeated, to enable temporal comparison. 
Specific questions about experiences during the summer vacation were also asked. Respondents were 
also asked their opinion of eggs in the MDMS, an issue raised during the expert interviews. As some 
participants were not present during the third stage of research, the sample size was smaller for 
household survey three (HS3) than HS2 (Table 3.19). 
 
Table 3.19: Sample sizes in the second and third household surveys  
Case Study  HS2 HS3 
CS1 37 29 
CS2 38 37 
CS3 36 36 
CS4 50 30 
Total 161 132 
 
24-hour Recall  
Food recall was repeated to assess food intake during the summer. The recall was conducted twice as 
there was no need to compare school days and non-school days. In total, 293 cases of recall were 
conducted; 70 in CS1, 75 in CS2, 105 in CS3 and 43 in CS4.  
 
Interviews  
To further explore perceptions of the MDMS and experiences of food insecurity, we conducted 10 
interviews with selected participants at each case study (n=40). Interviews were conducted at this point 
in the research as sufficient rapport had been established with interviewees. Interviews were semi-
structured, as the research at this point required depth and flexibility not sufficiently offered by 
structured interviews (Tracy, 2013). We used an interview guide, which covered the impact of the 
MDMS, what happened during the summer vacation and household’s access to food. Interviews were 
recorded and subsequently translated by my research assistants. 
 
Focus Groups 
Two focus groups were conducted in each case study. Each group had four or five participants; a 
manageable number and a small enough group to allow personal accounts to be uncovered (Barbour, 
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2007). The topics covered were: school attendance, discrimination, the quantity and quality of the 
MDMS and household food consumption. The group discussions were useful to examine areas of 
consensus and disagreement among the participants (Tracy, 2013; Valentine, 2005).  
 
3.3.9 Additional Methods  
 
Visits to Centralised Kitchens 
An aim of this research was to examine the decentralised and centralised models of delivery. To gain 
further insight into the latter, I visited two centralised kitchens, one in Jaipur and the other in Nathdwara. 
These visits were undertaken to understand how centralised kitchens function, from discussions with 
the kitchen managerial staff and observation. Centralised kitchens are known to be hard to find and/or 
their staff reluctant to speak to researchers (Samson et al., 2008; Shankar and Natasha, 2010). After I 
had approval from head-office, access was not a problem. Gaining access to other centralised kitchens, 
however, proved difficult. I had intended to visit centralised kitchens in Delhi; however, the contact 
details of the NGOs were hard to find. Even when contact details were found, organisations did not 
reply. I did, however, visit an NGO-run ICDS kitchen in Delhi, which provided insight into a smaller-
scale centralised cooking facility.   
 
Expert Interviews 
Here, an ‘expert’ is defined as those possessing ‘technical, process and interpretative knowledge that 
refers to a specific field of action, by virtue of the fact that the experts acts in a relevant way, (for 
example, in a particular organizational field)’ (Bogner and Menz, 2009: 54). At the beginning of the 
research, some interviews had an exploratory purpose; however, most interviews were systematic, used 
to access the specialised knowledge of the expert to obtain systematic information (ibid). In total, I 
conducted 43 interviews (Table 3.20). I purposefully sampled interviewees according to their position 
and expertise on the MDMS.  
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Table 3.20: Expert Interviewees 
Interviewee  Number of Interviews 
Government official  Block 4 
District 6 
State 1 
National 1 
Bureaucrat 4 
Academic/Researcher 13 
Activist 1 
NGO 12 
Journalist 1 
Total  43 
 
I conducted interviews in Udaipur, Jaipur, Delhi and London. The majority of interviews were 
conducted in April and July, 2015. The interviews were semi-structured. When appropriate and when 
permission was granted, interviews were recorded. Otherwise, I took detailed notes.  
 
Documents 
I obtained MDMS records from schools and block and district officials to provide information on a 
larger number of schools (see Table 3.21). The ease of accessing this information varied, due to the 
adequacy of record-keeping in schools and the reluctance of some schools and offices to share 
information.     
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Table 3.21: MDM Records 
Type of record Information   Number of days 
covered by the 
records 
School-level MDM 
record 
Attendance, grain use CS1 21 
CS2 67 
CS3 34 
CS4 460 
School 23 132 
School 24 196 
School 25 223 
School 29 191 
Total 1324 
Yearly school 
forms 
Attendance, MDM 
consumption, grain use, the 
number of cooks 
Girwa 269 schools 
Monitoring data 
Schools visited, 
infrastructure, 
implementation, food served, 
cleanliness 
Girwa 108 
Kumbhalgarh 71 
 
To understand the design of the scheme and to provide an indication of the extent to which the findings 
in this study are applicable elsewhere, I also analysed documents produced by national and state level 
governments. Recognising that documents can not only inform decisions but also ‘constitute particular 
readings of social events’ (May, 2001: 176), documents were also used to understand how the scheme 
is perceived. The type and number of documents analysed are listed in Table 3.22. 
 
Table 3.22: Government documents 
Type Year Number 
Guidelines/Orders  1995-2016 24 
Annual Work Plan and Budget (write-up, tables 
and appraisal) 
2015-2017 321 
National Steering-cum-monitoring committee 
(Minutes) 
2009-2016 10 
Empowered committee (Minutes)  2014 2 
Joint Review missions (Report)  2009-2016 46 
Rajasthan half-yearly monitoring reports (Report)  2010-2015 23 
Total  426 
 
To permit comparison with larger trends, I have supplemented the primary data and data from 
documents with secondary data. When statistics on the population were needed, I have used data from 
the 2011 Census (GOI, 2011a). For figures relating to education, I have used data from the Unified 
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District Information System for Education (U-DISE), published by the National University of 
Educational Planning and Administration (NUEPA).  
 
Media Reports  
To examine safety and accountability, I analysed the content of media reports. I had originally intended 
to use the newspaper archives of six newspapers, including national and Rajasthani papers. However, 
online archives did not exist. Instead, I sourced articles using the newspaper search software, 
LexisNexis India. Electronic searches can generate false positives (a word has several meanings) and 
false negatives (a term is too precise) and remove the article from its context (Deacon, 2007). 
Furthermore, Lexis Nexis searches a selection of newspapers only. However, my intention was to 
analyse newspaper articles to gain an insight into instances of MDM-caused illness, rather than to count 
all instances as such information is already available (Barnagarwala, 2013; Thakur, 2016). For this, 
LexisNexis was sufficient. I searched for instances of ‘Midday meal’ or ‘mid day meal’ with ‘sick’, ‘ill’ 
or ‘well’, between 1 January 2002 and 4 September 2015. The search produced 908 results. I discarded 
irrelevant or duplicate reports, leaving 143 articles, which referred to 115 incidents. For each, I recorded 
the key details.   
 
3.3.10 Data Entry and Analysis 
 
I input data from observation, quantitative data from all surveys, recall and lunch measurements into 
Microsoft Excel. I then cleaned the data and analysed it in R. The statistical tests used are detailed as 
relevant in Chapters 5-8. I typed the qualitative data from surveys, interviews and focus groups into 
Microsoft Word. I then analysed these in Atlas.ti. I also analysed documents using this software. For 
all qualitative data, I initially conducted open coding; I read through the transcripts and documents 
several times and identified recurring themes. The initial coding framework included codes such as 
‘payment for CCHs [cook-cum-helpers] is too low’ and ‘payment for CCHs is delayed’. I then grouped 
these codes into categories, for example ‘CCH Payment’ and conducted coding using these categories. 
The only qualitative data not typed or analysed in this manner were the essays which were handwritten 
in Hindi. As typing in Devanagari script is difficult and the essays were easy to understand, I analysed 
the essays manually following the same coding method as for the digitised data.  
 
3.3.11 Ethics 
 
The Department of Geography granted this research ethical approval. Throughout, I adhered to the 
ethical standards of the Department, the University, the Economic and Social Research Council and the 
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Indian National Committee for Ethics in Social Science Research in Health. I conducted the research 
with complete transparency; the purpose, process and outcomes of the study were fully disclosed to 
participants. Research was only conducted with informed consent. To ensure informed consent was 
reality not rhetoric (Wiles et al., 2005), on arrival at each household, we explained who we were, the 
research aims, process and outcomes. We emphasised that we were independent and not working for 
the government or an NGO. Before beginning the work, we asked explicitly for verbal consent; written 
consent was inappropriate due to the low literacy levels. Some people did not want to speak to us and 
therefore were left alone. Others did not want to answer certain questions and therefore these questions 
were skipped. We also sought permission before taking photographs and efforts were made not to 
include the faces of children. It was necessary to record the names of respondents to enable us to return 
to households and to cross-reference data. This information has been stored securely and will be deleted 
once no longer necessary. To maintain the anonymity of participants, I have not included the names of 
any people or specific locations in this thesis.  
 
The research adhered to the principles of non-maleficence and beneficence. We minimised disturbance 
by conducting research at suitable times and in suitable locations and minimised stress by avoiding 
particularly sensitive topics. We minimised any potential harm by ensuring anonymity. Ultimately, the 
direct benefits of my research for participants were limited, which I made clear. I was clear that just 
because they told me about problems, it did not mean I could fix them. Efforts were, however, made to 
bring some short-term benefits, without compromising the research. To show my gratitude for their 
participation in the research, I provided fruit at the case study schools, gave the occasional food item to 
children and households during surveys, provided snacks during focus groups and gave pens to the 
children and sporting equipment to the case study schools. We also shared knowledge when it transpired 
that people were not getting entitlements, particularly widows who were not receiving their pensions. 
At CS1, we also visited government offices on behalf of two widows.  
The research highlighted irregularity in the implementation of the MDMS. Reporting every deviation 
would have repercussions for the teachers, which would have compromised my relationship with them. 
However, when school 15 was found to have not served the MDM for over a month, to adhere to the 
principle of beneficence, I clearly had to do something. Some villagers knew they had to complain to 
the Block Education Officer (BEO), but due to their illiteracy, they could not write the necessary letter. 
We therefore wrote what they dictated and told them what to do with the letter. By the time we returned 
to this village, the meal was being provided again. At the end of the fieldwork, we also informed the 
block and district level officials which schools were not providing the MDM.  
The ethical considerations above apply to children; however, specific issues arise from the competency 
and vulnerability of children (Morrow and Richards, 1996). Informed consent for children’s 
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participation was sought from the teachers. The purpose and content of the research was also carefully 
explained to the children in the local language and they were encouraged to ask questions. Luckily, the 
safety of the children was never found to be at risk and thus confidentiality did not have to be broken. 
To minimise any negative outcomes and to maximise enjoyment, the methodology was chosen 
according to children’s needs, competencies and culture (ibid).  
 
3.3.12 Positionality 
 
How my position influenced the research process varied. Narayan’s (1993: 671-672) oft-cited 
description of positionality is apt here:  
 
The loci along which we are aligned with or set apart from those whom we study 
are multiple and in flux. Factors such as education, gender, sexual orientation, 
class, race or sheer duration of contact may at times outweigh the cultural identity 
we associate with insider or outsider status. 
 
Position is about more than being an ‘insider’ or ‘outsider’; these categories are relative, changeable 
and complex (Chacko, 2004; Merriam et al., 2016; Srivastava, 2006b; Sultana, 2007). Yet, as a white 
British female conducting research in rural Rajasthan, I was certainly an outsider. Although most 
participants could not comprehend where I was from, it was apparent that I was not local. I attempted 
to ‘blend in’ more, wearing traditional Indian clothing even if my assistants were wearing jeans and t-
shirts; however, I would never fully blend in. Furthermore, as experienced by other researchers (e.g. 
Sherif, 2001; Stiedenroth, 2014), my marital status (unmarried) frequently came up during the research 
process and created confusion. My lack of caste and inability to speak the local language only added to 
the confusion. Using two research assistants who were ‘insiders’ was thus vital and I believe minimised 
the negative impact of my position on the data collection process as far as possible. Despite my position 
as an outsider, people were welcoming. Echoing Sultana’s (2007) experience in Bangladesh, we were 
often treated as guests; offered the best seats and sometimes water, tea and food, which we were obliged 
to accept.  
 
My position as an outsider in the school environment, however, differed. In the school environment, 
anyone not a teacher or government official was an outsider. Thus, both myself and my assistants were 
outsiders. Schools were often apprehensive about our presence, fearing repercussions. Consequently, 
some teachers altered their behaviour, for example providing a meal when they otherwise would not 
have. To minimise our impact on the MDM served as far as possible, in the first stage we conducted 
surprise visits to schools.  
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As was also found by Scott et al. (2006), my foreignness closed some doors but opened others. Being 
an outsider helped me gain access, such as to the officials needed to grant permission. Still, this was 
rarely easy. As found by others such as Kovàcs and Bose (2014), my gender affected the interview 
process. Often officials in Delhi and Udaipur were confused by my position as a young female 
researcher and gaining permission required persistence. In Rajsamand, officials were more welcoming. 
When conducting interviews with block and district-level officials, my status as a young female 
researcher created scepticism. Some men presumed that I knew little about the scheme. Consequently, 
a ‘rhetorical interview’ (Meuser and Nagal, 1991) often ensued, whereby the interviewer discussed the 
basics of the MDMS which I already knew. Although I was explicit about my position, some 
interviewees seemed determined to talk at me. As experienced by Sultana (2007), the ‘othering’ of me 
by such officials sometimes led to guarded and rushed interviews, which negatively impacted the 
richness and depth of the data collected. In others, I smiled and nodded for 30 minutes before proceeding 
to ask my questions.  
 
Sometimes officials felt the need to assert their power, choosing to speak to Kamlesh instead of me. 
Although frustrating, in such situations I let Kamlesh take the lead. As experienced by Srivastava 
(2006b), my position at an elite university opened opportunities for me to speak to officials and 
academics. I expect this was also influenced by my status as a foreigner (Dam and Lunn, 2014). Experts 
were also welcoming as they shared a common interest in the research topic, which benefited the 
research by enabling rich and in-depth interviews.   
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Chapter 4 
 
The Design of the MDMS 
 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
In this Chapter, I outline how the MDMS is designed and intended to function. I begin by examining 
the objectives of the MDMS. In the rest of the chapter, I examine the proceduralisation- ‘the enacting 
of (legal or informal) laws and rules of procedure and access’ (Harriss, 1991:4)- and the proposed 
allocation of resources within the MDMS. To do so, I consider the three components of a rights-
system in turn, beginning with the rights-holders and their rights and followed by the duty-bearers 
and their duties and accountability mechanisms.  
 
4.2 Rationale  
 
4.2.1 Objectives 
 
The GOI launched the National Programme of Nutritional Support to Primary Education (NP-NSPE) 
in 1995 in response to two problems: high levels of child malnutrition and non-universal elementary 
education (GOI, 1995b). The aim of the programme was to ‘enhance the nutrition status of school-
age children’ and to ‘hasten the march to universalisation of elementary education’ (ibid: 6). The GOI 
anticipated that providing food at school would address the average nutritional deficit of 628 kcal and 
6-7g of protein that had been identified in the 1991-1992 NNMB survey of eight states. The GOI 
perceived the scheme as a continuation of the efforts of the ICDS to address child malnutrition. The 
GOI also recognised that school feeding could compensate for the cost of education and therefore 
incentivise families to send their children to school (ibid).  
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In December 2004, the MHRD launched a revised NP-NPSE, that aimed to: 
 
1. Boost universalisation of primary education (classes I-V) by improving enrolment, 
attendance, retention and learning levels of children, especially those belonging to 
disadvantaged sections,  
2. Improve nutritional status of students of primary age, and 
3. Provide nutritional support to students of primary stage in drought-affected areas 
during summer vacation also. (2004: 4) 
 
With this revision, the MHRD expanded the educational aims of the MDMS and rendered it more 
than a means of encouraging enrolment. The provision of the meal in drought-affected areas during 
the summer vacation turned the MDMS into a safety net, intended to protect food consumption during 
drought. The 2004 guidelines also included several secondary objectives: the ‘inculcation of hygienic 
habits, discipline, and spirit of equality among children’ (MHRD, 2004: 11), as well as the provision 
of work experience for children, for example in account management or meal distribution. The 
guidelines also stated that the MDMS should be utilised for micronutrient supplementation and de-
worming (ibid). Following the April 2004 Supreme Court Order, that ‘In [the] appointment of cooks 
and helpers, preference shall be given to Dalits, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes’, the MHRD 
also stated that preference in the employment of cooks should be given to women, particularly 
belonging to SCs and STs.  
 
In 2006, the MHRD launched new guidelines, which have not since been updated. These guidelines 
state that the scheme’s overarching objective is ‘to address two of the most pressing problems for the 
majority of children in India… hunger and education’ (2006: 6). The specific objectives are: 
 
1. Improving the nutritional status of children in classes I-V in Government, Local Body 
and Government aided schools, and EGS [Education Guarantee Schools] and AIE 
[Alternative and Innovative Education] centres. 
2. Encouraging poor children, belonging to disadvantaged sections, to attend school more 
regularly and help them concentrate on classroom activities. 
3. Providing nutritional support to children of primary stage in drought-affected areas 
during summer vacation.  
 
There is a tension in the 2006 Guidelines between the identified problem of hunger and the aim to 
improve nutrition. Hunger is ‘a state, lasting for at least one year, of inability to acquire enough food, 
defined as a level of food intake insufficient to meet dietary energy requirements’ (FAO, 2015). In 
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contrast, undernutrition refers to protein-energy malnutrition (PEM) and micronutrient deficiencies 
(ibid)1. Thus, one can give food to children to address their hunger, without addressing undernutrition.    
 
The 2006 guidelines did not include the objective to increase enrolment; instead, attendance and 
classroom hunger became the focus of the educational objective. The 2006 guidelines also included 
secondary objectives. The MHRD considered the scheme capable of fostering equality between 
castes, class and genders. The guidelines also mention the provision of employment of women, 
although the specific involvement of SCs and STs is not mentioned. The MHRD described how the 
MDMS would be complemented by deworming and micronutrient supplementation (ibid: 25), a shift 
from the 2004 guidelines which stated that the MDMS would be utilised for these purposes. There is 
no reference in the 2006 guidelines to the provision of work experience. Overall, using the categories 
presented in Table 2.1, the MDMS is intended to protect consumption during droughts, to promote 
enhanced capabilities and to transform gender and caste relations.    
 
The current objectives are inconsistently recognised by duty-bearers at the national level, highlighting 
the fact that the state is not one unitary actor. In their 2010 report on the NP-NSPE, the Public 
Accounts Committee (PAC) noted that, despite the changing objectives, the design of the MDMS had 
not changed. The report consequently argued that the objectives of the scheme were unclear. In 
response, the Secretary of the Department of School Education and Literacy (SE&L) stated that the 
Department has two programmes for the universalisation of primary education: Sarva Shiksha 
Abhiyan2 (Education for All Campaign) and the MDMS. The Secretary went on to say:  
 
The objective of the Scheme is also to increase enrolment, attendance and retention, 
to improve nutritional status of the children in elementary schools, to decrease the 
number of drop-outs, to teach them hygienic practices, to develop the feeling of 
togetherness and social harmony because of the opportunity to eat together and to 
break social divide such as caste, gender community [sic] divides… There has been 
some rephrasing of the objectives in the revised guidelines of the Mid-Day Meal 
Scheme. But the basic purpose remains the same to address the class room hunger 
and to create an environment for universalisation of elementary education through 
addressing class room hunger. (in PAC, 2010: 7).  
 
                                                        
1 These terms are discussed further in Appendix A. 
2 Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA), launched in 2000, is the GOI’s ‘flagship programme for achievement of 
Universalization of Elementary Education’ (GOI, 2016e). Initiatives of the campaign include opening new 
schools in locations without schools, improving school infrastructure, providing extra teachers and giving 
further training to teachers. 
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The Secretary’s statement is at odds with the 2006 guidelines, which do not mention enrolment. The 
statement also suggests that addressing classroom hunger will encourage universalisation, based on 
the assumption that children do not attend school due to hunger.  
 
Evident in the Secretary’s statement is an overall emphasis on education. This focus on education is 
reflected in the scheme’s administrative organisation. The MDMS is under the remit of the 
Department of SE&L in the MHRD; not the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare which is 
responsible for the National Rural Health Mission or the Ministry of Women and Child Development 
which is responsible for the ICDS. The MDMS therefore does not neatly fit into a single sector, such 
as nutrition policy and is not managed by a department of nutrition. 
 
The MDMS’s objectives are also inconsistently recognised across states. Each state/UT produces an 
Annual Work Plan and Budget (AWPB) which provides data on the previous year and a plan for the 
following. Of the 31 AWPBs in 2015-2016, 27 listed enrolment, attendance and retention as the 
MDMS’s objectives, while three listed only two of these. Twenty-four AWPBs listed nutrition as an 
objective, typically in vague terms such as ‘improving’ or ‘benefiting’ nutrition. Eleven mentioned 
social benefits, particularly for the disadvantaged. Improved school performance is mentioned in 
eight. Malnutrition is explicitly mentioned only in the reports for Bihar (Government of Bihar, 2015), 
Tamil Nadu (Government of Tamil Nadu, 2015) and Telangana (Government of Telangana, 2015).  
 
4.2.2 A Right to Food and Food Security  
 
As outlined in Chapters 1 and 2, in 2001 the MDMS became a legal entitlement under a right to food 
and following the 2013 NFSA, became central to efforts to realise food security. These objectives are 
not, however, reflected in official discourse. References to either ‘food security’ or ‘the right to food’ 
are absent from the 2006 guidelines and the 2015 MDMS Rules (GOI, 2015a). The term ‘food 
security’ is found in just two AWPBs from 2015-2016: Andhra Pradesh (Government of Andhra 
Pradesh, 2015) and Telangana (Government of Telangana, 2015). The ‘right to food’ is not referred 
to in any of the AWPBs.  
 
Consideration of the right to food and food security are also lacking in the conceptualisation of public 
policy. Food security is multi-dimensional; a product of food availability, access, utilisation and 
stability (See Appendix A.2.5). The schemes included in the NFSA primarily provide access to food. 
Although the importance of availability and utilisation are recognised in Schedule IV of the NFSA, 
little detail is provided. Section 31 of the NFSA states that the Central and State Governments should 
progressively realise access to: 
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a) safe and adequate drinking water and sanitation;(b) health care;(c) nutritional, 
health and education support to adolescent girls; (d) adequate pensions for senior 
citizens, persons with disability and single women’.  
 
No further details on how the above might be achieved is provided in the Act. Notably, in the 2014 
guidelines for the Swach Bharat (Clean India) initiative (Ministry of Urban Development, 2014), no 
reference is made to food security, the right to food or the NFSA. Thus, whilst the GOI recognises 
the multi-dimensional causes of food insecurity, the MDMS and the other schemes included in the 
NFSA focus primarily on the provision of food. Considering the MDMS in light of the discussion of 
the capability approach in Section 2.4.4, the scheme focusses on providing food to hungry people 
not nutritional functioning.  
 
4.2.3 Measurement  
 
Strikingly, the objectives outlined in both the 2004 and 2006 guidelines are vague; there is no mention 
of the extent to which nutrition should be improved and no timeline for the realisation of the 
objectives. Assessing the success or failure of the MDMS as earlier discussions of public policy were 
prone to do (Section 2.8), would therefore be difficult. For example, would a slight improvement in 
attendance or nutrition merit the label of ‘success’ or would a more substantial improvement be 
required?   
 
Due to the conflation of the MDMS and SSA, the GOI has failed to monitor the outcomes of the 
MDMS. The PAC noted: ‘the Ministry [MHRD] had not established any system to assess the outcome 
of the scheme in terms of well-defined parameters’ (2010: 6). In response, the Secretary of SE&L 
stated that ‘no separate mission has been created for the Mid-Day Meal Programme as it is seen as a 
programme that should serve the ends of the SSA’ (in ibid: 7). The MHRD wrote: ‘There are so many 
interventions, including Mid-Day Meal Scheme, to attract and retain children in schools. It will not 
be possible to analyse direct relationship [sic] between increase in school attendance and Mid-Day 
Meal Scheme. Further, the attendance in school is also dependent on several other factors’ (in ibid: 
9).  
 
The nutritional impact of the scheme is also not measured. The MHRD also considered the 
measurement of nutrition to be the duty of the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare and that 
nutrition should be measured in the NFHS (PAC, 2010: 8). The NFHS, however, would only measure 
nutritional status rather than the nutritional impact of the MDMS. From this data, one might be able 
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to see district, state and national level trends in child nutrition, but it would be difficult to attribute 
these trends to the MDMS. Attempts are made to map the health of school children through the School 
Health Programme. According to the GOI (2013c), in the School Health programme children are 
screened bi-annually and, if necessary, are referred for further treatment. Indeed, during the course of 
the research, I saw records detailing the names, age, height and weight of children; however, these 
initiatives are not linked to the MDMS. It is not the case that if a child is identified as being 
malnourished then they receive a larger or a more nutritious MDM. Drawing on the discussion of 
biopolitics and data in Section 2.5.2, although the nutritional status of India’s children is mapped 
through various surveys and data is collected on children at the school level, these findings are not 
connected to the MDMS. In the absence of such data, it is difficult to know the extent to which the 
MDMS has achieved its objectives.  
 
4.3 Right-Holders  
 
In 1995, the GOI argued that the NP-NPSE should not target the most disadvantaged children only, 
stating that ‘one cannot and should not discriminate among children in the distribution of cooked 
food’ (24). The GOI also recognised that the ‘universal provision of food to all the students can be a 
potent solvent of social barriers and inhibitions’ (ibid: 24). For this reason, the scheme covered all 
children at the primary level in government, local-body and government-aided schools; more than 
96% of primary schools at the time. Other schools were not covered as most of them were ‘either 
unrecognised or high fee charging schools catering to the better off families’ (ibid: 27). There was an 
assumption that need and school category overlapped.  
 
When the MDMS was launched, it was for children at the primary-level (grades I-V), although the 
future expansion to upper primary (grades VI-VIII) was seen as necessary for the universalisation of 
elementary education (ibid). The MDMS’s coverage has expanded over time, as detailed in Table 4.1. 
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Table 4.1: Expansion in the coverage of the MDMS 
Date Group included 
October 2002  The GOI launched the EGS and AIE initiative which created EGS and AIE 
centres to provide informal education to out-of-school-children without a 
school within 1km of their home. Students at EGSs and AIEs were 
automatically included in the MDMS 
September 2007 All children at the upper primary level (MHRD, 2007) 
April 2008  All children at madarsas/maqtabs recognised as government-aided or 
EGS/AIE interventions (MHRD, 2008) 
October 2011 All children at National Child Labour Project (NCLP) schools - schools or 
rehabilitation centres for children previously engaged in labour (GOI, 
2016b). 
 
The NFSA (2013: Section 5.1.b) stipulated that: 
 
In the case of children, up to class VIII or within the age group of six to fourteen 
years, whichever is applicable, one mid-day meal, free of charge, everyday, except 
on school holidays, in all schools run by local bodies, Government and 
Government aided schools, so as to meet the nutritional standards specified in 
Schedule II.  
 
In August 2014, the nomenclature was changed; EGS/AIE and NCLP schools were to be referred to 
as Special Training Centres. Therefore, ‘the institutions to be covered under Mid Day Meal Scheme 
would be termed as Government schools, Government aided schools, Special Training Centres and 
Madrasas & Maqtabs supported under Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan’ (MHRD, 2014). 
 
Education in India has, however, changed since the MDMS was launched. In recent years, the number 
of private schools has risen dramatically. Between 2006-2014, enrolment in private schools increased 
from 18.7% of school-going children to 30.8% (Wadhwa, 2014). In particular, low-cost private 
education has expanded, especially in urban areas (Härmä, 2011; Tooley and Rangaraju, 2015). Fees 
at low-cost private schools range from just INR 80 per month to INR 800 (The Economist, 2015a; 
Thorat, 2011). The expansion of private education is attributed to the declining quality of government 
schools especially relative to private schools alongside an increased demand for education and an 
increased ability to pay (De et al., 2002; Härmä, 2011; Kingdon, 2007; PROBE, 1999). Even the 
Rajasthan Department of Education stated in their 2015 Public Private Partnership in School 
Education Policy that the ‘quality of education in government schools has been deteriorating as 
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compared to private schools’ and that there is ‘better learning outcome [sic] in private schools’ 
(Government of Rajasthan [GOR], 2015c: 1).  
 
Private schools are not, however, accessible to all. Scholars (Härmä, 2011; Srivastava, 2006a; Tooley 
and Dixon, 2006; Vasavi, 2003) have found that children from certain groups, particularly 
traditionally lower castes, Muslims, Christians and girls are more likely to be enrolled in government 
schools than private schools. As noted by the Rajasthan Elementary Education Department, ‘students 
from poorer sections of society are dependent on government schools for schooling’ (GOR, 2015c: 
1). The MHRD stated (in PAC, 2010: 8) that: 
 
It is generally understood that amongst the children attending Government schools, 
a large number belong to the disadvantaged social and economic groups of the 
society. It [the MDMS] serves the purpose of bringing the children of poor and 
disadvantaged groups to schools.  
 
The MDMS is also targeted by grade/age. The NFSA stipulates that those up to grade VIII or age 14 
are rights-holders ‘as applicable’.  
 
The NFSA also recognises the needs of specific groups, stating a ‘special focus’ should be given to 
‘the needs of the vulnerable groups especially in remote areas and other areas which are difficult to 
access, hilly and tribal areas for ensuring their food security’ (NFSA, 2013: paragraph 38). The NFSA 
and 2015 Rules on the MDMS (GOI, 2015a) do not outline what a ‘special focus’ means in practice.  
 
The identification of those in need of school-feeding in India differs from SFPs elsewhere. Individual 
or spatial targeting based on need does not occur; rather, targeting is based on the assumption that 
those who attend government schools are those in need. It is therefore necessary to understand 
whether this assumption is valid (see Chapter 5). Similarly to other SFPs, the MDMS is conditional 
on school-attendance; children not enrolled at school or not attending regularly cannot access the 
MDM. It is therefore necessary to understand the consequences of targeting and conditionality in the 
MDMS (Chapter 5).  
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4.4 Entitlements  
4.4.1 Quantity and Nutritional Needs 
 
The Quantity of Entitlements 
When the MDMS was launched in 1995, the GOI stated that if given the choice between a hot meal, 
pre-cooked food and grains, hot meals are ‘likely to be the most satisfying to the rural communities 
and is likely to have best [sic] outcomes’ (1995b: 24). In 1995, local bodies were granted two years 
to provide cooked or pre-cooked food. Pre-cooked food was to be served in urban areas only as it was 
deemed inappropriate for rural areas due to difficulties of access, taste preferences and the associated 
higher costs (ibid). The food served in the scheme was expected to have the calorie equivalent of 
100g of wheat or rice, per student, per day (ibid). Until local bodies could provide hot meals, 3kg of 
food grain were to be allocated per month to every student with a minimum attendance of 80%. The 
choice of food was left to local bodies.  
 
The MDMS changed significantly following the 2001 Supreme Court Order, which ordered the 
provision of ‘a prepared mid day meal with a minimum content of 300 calories and 8-12 grams of 
protein each day of school for a minimum of 200 days’. The conditionality of regular attendance was 
removed. The stipulated quantities of grain, calories and protein have since increased (Table 4.2).  
 
Table 4.2: GOI food norms for the MDMS 
Item Primary 
level 
1995 2004 2006 2007 2013 
Grain (g) Lower 100g 100 100 100 100 
Upper  NA NA NA 150 150 
Calories 
(kcal) 
Lower Equivalent to 
100g of grain 
300 450 450 450 
Upper NA NA NA 700 700 
Protein (g)  Lower Not specified 8-12 12 12 12 
Upper  NA NA NA 20 20 
Micro-
nutrients 
Lower  Not stated Not stated Adequate 
Quantities 
Adequate 
Quantities 
Not 
stated Upper  NA NA 
 
The 1995 guidelines stated that ‘the endeavour should be to bridge the average nutritional gap of 
about 600 cal. through a balanced diet of cereals, pulses, oil and vegetables’ (GOI, 1995b: 8), which 
constitute one third of daily calorie needs. The scheme was also intended to bridge the 6-7g deficit in 
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protein intake. The GOI assumed that ‘if the energy gap is bridged, the protein gap will be 
automatically filled’ (ibid: 8). The scheme was intended to cover 60-70% of the identified calorie gap 
(Section 4.2). The MHRD does not refer to the percentage of calorie intake to be fulfilled by the 
MDMS in the 2004 and 2006 guidelines, but do mention the provision occasionally. For example, in 
the report on the 2016 Joint Review Missions (JRMs)3 the MHRD states: ‘The programme aims at 
providing one meal out of the three meals for children in the schools which should provide at least 
one third of the calories and half of the protein of Recommended Daily Allowance’ (2016e: 3). The 
MHRD assumes that the MDMS will supplement food at home and state that ‘it needs to be explained 
to parents belonging to weaker sections that School Mid-Day Meal [sic] is meant to be in addition to, 
and not a substitute for meals’ (2006: 19).  
  
In 2009, the MHRD issued more precise guidelines on meal composition, detailed in Table 4.3. 
 
Table 4.3: Meal Composition Guidelines (MHRD, 2009a) 
Ingredient Amount for lower primary 
students (g) 
Amount for upper primary 
students (g) 
Grain 100 150 
Pulses 20 30 
Vegetables (including green 
leafy vegetables) 
50 75 
Oil and fat 5 7.5 
 
The MHRD stipulated that there should be ‘adequate quantities of micronutrients like iron, folic acid, 
vitamin-A etc.’ in the MDM (2006: 6); however, there is no further discussion of micronutrients in 
the 2006 guidelines or subsequent orders. It is unclear what might constitute an ‘adequate quantity’ 
and what the additional nutrients indicated by ‘etc.’ might be. As micronutrients are essential for child 
development (Section 2.2 1 and Appendix A) and are often lacking in the diets of Indian children 
(Section 4.4.6), it is surprising that the GOI has not considered the micronutrient content of the MDM 
in more depth. 
 
Defining Need 
The GOI have not published figures on the theoretical contribution of the MDM to recommended 
daily intake of calories, protein or each ingredient. My own calculations are provided in Appendix 
D.1 and summarised in Table 4.4. Due to the different needs of children by age and gender, the 
                                                        
3 JRMs are a team of experts that visit sampled schools in selected districts in a state to rigorously assess the 
MDMS. The missions submit detailed reports on their findings to the GOI.  
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theoretical contribution of the MDM to RDAs varies considerably. The provision of one third of 
calories and half of protein requirements are inconsistently fulfilled across each group. 
 
Table 4.4: Theoretical MDM contribution to RDA as defined by NIN (2011) 
Group Age 
Group 
Theoretical MDM contribution to RDA (%) 
Calories Protein Cereal Pulses Vegetables Oil/fat 
Boys and 
Girls 
4-6 33.3 59.7 83.3 66.7 33.3 20 
Boys and 
Girls 
7-9 26.6 40.7 55.6 33.3 25 16.7 
Boys 
10-12 
(LP)  20.5 30.1 33.3 33.3 16.7 14.3 
10-12 
(UP) 32.0 50.1 50 50 25 21.4 
Girls 
10-12 
(LP) 22.4 29.7 41.7 33.3 16.7 14.3 
10-12 
(UP) 35.0 49.5 62.5 50 25 21.4 
Boys 13-15 27.3 36.8 35.7 40 25 16.7 
Girls 13-15 30.0 38.5 45.5 50 25 18.8 
 
The specified quantity of calories, protein and each ingredient in the MDMS does reflect changes in 
need by age; upper primary school students receive more food than lower primary students. However, 
this two-fold distinction based on school grade (which may not overlap with age) is as complex as 
the interpretation of need gets in the MDMS. Differences in need by activity levels are also not 
considered. The RDAs published by the NIN (2011) do not account for activity level among children 
or any other variable that affects need such as health. The reason for this simplification of need is 
clear; the NIN seek to issue general guidelines. What this shows, however, is that even the theoretical 
contribution of the MDMS to meeting daily needs is difficult to assess.  
 
Overall, there has been little attempt by the GOI to assess needs or the contributions that the MDMS 
can make to meeting these needs. Moreover, the consideration of needs that is present in the MDMS 
is top-down. There is thus the need to consider whether the MDMS contributes to both dietary and 
perceived needs (Chapter 6).   
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4.4.2 The Menu 
 
The menu is decided by each State/UT government and varies considerably across India. For example, 
rice and sambhar are served alongside eggs in Tamil Nadu, whereas in Punjab, dal or vegetables are 
served with roti or rice. When the MDMS was launched in Rajasthan in 2001, ghoogri (boiled wheat) 
was served daily (Drèze and Goyal, 2003). Following the 2004 Supreme Court Order, schools started 
serving a more diverse and appetising menu. The current menu is shown in Table 4.5. Vegetables 
should be served four times per week and fruit once. Centralised kitchens must also provide 
something extra two days a week. The menu in Rajasthan is vegetarian. The food can be changed 
once per week according to local taste, although it is unclear as to who should define local taste; 
teachers or students. 
 
Table 4.5: The MDM menu in Rajasthan (GOR, 2016d) 
Day Decentralised Centralised 
Monday Roti, vegetables Roti, vegetables, plain rice 
Tuesday Rice and dal with vegetables Roti, dal, sweet rice 
Wednesday Roti dal Roti, dal or dal bati 
Thursday Khichdi (dal, rice with vegetables) Roti, vegetables and plain rice 
Friday Roti dal Khichdi (rice, dal and vegetables) 
Saturday Roti, vegetables Roti, vegetables 
Additional 
items 
One day food according to local taste. 
One day fruit 
One day food served according to local 
taste. On two days something extra 
should be provided and it is mandatory 
to serve fruit on one day per week.  
 
The quantities of ingredients and the calorie and protein content of the MDM per child per day as 
reported by the GOR are detailed in Table 4.6. 
 
Table 4.6: Quantity and nutritional content of the MDM (GOR, 2014a) 
Item 
Lower Primary Upper Primary 
Quantity 
(g) 
Calories 
(kcal) 
Protein 
(g) 
Quantity 
(g) 
Calories 
(kcal) 
Protein 
(g) 
Grain 100 346 11.8 150 519 17.7 
Pulse 20 67 4.5 30 100.5 6.75 
Vegetables* 50 NA 0 75 NA 0 
Oil 5 90 0 7.5 120 0 
Total  175 503 16.3 262.50 739.50 24.45 
* As there are 45 calories in 5g of oil, and 90 calories are listed, one can only assume that the calorie content 
of vegetables and oil have been combined. 
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Based on these figures (Table 4.3), one would deduce that the minimum quantities of energy and 
protein are reached and that the menu adheres to the national guidelines. However, the GOR’s figures 
are misleading for two reasons. Firstly, the stated protein content of grain (11.8g per 100g) only 
applies to flour. Using the standard nutritive values of Indian food (Gopalan et al., 2014), the protein 
content of 100g of parboiled milled rice is 6.4g and raw rice is 6.8g. On the days that rice is served, 
the protein content would therefore be approximately 5g lower than the GOR suggests. Secondly, the 
information in Table 4.3 is based on the assumption that all food groups are served on the same day. 
However, from the state-level menu (Table 4.5) it is clear that this is not the case. When these facts 
are accounted for, the nutritional content of the food is lower (Table 4.7). The GOR specify that 100g 
of fruit should be provided once a week. On the days when fruit is served, the calorie content of the 
meal would be higher, for example by 71 kcal per 100g of grapes and 166 kcal per 100g of banana. 
 
Table 4.7: Recalculated nutritional content of standard menu 
Kitchen  Menu Calories (kcal) Protein (g) Lower Upper Lower Upper 
Decentralised 
Roti, vegetables  436 639 11.8 17.7 
Rice and dal with vegetables  503* 740* 11.3 17.0 
Roti, dal 413 620 16.3* 24.5* 
Khichdi (dal, rice with vegetables)  503* 739.5* 11.3 17.0 
Centralised** 
Roti, vegetables and rice  436 639 9.3 14.0 
Roti, dal, sweet rice  413 620 13.8* 20.7* 
Roti, dal  413 620 16.3* 24.5* 
Khichdi  503* 740* 11.3 17.0 
Roti and vegetables  436 639 11.8 17.7 
*Indicates the norms are met.  
** When roti and rice both feature it is assumed that 50g of roti and 50g of rice will be used. It has also been 
assumed that when dal or vegetables feature within other food such as dal or khichdi, the full quantity is to be 
used. 
 
In Appendix D.1, I detail the potential contribution of the MDM in Rajasthan to the RDA of energy, 
protein and calories. Based on these calculations, if the MDM is served as per the government norms, 
then on the six days when the meal is served it should contribute between 20-33% of energy needs, 
26-51% of protein needs, 33.3-83% of the RDA of cereal intake, 16.7-33% of pulse intake, 11-22% 
of vegetable intake, 11-21% of fat intake and 16.7% of fruit intake. The MDMS therefore theoretically 
contributes far more to cereal intake than the intake of any other food group. The contribution to 
micronutrient intake would vary significantly depending on the vegetables and fruit served, although 
the contribution to calcium, iron, vitamin A, dietary folate and zinc intake would typically be small. 
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Overall, for the RDAs of children to be met, two or three other well-balanced meals would need to 
be consumed at home. Milk and fruit would also need to be consumed at home. 
 
4.4.3 Nutritious Extras  
 
Some states/UTs provide additional items in the MDMS. Milk is provided in the MDMS in Gujarat, 
Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Puducherry and as part of a breakfast program in Karnataka. Fruit is on the 
menu in Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, Andaman and Nicobar Islands, 
Dadra and Nagar Haveli and in Daman and Diu. Elsewhere, these additional items may be provided 
at the discretion of district officials or School Management Committees (SMCs).4 Eggs are provided 
in 13 states/UTs (Figure 4.1). Eggs are not on the menu in Rajasthan (see Section 6.6 for further 
discussion).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1: The states/UTs providing eggs in the MDMS and the number of eggs provided 
                                                        
4 SMCs are explained in Section 4.6.2.  
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4.4.4 The Source  
 
The GOI provides the grains (wheat and/or rice) for the MDMS (MHRD, 2006). There is little 
discussion in national and state government policy documents of where other ingredients should be 
sourced from. The 2006 guidelines and a small number of AWPBs mention the source of food only 
in reference to kitchen gardens at schools. In contrast to the increasing links between SFPs and 
agriculture evident in other countries (Section 2.5.2), the GOI and state governments have only 
infrequently considered the links between local agriculture and the MDMS.  
 
4.4.5 Safety 
 
In the 2006 guidelines, the MHRD set out a list of safety protocols for the MDMS. Among other 
things, the guidelines specify that: cooking should be done in a kitchen; a smokeless chulha (stove) 
should be used; fuel should be stored safely; as far as possible, firewood should not be used; staff 
should be trained in hygiene and handling fuel; the kitchen and storeroom should be clean and 
ingredients should be clean, free from adulteration and stored properly. In July 2013, 23 children died 
in Bihar after consuming a MDM contaminated with insecticide. Although the cook had complained 
that something was wrong with the food, the teacher encouraged her to continue cooking and to serve 
the meal (The Indian Express, 2016a). Shortly after this incident, the MHRD issued a letter reiterating 
the need to adhere to the safety practices outlined in the 2006 guidelines. The MHRD emphasised 
that teachers are required to taste food and that food should be stored safely.  
 
In 2013, the NFSA stipulated that all meals should adhere to the 2006 Food Safety and Standards 
Act. The Food Safety Act specifies that no food business operator shall sell or distribute food which 
is ‘unsafe’, ‘sub-standard or contains extraneous matter’ (2006: 26). Anyone that does is liable to a 
penalty of up to INR 500,000 (ibid: 51) and anyone selling food unfit for human consumption is liable 
to a fine and imprisonment (ibid: 59). In February 2015, the MHRD issued ‘The Guidelines on Food 
Safety and Hygiene for School level kitchens under Midday Meal’. These guidelines stipulate that 
the food in schools should be stored adequately, cleanliness should be maintained, CCHs should 
follow good hygiene practices and pests should be controlled. The guidelines also stipulate that 
children should wash their hands before consuming the MDM and that schools should have adequate 
infrastructure, including a clean, well-ventilated kitchen-cum-store, tested drinking water and waste 
disposal arrangements. The guidelines do not state who is responsible for ensuring that these 
conditions are fulfilled. The guidelines also conflate safety and nutrition, stating under the heading 
‘Food Safety Measures During Cooking’, that ‘recipes requiring fermentation and sprouted pulses 
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lead to increase in nutrition value’ (MHRD, 2015b: 9). Finally, the guidelines are for school-level 
kitchens only; no safety guidelines exist for centralised kitchens.  
 
4.5 Duty-Bearers 
4.5.1 Introduction 
 
The MDMS can be interpreted as the GOI directly fulfilling the right to food. Yet, of course the GOI 
and indeed any state is not one single entity. Furthermore, actors at all levels of government are 
involved in the management and implementation of the MDMS. In the following section, I outline 
who the duty-bearers are and the duties that they have. I first detail the roles of central, state, district 
and block level governments before describing the decentralised and centralised delivery models.  
 
4.5.2 The National Government 
 
The MDMS is the responsibility of the Secretary of SE&L within the MHRD. The duty-bearers within 
the MHRD are shown in Figure 4.2. 
 
Minister of Human Resource Development (MHRD) 
 
 
Secretary for School Education and Literacy (SE&L) 
 
 
 
Joint Secretary 
 
    
 
             Director (MDM)  Director (MDM)  
 
 
 
      Under secretary            Under Secretary     Under Secretary 
 
 
     
       2 Section officer          1 Section officer               2 Section officers 
 
Figure 4.2: Responsibility for the MDMS in the central government (MHRD, 2016) 
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The MHRD is responsible for setting national norms and nutritional standards, providing funding and 
reporting and monitoring impact (MHRD, 2006: 20). A National Steering-cum-Monitoring 
Committee was established in 2005 and is chaired by the Secretary for SE&L. Members of this 
committee include representatives from the MHRD and other relevant departments and 
representatives from external institutions such as the Food Corporation of India (FCI). The committee 
is expected to meet every six months to: guide and monitor implementation; co-ordinate concerned 
departments and schemes; mobilise community support and public-private partnerships; provide 
policy advice to Central and state governments and to identify institutions to undertake training, 
capacity building, monitoring and evaluation and research (MHRD, 2006: 12).  
  
In 2013, the MHRD established an ‘empowered committee’ to oversee implementation. The 
committee is chaired by the Minister of Human Resource Development. The committee’s 33 
members include the Member of State for Elementary Education, the Education Ministers from 
certain states and representatives from NGOs running centralised kitchens. The committee is expected 
to meet every three months to: assess safety and hygiene, converge with other relevant departments 
such as the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare; and to review governance, implementation and 
community participation (MHRD, 2013m: 2). At the national level, there is also the Planning and 
Approval Board (PAB) which considers and approves the AWPBs submitted by each state/UT at the 
beginning of each year (MHRD, 2006).    
 
4.5.3 The State, District and Block Governments 
 
In each state, a nodal department is appointed to manage and implement the MDMS. This is often the 
Department of Education, but in Rajasthan the Department of Rural Development and Panchayati Raj 
is responsible for the MDMS in both rural and urban areas. Responsibilities in Rajasthan are divided 
as shown in Figure 4.3. State Governments establish norms of expenditure and hygiene regulations, 
and submit the AWPB and release funds. In addition, states must report on the scheme, assess its 
impact and oversee studies.  
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Figure 4.3: The management and implementation structure for the MDMS in Rajasthan  
(GOR, 2016a: 6) 
 
The MDMS at the state-level is overseen by a state level steering-cum-monitoring committee. The 
committee is expected to meet every six months to ensure the ‘implementation of the [National Food 
Security] Act including establishment of a mechanism for maintenance of nutritional standards and 
quality’ (GOI, 2015a: paragraph 6).  
 
In each district, a nodal department is assigned responsibility for the MDMS. In Rajasthan, this is the 
Zila Parishad (district council). The Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the Zila Parishad has primary 
responsibility for the MDMS. A district steering-cum-monitoring committee is responsible for 
determining the eligibility of voluntary agencies, lifting and transporting food grain, completing 
information activities to increase awareness, reporting and assessing impact and overseeing studies. 
The committee should meet monthly. At the Block level, the Block Elementary Education Office 
(BEEO) is responsible for the MDMS. 
 
4.5.4 The Budget 
 
The GOI bears the full cost of food grain, transportation, utensils and management, monitoring and 
evaluation (MME). The costs of cooking, kitchen construction and the wages of CCHs are shared 
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between the Centre and the State. Costs were previously shared at a ratio of 75:25, except for the 
North-Eastern Region (NER) where the ratio was 90:10. In January 2016, the ratio changed to 60:40, 
except for the NER and Himachal Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir and Uttarakhand, where costs are 
shared at 90:10 (MHRD, 2016c). The GOI provides 100% of funds to UTs. The money for the 
recurring costs of cooking and wages are released annually as ‘recurring grants’. Funds for the 
construction of kitchens and kitchen devices are released once as ‘non-recurring grants’ 
(Accountability Initiative, 2013). The GOI is responsible for setting the minimum cooking costs in 
the MDMS, i.e. the amount to be spent per child per day. The cooking costs for the past three years 
and associated sources of funding are presented in Table 4.8. At the time of fieldwork (2014-2015), 
the cooking cost was INR 3.59 for primary students and INR 5.58 for upper primary students. 
Cooking costs should increase by 7.5% annually (MHRD, 2009a). This increase occurred for all years 
from 2014-2017, except for the upper primary level in 2015-2016, which was just 3.5% higher.  
 
Table 4.8: Cooking cost in the MDMS in INR (MHRD, 2016a) 
Year Primary level  
Cooking 
cost 
Non-NER states NER* UTs 
GOI State GOI State  
2014-2015 Lower 3.59 2.69 0.90 3.23 0.36 NA Upper  5.58 4.04 1.34 4.48 0.54 NA 
2015-2016 Lower 3.86 2.32 1.54 3.47 0.39 3.86 Upper  5.78 3.47 2.31 5.20 0.58 5.78 
2016-2017  Lower 4.13 2.48 1.65 3.72 0.41 4.13 Upper  6.18 3.71 2.47 5.56 0.62 6.18 
*NER and, since 2015, Himachal Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir and Uttarakhand. 
 
The budget for the MDMS is determined in the annual Union Budget. Between 2014-2015 and 2015-
2016 the budget declined (Table 4.9), a trend also observed in the budget for the ICDS. The Bharatiya 
Janata Party (BJP) government, which came to power in 2014 was for this reason criticised in the 
media (e.g. The Economic Times, 2015; The Hindu, 2015). The government replied that the funding 
had not been cut as increased money was devolved to the states (DNA India, 2015). The implications 
for funding, however, vary at the state level depending on each state’s contribution (IO25). The Centre 
for Budget and Governance Accountability found that the funding for all nutrition schemes in Odisha, 
Madhya Pradesh and Andhra Pradesh decreased between 2014-2015 and 2015-2016. The report noted 
that the increase in the financial autonomy of states had adversely affected nutrition schemes in some 
states, leaving funding dependent on state-level budgetary priorities (Shrivastava, 2016: 71). 
 
 
                                                        
5 All expert interviews have been assigned codes, outlined in Appendix D.3.  
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Table 4.9: Union Budget allocation for the MDMS in INR Billions (MHRD, 2017d) 
Year Budget Estimate Revised Estimate Released 
2007-2008 73.24 66.78 58.35 
2008-2009 80.00 80.00 65.39 
2009-2010 80.00 73.59 69.37 
2010-2011 94.4 94.40 91.28 
2011-2012 103.8 102.39 99.01 
2012-2013 119.37 115.00 108.67 
2013-2014 13.215 121.89 109.27 
2014-2015 13.215 110.50 105.26 
2015-2016 92.36 92.36 91.51 
2016-2017 97.00 97.00 94.83 
2017-2018 100.00 - - 
 
The budget for the MDMS in Rajasthan has declined since 2014 (Table 4.10). In Rajasthan, the total 
budget for child development and nutrition, which includes the MDMS, has declined from a budget 
estimate of INR 19.58 billion in 2014-2015 to 16.95 billion in 2015-2016.  
 
Table 4.10: Rajasthan MDM budget in INR millions (Budget Analysis Rajasthan Centre, 2017) 
Year Budget Estimate 
Revised 
Estimate 
Actual 
Expenditure 
2010-2011 - - 7,130.0 
2011-2012  6,580.8 6,208.1 
2012-2013 7,490.6 7,799.5 6,854.7 
2013-2014 7,487.5 7,478.5 5,580.0 
2014-2015 7,611.0 6,000 5,668.9 
2015-2016 6,594.5 6,834.6 - 
2016-2017 7,092.7 7,072.4 -  
 
4.5.5 Flows of Funds and Grains  
 
The quantity of ingredients and levels of funding are based on a specified amount per child. Each 
school calculates the number of children they anticipate will consume the MDM. This information is 
then passed to the block, district and state level governments (Accountability Initiative, 2013). Based 
on these figures, each state then creates an AWPB detailing the grain and funding requirements. As 
the GOR (2016a: 10-13) outline, in Rajasthan, the specified quantity of grain for each district is taken 
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from the FCI and transported by the state nodal transport agency (the Department of Food, Civil 
Supplies and Consumer Affairs). The Department lifts food grains quarterly. The transport agency 
takes the grain from the FCI depot to the school, according to the amount specified by the BEEO. 
The GOI transfers funds to the State Nodal Department in three or four instalments per year. Central 
and state funds are then released to districts in proportion to enrolment and attendance. Funds are then 
transferred from the District treasury office to the Zila Parishad, then to the BEEO and finally to 
schools (GOR, 2015a).  
 
4.5.6 Infrastructure 
 
The RTE Act, the NFSA and their respective rules detail the infrastructure required for the MDMS 
in each school. Schools should have toilets for boys and girls, safe and adequate drinking water and 
a kitchen. Kitchens should be sufficient in size; 20m2 for up to 100 students, and 4m2 for every 
additional hundred students (MHRD, 2009a). Kitchens should also have chimneys, sufficient 
ventilation and sunlight and smokeless chulhas are encouraged (MHRD, 2006; 2015c). Central and 
state governments fund the construction of kitchen-cum-stores at a cost of INR 90,000. State 
governments must detail the funding required to construct kitchens in the AWPB. Gram Panchayats 
are then responsible for the construction. Central and state governments are also responsible for 
providing water and sanitation facilities. The building of infrastructure falls under the remit of SSA 
through direct and convergent funding with other schemes, such as Swach Bharat: Swach Vidyalaya 
(GOI, 2011b; 2014c). 
 
4.5.7 Management, Monitoring and Evaluation  
 
The central government provides the equivalent of 1.8% of the total cost of grain, transport and 
cooking costs for MME (MHRD, 2006). In April 2015 to April 2016 in Rajasthan, INR 105.1 million 
were allocated for MME. At the end of 2015, INR 36.27 million had been released.  
 
Management, i.e. the management of data, requires schools to maintain expenditure and grain 
consumption records and submit a monthly progress report to a nodal school. The nodal school 
submits reports to the block-level officers who enter the data into the Management Information 
System (MDMS-MIS) web portal. District level officers also input data into the portal. The data is 
then reviewed at the state level. The 2006 guidelines stress the need to process data digitally as manual 
data collection and entry is time-consuming and error-prone. 
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A range of actors have a duty to monitor the MDMS. At the national level, JRMs evaluate sampled 
schools. JRMs should now visit 12 states annually (MHRD, 2015b) to assess the implementation of 
the scheme and the nutritional status of children. The state MDM office must monitor the MDMS 
regularly, including the quality and regularity of meals and must evaluate the impact of the scheme 
on attendance, retention and nutrition (MHRD, 2006). One quarter of schools should be visited each 
quarter, such that all schools are visited annually (ibid). The state management committee is also 
expected to monitor the scheme.  
 
Fifteen officials at the district and block levels must monitor a specified number of schools (Table 
4.11). Each school should be visited at least twice per year.  
 
Table 4.11: Targets for monthly monitoring in Rajasthan (GOR, 2016a). 
Administrative 
level 
Official  Schools per 
month 
District  
District Collector  5 
Additional District collector 5 
Sub-divisional officer 10 
Tehsildar 10 
Other District Level Officers (DLOs) 5 
Chief executive officer (CEO), Zila parishad 5 
Additional Chief executive officer (CEO), Zila parishad 5 
Other officers, Zila Parishad 5 
District Education Officer 20 
Block 
Block Education Officer 20 
Sub-divisional Education Officer 20 
Block Development Officer 10 
Other officers of panchayat samiti 5 
Other block level officers 5 
Executive Officer, Local Bodies  10 
Total 140 
 
In each state, independent institutions monitor the MDMS. In Rajasthan, the scheme is monitored by 
The Institute of Development Studies, The Centre for Development Communication and Studies and 
the Shiv Charan Mathur Social Policy Research Institute, which are all in Jaipur. These institutions 
submit reports to the GOR bi-annually. Between April and December 2015, these institutions carried 
out 280 inspections at a cost of INR 3.9 million (GOR, 2016a).  
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4.6 The Delivery Models  
4.6.1 Introduction 
 
In the decentralised model, the MDM is cooked and served on school premises and may be managed 
by SMCs, Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs), Gram Panchayats or urban local bodies. There are two 
other main delivery models in the MDMS; SHGs and NGOs. SHGs are groups, typically of women, 
who provide the MDM to a small number of schools. NGOs typically run far larger and mechanised 
kitchens, from which they supply the MDM to hundreds of schools. The decentralised model is the 
most common delivery model (Table 4.12). The figures for each state are provided in Appendix D.2. 
The MDMS is overseen by SMCs in 77.1% of MDM- eligible schools in Rajsamand district and 
99.7% in Udaipur district. 
 
Table 4.12: Percentage of schools in India and Rajasthan managed by each management type 
Management Percentage of schools covered by 
each management type 
India Rajasthan 
SMCs 44.4 92.2 
PRI/local bodies 17.2 0 
SHGs 27.2 2.6 
NGOs 3.2 5.2 
Trusts 0.2 0 
Other 7.9 0 
 
4.6.2 The Decentralised Model 
 
SMCs are similar to parent-teacher associations and are mandatory under Section 21 of the 2009 RTE 
Act. In Rajasthan, SMCs should have 13 members, of which at least three quarters are parents of 
students (GOR, 2016a). Proportionate representation should be given to ‘weaker’ sections of society 
and at least half of the members should be women. Other members should include officials from the 
local authority, teachers and local ‘educationists’ or children at the school (GOI, 2010). SMCs are 
expected to meet monthly. As per the RTE Act (2009), SMCs should monitor the working of the 
school, prepare the school development plan and monitor the utilisation of grants. The 2010 Rules on 
the RTE Act state that SMCs should communicate children’s rights; ensure the punctual attendance 
of teachers; ensure that teachers are not burdened with non-academic activities except for the census, 
disaster relief and elections; ensure student enrolment and attendance; maintain norms and standards; 
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bring the deviations from the rights of children to the attention of authorities; monitor the 
implementation of the MDMS and prepare an annual account of receipts and expenditure (GOI, 
2010). The 2015 guidelines on safety stipulate that SMC members should taste the food before it is 
served (MHRD, 2015b). The 2015 MDMs Rules state that SMCs should monitor implementation and 
oversee quality, cleanliness and hygiene (GOI, 2015a). The GOR considers SMCs to be ultimately 
‘responsible for effective implementation of the [MDM] Programme at school level’ (2016a: 14). 
 
Within each school, the head-teacher and a teacher designated the ‘Midday-Meal-in-charge’ are 
responsible for the MDMS. These teachers must ‘a) ensure good quality, wholesome food is served 
to children and b) [that] the actual serving and eating is undertaken in a spirit of togetherness, under 
hygienic conditions and in an orderly manner’ (MHRD, 2006: 23). Teachers must also taste the food 
before it is served, maintain a tasting record and keep records of the cash spent and the food grain 
consumed (MHRD, 2015c). There are two contexts in which the duties of teachers are unspecified 
and therefore unclear: when the MDM is provided by an NGO and when the MDMS is provided 
during the summer vacation in drought-affected areas.   
 
CCHs are ‘expected to perform all activities relating to cooking, serving and washing the utensils’ 
(MHRD, 2010a). In return, they are paid an honorarium (not wage) of at least INR 1,000 per month. 
The honorarium is paid for 10 months per year as CCHs are not employed during the summer 
vacation. In 2015-2016, 13 states paid cooks more than the minimum, from INR 1,200 per month in 
Chhattisgarh to INR 250 per day or INR 6,000 per month in Lakshadweep. In Rajasthan, CCHs 
receive the minimum INR 1,000 per month. If NGOs organise the serving of the MDM, then they 
receive the honorarium (MHRD, 2010a). If the centralised kitchen is not serving the meal then the 
honorarium is divided between the kitchen and the person or agency serving the meal, although the 
MHRD offer no guidelines on how the honorarium is divided. As per the 2004 Supreme Court order, 
‘in [the] appointment of cooks and helpers, preference shall be given to Dalits, Scheduled Castes and 
Scheduled Tribes’.  
 
4.6.3 NGOs 
 
In 2015-2016, there were 361 NGOs running 475 kitchens and supplying the MDM in 35,441 
institutions across India (Table 4.13). NGOs provided food to 5.1% of students in schools receiving 
the MDM. The extent of coverage and number of NGOs varies by state (Table 4.13). In Rajasthan, 
there are presently four NGOs running six kitchens across four districts (see Section 7.6).   
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Table 4.13: NGOs in the MDMS 2015-2016 (calculated from the AWPBs, 2015-2016)  
State/UT Kitchens NGOs Institutions Enrolled Students Freq. % Freq. % 
Andhra Pradesh 8 2 1,018 2.2 123,552 3.8 
Assam 1 1 591 1.0 47,559 1.0 
Bihar 6 29 2,751 3.9 821,717 4.0 
Chhattisgarh 5 4 671 1.5 114,326 3.4 
Gujarat 8 3 3,264 9.0 492,762 8.0 
Haryana 4 1 4 0.0 277,932 15.5 
Jharkhand 2 1 388 0.9 55,816 1.1 
Karnataka 62 80 5,840 10.5 877,518 17.3 
Madhya Pradesh 15 11 2,171 2.5 324,711 3.9 
Maharashtra 9 2 1,441 1.7 278,832 2.4 
Orissa 1 1 297 0.5 30,112 0.6 
Rajasthan 6 4 3,728 5.2 252,519 4.0 
Sikkim*  - - 65 8.8 - - 
Telangana 1 1 961 3.3 46,795 2.2 
Uttar Pradesh 154 112 8,356 5.0 1,086,423 5.8 
West Bengal 146 61 892 1.1 158,366 1.3 
Chandigarh 3 3 0 0.0 47,000 46.5 
Delhi 44 45 3,003 100.0 1,716,142 98.1 
Total  475 361 35441 157.1 6,752,082 5.1 
*NGOs provide the meal in Sikkim, but there are no centralised kitchens 
 
NGOs typically use their own funds or funds from the private sector to cover the costs of establishing 
a kitchen. The GOI supplies NGOs with grain and the funds to cover cooking costs. Therefore, the 
involvement of NGOs in the MDMS changes the organisation of the service delivery, but does not 
alter the cost for the public sector. NGOs must purchase non-grain ingredients and prepare and 
distribute the food (MHRD, 2006). NGOs should only provide the MDM in large urban locations 
where space is constrained and centralised distribution is feasible (ibid; NFSA, 2013).  
 
In the 2006 guidelines, the MHRD stated that several points needed to be ‘kept in mind’ to determine 
the suitability of voluntary organisations (17-18), including:  
 
(i) The voluntary agencies should not discriminate in any manner on the basis of 
religion, caste and creed, and should not use the programme for propagation of any 
religious practice.  
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(ii) The voluntary agency should be…registered under the Societies Registration Act or 
the Public Trust Act, and should have been in existence for a minimum period of 
two years.  
(iii) …undertake supply responsibility on a no-profit basis.  
(iv) Financial and logistic capacity to supply the mid day meal on the requisite scale. 
(v) Commitment to abide by the parameters of NP-NSPE, 2006 particularly…the 
prescription of eligible children, nutrition content etc… 
(vi) It will furnish to the body assigning the work to it an Annual Report along with 
audited statement of accounts... 
(vii) The voluntary organisation shall not entrust/ sub-contract the programme or divert 
any part of the assistance (food grains/money).  
 
The MHRD (2010b) has since added that:  
 
Operation of these Centralized kitchens may be entrusted to reputed NGOs under the 
PPP model. It would be advisable to select NGOs with a local presence and 
familiarity with the needs and culture of the State. As the quality and quantity of 
meals supplied to a large number of children...depends upon the commitment and 
ability of the NGOs, it is important that such NGOs are selected carefully and their 
performance is evaluated regularly.   
 
To ensure accountability, the MHRD (2010b) added that: NGOs should have a managing body with 
clearly defined duties; the names of all officers and their duties should be disclosed; a 
contract/Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the NGO and the local authority should be 
signed; a mechanism to check food quality and quantity should exist; performance should be assessed 
annually and renewal of the MOU should depend on satisfactory performance. The NFSA and 2015 
MDMS Rules state that these guidelines should be followed and reiterate that centralised kitchens 
should only operate in urban areas. When viewed in reference to the literature on NGO accountability 
(Section 2.6.3), it is clear that these specifications ensure some accountability within the NGO and to 
patrons (the state government). The third form of accountability to ‘clients’ is not discussed by the 
NGOs. The specified arrangements are for internal performance assessment. Although external 
accountability is indicated by the stipulation that governments should only continue the MOU if there 
is satisfactory performance, what this means and where this will draw on internal assessments of food 
quality and quantity are unclear.   
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4.6.4 Self-help Groups  
 
When the MDM is supplied by SHGs, these groups are responsible for the preparation, cooking and 
distribution of the MDM. SHGs may sometimes operate under the guidance of NGOs. In Rajasthan, 
SHGs may take the form of Annapurna Mahila Sahkari Samities (AMSS), women’s cooperative 
committees. Presently in Rajasthan, there are 249 SHGs providing the MDM to 169,817 students in 
1,847 schools (GOR, 2016a). There are no SHGs in Rajsamand district and only two in Udaipur 
district covering 12 schools. As the MDMS was not supplied by SHGs in any of the sampled schools, 
this study cannot provide insight into SHGs in the MDMS. The SHG model is a topic worthy of 
further investigation.  
 
4.6.5 The Community 
 
The Secretary of SE&L issued a letter to the secretary of education in every state/UT, stating that 
‘community participation is key to the successful implementation of the MDMS as it ensures effective 
monitoring at the local level and generates a sense of ownership of the programme’ (MHRD, 2014a: 
1). The 2015 guidelines on safety state that schools should draw on the support of the community to 
ensure quality, cleanliness and handwashing (MHRD, 2015c: 9). There is a distinct gendered 
dimension to the expected involvement of the ‘community’, as the GOI particularly advocate the 
involvement of mothers. In a letter to Chief Ministers included in the 2006 Guidelines (GOI, 2006: 
59), the Minister of HRD wrote:  
 
Mothers could be encouraged to take turns to come to the school at the time of the 
preparation or serving of the meal. By this simple intervention, we could empower 
crores of mothers to exercise effective vigil reducing dependence on inspectors.  
 
The MHRD (2016b) stated that: ‘The intention is to empower mothers of the children covered under 
the programme to supervise the preparation and serving of the meal and to exercise an effective vigil’. 
Mothers are involved in the implementation of the MDMS in some states. For example, in 
Uttarakhand in each school all CCHs are mothers of children at that school and are referred to as 
Bhojan matas (food/meal mothers). However, generally the involvement of mothers is perceived as 
in addition to the role of CCHs and is voluntary.  
 
Another initiative to encourage community participation is Tithi Bhojan (‘date meal’), in which the 
community donates food or equipment to the MDMS on special occasions. Based on the perceived 
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success of the initiative in Gujarat, in 2014 the GOI decided to introduce the practice nationally. The 
scheme was introduced in Rajasthan in 2015 as ‘Utsav Bhoj Yojana’ (Festival Feast Scheme) (GOR, 
2016a). The GOR reports that between June and December 2015, 1.53 million meals were served 
under this initiative, although they do not provide any details as to when and where these meals were 
served. It is unclear how the community might be involved in the implementation of the MDMS in 
the centralised delivery model. 
 
The involvement of the community in the MDMS therefore extends beyond the recognition that the 
community has an imperfect obligation to realise a right to food. Nevertheless, for perfect obligations 
to arise requires additional organisation and institutionalisation; rotas would need to be established to 
organise volunteering and some organisation would need to take place to guide the donation of food 
by the community. The expected involvement of the community also raises the issues of 
accountability; if something were to go wrong, would the volunteering mothers or those that had 
donated the food be held responsible? This is an important issue; however, due to the lack of 
involvement of the community found in the study area, it is not empirically examined in this thesis.  
4.6.6 Claims and Duties  
 
Drawing on Jonsson (2005), from the information provided in Sections 4.6.1-4.6.5, I have conducted 
a pattern analysis of claims and duties (Table 4.14). The realisation of the right to food requires that 
the duty-bearers outlined in Table 4.13 perform the duties. The concept of ‘duty-bearers’ therefore 
allows for a detailed assessment of obligations, which goes beyond the duties of ‘the state’. Once 
these relationships have been established, whether obligations are fulfilled and the determining 
factors must be explored. 
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4.7 Accountability Mechanisms 
 
In the previous discussion, I have outlined the provisions in place for external accountability in the 
MDMS from various committees and for NGO accountability. Here, I consider the provision for 
external accountability ‘from below’, from rights-holders and their parents.  
 
In the 2006 guidelines, the MHRD stated that all states/UTs must create ‘widely publicised’ and ‘easily 
accessible’ mechanisms for public grievance redressal, such as a toll-free call line (2006: 33). The 
decisions as to the forms these mechanisms might take are left to the state governments. The GOR 
(2016a) outlines the following potential ‘grievance redressal mechanisms’. Any complaint made in the 
media is sent to the CEO of the Zila Parishad. A reply from the district officer and action is sought 
immediately. If a serious issue is raised through the Chief Minister’s office, a response is sought from 
the district or block officer. The secretary of the government should review and address the grievance. 
Complaints made in person or by post are dealt with immediately and a report is sent to the issuer of 
the complaint once the issue has been resolved. The GOR does not specify where the complaint should 
be made. If shortcomings in the implementation of the MDMS are highlighted in monitoring reports, 
the concerned authority is expected to respond accordingly. The state, district and block officers are 
responsible for issues regarding the right to information, and the head teacher is responsible for 
providing information. A toll-free line that allows the public to complain about the MDMS does not 
exist in Rajasthan (GOR, 2015a).   
 
The 2015 MDMS Rules included the provision of a food security allowance; a legal accountability 
mechanism for rights-holders. The allowance entitles children to the quantity of grain and cooking cost 
if the MDMS is not provided for three consecutive days or three days a month. To my knowledge, 
currently there are no details available on how this allowance system will be implemented.  
 
These details are the extent of the information that the GOR provides on the accountability mechanisms 
in the MDMS. From this information, it is not sufficiently clear who a rights-holders’ representative 
should complain to and how. In Chapter 8, I examine the existence and use of these mechanisms in 
practice.  
 
4.8 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have shown that the MDMS has three primary objectives; to encourage attendance, to 
improve nutrition and to protect consumption during droughts. I have also shown the limitations in the 
conceptualisation of these objectives and the inconsistent recognition of them among duty-bearers at 
 
 
128 
the national and state level. I then detailed the three components of a rights system rights-holders and 
their rights, duty-bearers and their duties and accountability mechanisms. These components, 
particularly the first two, are clearly defined in national and state government guidelines. In the 
empirical chapters that follow, I examine these components in practice.   
 
In this chapter, I have shown that the design of the MDMS reflects rights-based principles. The GOI 
encourages community participation, the MDMS is designed with consideration for accountability and 
transparency and the principle of non-discrimination is adhered to in the employment of CCHs and the 
involvement of NGOs. The rule of law is also used, particularly to ensure food safety. The following 
four chapters examine the extent to which the norms and guidelines outlined in this chapter are adhered 
to and reflected in practice, and overall whether the implementation of the scheme reflects a RBA.  
 
		
Chapter 5 
Food for all? Inclusion and  
Exclusion in the MDMS 
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Chapter 5  
 
Food for all? Inclusion and 
Exclusion in the MDMS  
 
 
5.1 Introduction  
 
In contrast to many other SFPs, in the MDMS students are targeted by age and school type (Section 
4.3). In consequence, of the approximately 233 million children aged 6-14 years in India (GOI, 
2011a), 133.7 million are eligible to receive the MDM (NUEPA, 2016).1 Of these, 100.3 million 
actually consume the MDM (MHRD, 2016g). Of the 100 million children that are ineligible to receive 
the MDM, 62.8 million attend ineligible schools (NUPEA, 2016) and the remaining do not attend 
school (GOI, 2011a).2 Thus, almost 100 million children have no right to consume the MDM and a 
further 30 million do not realise their right.  
 
In this chapter, I explore these patterns of inclusion and exclusion in the MDMS. To assess whether 
targeting has led to the inclusion of the needy, I first consider who the rights-holders in the MDMS 
are. To do this, I use secondary data to examine trends in enrolment (Section 5.2.1). I then use primary 
data from the household surveys to examine the socio-economic background of the students enrolled 
at the sampled schools and their food consumption (Sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2). I then explore the 
impact of the scheme as it is perceived by the rights-holders and their representatives (their parents) 
to provide further insight into need and inclusion (Section 5.2.3). In Section 5.4, I focus on the ‘gap’ 
between eligibility and consumption; the difference between having a right and realising it. I examine 
the extent of this trend and explore the potential determinants. I then turn to those excluded from the 
                                                        
1 These calculations are limited by comparing 2011 Census data (GOI, 2011a) with data from the NUEPA 
(2016) for 2015-2016. Therefore the figures should be considered approximations.  
2 The Census data for 6-14 year olds likely includes children aged six not starting school or those aged 14 having 
left school. Yet, even when 6 and 14 year olds are removed, 25.5 million children are out-of-school. 
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scheme. First, I examine exclusion within the scheme due to discrimination (Section 5.5) and the 
temporal variation in MDM provision (Section 5.6). Then, I consider exclusion from the MDMS. I 
focus on three groups of excluded children: those in private schools, those above grade VIII and those 
out-of-school (Section 5.7). Finally, I consider the unintended inclusion of two groups: rights-holders’ 
siblings and adults (Section 5.8). 
 
5.2 The Rights Holders 
5.2.1 Who are they?  
 
To understand who the rights-holders in the MDMS are, it is first necessary to consider who is 
enrolled in eligible schools. Table 5.1 presents the 2015-2016 enrolment data for all school types. In 
total, 68% of children in India and 52.1% of children in Rajasthan were enrolled in eligible schools. 
In Rajsamand and Udaipur, this figure was higher at 71.6% and 69.1% respectively. The MDMS is 
therefore, in principle, available to a large proportion of students in the study area.   
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As discussed in Section 4.3, the MHRD assumes that of the ‘children attending Government schools, 
a large number belong to the disadvantaged social and economic groups of the society’ (in PAC, 2010 
8). Of girls, children from ‘lower’ castes and Muslims, a higher proportion of each group is typically 
enrolled in government schools than private schools and therefore are more likely to be rights-holders 
in the MDMS.  
 
In Table 5.2, I present the gender and caste composition of the students enrolled in eligible and 
ineligible schools nationally, in Rajasthan and in the study districts. In India, although males account 
for approximately 52.2% of 6-14 year olds, they account for 49.1% of students enrolled in MDM-
eligible schools and 56.2% of all students in ineligible schools. These trends are more pronounced in 
Rajasthan and also exist in Rajsamand. In Udaipur, the percentage of males enrolled in eligible 
schools reflects their proportion in the population. The number and genders of out-of-school children 
are discussed in Section 5.6.4. The majority of SCs, STs and OBCs attend government schools at all 
levels, with the exception of OBCs in Rajasthan. Notably, the majority of students attending eligible 
schools in Udaipur are from STs, whereas OBCs comprise the majority at all other levels. Both across 
India and within Rajasthan, more than half of Muslim children are enrolled at MDM-eligible schools; 
however, this is not the case in the study districts.  
 
Overall, girls and lower castes are more likely to be enrolled in MDM-eligible schools than non-
eligible schools. In the study districts, approximately 51% of rights-holders are male, between 86-
90% belong to a SC, ST or OBC and just over 1% are Muslim.  
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SCs comprise a greater percentage of those enrolled in government schools than their proportion in 
India and Rajasthan (Table 5.3). STs account for a greater proportion of enrolled students than their 
proportion in the population across all locations (Table 5.3). Notably, STs account for more than two-
thirds of the rights-holders in Udaipur; far higher than their proportion in the population.   
 
Table 5.3: Proportions of SCs and STs in the population (GOI, 2011a) and in MDM-eligible schools 
(NUEPA, 2016) 
 SC ST 
Population 6-
14 year olds 
(%) 
MDM-
eligible 
schools (%) 
Population 6-
14 year olds 
(%) 
MDM-eligible 
schools (%) 
India 17.7 19.4 9.8 11.3 
Rajasthan 19.0 22.5 14.9 20.5 
Rajsamand 13.2 10.9 15.7 17.8 
Udaipur 5.8 4.9 53.8 69.9 
 
Tables 5.2 and 5.3 show that SC, ST and female children are more likely to be enrolled in government 
schools than non-government schools and therefore to be rights-holders in the MDMS, reflecting 
known patterns in enrolment in government and private schools (Section 4.3). However, the 
composition of rights-holders varies; girls do not comprise the majority of rights-holders in the study 
districts and STs account for a far higher proportion of enrolled students in Udaipur district than in 
Rajsamand district, Rajasthan and India. 
 
Attention now turns to the sampled schools. Of the 4,312 students enrolled at the schools, 2,397 
(55.6%) were male and 1,915 (44.4%) were female.5 Table 5.4 presents the gender and caste 
composition of the enrolled students. Boys comprised the majority of rights holders in the sampled 
schools in Girwa, Kotra and Khamnor, but not in Kumbhalgarh. The gendered pattern of enrolment 
indicates that a number of girls must not be attending school (see Section 5.7.2). The majority (63.1%) 
of students were ST, although as one would expect given the variation in the caste composition at 
each location (Section 3.2.4), the caste-composition of rights-holders varies by location. Muslims 
accounted for a small proportion of the enrolled students at the sampled schools. 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
5 The complete data is provided in Appendix E.2.  
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Table 5.4: Students at sampled schools 2014-2015 (NUEPA, 2016) 
 Girwa Kotra Khamnor Kumbhalgarh  Total 
Enrolled Students 1,372 1,292 774 874 4,312 
Gender (%) Male 55.2 58.8 58.5 48.7 55.6 
Caste (%) 
SC 5.2 0.2 14.1 8.5 6.0 
ST 70.3 95.7 41.7 22.9 63.1 
OBC 13.0 0.7 17.8 44.7 16.6 
Muslim 5.0 0.0 4.7 0.0 2.4 
Other 6.6 3.4 21.7 23.9 11.9 
Gender and Caste 
(%) 
SC Male 46.5 66.6 68.8 47.3 56.4 
ST Male 58.2 59.2 54.2 51.5 57.7 
OBC Male 50.6 33.3 66.6 45.8 50.8 
Muslim Male 62.3 0 58.3 0 61.0 
Other Male  52.5 52.3 53.6 52.2 49.5 
 
Primary data from the household surveys provides further insight into the background of the rights-
holders in the study area. The full dataset is provided in Appendix E.2; here, results by block and case 
study are shown in Tables 5.5 and 5.6. The majority of the sampled households in all blocks and case 
studies belong to STs, except for CS1. The highest number of ST households were in Kotra and all 
households in CS3 were ST. Literacy levels were far lower in the sampled households than the area 
averages; 37.9% of respondents in HS1 and 26.1% in HS2 were literate, compared to 63.1% in 
Rajsamand and 61.8% in Udaipur (GOI, 2011a). Sampled households were often engaged in irregular 
jobs. In rural areas, households were most commonly self-employed in agriculture alongside casual 
labour. In urban areas, households were most commonly engaged in casual labour alongside self-
employment. Fewer than 10% of those in each sample were engaged in regular employment. 
Although the type of PDS card possessed is far from a perfect indicator of poverty due to inclusion 
and exclusion errors in the PDS (Section 2.4.3), the proportion of people with a BPL card reflects the 
other indicators of development.  
 
Overall, based on these indicators of development, one expects there to be a need for increased access 
to food among the rights-holders in the sample.  
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Across the four case studies, the average monthly household income was INR 4,741 (Table 5.7). The 
income of respondents was thus lower than the state average monthly per capita income in 2013-2014 
of INR 5,497.83 (GOI, 2015b).  
 
Table 5.7: Monthly income (number of respondents) 
Case Study 
Monthly Income (INR) 
<2500 2500-
<5000 
5000-
<7500 
7500-
<10000 
10000+ Average 
CS1 1 9 13 8 5 6676 
CS2 6 13 14 3 2 4809 
CS3 16 14 5 0 0 2823 
CS4 0 27 19 1 1 4677 
Total Freq. 21 63 51 12 8 4741 
% 14.6 40.1 32.5 7.6 5.1 - 
 
Overall, data from the household surveys shows that the rights-holders in the sample had illiterate 
parents and were from households with low-incomes and irregular jobs, particularly in the sampled 
locations in Kotra and in CS3. The trends in enrolment in the sampled schools support the assumption 
that government schools and therefore the MDMS are for disadvantaged groups. Of course, these 
characteristics are the very reason that children attend MDM-eligible schools rather than private 
schools. Yet, examining the background of students at eligible schools is useful, as the data shows that 
although there are commonalities, rights-holders are not a homogenous group; socio-economic status 
varies within and between locations. Given this variability, one might also expect there to be differences 
in food-based needs among the rights-holders, which is now examined. 
 
5.2.2 Food Needs 
 
Food Consumption  
Table 5.8 presents the results from the food consumption survey in HS1. Staples were consumed daily 
by all but one participant. Most commonly, milk, sugar, oil and condiments were consumed daily, pulses 
and vegetables were consumed twice in the previous seven days and fruit and meat were not consumed. 
The daily guidelines on dietary intake in India (NIN, 2011) advocate daily intake of cereals, pulses6, 
milk, vegetables and fruit. Evidently, most of the sampled households were not consuming pulses, 
                                                        
6 The NIN suggest that one portion of pulses can be swapped for meat/fish/eggs. 
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vegetables and fruit daily. Meat consumption was also infrequent, although is higher than one would 
expect given that only 79 respondents (18.6%) reported that they were not vegetarian. 
 
Table 5.8: Food Consumption Score results from household survey one- the number of people that 
reported each frequency for each food group (n=427) 
Food Group  
Number of times consumed past 7 days 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Staples 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 426 
Pulses 24 75 153 102 46 11 2 14 
Vegetables 23 72 100 77 49 34 12 60 
Fruit 269 128 17 7 4 1 0 1 
Meat/fish 328 83 6 4 3 1 0 2 
Milk/dairy 118 7 15 14 21 15 23 214 
Sugar 4 1 2 10 5 5 14 386 
Oil 13 4 4 15 12 11 11 357 
Condiments 0 0 3 5 5 2 7 405 
 
Kmeans cluster analysis identified four clusters of dietary patterns in the food consumption survey 
results (Table 5.9). Cluster one exhibits the least varied diet with the lowest means for pulses, vegetable, 
fruit, sugar, oil and condiment consumption. Cluster two exhibits the most varied diet, followed by 
cluster four. The diversity of consumption in cluster three is in between the first and fourth cluster, yet 
has a lower mean milk consumption than cluster one. 
 
Table 5.9: Cluster analysis of food consumption frequency, household survey one 
Food group 
Cluster Means 
(Frequency of consumption) 
1 
n=37 
2 
n=98 
3 
n=118 
4 
n=174 
Staple 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 
Pulses 1.5 2.7 2 2.7 
Vegetable 1.6 6.2 2.0 2.6 
Fruit 0.0 1.0 0.2 0.5 
Meat and fish 0.1 0.6 0.1 0.4 
Milk 1.3 6.6 0.4 6.6 
Sugar 4.9 7 6.9 6.8 
Oil 1.8 6.9 7.0 6.7 
Condiments 5.7 7.0 7.0 6.9 
Sum of squares 17.1 7.6 5.9 6.2 
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The distribution of clusters by block is shown in Table 5.10. A chi-square test of independence found a 
significant relationship between cluster and location, χ2(9)=92.395, p=<0.001. Pairwise comparisons 
found significant differences between all blocks (p=<0.01). Notably, nearly two-thirds of respondents 
in Girwa were in cluster four, nearly half of respondents in Khamnor were in cluster two and nearly 
half of respondents in Kotra were in cluster three. The distribution among clusters indicates that 
respondents in Girwa had the most diverse diets, followed by respondents in Khamnor, Kumbhalgarh 
and Kotra. This pattern of food consumption reflects the pattern of development indicators examined 
in Section 2.4; the highest proportion of people in the sampled locations that were literate and engaged 
in main work were found in Girwa, followed by Khamnor, Kumbhalgarh and Kotra.  
 
Table 5.10: Block categories by cluster, household survey one 
Block 
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4 
 Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
Girwa 0 0 20 17.9 21 18.8 71 63.4 
Kotra 20 18.3 14 12.8 48 44.0 27 24.8 
Khamnor 7 7.2 44 45.4 15 15.5 31 32.0 
Kumbhalgarh 10 9.2 20 18.3 34 31.2 45 41.3 
 
Table 5.11 presents the food consumption results from HS2. Staples were consumed daily. Typically, 
milk was consumed daily, pulses were consumed twice in the previous seven days, vegetables were 
consumed once and fruit and meat were not consumed. Again, the frequency of the intake of pulses, 
vegetables and fruit was inadequate. Meat consumption was also infrequent, although 106 households 
(68.4%) were vegetarian. The pattern of consumption varied between case studies (see Appendix E.4.1 
for the full data set). Across all food groups, the frequency of consumption was the lowest at CS3.  
 
Table 5.11: Food Consumption Score results, household survey two (n=158) 
Food Group  
Number of times consumed past 7 days 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Staples 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 158 
Pulses 24 43 49 35 4 2 0 1 
Vegetables 11 44 39 24 9 2 2 26 
Fruit 85 62 5 1 1 0 0 4 
Meat/fish 116 37 1 2 0 0 0 2 
Milk/dairy 27 0 4 6 9 1 10 100 
Sugar 3 0 0 2 6 1 4 141 
Oil 1 1 10 10 9 2 3 121 
Condiments 1 0 1 1 1 0 3 150 
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Cluster analysis identified three clusters (Table 5.12). Cluster one had the lowest mean level of 
consumption for all food groups excluding staples. Cluster two had the highest mean levels particularly 
of vegetable consumption.  
 
Table 5.12: Cluster analysis of food consumption frequency, household survey two 
 
 
The distribution of clusters by location is shown in Table 5.13.7  
 
Table 5.13: Case studies and clusters, household survey two 
Case Study 
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
CS1 3 10.3 1 3.4 25 86.2 
CS2 3 7.3 20 48.8 18 43.9 
CS3 27 75.0 0 0.0 9 25.0 
CS4 4 8.7 0 0.0 42 91.3 
 
A chi-square test found that case studies and clusters were not independent, χ2(6)=110.74, p=<0.001. 
Pairwise comparisons found significant differences between all case studies (p=<0.001) except for 
between CS1 and CS2 (p=0.457). Notably, the majority of households at CS1 belong to cluster two, the 
majority of households at CS3 belong to cluster one and the majority at CS4 belong to cluster four. 
Households at CS2 are mostly split between clusters two and three. This distribution indicates that 
                                                        
7 Clusters are also compared to HFIAS categories in Appendix C.7  
Food group 
Cluster Means 
(Frequency of consumption) 
1 
n= 35 
2 
n=37 
3 
n=94 
Staple 7.0 7.0 7.0 
Pulses 1 1.9 2.1 
Vegetable 1.2 6.5 2.1 
Fruit 0.1 1.5 0.6 
Meat/fish 0.2 0.9 0.3 
Milk 0.8 6.8 6.5 
Sugar 5.6 7 7.0 
Oil 3.7 7.0 6.8 
Condiments 6.4 7.0 7.0 
Sum of squares 17.0 10.7 4.8 
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respondents at CS2 had the most diverse diets, followed by CS4 and CS1. Respondents at CS3 had, by 
far, the least diverse diets. The considerably worse situation at CS3 reflects the considerably worse 
indicators of development (see Section 3.2.5) as well as its remote location. 
 
There are two key conclusions to be drawn from the results presented in Tables 5.8-5.13. Firstly, these 
results show that most households had an inadequate diet, lacking in vegetables, fruit and pulses. Thus, 
there is a general need for increased dietary diversity among these households. Yet, secondly, this need 
is not identical across households. Within the category of ‘rights-holders’, food consumption at home 
varies considerably. The quality of diets varied both within and across locations. Needs relating to food 
are therefore not homogenous across rights-holders.  
 
Meals 
To reach their recommended daily intake, children would need to consume two well-balanced meals at 
home and a MDM that adheres to guidelines (Section 4.4.1). Indeed, the GOI envisage that the MDM 
is one of three meals per day. However, the inadequate diet shown in the FCS results indicates that, in 
the study area, food consumption at home may not address the shortfalls left by the MDMS. To explore 
this issue further, I asked parents and students how many meals their child/they ate per day including 
the MDM. I also calculated the number of meals reported in the 24-hour food consumption recall. As 
shown in Table 5.14, a significant number of children consumed only two meals per day, including the 
MDM. The number of meals consumed varied spatially (the full data is given in Appendix E.4.2). For 
example, in HS1 the highest proportion of people consuming two meals per day were found in 
Khamnor, followed by Girwa, Kotra and Kumbhalgarh. The results from the student survey and the 
recalls show that students consumed two meals most frequently in CS3, followed by CS4, CS1 and 
CS2.  
 
Table 5.14: Number of meals consumed per day 
Source Number of meals per day (including MDM)  
1 2 3 4 5 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
HS1 9 2.4 213 56.3 120 31.7 35 9.3 1 0.3 
Student Survey 12 4.1 96 33.0 155 53.3 21 7.2 7 2.4 
Household Recall 
(Cases) 
12 2.8 296 70.0 115 27.2 0 0 0 0 
Student Recall 
(Cases) 
4 1.0 220 57.1 161 41.8 0 0 0 0 
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Children consuming two meals a day tended to consume lunch and dinner and miss breakfast. Of the 
336 students surveyed, 135 (40.2%) reported that they consumed breakfast before coming to school, 73 
(21.7%) said that they sometimes ate breakfast and 128 (38.1%) said that they never ate breakfast. The 
food consumption recall data, however, showed that breakfast consumption is more complex than a 
simple ‘yes’ or ‘no’. From the recall data, four types of breakfast can be identified: no food or drink; 
only a drink, typically tea; a drink and a snack item such as a small packet of biscuits; and a substantial 
breakfast such as a roti or a paratha, usually with tea. A substantial breakfast was consumed in just 
20% of the cases in the recall (Table 5.15).  
 
Table 5.15: Breakfast consumption from 24-hour recall 
Case Study 
Breakfast consumption (number of cases) 
Nothing Drink only Snack Substantial 
CS1 2 40 35 19 
CS2 6 15 9 34 
CS3 49 28 0 1 
CS4 22 111 5 30 
Total 
Freq. 79 194 49 84 
% 19.5 47.8 12.1 20.7 
 
Although the precise figures vary, Tables 5.14 and 5.15 show that approximately half of students 
consumed two meals a day including the MDM. Among those consuming three meals a day, breakfast 
was often inadequate.  
 
From the two recalls, a typical pattern of consumption can be determined based on the most commonly 
consumed food types (Table 5.16). Notably, the typical food intake of participants in CS3 is insufficient 
in both quantity and variety.   
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Table 5.16: Typical food consumption at home from recalls 
Meal Recall CS1 CS2 CS3 CS4 
Breakfast 
Household  Tea Tea, 1 roti Nothing Tea 
Student Tea, 3 toast Tea, 1 roti Nothing Tea 
Dinner 
Household  2 rotis,  
1 cup of 
vegetables 
1.5 rotis, 
0.5 cup of 
vegetables 
1 roti, chilli 
paste 
2 rotis, 1 
cup of 
kadhi 
Student 2 rotis, 1 
cup of 
vegetables 
2 rotis and 
1 cup 
vegetables 
2 rotis,  
1 cup 
vegetables 
2 roti, 1 cup 
dal  
Snacks Household  Tea Tea Nothing  Tea 
Student Nothing Namkeen Nothing Nothing  
 
As discussed in Section 3.3.6, nutritional information cannot be accurately determined from the recall. 
However, due to the consistency of roti sizes at each location, the calories from roti can be calculated. 
One roti provided approximately 140 kcal at CS1, 170 kcal at CS2 and 155 kcal at CS3 and CS4. Roti 
alone therefore provided approximately 560 kcal at CS1, 765 kcal at CS2, 465 kcal at CS3 and 620 kcal 
at CS4. As shown in Table 5.16, rotis account for the majority of the food consumed by a typical child 
on a typical day. When the calorie content of rotis are compared to the RDAs outlined in Appendix D.1 
and the MDM norms, a potential calorie deficit is indicated. For example, in CS3, 465 kcal of roti and 
450 kcal of MDM would total 915 kcal. To reach the RDA of calories (2,190 kcal), a male child at the 
lower primary level would need to consume an additional 1275 kcal. As it is unlikely that this quantity 
of calories would come from food that is not in the MDM and is not a roti, it is unlikely that the child 
would consume enough calories. Although these calculations are approximate, they suggest that there 
may be inadequacies in food intake in the study area. Certainly, this is an avenue for further research.  
 
When the results presented in this section are compared to the norms and theoretical contribution of the 
MDMS to dietary intake outlined in Chapter 4, three findings emerge. Firstly, in the study area, the 
MDM was often one of only two meals consumed per day, not one of three. The GOI’s assumption that 
the MDMS is one of three meals consumed a day is therefore flawed. Food consumption at home was 
also lacking in both quantity and diversity. Therefore, one can deduce that the actual contribution of the 
MDMS to overall dietary intake will be different from the theoretical contribution outlined in Chapter 
4. Second, the contribution of the MDM to the intake of food varied between children. For some 
children, the MDM is one of three meals per day, for others it is one of two. The amount of food required 
also varies depending on age and gender. Finally, in Section 4.2, I outlined that an objective of the 
MDMS is to address classroom hunger. From the consumption patterns, however, it is clear that those 
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children who do not consume breakfast would be hungry for the duration of the morning. The MDMS 
therefore can only address classroom hunger that would have occurred after lunch.  
 
Food Security 
To further understand the food-based needs of rights-holders, I now examine household food insecurity. 
More than half the respondents in HS1 had experienced food insecurity in the previous month. The 
distribution of affirmative responses shows the expected decrease by question (Figure 5.1). This shows 
food security levels in the sampled households; it is not reflective of food security status across the 
blocks or districts. 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Affirmative answers in the HFIAS, household survey one (n=425) 
 
The frequency with which people experienced the situation described in each question also decreased 
with severity, except for questions two and four (Figure 5.2). In total, 53.6% of households had 
experienced anxiety about food (domain one), 51.7% had consumed inferior quality food (domain two) 
and 27.9% had experienced reduced food intake (domain three). 
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Figure 5.2: Answers to the HFIAS, household survey one (n=425) 
 
Figure 5.3 shows the proportion of the sample in each food security category as determined by the 
pattern of answers in the HFIAS. Overall, 198 households (46.6%) were food secure and 227 (53.4%) 
were food insecure. Food security was experienced the most commonly in Girwa and the least 
commonly in Kotra. A Kruskal-Wallis test showed a significant difference between blocks, 
H(3)=71.165, p=<0.001. Experiences of food insecurity also varied by sampled location (see Appendix 
E.4.3). 
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Figure 5.3: Food security status, household survey one (n=425) 
 
An ordinal regression showed location, education, caste and PDS card had a significant effect on HFIAS 
categories (Table 5.17). The trends by location are shown in Figure 5.3. A higher proportion of literate 
respondents than illiterate respondents were food secure; 68.4% compared to 34.4%. A higher 
proportion of general and OBC castes were food secure than SCs and STs; 80.4% of general castes and 
72.7% of OBCs were food secure, compared to 56.1% of SCs and 33.7% of STs. A higher proportion 
of APL households were food secure compared to BPL households; 59.2% compared to 35.2%. In each 
case, the group with higher levels of food insecurity also had higher levels of severe food insecurity. 
For example, 14.4% of APL households were severely food insecure compared to 32.0% of BPL 
households. 
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Table 5.17: Ordinal regression output: Food security category 
Variable Value Standard 
Error 
P value 
Location 0.437546 0.093721 <0.001*** 
Household size 0.022743 0.037226 0.541 
Employment -0.006951 0.047751 0.884 
Education -0.331800 0.062965 <0.001*** 
Vegetarian 0.155570 0.253568 0.540 
Caste 0.533465 0.136783 <0.001*** 
PDS card type 0.575127 0.172218 <0.001*** 
***p<0.001 
 
Food insecurity was experienced more frequently by the respondents in HS2 than HS1 (Figure 5.4). In 
total, 145 respondents (90.1%) had experienced food insecurity in the previous month. In contrast to 
HS1, the most common experience was consuming a limited variety of food (question three), a trend 
also observed in Tanzania by Knueppel et al. (2009).  
 
 
Figure 5.4: Affirmative answers in the HFIAS, household survey two (n=161) 
 
The same pattern evident in Figure 5.4 is also shown in the responses to each question (Figure 5.5); the 
situation described in question three was experienced by the most people.  
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Figure 5.5: HFIAS responses, household survey two 
 
 
Overall, 82.6% of respondents in HS2 experienced domain one (anxiety), 88.4% experienced domain 
two (quality) and 48.2% experienced domain three (food intake). Only 17 households (10.6%) were 
food secure. (Figure 5.6). A Kruskal-Wallis test found a significant difference between case study, 
H(2)=25.077, p=<0.001. Respondents at CS2 were the most food secure and respondents at CS3 were 
the most food insecure (Figure 5.6).  
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Figure 5.6: Food Security Status, household survey two  
 
The results from the HFIAS show that a considerable proportion of the households that rights-holders 
belonged to were food insecure, particularly at the case studies. The findings also show that food 
insecurity is not ubiquitous across rights-holders. Even among those experiencing food insecurity, the 
severity varies.  
 
Summary  
Two key trends emerge from the findings presented above. Firstly, food insecurity and inadequate food 
consumption were prevalent among the sampled households, indicating that those targeted in the 
MDMS have a need for the scheme. Second, both food consumption and food insecurity vary between 
households and across locations. Thus, among ‘rights-holders’, food needs vary. As shown in Chapter 
4, the MDM norms are fixed. Therefore, the MDMS is not designed in a manner which addresses these 
varying needs. For example, the food provided in CS1 and CS3 should, in principle, be almost the same. 
Yet, as I have shown, there are considerable differences in food consumption and food security between 
the two case studies. The design of the MDMS only reflects differences in needs between lower and 
primary students; differences between households or locations are not reflected in the design of the 
scheme or its implementation. Dietary needs have therefore been simplified and homogenised in the 
MDMS. 
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5.2.3 Perceived Impact 
 
The aim of this research was not to quantitatively examine the impacts of the MDMS in terms of the 
fulfilment of objectives (see Section 2.8). Instead, I examined the perceived benefits of the MDMS to 
assess whether rights-holders and their representatives perceived the scheme to be beneficial and 
whether perceptions varied. In the household surveys, we asked participants whether they thought that 
the MDMS had positively impacted their child(ren) and household. Table 5.18 presents the results from 
HS1 and HS2. In both, almost the same proportion of participants acknowledged a positive impact on 
enrolment and attendance. In HS1 there was a marked decline in the perceived impact on other areas. 
The results from HS2 do not show the same decline and instead responses vary depending on the impact.   
 
Table 5.18: Perceived impact of the MDMS8  
Impact  
HS1 
% of respondents 
(n=414) 
HS2 
% of respondents 
(n=156) 
Yes No Don’t Know Yes No 
Don’t 
Know 
Enrolment 57.2 34.5 8.2 53.8 43.6 2.6 
Attendance 57.5 34.8 7.7 58.3 39.1 2.6 
Performance 46.9 42.3 10.9 55.8 41.0 3.2 
Health of child 43.5 50.7 5.8 57.7 38.5 3.8 
Food at home 33.3 56.5 10.1 67.3 32.1 0.6 
Money at home 37.4 54.3 8.2 55.8 22.3 1.9 
Caste relationships 38.6 48.3 13.0 55.1 40.4 4.5 
More time - - - 55.1 42.3 4.5 
 
Spearman’s rank correlations were conducted to examine whether perceptions were internally 
consistent, i.e. whether the same people in the sample were answering yes across different impacts. In 
HS1, impacts were highly correlated (Appendix E.5), particularly for similar types of impact such as 
enrolment and attendance, rs=0.99, p=<0.001. The same trend was also found for HS2 (Appendix E.5).  
 
Table 5.19 presents the perception of impact from HS1 compared to household food security status. A 
chi-square test of independence shows significant differences between the perception of impact and 
food security status for enrolment (χ2(3)=11.997, p=0.007), attendance (χ2(3)=11.712, p=0.008), 
performance (χ2(3)=21.042, p=<0.001) and child health (χ2(3)=13.373, p=0.003). For enrolment, 
attendance and performance, the percentage of respondents answering ‘yes’ increases with the 
                                                        
8Having more time was mentioned repeatedly during the first stage of research and was therefore added.  
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increasing severity of food insecurity. The highest (or joint highest) percentage of respondents 
answering yes for a positive impact on child health and the amount of food were severely food insecure; 
however, the second highest proportion answering yes were food secure. Thus, whilst there is a general 
relationship that the most food insecure people considered the MDMS to have a positive impact, the 
exact trend varies depending on the impact in question. 
 
Table 5.19: Impact as reported in household survey one 
Impact Food secure Mildly insecure Moderately insecure Severely insecure 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
Enrolment 95 53.4 41 69.5 35 66.0 67 72.8 
Attendance 96 53.3 41 68.3 35 66.0 67 72.8 
Performance 80 45.7 21 37.5 32 61.5 73 73.0 
Child Health 89 48.4 24 39.3 22 41.5 46 48.4 
Food at home 72 40.9 23 38.3 19 35.8 43 45.7 
Money at home 72 40.7 22 36.7 20 37.7 39 41.9 
Equality 80 47.6 24 42.9 18 36 39 43.82 
 
I also assessed perceptions of impact using qualitative methods. Interviewees and focus group 
participants considered the MDMS to have a greater impact than was reported in the surveys; perhaps 
indicative of the limits of the survey to examine this issue. Parents perceived the MDMS to have a 
positive impact on enrolment, attendance and child health and thought that the MDMS helped families 
to save food. The focus groups at CS3 particularly stressed the positive impact on enrolment and 
attendance. For example, one participant stated that they previously sent their children to work in 
Gujarat, but now, because of the MDMS, sent them to school. The benefit most commonly cited by 
students across all case studies was that the MDMS removed the need to bring a tiffin9 to school. For 
example, a grade VIII student at CS1 wrote: ‘I do not bring a tiffin from home... for poor children who 
do not have food available at home, this is the benefit’.10 The impact of the scheme was, however, 
affected by implementation. Participants at CS2 stated that the scheme would be more helpful if more 
food was given and participants at CS3 stated that the scheme was only helpful when the children 
actually received food.  
  
                                                        
9 In HS1, 19 of 402 respondents reported that their child took a tiffin (a layered container in which lunch is carried 
from the home) to school and 25 said that they did sometimes. Observation showed, however, that tiffins only 
supplemented the MDM. For example, an additional roti or leftover food might be used to supplement the quantity 
or chutney might be used to improve the taste.   
10 All quotations are provided in English. The original Hindi is provided in Appendix E.3.  
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Participants commonly commented that the MDMS particularly benefited the ‘poor’, mentioned both 
by those who did and did not identify themselves as poor. For example, in CS1, the mother at household 
12 stated that ‘all families benefit from the MDM. For poor children, hot nutritious food is available 
which is not available at home’. The same sentiment was echoed at CS2. Unique to CS2, however, was 
the recognition that the MDMS benefited students walking to school from several kilometres away. For 
example, one student wrote: ‘for those children coming from far away the meal is very beneficial. 
Because in our school children come from five kilometres away. They are tired and eat the food’. At 
CS3, all participants identified themselves as poor. The MDM was perceived to be beneficial due to the 
paucity of food, particularly varied food, at home (a trend confirmed by the food-consumption recall 
results presented in Table 5.16). Respondents reported that, because of the MDMS, they could save 
food and that their children could eat better. At CS4, parents and students recognised the relief that the 
MDMS provided for the poor, especially those with large families. A grade VII student wrote: ‘If school 
food stopped, then there would be a loss for us… from the mid day meal there is the effect that for poor 
children, if there is no roti or vegetable in their home, they can eat at school’. The positive impact of 
the MDMS on the poor was also recognised by teachers and CCHs. Eight teachers considered the 
objective of the MDMS to be to benefit those poor students who could not get enough food at home, 
two said it existed specifically to benefit undernourished children and two cited both reasons. Five 
cooks also mentioned that the MDMS benefited those children not receiving enough food at home.  
 
The qualitative data suggests that the meal particularly benefitted those considered poor and needy and 
those without sufficient food at home, once again showing variation in needs across rights-holders.   
 
5.3 The Missing Millions  
5.3.1 Enrolment and Consumption 
 
Of course, the MDMS can only benefit students if they consume the meal. The 2015-2016 AWPBs 
report that 131.6 million students were eligible to receive the MDM and 102.5 million (77.8%) 
consumed the meal. U-DISE data shows that 133.7 million were eligible to receive the MDM (NUEPA, 
2016), of which 100.3 million (75.0%) consumed the meal (MHRD, 2016g). Although figures vary 
annually and between data sources, there are approximately 30 million ‘missing’11 children in the 
MDMS. Given the size of this figure, it is important to understand who these ‘missing’ children are. In 
the sections that follow, I consider the extent of this issue in the study districts and examine the reasons 
                                                        
11 The phrase ‘missing millions’ is taken from Poppendiecks’ 2010 book on school lunches in America. In the 
United States, millions of children eligible to eat a subsidised school lunch choose not to for a multitude of reasons.  
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for the disparity between eligibility and consumption. Drawing on the capability approach, I explore 
whether children not consuming the meal is a product of an absence of capability or choice.    
 
The difference between reported enrolment and consumption varies geographically (Figure 5.7).  
 
 
Figure 5.7: The percentage of enrolled students consuming the MDM in 2015-2016  
(data from AWPBs for 2016-2017) 
 
In Table 5.20, I present the enrolment and consumption figures for Rajasthan. In 2015-2016, the 
proportion of students consuming the meal was higher than in 2013-2014, but had declined since 2014-
2015. Still, consumption as a proportion of enrolment was lower in Rajasthan and the study areas than 
the national average (77.8%). In the study districts, just under three quarters of eligible students 
consumed the MDM.  
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Table 5.20: Enrolment versus consumption from AWPBs (GOR, 2013; 2014; 2015). 
Location Year Enrolment Consumption % of enrolled 
students 
consuming the 
MDM 
Rajasthan 
2013-2014 6,770,832 4,651,931 68.7 
2014-2015 6,250,214 5,003,140 80.0 
2015-2016 6,283,879 4,518,987 71.9 
Rajsamand 
2013-2014 145,566 104,571 71.8 
2014-2015 146,405 109,555 74.8 
2015-2016 151,160 108,825 72.0 
Udaipur 
2013-2014 362,426 258,669 71.4 
2014-2015 363,302 293,929 80.9 
2015-2016 363,241 260,832 71.8 
 
Considerable differences between the number of enrolled students and the number of students 
consuming the meal were observed at the case study schools (Table 5.21).12  
 
Table 5.21: Students consuming the meal at the case study schools as a proportion of enrolled students  
Case Study Proportion of enrolled students observed 
consuming the MDM (%) 
Minimum Maximum Average 
CS1 29 85 61 
CS2 37.6 51.2 44 
CS3 16.7 61.9 45.2 
 
The 2015 report on the MDMS by the Comptroller and Auditor General of India (CAG) and my primary 
data indicate three reasons why consumption is considerably lower than enrolment. First, enrolment 
figures may be inaccurate. Second, children may be enrolled but may not attend school or may choose 
not to eat the meal. Third, the children may be unable to eat the meal because it is not provided. I now 
examine these reasons in turn.   
 
5.3.2 Enrolment  
 
Enrolment figures in India are often inflated (Drèze and Goyal, 2003; Drèze and Kingdon, 2001; 
Kingdon, 2007; PROBE, 1999). Teachers may exaggerate figures to justify the existence of a school 
                                                        
12 Unfortunately, such figures are not available for CS4, as my assistants forgot to record the data. 
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and thus their job or to access additional funding (Kingdon, 2007; PROBE, 1999; Tooley and Dixon, 
2006). Figures may also be inaccurate as some children attend unrecognised private schools but are 
enrolled in government schools to obtain official certificates (Drèze, 2017; PROBE, 1999). Attendance 
figures may also be inflated to access additional MDMS funds (Bhatty, 2015). I observed teachers 
inflating enrolment and attendance figures during the fieldwork. This was most obvious at school 19. 
On the day of our visit, the head-teacher reported an enrolment of 117. The school was in a very small 
village where it appeared unlikely that 117 people lived, let alone 117 children were of primary school-
going age. The head-teacher reported an attendance of 77, yet only 22 students were present.13 At the 
time, an inflation of 55 students would have amounted to additional MDMS funding of INR 197.45 per 
day or INR 45,610.95 per year. In the absence of frequent monitoring (see Chapter 8), the teacher could 
inflate figures without much concern for being caught. The influence of teachers’ interests and agency 
is discussed further in Chapter 8. 
 
Determining the number of students enrolled is further complicated by the inconsistency between data 
sources. As outlined in Section 5.3.1, the number of enrolled students in eligible schools reported in the 
AWPBs is 2 million lower than reported in the NUEPA data. The MHRD figures and the quarterly 
figures provided by each state are also often inconsistent (CAG, 2015). For 2013-2014, these two sets 
of figures were different in 20 states/UTs including Rajasthan. Rajasthan had one of the largest 
discrepancies; 197,729 more enrolled students were reported in the MHRD’s data than in the GOR’s 
(ibid). Uncertainty regarding the number of enrolled students is problematic as the quantity of grain and 
funds are calculated per student.  
 
5.3.3 Enrolment versus Attendance 
 
The MDM is conditional on school attendance. In 2012-2013, the GOI found that attendance rates were 
76.2% at the primary level and 77.8% at the upper primary level (NUEPA, 2014), indicating that almost 
one quarter of enrolled students did not attend school and thus consume the MDM. Sizable differences 
between enrolment and attendance were found at the sampled schools (Table 5.22).  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
13 The title page for Chapter 2 shows the MDM being consumed on the day that 77 students were reported to 
attend. Clearly there are 22 students pictured, not 77.   
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Table 5.22: Attendance figures as a proportion of those enrolled from school records  
Source Location Minimum 
Attendance 
(%) 
Maximum 
Attendance 
(%) 
Average 
Attendance 
(%) 
Observation  
Stage 1  33.9 91.4 69.3 
CS1 32.1 85.9 68.9 
CS2 74.6 90.2 76 
CS3 16.6 61.9 41.4 
CS4 28 78 50.2 
School 
records 
CS1 66.7 84.6 77.1 
CS2 31.4 66.2 56.5 
CS3 64.3 95.2 82.3 
CS4 12.4 88.4 58.6 
S25 21.2 100 72.9 
S23 37.2 91.7 77.1 
S29  42.4 96.5 79.5 
 
The factors preventing school attendance and enrolment are typically classified as ‘demand-side’ and 
‘supply-side’ barriers. Demand-side barriers relate to the home and community and include: household 
work or care for siblings; paid employment; the ill-health of family members; migration; the livelihood 
of the household and indifference to and a lack of interest in education (IN4; Research, Evaluation and 
Studies Unit, 2006; UNICEF 2014a; 2014b). Supply-side barriers include lack of access to a school, 
poor school functioning, poor infrastructure at school and the absence of good teachers (UNICEF, 
2014b). 
 
Factors affecting attendance were explored in the interviews and focus groups. At CS1 and CS2, 
approximately half of the participants reported that their child(ren) went to school regularly, citing a 
desire to be with friends, a desire to learn and the availability of food as the determining factors. Others 
reported that it was difficult to get their child(ren) to attend due to a lack of interest in school or 
‘laziness’. The lowest attendance rates were observed in CS3. Of the 10 participants interviewed, eight 
reported that their child(ren) did not attend school regularly, although they did go when food or good 
food was served. For example, the interviewee at household nine stated that her child ‘only goes for 
food’ and the interviewee at household 12 stated ‘If good food and food is available daily then more 
children will go to school’. In CS4, nine of 10 participants stated that their child(ren) liked to attend 
school, as they could play with friends, whereas at home they would have to work. Five participants 
also mentioned the appeal of the MDM. Only one interviewee commented that their child did not like 
to attend regularly because the school was far away. It should be noted that the teachers at CS4 actively 
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encouraged students to attend every morning. Therefore some children had agency in the decision of 
whether to go to school. The quality of the MDM served played a role in this decision. 
 
The MDMS is therefore not always sufficient to ensure that students go to school, due to the opportunity 
cost, a lack of interest in education or the meal. However, the qualitative data suggests that a regular 
MDM of sufficient quality can attract children to school.  
 
5.3.4 Attendance versus Consumption 
 
Of the children attending school on any given day, it is unlikely that all consume the MDM. From the 
school records obtained for Girwa (2014-2015), a higher rate of attendance than consumption was 
observed in 78 of 269 schools (29%) amounting to an annual difference of 252,295 meals. In the 20 
sampled schools where it was possible to accurately record the number of children consuming the 
MDM, on average 88.5% of those attending consumed the meal. Recognising that enrolment figures 
may be inflated, in the student survey students were asked how often they ate the MDM. Interestingly, 
88.5% reported that they always ate the meal (Table 5.23). Few students reported that they never ate 
the meal.   
 
Table 5.23: Frequency of MDM consumption reported in the student surveys 
Case Study 
Always Sometimes Never 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
CS1 61 98.4 1 1.6 0 0 
CS2 56 70 22 27.5 2 2.5 
CS3 15 68.2 7 31.8 0 0 
CS4 114 100 0 0 0 0 
Total 236 88.5 30 10.8 2 2.5 
 
In HS1, 87.8% of parents reported that their child(ren) consumed the MDM every day (Table 5.24). 
The frequency varied slightly between blocks; the lowest frequency of consumption was reported in 
Kotra, most likely due to the greater irregularity in the provision of the MDM (Section 5.3.5). 
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Table 5.24: Frequency of MDM consumption according to parents, household survey one 
Block 
MDM Consumption (days per week) 
0 1-5 6 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
Girwa 4 3.9 8 7.8 91 88.3 
Kotra 9 8.5 12 11.3 85 80.2 
Khamnor 2 2.2 6 6.5 84 91.3 
Kumbhalgarh 0 0.0 8 7.5 99 92.5 
Total 15 3.7 34 8.3 359 88.0 
 
Data from the household and student surveys indicates that in the study area approximately 85-87% of 
children at school consumed the MDM daily. Therefore, approximately 15% of students were self-
excluding from the scheme. Self-exclusion occurred for several reasons. Some students believed that 
they did not need the meal because they ate before or after school. For example, a girl in grade VII at 
CS1 stated: ‘sometimes I come from home after eating, then I don’t eat [the MDM]’. Others went home 
for lunch. Four teachers reported that some children always went home for lunch and seven said that 
this occurred sometimes. Those living close to the school were more likely to go home. Thus, for some 
students there was a self-assessed absence of need due to the availability of food at home. 
 
Other students did not consume the MDM because they did not want to. For example, one boy at CS2 
wrote: ‘I eat the food just once a week because I do not like the school food’.14 Children also have 
agency in the decision as to whether to consume the MDM when at school. A small number did not eat 
the food due to a perceived absence of need and/or discrimination. For example, at school 24, the 
children at household eight who belonged to a general caste stated that they did not eat the MDM 
because the scheme is for SC, ST, OBC children. They felt that if they sat and ate the meal with them 
it would by association mean that they were also poor. They stated that ‘higher’ caste children at the 
school did not consume the meal. In this case, a stigma was attached to eating the meal, resulting in 
rights-holders not consuming the meal.15 However, stigma was not commonly mentioned in this 
research; probably due to the homogeneity of castes in many locations. Finally, on occasion students 
(especially older girls) were not consuming the meal due to religious fasting. 
 
                                                        
14 Preference is considered in greater depth in Section 7.5. 
15 Discrimination is discussed further in Section 6.5.  
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For those children attending a school serving the MDM, there is the option to consume the MDM. 
However, children may ‘choose’ not to. This decision can be affected by need, preference and social 
structures which affect how students perceive the act of eating the meal. 
 
5.3.5 Irregularity  
 
Students do not have the option to consume the MDM if it is not served; a form of exclusion within the 
scheme. In these situations, students do not have the capability to consume the MDM. This exclusion 
occurs for two primary reasons. Firstly, the MDM may not be provided due to school closure. Schools 
should open for approximately 230 days per year. In 2013-2014, on average, primary schools opened 
for 226 days, although 5.1% of primary schools opened for fewer than 200 days (NUEPA, 2016). 
Between April and December 2015, schools opened for the expected number of days in just 13 
states/UTs.16 The lowest number of working days was reported in Nagaland, where schools opened for 
just 121 of 173 days (69.9%). Schools often do not open for the specified number of working days due 
to teacher absences. The GOI found that teacher attendance averaged 84.3% at the primary level and 
81.3% at the upper primary in 2012-2013 (NUEPA, 2014). The absence of teachers is a particular 
problem in single-teacher schools as it results in school closure. When schools are not open, the MDM 
is not provided and students do not receive their entitlements. School closure has thus been recognised 
as a problem for the MDMS, for example in the JRMs to Bihar (MHRD, 2013d), Madhya Pradesh 
(MHRD, 2013e), Meghalaya (MHRD, 2013f) and Nagaland (MHRD, 2013b).  
 
In 2014-2015, in Rajasthan schools should have opened for 231 days (GOR, 2015a). The GOR (2015a) 
reported that schools opened for the correct number of days; however, the records for Girwa block for 
the same period show that only 113 of 240 schools (43.0%) opened for at least the correct number of 
days (Table 5.25).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
16 The full dataset is provided in Appendix E.6. 
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Table 5.25: Working days at schools in Girwa 2014-2015 (from Girwa block records) 
Number of 
working days 
Number of 
schools 
Percentage of 
schools 
202-210 7 2.9 
211-220 19 7.9 
221-230 111 46.3 
231 45 18.8 
232-240 57 23.8 
241-244 1 0.4 
 
A state-level official suggested that the closure of schools in Rajasthan was rare, stating: ‘In our state 
every child is under the MDM, except a few schools occasionally’ (IG4). However, observation showed 
that school closure was not uncommon. Of the 47 schools visited, three schools in Kotra were closed 
and thus were not included in the final sample. School 15 in Kotra was also closed on the day of our 
visit due to the absence of the only teacher, although likely due to our presence the MDM was still 
served. Even schools included in the sample were not always open when we visited. The third case 
study school, for example, which only had one teacher was closed for 10 days after the Holi vacation. 
Teacher absenteeism is a known problem in India and occurs due to multiple reasons, including due to 
the motivation of teachers, which may be determined by the working conditions and how remote the 
location of the school is, and the institutional context including a lack of accountability and incentives 
(Kremer et al., 2005; Narayan and Mooij, 2010; Ramachandran et al., 2005). These factors clearly 
influenced the teacher at CS3. She had to travel on foot to reach the school, which did not have a 
functioning toilet or running water and had been recently broken into. In the absence of effective 
accountability mechanisms, it is unsurprising that she sometimes did not go to work.  
 
Secondly, schools may open but not serve the MDM. No meal was served during our visits to schools 
12, 14 and 21 in Kotra and school 43 in Kumbhalgarh. In schools 12 and 21 this was because the cooks 
were absent. Notably, many of the students at school 12 boarded at the school and did not have the 
option to return home for lunch. Students were forced to miss lunch and wait for their evening meal at 
the hostel. In schools 14 and 43, teachers gave no reason for the lack of a MDM. At school 14 (CS3), 
the meal had not been served for several weeks. According to the parents, the teacher told them that the 
MDMS no longer existed. On our arrival at the school, the teacher called her husband who promptly 
brought namkeen. The children went through the performance of washing their hands using the nearest 
water source (an irrigation pump in a field) and then ate namkeen from a plate. The case study schools 
served lunch regularly because they knew we were coming. However, at CS1 the lunch was not served 
during the examination period. The decision not to serve the meal may be a coping strategy in the 
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absence of sufficient human resources (cooks or teachers) or may be the product of a lack of motivation 
of teaches to organise the MDMS.   
 
Household surveys confirmed irregular MDM provision. Of the 219 participants in HS1 that expressed 
dissatisfaction with the scheme, 23 cited irregularity as a cause. These responses were from households 
in locations 16, 17, 19 21 and 22 in Kotra, 30 and 31 in Khamnor and 39, 42, and 43 in Kumbhalgarh. 
Reports of irregularity were therefore more common in Kumbhalgarh and particularly common in 
Kotra. Many of the respondents that cited food irregularity as a problem were in particularly remote 
locations (schools 17, 39, 42, 43). Due to the centralised nature of provision, one would not expect 
irregularity to be a problem Khamnor, yet irregularity was cited as a problem at two schools in the 
block. 
 
The block level official in Kotra was not surprised to hear that MDM provision was often irregular. He 
stated that although the MDM was a successful scheme, it had not been particularly well-implemented 
in Kotra (IG5). He considered that this was largely due to the physical conditions in Kotra; schools 
were often 5km away from the road and the terrain was hilly, making it difficult for teachers to provide 
the MDM. He also attributed the scheme’s poor implementation to the unavailability of fruit and 
vegetables in the block and common incidents of theft, which made storing food at schools difficult. 
Indeed, the aftermath of a theft was witnessed at the third case study school. The block-level official 
concluded that the block office ‘can’t do anything about it’; he considered the area to be ‘backward’ 
and such problems to be inevitable. The officer was also not surprised to hear that the third case study 
school had not served food after Holi, stating that this was a ‘tradition’ in the area. Thus, the official 
with responsibility for the implementation of the MDMS in the block considered successful 
implementation to be a lost cause. Notably, the implementation problems he cited were inevitable and 
unalterable, relieving him of any responsibility to improve the scheme’s implementation. The reasons 
cited can thus be considered ‘escape hatches’ (Schaffer, 1984).  
  
5.4 Discrimination  
 
Exclusion within the MDMS may also occur due to discrimination, which is typically caste-based. Such 
discrimination may result in the outright exclusion of dalit children or the provision of quantitatively 
or qualitatively inadequate food to ‘lower’ castes (Thorat and Lee, 2005). Discrimination may also 
affect how children experience the scheme, for example dalit children may be forced to sit separately 
(ibid). Others may choose not to consume the meal, due to the discrimination towards ‘lower’ caste 
cooks or ‘lower’ caste children. Discrimination in the MDMS is not, however, ubiquitous (Drèze and 
Goyal, 2003). To assess whether discrimination had been experienced in the MDMS in the study area, 
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respondents were directly asked whether their child had experienced discrimination in the MDMS. In 
HS1, 320 (76.9%) answered no, 16 (3.9%) said yes and 80 (19.2%) did not know. Of the 12 that 
answered yes and provided further details, six said that their child received less food because they were 
lower caste, four said that older students gave their child less, one reported that the cook gave more to 
students that they preferred and another reported their child received less because they were Muslim. 
HS2 generated similar results; 117 people (74.5%) stated that their child had not experienced 
discrimination, 10 (6.4%) said that they had and 30 (19.1%) did not know. Four respondents provided 
further details; two stated that lower castes were given less food and two reported that the cook gave 
preferential treatment to certain students. I encountered discriminatory attitudes on two occasions. The 
respondent from household two from school 23, argued against the practice of children sitting together. 
The father from household one at school 26 stated that the only problem with the MDMS was the mixing 
of castes, arguing that lower caste children should not be allowed to serve or touch the food and that 
they should sit separately.  
 
All teachers and CCHs reported that students sat together to eat the MDM and were served in the same 
manner. Observation confirmed this, except for at school 16 where boys were served first. Many of the 
children described the process of sitting down to eat in their essays, but none mentioned segregation. 
In HS3, 115 parents (87.1%) reported that there was no segregation in seating in the MDMS, of which 
34 (29.6%) specifically mentioned that the teacher did not allow it. Seventeen parents (12.9%), 
mentioned that caste influenced seating; 11 reported that upper castes would not sit with their child and 
six said that their child would not sit with lower caste children. Responses included ‘we cannot sit with 
lower castes because we are Brahmin’ (household eight at CS1), ‘lower castes are not clean’ (household 
21 at CS1) and ‘upper caste children won't sit with our children so our children sit with their own caste’ 
(household 22 at CS4). In the focus groups, most participants noted that children sat together and that 
discrimination was prohibited by teachers. In each group, however, some form of discrimination was 
mentioned. For example, at CS2, two participants stated that when high caste children served the food 
they gave less to low caste children. At CS2 and CS4, some participants mentioned that when lower 
caste children served the food, higher caste children did not eat the MDM.  
 
The extent to which this study can comment on discrimination in the MDMS is limited by the 
homogenous caste composition of many locations (Section 3.2.4) and by my position as an outsider. I 
did find, however, that caste-based discrimination towards students in the MDMS in the study area was 
neither ubiquitous nor entirely absent. Discrimination was found to affect the quantity of food children 
received. One can deduce that it also affected the experience of students.  
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5.5 Temporal Exclusion 
5.5.1 Introduction  
 
The existence of a right to consume the MDM varies temporally. Rights-holders are not entitled to a 
meal when the school is closed on Sundays. In the student survey, 260 students (77.4%) reported that 
they ate less on Sundays. In HS2, 132 parents (94.3 %) reported that their child ate less on Sundays. 
More concerning, however, is that the MDM is not provided during vacations. The longest vacation is 
in the summer (early May until late June). The summer is a difficult time of the year in Rajasthan; it is 
hot, dry and there is little surplus food (IN10). When the third stage of the fieldwork was conducted in 
the summer of 2015, the study area had not been declared ‘drought-affected’ and therefore, the MDM 
was not served. In the following two sections, I examine what happened to food security and food 
consumption during the summer.  
 
5.5.2 Food Security  
 
A paired sampled t-test was conducted to compare HFIAS scores in HS2 and HS3 (before and during 
the summer). There were significant differences in the scores at CS1 and CS2. Significant differences 
were not found at CS3 and CS4 as food insecurity levels were already high at the time of HS2. The 
mean HFIAS scores were higher at all case studies in HS3 than HS2, indicating that food insecurity 
was higher in the summer (Table 5.2.6). 
 
Table 5.26: Mean HFIAS scores and standard deviations 
Case study 
HS2 HS3 T-test results 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
CS1 7.34 6.81 10.52 6.72 t(28)=2.458, p=0.02 
CS2 7.41 6.44 12.54 5.11 t(36)= 3.5043, p=0.0012 
CS3 17.33 5.67 18.36 4.06 t(35)=0.9435, p=0.35 
CS4 10.21 4.56 12.45 5.12 t(28)=1.8458, p=0.07 
Total 10.74 7.24 13.67 6 t(130)=4.5006, p=<0.001 
 
The number of affirmative responses in the HFIAS increased in the summer for all questions (Table 
5.27). By the summer, 98.5% of the sample reported that they were unable to eat food that they preferred 
and ate a limited variety of food.   
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Table 5.27: Affirmative Responses to HFIAS in the second and third household surveys (n=131) 
Question  HS2 (%) HS3 (%) 
Q1. Worry about food 80.1 96.3 
Q2. Unable to eat preferred food 86.8 98.5 
Q3. Eat a limited variety of food 87.5 98.5 
Q4. Eat food really did not want to eat 83.8 97.1 
Q5. Eat a smaller meal 72.8 94.9 
Q6. Eat fewer meals 64.0 83.1 
Q7. No food to eat  55.9 72.1 
Q8. Go to sleep hungry 31.6 59.6 
Q9. Did not eat for a whole day and night 24.3 40.4 
 
The number of households experiencing severe food insecurity increased in the summer (Figure 5.8).  
 
 
Figure 5.8: HFIAS categories in household survey two and three  
 
Changes in the prevalence of food insecurity differed between the case studies (Table 5.28). A Kruskal-
Wallis test found a significant difference between case studies, H(1)=16.819, p=<0.001. At CS1 and 
CS2, the number of households classified as food secure decreased in the summer and the severity of 
food insecurity increased. At CS3, no households were food secure at the time of HS2; however, by the 
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summer all households were severely food insecure. The smallest change in food security was found at 
CS4; the change was from mildly to moderately food insecure. 
 
Table 5.28: Food insecurity category, percentage of households by case study 
Case Study Food Insecurity Category HS2 (%) HS3 (%) 
CS1 
Food Secure 20.7 6.9 
Mildly Food Insecure 27.6 13.8 
Moderately Food Insecure 24.1 27.6 
Severely Food Insecure 27.6 51.7 
CS2 
Food Secure 29.7 0.0 
Mildly Food Insecure 13.5 2.7 
Moderately Food Insecure 13.5 18.9 
Severely Food Insecure 43.2 78.4 
CS3 
Food Secure 0.0 0.0 
Mildly Food Insecure 5.6 0.0 
Moderately Food Insecure 13.9 0.0 
Severely Food Insecure 80.6 100.0 
CS4 
Food Secure 0.0 0.0 
Mildly Food Insecure 10.3 3.4 
Moderately Food Insecure 17.2 24.1 
Severely Food Insecure 72.4 72.4 
 
Desiere et al. (2015) and Maes et al. (2009) observed that temporal changes in responses to the HFIAS 
were a product of response shift rather than changing food security and thus argued that the capacity of 
the HFIAS to examine temporal changes was limited. However, both Desiere et al. and Maes et al. 
found that food insecurity decreased over time; the opposite of the trend found in this research. 
Furthermore, the observed increased food insecurity in the summer is reflected in the results from the 
food consumption survey and recall. 
 
The frequency of the consumption of all food groups decreased in the summer (Table 5.29).  
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Table 5.29: The frequency of food consumption in household surveys two and three  
Food Survey 
 
Frequency in the past seven days 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Staple  
HS2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 133 
HS3 0 0 0 0 0 5 5 123 
Pulses HS2 23 31 47 23 5 2 0 2 
HS3 22 62 42 7 0 0 0 0 
Veg  
 
HS2 8 31 29 24 8 2 2 28 
HS3 47 66 19 1 0 0 0 0 
Fruit  
HS2 73 50 4 1 1 0 0 4 
HS3 125 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Meat 
HS2 99 29 1 2 0 0 0 2 
HS3 121 11 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Milk HS2 27 0 2 6 8 1 5 84 
HS3 54 1 10 7 7 5 10 39 
Sugar  
HS2 3 0 2 0 5 0 3 120 
HS3 7 3 10 14 7 3 7 82 
Oil 
HS2 1 1 11 10 6 1 3 100 
HS3 0 2 16 20 16 12 8 59 
Condiments 
HS2 1 0 1 1 1 0 2 127 
HS3 0 2 0 0 2 2 14 113 
 
A Wilcoxon signed-rank sum test shows that FCS scores from HS2 (Mdn=54) are statistically 
significantly greater than the scores from HS3 (Mdn=32.5), Z=8168, p=<0.001. These results indicate 
that dietary diversity was lower in the summer. A significant difference was found for all case studies 
(p=<0.001).  
 
Similarly to HS2, cluster analysis revealed three clusters in the food consumption of respondents in 
HS3 (Table 5.30). Comparing Table 5.30 and the results for HS2 (Table 5.13) shows a decrease in the 
cluster means across all food groups and clusters for HS3 compared to HS2. This means that all food 
groups were consumed less frequently in the summer. The existence of clusters in the data, however, 
shows that food needs still varied between households. Respondents in cluster one had the most diverse 
diet and respondents in cluster three had the least diverse diet. 
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Table 5.30: Cluster analysis of the FCS results, household survey three 
  
Food group 
Cluster Means 
(Frequency of consumption) 
1 2 3 
n=59 n=33 n=42 
Staple 7 7 6.7 
Pulses 1.4 1.7 0.8 
Vegetable 1.2 0.5 0.5 
Fruit 0.2 0 0 
Meat/fish 0.2 0 0.1 
Milk 6.4 0.1 1 
Sugar 6.7 7 2.2 
Oil 6.4 5.4 3.1 
Condiments 6.9 6.8 6.6 
Sum of 
squares 
4.0 6.1 6.4 
 
There was a significant relationship between case study and cluster, χ2(6)=62.869, p=<0.001. As shown 
in Table 5.31, participants at CS1 predominately fell into cluster one (the most diverse diet). Most of 
the participants at CS3 were in cluster three (the least diverse). Respondents at CS2 were largely split 
between clusters one and two and respondents at CS4 were split almost equally across all clusters. 
Dietary diversity was thus the greatest at CS1, followed by CS2 and CS4. Consumption was by far the 
least diverse at CS3.  
 
Table 5.31: Clusters by location- FCS results, household survey three  
Case Study 
Cluster  
(number of households) 
1 2 3 
CS1 23 4 3 
CS2 19 13 4 
CS3       0 5 27 
CS4 10 8 8 
 
Food consumption recall confirms that both the quantity and diversity of the food consumed decreased 
in the summer (Table 5.32). Most notably, in the summer at CS2, CS3 and CS4, dinner typically 
consisted of roti and an accompaniment such as chilli or coriander paste. Snacks were also not 
consumed in the summer. The lunch consumed in the summer is typically smaller in quantity and lower 
in quality than the quantities served in the MDMS. 
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Table 5.32: Most commonly consumed meals from household recall 
Case 
Study 
Time Breakfast Lunch Dinner Snacks 
CS1 
Term Tea MDM- 2 roti,1 cup 
vegetables 
2 rotis, 1 cup of 
vegetables  
Tea 
Summer Tea 2 roti, 0.5 cup of dal  2 roti, 1 cup of dal  Nothing 
CS2 
Term Tea, 1 roti MDM- 2 roti, 1 cup 
vegetables 
1.5 rotis, 0.5 cup of 
vegetables 
Tea 
Summer Tea 2 roti, 0.5 cup dal 2 roti, accompaniment  Nothing 
CS3 
Term Nothing MDM- 1 roti, 1 cup 
of vegetables or 1 
plate of dal dhokli  
1 roti, chilli paste 
Nothing 
Summer Nothing 2 roti, 
accompaniment 
1 roti, chilli paste Nothing 
CS4 
Term Tea MDM – 2 roti, 2 
spoons of rice, 1 cup 
of dal  
2 rotis, 1 cup of kadhi Tea 
Summer Tea 2 roti, 0.5 cup of dal 2 roti, accompaniment  Nothing 
 
Together, the results from the FCS, HFIAS and food recall confirm temporal variability in food access. 
The results therefore show that household food needs were the highest at a time when the MDMS was 
not operating. The design of the MDMS therefore does not reflect temporal variations in food needs. 
 
5.5.3 Perceived Changes 
 
Interviewees and focus group participants confirmed that their food consumption decreased in the 
summer. All interviewees stated that less food is available in the summer than at any other time of the 
year, due to an absence of water, a lack of grass for livestock and the unavailability of wage labour. 
Interviewees noted that the impact of the absence of the MDMS. For example, the respondent at 
household 20 at CS2 reported that they have the most food when the school is open, because they had 
six children who all went to school to eat one meal per day. Of the students, 245 (72.3%) said that they 
consumed less food in the summer and 94 (27.7%) said that they consumed the same amount. Of the 
parents in HS3, 132 (95.7%) said their child ate less in the summer than at school and six (4.3%) said 
they ate the same amount. Parents were asked whether the lack of the MDM in the summer affected 
their child; 120 (87.0%) said that it did, nine (6.5%) said that it sometimes did, six (4.3%) said it did 
 
 
170 
not and three (2.2%) did not know. Parents were asked to explain their answer. The key themes in their 
responses are detailed in Table 5.33.  
 
Table 5.33: Explanations of the impact of the absence of the MDM 
Response Frequency 
Food at home is worse (less varied, no rice, less dal) 72 
Don’t get enough food 60 
Children miss the food 14 
Negative impact on health 12 
Can’t afford food 7 
Problems serving food at home on time 5 
Food expense increases 3 
Not a problem – have enough food in the summer 9 
 
As shown in Table 5.32, participants most commonly considered that the food served at home was 
worse than the food served at school. For example, household one from CS3 stated that ‘we can’t 
provide dal, vegetables and rice as they have in school. It makes the child ambitious’. The second most 
common response was that the food at home was lower in quantity than the food at school. For example, 
the respondent from household 29 at CS2 replied that ‘because the child now eats at home, there is less 
food available at home. In school time, they had full diet so children do not eat two meals at home…but 
now they do’. Parents frequently reported that their children were hungry in the summer. For example, 
household 16 at CS1 stated that the ‘child is starving from hunger in the summer and they are begging 
for food’.  
 
The absence of the MDMS in the summer was most strongly felt at CS3. Life in the village was tough. 
All interviewees described how, in addition to the general lack of jobs and the absence of an anganwadi 
or a functioning PDS in the village, in the summer there was also no water, food or MDMS. Two 
interviewees even mentioned deaths occurring during the summer. Several households mentioned that 
to cope in the summer they send their child to Gujarat to work. They requested that the MDM be 
provided during the summer as ‘when the food is not available in the summer, children become 
hopeless’.  
 
Overall, 135 parents (98.5%) wanted the MDMS to continue in the summer. The explanations given 
reflected the answers listed in Table 5.32; participants thought that the continued provision of the MDM 
in the summer would provide their children with more food and higher quality food, and that they would 
save food, money and time. 
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5.5.4 Summary  
 
In Sections 5.5.2 and 5.5.3, I have shown that at the case study locations in the summer, the quantity 
and quality of food consumption at home decreased and food insecurity increased. The absence of the 
MDM has been shown to have put a strain on households’ resources and to have been negatively felt 
by children and their parents. Presently, the design of the MDMS does not account for temporal 
variation in need outside of drought-affected areas. The MDMS does not provide ‘secure functionings’ 
(Wolff and de Shalit, 2007), whether functionings is interpreted as being full, well-nourished or food 
secure. As shown in the qualitative accounts, the instability of this functioning can have emotional as 
well as potential physiological impacts. Further qualitative and nutritionally-focussed research is 
needed to explore these impacts. 
 
5.6 Exclusion from the MDMS 
5.6.1 Introduction 
 
The targeting procedure in the MDMS leads to the exclusion of three groups of children: those in 
ineligible private schools, those above grade VIII and those not in school. In the following three 
sections, I examine the extent of exclusion and potential consequences. 
 
5.6.2 Private schools 
 
The enrolment of children in MDM eligible schools has decreased since 2010 due to the increase in the 
number of children attending private schools (Table 5.34). In 2015-2016, 59 million children attended 
unaided private schools and were therefore excluded from the MDMS (see Table 5.1).  
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Table 5.34: Change in school enrolment patterns in India  
(data from the MHRD in CAG, 2015: 17-18). 
Year Enrolment at MDM- 
eligible schools 
(millions) 
Enrolment at private 
schools (millions) 
2009-2010 146.9 40.2 
2010-2011 147.7 42.4 
2011-2012 145.9 48.2 
2012-2013 142.1 53.2 
2013-2014 138.7 55.3 
 
The decline in enrolment in MDM-eligible schools is also observed in Rajasthan and the study districts 
(Table 5.35). Between 2009-2016, the number of children attending MDM-eligible schools declined by 
16.1% in Rajasthan, 12.0% in Rajsamand district and 10.5% in Udaipur district.  
 
Table 5.35. Enrolment in MDM-eligible schools (data from GOR 2011-2016) 
Year Rajasthan Rajsamand Udaipur 
2009-2010 7,494,000 172,000 406,000 
2010-2011 7,341,000 168,000 385,000 
2011-2012 7,321,000 165,000 401,000 
2012-2013 6,969,000 156,000 392,000 
2013-2014 6,771,000 146,000 362,000 
2014-2015 6,250,000 146,000 362,000 
2015-2016 6,284,000 151,000 363,000 
 
The rise of low-cost private schools means that a family does not have to be wealthy to send their child 
to private school (Srivastava, 2013; Tooley and Dixon, 2003). A family sending their child(ren) to 
private school is not necessarily food secure. Consequently, the child(ren) may still need to consume 
the MDM. For example, Tooley and Dixon (2007) found in Delhi that some children were enrolled in 
both types of school; attending private school but visiting the government school for the MDM. This 
was not observed during this research. Instead, I encountered households that were sending children to 
different types of schools. In 15 of 427 households in HS1 and 10 of the 133 households in HS2, there 
was at least one child attending a private school and at least one attending a government school. In the 
majority of cases, a young male child went to a private school and the female child or an older male 
child went to a government school.  
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The HFIAS results from HS1 show that households within which a child attended private school were 
not the most food insecure in the sample. Three of the 15 households were food secure; however, the 
remaining households had low scores meaning that they had worried about food and had taken actions 
to address having limited food once or twice in the previous month. The absence of the MDMS was 
evidently felt by parents, as some expressed their wish to have a MDMS in private schools. The absence 
of a MDM may therefore be detrimental to food security. Moreover, the absence of the MDM in private 
schools highlights that the functioning to be well-nourished or food secure may not be the priority for 
parents. Instead, the desire for their children to be well-educated may take priority.    
 
5.6.3 Students Above Grade VIII 
 
On Independence Day in 2003, Prime Minister Vajpayee announced: “The Mid-Day Meal Scheme for 
children up to class five is going on in some States...Later, this will be extended to students up to class 
ten”. The announcement was subsequently referenced in the Supreme Court Order of April 2004 
(Appendix B.2.4). However, the GOI has only extended the scheme to grade VIII. The state 
governments of Karnataka, Tamil Nadu and Telangana include older students from their own resources; 
however, this is not the norm. In Rajasthan, students in grades IX and X are excluded from the MDMS 
and across India, students in grades XI and XII are excluded. In 2015-2016 there were more than 33.8 
million students in grades IX-XII in MDM-eligible schools in India, more than 1.8 million in Rajasthan, 
42,712 in Rajsamand and 83,481 in Udaipur (NUPEA, 2016).  
 
When a child enters grade IX they are no longer eligible to receive the MDM. In schools with grades I-
X, which have become more common in Rajasthan recently (Section 5.6.4), older children must observe 
younger children consuming the meal. As described in the 2014 report by the JRM to Punjab, but 
equally as applicable to Rajasthan, ‘when they [students] join 9th class suddenly they find that they are 
no more entitled to the MDM. The habit formation... is done away with’ (MHRD, 2014: 5). The JRM 
noted that this had a marked effect on the experiences of older students, who often stared at the meal.   
 
Of course, the need to consume lunch does not disappear when a student reaches grade IX. Therefore, 
students must either bring food from home or purchase lunch outside of school, both of which draw on 
a household’s resources. If these resources are unavailable, then the child does not eat. The second case 
study school provides the best insight into what happens to older students when no longer eligible for 
the MDM. The school was the only secondary school in the surrounding area and many children had to 
walk several kilometres across hilly terrain to get to the school. These children had to leave home early 
and were usually hungry by lunchtime. For this reason, the school management offered the MDM to all 
students. As one student in grade X wrote: ‘In school, from class one to class ten everyone is given 
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food, so for us there is a benefit’. In this context, teachers exercise discretion and consequently make 
policy.  
 
Despite being permitted to consume the MDM, not all students did so. Of the 54 children in grades IX 
and X that completed the student survey, 22 (40.7%) reported that they always ate the meal, 27 (50%) 
reported that they ate the meal sometimes and five (9.3%) reported that they did not eat the MDM. The 
essays confirmed that the frequency of consumption varied. For example, one student in grade X stated 
‘I eat the food daily’ whereas another student in the same grade stated ‘I eat in the morning at home 
before coming to school, therefore I do not eat food at school. Only dal rice is good, therefore I just eat 
dal and rice’. The influence of preference on consumption is discussed further in Section 6.5. Across 
the three days of student recall, on average 15 children in grades IX and X reported that they ate the 
MDM and seven reported that they ate lunch once they returned home, typically two rotis and half or 
one cup of vegetables. Two students reported that they consumed namkeen and biscuits and three 
reported that they ate nothing. In the absence of the MDM and food at home, some children clearly 
turned to cheap snack items and some ate nothing.  
 
The exclusion of older students is potentially problematic for four reasons. Firstly, studies have 
recognised the sizable gap between dietary intake and RDA for adolescents (see Section 3.2.2), A deficit 
in intake is particularly problematic in the context of rapid growth in adolescence (see Appendix A.2.3). 
The implication of excluding adolescents from the MDMS has not gone unnoticed. The 2013 JRM to 
Delhi concluded that the MDMS should be extended to include grades IX and X as ‘adolescence is the 
second opportunity to achieve development milestones’ (MHRD, 2013: 74).  
 
Secondly, as observed at CS2, teachers often allow older ineligible students to consume the MDM. An 
expert interviewee confirmed that this occurred elsewhere in Rajasthan (IN4) and has also been found 
elsewhere in India (MHRD, 2013b). As grain and funding are allocated per student, there is no formal 
‘room for manoeuvre’ to include additional beneficiaries. Schools ‘manage somehow’ to include these 
students (IN4). As the demand for the MDM is higher than the supply of financial resources, teachers 
must ‘do more with the same amount’ (Hupe and Buffat, 2014) by reducing the overall amount given 
to each student or by inflating the figures on the number of eligible students consuming the meal. The 
former denies rights-holders their full entitlements whereas the latter is detrimental to transparency.  
 
Thirdly, at the end of grade VIII, rights-holders lose their right to consume the MDM but must observe 
others consuming the meal. This research, along with the JRM to Punjab, shows that there may still be 
a need for and desire to eat the MDM in Grade IX and above. Thus, both nutrition- and experience-
focussed research is needed to explore the consequences of this exclusion from the MDMS. 
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Finally, in Section 5.6.4, I will show that enrolment decreases considerably when children reach 14 
years of age. Of course, there are multiple reasons for the decline in enrolment, including the limited 
availability of secondary schools in rural areas. Whether the absence of the MDMS is also a determining 
factor merits further study.  
 
5.6.4 Out-of-school children 
 
The MDMS is only for those in school; out-of-school students are therefore excluded. Determining the 
size of this excluded group is difficult due to unreliable data, methodological limitations and 
inconsistent definitions of what constitutes an out-of-school child (Bhatty, 2015). Consequently, figures 
on the number of out-of-school children vary greatly, ranging from six million (Social and Rural 
Research Institute, 2014) to 38 million (GOI, 2011a).17  
 
The distribution of out-of-school children varies geographically. Certain states, such as Uttar Pradesh, 
Bihar and Rajasthan have especially high rates (ibid). The 2011 Census found that 3.1 million children 
aged 6-14 were out-of-school in Rajasthan. As shown in Table 5.36, in Rajasthan a higher proportion 
of females are out-of-school than males. Notably, in Udaipur district more than a third of girls aged 6-
14 are out-of-school. SCs and STs comprise a higher proportion of out-of-school children than in the 
age group at the state and district levels, except for STs in Udaipur. The proportion of out-of-school 
children is particularly high in Udaipur district.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
17 The different estimates are reviewed in Appendix E.7. 
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Table 5.36: Out-of-school children aged 6-14 in Rajasthan and the study districts- calculated using 
data from the 2011 Census (GOI, 2011a) 
 Rajasthan Rajsamand Udaipur 
Number of 6-14 year olds 14,716,568 240,333 644,312 
Number out-of-school 3,111,398 43,497 190,488 
Percentage out-of-school (6-14 years) 21.1 18.1 29.6 
Population 
(6-14 year 
olds)  
Males (%) 52.8 52.1 52.2 
Females (%) 47.2 47.9 47.8 
SC (%) 19.0 13.2 5.8 
ST (%) 14.9 15.7 58.4 
Out-of-
school 
children 
% of all males  17.4 14.5 25.1 
% of all females           25.3 22.0 34.5 
% that are male 43.6 41.7 44.3 
% that are SC 21.1 18.1 29.6 
% of out-of-school SC children 
that are male  44.0 44.6 47.1 
% out-of-school children that 
are ST 
29.9 34.3 39.9 
% out-of-school ST children that 
are male 
43.2 39.1 43.8 
 
Although the Social and Rural Research Institute (2014) found that far fewer children were out-of-
school than the GOI (2011a) did, their results are useful as additional variables are included. As shown 
in Table 5.37, the data shows that out-of-school children are most likely to be from rural areas, to be 
girls, SCs and STs and Muslims and to be 11-13 years. Notably, more than one quarter of disabled 
children are out-of-school.   
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Table 5.37: Out-of-school 6-13 year olds (Social and Rural Research Institute, 2014). 
 Percentage 
out-of-school 
Location 
Rural 3.1 
Urban 2.5 
Gender 
Males 2.8 
Females 3.2 
Caste 
SC 3.2 
ST 4.2 
OBC 3.1 
Other  1.9 
Religion  
Hindu 2.7 
Muslim 4.4 
Christian 1.5 
Other 1.3 
Age 6-10 years 2.8 
 11-13 years 3.3 
Disabled   28.1 
 
Figures 5.9 and 5.10 show the proportion of out-of-school children in Rajsamand and Udaipur that 
belong to STs. As shown, the youngest and oldest children are most likely to be out of school. Moreover, 
a far higher proportion of girls than boys are out-of-school.  
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Figure 5.9: Out-of-school ST children in Rajsamand district (GOI, 2011a) 
Figure 5.10: Out-of-school ST children in Udaipur district (GOI, 2011a) 
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The results of two surveys conducted by Udaipur-based NGOs provide insight into the number of out-
of-school children at the sub-block level. Seva Mandir found that 68% of children in Kotra were out-
of-school (IN1) and Rajasthan Bal Kalyan Samiti (2010) found that in Kotra and neighbouring Jhadol, 
14% of boys and 26% of girls had never been to school. These studies indicate that in the study area a 
considerable number of children are out-of-school. 
 
The number of out-of-school children in Rajasthan may also have increased recently. Beginning in 
2014, the GOR merged schools that had low enrolment rates with larger schools. The PUCL found that 
in Jaipur district, 10% of the students from merged schools had dropped out (Dhar, 2014). I encountered 
this trend during the research. On arrival at a sampled school we found it had closed and merged with 
the local secondary school, which became the sixteenth sampled school. Many parents in the village 
reported that their child no longer went to school as the secondary school was too far away and the 
journey was unsafe, particularly for girls.  
 
This research did not include out-of-school children (Section 3.3.7). Nevertheless, out-of-school 
children were encountered. Of the 335 children of school-going age in the sampled households in HS2, 
218 (65.1%) went to the case study school, 72 (21.5%) went to other schools and 45 (13.4%) did not 
go to school. In such households, food insecurity was particularly high. Of the households where at 
least one child was not attending school, one was food secure, four were moderately food insecure and 
17 were severely food insecure.  
 
Thirty households specified the reason why their child did not attend school; 20 stated that it was due 
to work including household chores, grazing animals or paid employment and seven stated it was 
because their child had decided that they did not want to go to school. Interviewees and focus group 
participants cited work, either paid employment or at home, as a key reason for non-enrolment or 
irregular attendance. Girls in particular were expected to work at home. For example, the mother from 
household four at CS2 had stopped her daughter from going to school after grade VII as she was needed 
to help with the housework. The father from household 37 said that his son had not been to school for 
several months as, following the death of his grandfather, the child was needed to look after the family’s 
cattle. In CS1, the only case study in an urban location, the work performed by children instead of going 
to school also included begging. Thus, the capability of children to attend school and therefore consume 
the meal can be determined by several factors, including household income and social norms. Parents 
evidently influence these capabilities of children; however, some children may have agency in the 
decision as to whether to attend.  
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Although school enrolment in India has increased significantly in recent decades, partly due to the 
MDMS, a considerable number of children remain outside of education. Based on research on the 
school lunch programme in Tamil Nadu in 1983-84, Harris (1991: 19) wrote: ‘the conflation of a school 
feeding programme for poor children with an eligibility criterion of being a registered school attender 
acts as a filter, straining out those compelled by poverty to learn through labour and not through school, 
especially girls’. More than three decades later, the observation still holds. In Chapter 3 and Appendix 
A, I show that malnutrition is more prevalent among SCs, STs and Muslims, children living in rural 
areas and, depending on the indicator of malnutrition, sometimes girls. In this section, I have shown 
that these groups are also the most likely to be out-of-school. The MDMS therefore continues to be 
‘inept at including the most severely nourished who do not attend school’ (ibid: 12). The targeting 
procedure in the MDMS does not reflect the emphasis on the most vulnerable and disadvantage evident 
in RBAs and the NFSA. Further research, particularly with a nutritional focus is required to accurately 
determine the consequences of this exclusion.  
 
5.7 Unintended Inclusion 
5.7.1 Younger Siblings 
 
Studies of SFPs elsewhere have found that the provision of food at school can also benefit the siblings 
of recipients (Alderman and Bundy, 2012; Kazianga et al., 2009). In theory, the MDMS should not 
benefit siblings as the scheme is intended to wholly supplement consumption at home.18 Moreover, by 
virtue of being a hot-cooked meal, the MDM is difficult to share. Media reports indicate, however, that 
additional items provided in the MDMS may sometimes be shared. For example, in Uttar Pradesh in 
May 2016, an anganwadi worker and two young children died and dozens fell ill reportedly after 
consuming milk sachets from the MDMS supplied by Akshaya Patra. Students had taken the sachets 
home and shared them with their younger siblings (Jaiswal, 2016). It is unknown, however, how 
commonly food from the MDMS is shared. Certainly, I did not observe this. I did, however, observe a 
further means through which younger siblings benefit from the MDMS; consumption of the MDM at 
school. As the teacher from school four explained, younger children go to school with their older sibling 
because the parents work and there is no one at home to look after the young child. Children, especially 
girls, often must take on the childcare responsibilities. To get older children to enrol, teachers must 
allow the young children to also attend and consequently, to consume the MDM. This trend was also 
observed in Udaipur district by Blue (2005) and in Jaipur district by Garg and Mandal (2013); although 
neither examined the extent of occurrence. Once again, by altering the eligibility criteria, teachers 
exercise their discretion and thus can be considered to make policy. 
                                                        
18 This is examined in Section 6.2.4.  
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Teachers at 28 schools reported that there were always some younger children accompanying their older 
sibling to school. Another two teachers reported that this occurred sometimes. I observed the presence 
of younger children in 25 schools. The number of additional children in attendance ranged from one to 
10, although most commonly there were two or three additional children at each school.19 At the case 
study schools, additional children were observed attending on all 49 days of observation. The number 
of additional children ranged from two to nine, although most commonly there were three additional 
siblings in each case study school.  
 
Young children either shared their sibling’s meal or received their own portion (Figure 5.11). Younger 
siblings are not officially enrolled as students and therefore schools do not receive any funding for these 
children. When the siblings share a MDM, the rights-holder does not receive their full entitlement. 
When the unenrolled child receives their own portion, it can be assumed that either the average portion 
size is slightly reduced to accommodate the extra beneficiaries or that figures are inflated to provide 
additional grain and funds (IA3). Bringing their siblings to schools enables older children to attend 
school and realise their right to the MDM as well as education. Yet, the necessity to accommodate the 
younger sibling may prevent the enrolled child from realising their full entitlements. 
 
                                                        
19 However, counting the number of additional children by observation was difficult. Although typically easy to 
identify due to their smaller size, oversized uniform and by the fact that they were usually covered in dal by the 
end of lunch, some children closer to school-going age were more difficult to identify. Therefore, although 65 
additional children were observed during the first stage of research, it is likely that this number was higher. 
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Figure 5.11: Younger siblings consuming the MDM. Top and bottom left- school 29. Bottom right- 
school 37 
 
The need for non-rights-holders to consume the meal indicates how one food security scheme, the 
MDMS, may be important in the absence of another, the ICDS. The limited coverage of the ICDS and 
the irregular opening of anganwadi centres have been widely noted (e.g. Saxena and Srivastava, 2009; 
Sinha, 2006; Swain and Kumaran, 2012). Indeed, in this research anganwadi centres were found to not 
exist or to not be functioning in seven locations (the catchment areas for schools six, nine, 14, 25, 30, 
31 and 43). The absence of a functioning anganwadi means that children below the age of six are denied 
the two meals per day that they are entitled to as per the NFSA. Attending school can be used to address 
the consequent void in child care and food. For example, the interviewee at household 36 in CS3 stated 
that, as there is no anganwadi, when there is no food available at home she sends all of her children to 
school. Access to the MDM in the absence of a functioning or well-functioning ICDS is positive; 
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children are receiving some food instead of none. However, under the ICDS, a child should receive 500 
kcal and between 12-15g of protein whereas the MDMS provides 450 kcal and 12g of protein. It is 
unlikely that the young sibling would consume a full portion of the MDM, meaning that they are 
unlikely to receive food of the nutritional quantities that they are entitled to.  
 
The consumption of the MDM by young children means that the provision of the food extends beyond 
those with a right to the MDM, to younger children with a need to consume the meal. These siblings 
are rights-holders within the ICDS programme, but, due to circumstance, attend school instead. By 
encouraging female school attendance, the MDMS can have a transformative effect. However, 
education exists alongside social norms, as gendered norms relating to child care are played out in the 
school environment. In consequence, teachers must exercise their discretion and again adopt coping 
mechanisms to enable them to ‘do more with less’.  
5.7.2 Additional Adults  
 
In four schools (four, six, seven and 31), I observed teachers and other members of staff consuming full 
portions of the MDM. The adults consumed the MDM at the same time as the students and therefore 
their consumption cannot be considered a means of checking food safety. Instead, teachers consumed 
the meal due to a desire or perceived need to consume a free meal. The meal is also consumed by cooks 
and, in some cases, their young children who accompany them to work. Cooks may also take cooked 
food home with them. A cook at CS2 explained that taking extra cooked food from school is a coping 
mechanism at times when there is not enough food at home. The larger context for consuming the meal 
is that cooks are often needy and are paid a small amount (see Section 7.4.4). As a representative from 
the union for MDM workers stated, the cooks and their children eat the food as ‘It is all they get. 
Otherwise there is no reason to work’ (IN7). CCHs also work throughout lunchtime, rendering it 
inconvenient to go home and cook again.  
 
On the one hand, adults consuming the MDM may ensure that the quality of the meal is acceptable. 
Certainly, teachers were not consuming the meal in schools serving poor quality food. However, the 
consumption by adults is likely to decrease the amount of food that is available. This was observed in 
school 31; children received a small portion whilst the three teachers had large servings and bemoaned 
the weight they had put on because of the MDMS. The food at this school came from a centralised 
kitchen and thus the quantity would have been calculated as per the reported attendance. Assuming that 
the reported attendance was accurate, teachers’ consumption of the MDM would render the food for 
the children quantitatively insufficient.  
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5.8 Conclusion 
 
In Section 5.2, I showed that targeting by school-type results in the inclusion of traditionally 
disadvantaged groups, particularly SCs and STs. Rights-holders in the MDMS in the study area were 
shown to have a need for the scheme. However, I have shown variation in need among rights-holders. 
In the design of the MDMS, dietary needs are considered to vary between lower and upper primary 
students only. However, I have shown that food security and dietary diversity may vary considerably 
between children, and over space and time. Needs in the MDMS are therefore simplified and 
homogenised. Furthermore, I have shown that the assumption that the MDMS is one of three meals 
consumed per day is largely inaccurate in the study area. In this case, the interpretation of need and the 
resulting perceived role of the MDMS fails to reflect the reality of need.  
 
In Section 5.3, I have shown that having a right does not guarantee that it is realised. Eligible children 
may not attend school due to the multiple barriers to education or may self-exclude themselves from 
the scheme due to preference or a perceived absence of need. Children may also be prevented from 
claiming their right due to irregularity in the provision of the MDMS. In Section 5.4, I showed that 
discrimination can also affect whether students receive their full entitlement, as well as affecting how 
rights-holders experience the MDMS. Although the contexts are extremely different, it is clear that 
much like in the US school lunch system examined by Poppendieck (2010), the opportunity and choice 
to consume the MDM depends on multiple factors, including the meal provided, preference, stigma and 
socio-economic context. Inclusion therefore requires more than the establishment of ‘transparent, non-
discriminatory eligibility criteria’ (FAO, 2004: Point 13.3). Rights-holders must also have the capability 
to realise their right. This capability is discussed further in Chapter 9. 
 
In Section 5.6, I showed that the eligibility criteria in the MDMS excludes children at private schools, 
children above grade VIII and out-of-school children. In the latter group are some of the most 
disadvantaged children and thus their exclusion is at odds with the emphasis that the NFSA places on 
assisting disadvantaged groups. Overall, the eligibility criteria for the MDM does not ensure ‘no one 
who is in need is excluded’ (FAO, 2004: Point 13.3). Writing about a study of feeding centres in Tamil 
Nadu by Nagaraj (1983), Harriss wrote: ‘the scheme reaches poor children, but not all poor children, 
probably not the poorest, and not only poor children’ (1991: 17). Although the research reported here 
was conducted in a different state, more than 30 years later and on what is now a national MDMS, the 
same conclusion can be reached. The NFSA takes a life-cycle approach, within which the MDMS is 
the only scheme targeted at children above the age of six. The NFSA also recognises the needs of 
vulnerable and disadvantaged groups. However, the MDMS is not designed to enable all children to 
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consume the meal or to ensure that the most disadvantaged are included. This tension between targeting 
and the right to food is discussed further in Chapter 9.  
 
I have shown, however, that the absence of a right does not always prevent consumption of the MDMS. 
In Section 5.6.3, I showed that older students may be allowed to consume the meal. In Section 5.7, I 
showed that teachers, cooks and the siblings of rights-holders may consume the meal. There is therefore 
an informal room for manoeuvre in the MDMS; some teachers alter who is eligible to consume the 
MDM. Consequently, teachers can be considered to make policy by altering eligibility criteria.  
 
There are two further points that arise from the results presented in this chapter. First, it is evident that 
the right to food in the context of the MDMS is clearly entwined with both the right to education and 
the right to not engage in labour. Tackling the persistent supply and demand-side barriers to education 
is necessary not only for education but also for food security. Second, a recurring theme throughout this 
chapter has been uncertainty within the MDMS. I have shown that the number of students enrolled, 
attending and consuming the meal and the number of additional actors consuming the meal is unknown. 
Therefore, the exact number of rights-holders and those realising their right is unknown.  
 
	Chapter 6 
Entitlements: The Food in the 
MDMS  
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Chapter 6  
 
Entitlements: The Food in the 
Midday Meal Scheme  
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
As discussed in Chapter 4, rights-holders are entitled to a MDM that adheres to the GOI’s norms and 
the GOR’s menu. In this chapter, I consider whether these entitlements are fulfilled. The realisation 
of the right to food, however, is about more than a ‘minimum package of calories, proteins and other 
specific nutrients’ (CESCR, 1999: point 6). Food must also be qualitatively adequate and in line with 
preference and culture (see Section 2.3.3). Therefore, I also examine whether the MDM served in the 
study area fulfils the additional requirements for the realisation of the right to food and food security.  
 
In Section 6.2, I examine the quantity of the food served in the MDMS. I first consider the extent to 
which the GOR’s menu is adhered to, before examining the quantity of food and whether the quantity 
is considered sufficient by rights-holders and their representatives (their parents). In Section 6.3, I 
examine the quality of the food served, again as perceived by rights-holders and their representatives. 
In Section 6.4, I consider the extent to which the food served is safe. To do this, I examine whether 
the MDM has caused illness in the study area and whether the safety procedures outlined in Section 
4.4.5 are adhered to in practice. In Section 6.5, I explore which food students preferred and the impact 
of preference on MDM consumption. Finally, in Section 6.6, I consider whether the food served in 
the scheme is culturally appropriate.   
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6.2 Quantity  
6.2.1 The Menu 
 
The MDM menu is fixed, to the extent that it should be painted on the wall of every school (see Figure 
8.3). I assessed the extent to which schools followed the menu using both observation and school 
records. The complete dataset is provided in Appendix F.1; here, I provide a brief overview. In the 
decentralised model, the correct meal was served on the correct day on only 23 days (32.9%). Roti 
and vegetables and particularly rice, dal and vegetables and roti and dal were served less frequently 
than expected, whereas khichdi was served more frequently than it should have been. Food not on the 
menu was served on 20 occasions. The records from CS1 and CS21 show that food was served 
according to the menu on five of 21 days (23.8%) at CS1 and 34 of 54 days (63.0%) at CS2. The 
greater adherence at CS2 is due, in part to inaccurate record-keeping, indicated by cross-referencing 
observation and the school records. Monitoring reports from Girwa and Kumbhalgarh show that the 
correct food was served on 25 of 36 occasions (69.4%). Meals not on the menu were served on eight 
days of observation (22.2%).  
 
In all cases, the most common meal served that was not on the menu was dal dhokli; sheets or balls 
of dough cooked in dal. The tendency to serve dal dhokli was confirmed by teachers and cooks 
(schools one, 9, 10 16, 18 and 19) and parents (schools 14, 15 and 19). Notably, dishes such as khichdi 
and dal dhokli are easy to prepare as they are cooked in one pot and therefore require far less work 
than dishes such as roti and dal. This can be interpreted as a coping strategy, used by cooks facing a 
workload that either is or is perceived to be too great given the human resources and time available. 
Overall, observation and data from the records show that at schools with decentralised kitchens, 
deviation from the menu was common. 
 
At the schools under the centralised delivery model, the correct food was observed being served on 
four of the 31 days (12.9%). In the records, the correct food was served on 163 of 817 days (20.0%). 
Low adherence to the GOR’s menu is explained by the NGO using their own menu (Table 6.1). 
Compared to the GOR’s menu, the NGO menu features rice more regularly and in varied forms and 
contains rajsambhar (a mixture of lentils and vegetables in liquid) and kadhi (chickpea flour and 
buttermilk). Vegetables and dal are served as a main dish more frequently on the GOR’s menu than 
on the NGO’s menu.  
 
 
                                                        
1 The teacher at CS3 was unwilling to share records.   
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Table 6.1: The GOR’s menu for centralised kitchens and Akshaya Patra’s menu 
Day State government menu for 
centralised kitchens 
Menu followed by the centralised 
kitchen 
Monday Roti, vegetables, plain rice Roti, mix dal, plain rice 
Tuesday Roti, dal, sweet rice Roti, potato bhaji, cumin rice 
Wednesday Roti, dal or dal bati Roti, khichdi, kadhi and amla 
Thursday Roti, vegetables and plain rice Roti, mix vegetables and pulao 
Friday Savoury khichdi  
(rice, dal and vegetables) 
Roti, rajsambhar and plain rice 
Saturday Roti and vegetables Roti, vegetable dal and sweet rice.  
Additional 
Items 
One day local taste. One two days 
something extra should be provided. 
On one of these days, fruit is 
mandatory. 
No variation according to local 
preference. No fruit.  
 
The NGO typically adhered to their own menu. From observation, the menu was adhered to on 29 of 
31 days (93.5%). Based on the records, the correct food was served on 236 of 406 days (58.3%) in 
CS4, 169 of 219 days (77.2%) in school 25 and 89 of 188 days (47.3%) in school 29. The apparent 
deviation from the menu can, in part, be explained by inadequate record keeping, indicated by 
discrepancies between the records. However, agreement between the records shows that some 
deviation from the menu occurred. Records for all three schools show that between 5 and 22 of 
January 2015, khichdi was served more regularly than usual. Between 23 January and 23 February 
2015 (25 days), roti and dal were served 15 times, roti and vegetables were served seven times and 
roti and kadhi were served three times. Rice was not provided during the period and vegetables were 
rarely given. Even when NGOs create their own menu, adherence to that menu is not guaranteed. 
 
Overall, observation and the school records show that frequently the MDMS in the study area was 
not provided as per the GOR’s menu. This has implications for the provision of entitlements. The 
tendency to serve some dishes more often than others is likely to affect the overall provision of pulses 
and vegetables. Moreover, the deviation introduces uncertainty. If the menu is not followed, then 
rights-holders and their representatives do not know what they are entitled to and officials monitoring 
the scheme cannot accurately determine whether the state menu is being followed and norms are met.  
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6.2.2 Observed, Reported and Measured Quantities 
 
Figure 6.1 illustrates the variation in the quantity of the MDM served. Notably, the quantity of food 
was greater at the two schools under the centralised model than at the four schools under the 
decentralised model.   
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Figure 6.1: Variation in quantity of the MDM across schools. Top left: namkeen for lunch at school 
15 (CS3). Top right: watery dal and roti at school 14. Middle left: dal dhokli at school 33. Middle 
right: dal dhokli at CS1. Bottom left: dal and rice at CS2. Bottom right: dal and rice at school 29 
(centralised). 
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In the grain records obtained for schools in Girwa, in 2014-2015, 192 of 267 schools (71.9%) reported 
that exactly the correct quantity of grain had been used. Of the 75 schools reporting incorrect figures, 
24 reported lower grain use than expected and the remaining 51 reported higher grain use. The 
differences ranged from -773kg to 582kg, although in 31 cases the reported quantity was with within 
15kg of the expected quantity. Therefore, even if the records are considered to be completely accurate, 
9% of schools admitted serving an inadequate quantity of grain.  
 
The records also detail the amount of wheat and rice used. According to the state level menu, roti should 
be served four times per week and rice twice. One would therefore expect the quantity of rice to be 
approximately one third of the total amount of grain used. Slight deviation would be expected according 
to the requirement to provide the food in line with local taste. The amount of rice was between 30-36% 
of the total amount of grain in 172 of 257 schools (66.9%). For the remaining, rice as a proportion of 
total grain use ranged from 6-41%, with an average of 26.4%. The records therefore indicate that a 
number of schools were not serving rice as frequently as they should have been; a trend also observed 
at the sampled schools (see Appendix F.1).  
 
Teachers are not required to keep records on the quantity of the other ingredients used. Therefore, 
adherence to the national guidelines cannot be assessed using records. Consequently, in schools with 
decentralised kitchens, we asked teachers and cooks the quantity of ingredients used and the number of 
children attending. From this, I calculated the raw quantity of food per student. The results are presented 
in Table 6.2. At CS1, the reported grain use was slightly lower than it should have been, dal use was 
higher and vegetable use was considerably lower. At CS2, reported grain use was higher than expected; 
however, 20kg of flour was reported regardless of attendance, indicating that either the same amount 
of grain was always used or 20kg was reported regardless of use. The dal and vegetable use were both 
lower than expected, corroborated by observation. At CS3, the reported quantity of each ingredient was 
far higher than expected and far higher than the quantity observed, indicating that the reported values 
were inaccurate.    
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Table 6.2: The quantity of ingredients as reported and expected 
Item Case 
Study 
Expected 
Quantity 
(kg) 
Reported 
Quantity (kg) 
Reported-
expected (kg) 
Grain  
CS1 80.95 72.5 -8.45 
CS2 162.1 194 31.9 
CS3 22.6 46.5 23.9 
Dal  
CS1 7.45 9.05 1.6 
CS2 9.16 6.0 -3.16 
CS3 2.38 8.5 6.12 
Vegetables 
(excluding 
potatoes)  
CS1 14.1 9.4 -4.7 
CS2 43.525 12.3 -31.255 
CS3 2.35 4.65 2.3 
 
Of course, asking teachers and cooks the quantity of the ingredients used relies on their honesty and 
knowledge. Therefore, I also weighed the meal three times during each lunch time and took the average 
weight (Table 6.3). The raw weight of the roti should be 100g for lower primary and 150g for upper 
primary students. The addition of water to the flour to make roti will make the overall product heavier 
than 100g. In CS1 and CS2, the roti are on average below the specified weight. In CS3 they are heavier, 
although still inadequate. In CS4, roti were served alongside rice. The conversion of cooked weight to 
raw weight is standardised for rice; 100g of raw rice weighs between 340g-370g when cooked (MHRD, 
2013b: 61). The quantity of rice served at CS1 and CS3 was therefore inadequate. The combined weight 
of roti and rice at CS4 was also inadequate. The quantity of khichdi was also inadequate at CS1, CS2 
and CS3. For dishes with a higher water content such as dal and vegetables, converting cooked weight 
into raw weight is difficult. One can, however, make an educated assessment of whether the quantity 
was adequate based on weight and observation. For example, if a weight of 100g is recorded and the 
vegetable dish is observed to be mainly water, one can infer that the dish would not contain the 75g of 
vegetables required for upper primary students. The quantity of vegetables was therefore inadequate at 
all case studies and the quantity of dal was inadequate at CS3. Rice and kadhi were likely to be adequate 
at CS2 for lower primary students only.  
 
Overall, across the 54 days of measurement, the correct amount of grain was observed once at CS1. 
The correct quantity of pulses was served on three of three days at CS1 and not at all at CS2 and CS4. 
The correct quantity of vegetables, excluding potato, was not observed. 
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Table 6.3: Average weight of cooked portion 
Food (grams)  CS1 CS2 CS3 CS4 
Roti  99.8 117.8 78.3 79.6 
Rice 215 NA 104 105.1 
Dal 131 NA 30 91 
Vegetables 69.7 93.5 39 88 
Dal Dhokli 213 222 118 NA 
Kadhi NA NA NA 87.3 
Sambhar NA NA NA 86.6 
Khichdi  173.3 114 92.5 NA 
Rice and kadhi NA 399 NA NA 
 
Other studies found that the quantity of the food served in the MDMS in Rajasthan did not reflect the 
norms (MHRD, 2013b; 2014b). In the 2013 JRMs, an inadequate quantity of vegetables was found in 
18 of 20 states, including in Rajasthan. Insufficient provision of fruit was observed by the JRMs to 
Arunachal Pradesh (MHRD, 2013c) and Rajasthan (MHRD, 2014b). The inadequate quantity of the 
MDM was specifically mentioned for 13 of the 20 states/UTs covered by the 2013 JRMs. The CAG 
(2015) also found that the MDM was inadequate in quantity in nine states/UTs.   
 
Previous studies have found inadequate quantity to be a particular problem in the centralised model 
(MHRD, 2013a; 2013b; 2013e). In Andhra Pradesh a centralised kitchen was found to be providing 
food of a lower quantity than the guidelines (MHRD, 2013d). In Haryana the food provided by ISKCON 
was found to weigh less than the NGO reported (ibid). The CAG (2015) reports that in Mumbai, 
ISKCON had lifted approximately one third of the specified quantity of rice, resulting in the provision 
of just 40g of rice per child. The CAG also reported that 157 of 386 samples in Delhi where the MDMS 
is entirely centralised, were found to have an inadequate quantity of calories and protein.  
 
Three trends emerge from the data presented above. Firstly, the MDM frequently does not meet GOI 
guidelines on the quantity of ingredients used. From this, one can infer that the protein and calorie 
content is also insufficient. Secondly, the quantity of food varies. Even within the study area, the 
quantity of the MDMS served varied between the delivery models, schools and even between the type 
of meal. Third, the above shows that determining the quantity of food provided in the MDMS is difficult 
due to a lack of accurate information at the school-level. Determining whether rights-holders receive 
their entitlements is therefore difficult.  
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Sections 6.2.1 and 6.2.3 have indicated inadequate vegetable provision in the MDMS. Given the 
nutritional importance of vegetables and the inadequate consumption of vegetables in the sampled 
households (Section 5.2.2), it is necessary to consider the provision of vegetables in further depth. In 
the first stage of the fieldwork, vegetables were observed being served at four schools; schools 17 and 
20 in Kotra and 29 and 31 in Khamnor. In the second stage of the research, vegetables were reported to 
be served a total of 20 times; six times in CS1, five times in CS2, twice in CS3 and seven times at CS4. 
However, what teachers described as vegetables (sabji) were typically potato; a trend found more 
widely in the MDMS (IA1). Potato was typically served with a small amount of additional vegetable 
(Figure 6.2). I observed green vegetables being served on just three occasions.  
  
Figure 6.2: Potato as the main component of vegetable dishes. Top left: CS2 (decentralised). Top 
right: school 31 (centralised). Bottom: school 31 (centralised).  
 
Although potatoes are a good source of energy and carbohydrates, they do not provide the same level 
of minerals or iron as green leafy vegetables and provide considerably less calcium, β-Carotene 
(vitamin A) and vitamin C (Table 6.4). Therefore, the absence of vegetables, particularly green leafy 
vegetables, significantly decreases the micronutrient content of the MDMS.  
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Table 6.4: Nutritional content in 100g of an edible portion of vegetables  
(Gopalan et al., 2014) 
 Potato Spinach Drumstick 
Leaves 
Aubergine Bottle 
gourd 
Tomato 
Energy (kcal)  97 26 92 24 12 20 
Protein (g)  1.6 2 6.7 1.4 0.2 0.9 
Minerals (g) 0.4 1.7 2.3 0.3 0.5 0.5 
Carbo-hydrates (g) 22.6 2.9 12.5 4 2.5 3.6 
Calcium (mg) 10 73 440 18 20 48 
Iron (mg)  0.48 1.14 0.85 0.38 0.46 0.64 
Carotene (µg) 24 5580 6780 74 0 351 
Folic acid (total) (µg) 17 123 0 34 0 30 
Vitamin c (mg)  17 28 220 12 0 27 
 
Vegetables should also be served in khichdi, but were found to be lacking entirely or to only be included 
in very small quantities (Figure 6.3).  
 
 
Figure 6.3: The absence of vegetables in khichdi. Left: school 16 in Kotra. Right: school 38 in 
Kumbalgarh. Both schools have decentralised MDM provision. 
 
Overall, it is clear from figures 6.1 and 6.2 that students were not receiving the 50-75g of vegetables 
they were entitled to.  
 
Teachers at schools served by centralised kitchens confirmed the inadequate vegetable content of the 
MDM. Teachers complained that the vegetables were potato and pumpkin (schools 31 and 32), that the 
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vegetables were not green or high quality or fresh vegetables, such as okra or peas (schools 28, 30 and 
31) and that the quantity of vegetables was insufficient (school 31).  
 
Seasonal fruit should be served once a week (Table 4.2.2). Eleven teachers (26%) admitted that fruit 
was not served this frequently. Teachers at schools 16 and 21 reported that fruit was served twice a 
month and the teacher at school 25 reported that fruit was sometimes served once a month. Eight 
teachers, all in Khamnor and served by the centralised kitchen, reported that fruit was never served. 
Observation showed that fruit was served even less frequently than reported. Across the research, fruit 
was reported to have been served on just three occasions. Notably, we never witnessed the serving of 
fruit, as it had conveniently been served (or perhaps not) before our arrival. The children’s essays from 
CS1, CS2 and CS3 confirmed that fruit was provided sometimes. For example, one student at CS2 
wrote ‘[they] give fruit, but once in every two weeks, sometimes [they] don’t give and sometimes [they] 
give every Tuesday’. Students at CS4 confirmed fruit was not served. For example, a student in class 
VI wrote: ‘in our food, there is no fruit... there should be banana, grapes and chiku’. The desire to have 
fruit in the scheme was expressed in many essays. Thus, not only is inadequate vegetable provision a 
particular problem in the centralised model of delivery, so too is the inadequate provision of fruit.  
 
In Khamnor, the NGO occasionally provided amla candy, made from amla (Indian gooseberry) and 
sugar. The NGO considered amla to be a replacement for fruit. The staff at the centralised kitchen 
reported that amla candy was provided in 20-25 schools per week. As there are nearly 400 schools in 
the block, a school would receive amla candy every 16-20 weeks. The employees at the centralised 
kitchen stated that they had previously served fruit but no longer did. The staff in Jaipur reported the 
same, adding (incorrectly) that in Rajasthan there is the option not to provide fruit. Amla candy was 
only observed being served twice at CS4. In the school records, amla candy was reported to have been 
served on just two days of 842 days. In the essays from CS4, students wrote that they sometimes 
received amla, yet the students did not perceive this as fruit.     
 
The staff at the centralised kitchen and the DEO knew that amla candy was served instead of fruit, but 
emphasised the health benefits of amla, particularly the high vitamin C content. Indeed, 100g of amla 
has 600mg of vitamin C, compared to 7mg in 100g of banana and 30mg in 100g of orange (Gopalan et 
al., 2014). Amla is also cheap and retains a high vitamin C content when heated or dried (ibid). 
However, 100g of banana provides 116 kcal and 1.2g of protein, compared to 58 kcal and 0.5g of protein 
in 100g of amla (ibid). Also, whilst a whole banana would weigh at least 100g, when amla candy is 
provided children receive just two small pieces, which do not come close to equalling 100g. Clearly, 
two small pieces of amla candy consumed occasionally do not have the same nutritional value as a piece 
of fruit consumed weekly.  
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Students in the study area were therefore not receiving the quantity of fruit and vegetables that they 
were entitled to. In Section 5.2.2, I showed that vegetable consumption in the sampled households was 
inadequate; across HS1 and HS2, only 14.7% of people reported that they had consumed vegetables 
every day in the previous week. The MDM therefore has an important role to play in ensuring that 
children can consume the recommended 150-300g of vegetables per day (NIN, 2011). The absence of 
vegetables and particularly green leafy vegetables in the MDM in the study area is likely to be to the 
detriment of the nutritional status of children. As shown in Section 5.2.2, fruit was also lacking in the 
diets of most sampled households. Fruit was consumed daily in just one household in HS1 and four in 
HS2. Across all participants in HS1 and HS2, 60.5% had not consumed fruit in the previous week. The 
MDMS is therefore an important means through which to get children to consume fruit. Moreover, as 
was evident in the student essays, children like fruit. It seems likely that the provision of fruit would 
encourage more students to consume the MDM.  
 
6.2.3 Explanations  
 
The provision of a MDM that does not adhere to the norms on quantity can be interpreted as the duty-
bearers at the school-level failing to fulfil their duties. It might therefore be tempting to place the blame 
on teachers. Yet, whether teachers (and CCHs) in the decentralised model can provide the meal as per 
norms is largely determined by their capacity, affected by financial, food and human resources. Firstly, 
the provision of fruit and vegetables is constrained by cost. At the time of research, the budget was INR 
3.59 for lower primary students and INR 5.38 for upper primary students. One kilogram of bananas, 
roughly eight bananas, cost approximately INR 30 or INR 3.75 per child. The cost of fruit would 
therefore be greater than the budget for lower primary students, leaving no money for other ingredients. 
If a teacher wished to provide fruit, they must either reduce the portion of fruit served or cut corners on 
the quantity of other ingredients to save enough money to purchase fruit occasionally. In total, 16 of 32 
teachers considered the overall budget for the MDMS to be insufficient.  
 
Secondly, teachers are not required to keep records on the quantities of ingredients used other than 
grain. There is therefore no transparency regarding the quantity of dal, vegetables and fruit used. 
Officials only visit to monitor the MDMS occasionally (Section 8.3.2) and the scheme is not monitored 
over a prolonged period. In the absence of rigorous monitoring, schools can easily deviate from the 
menu and the norms on quantity.     
 
Thirdly, in schools without a market nearby, teachers must purchase ingredients elsewhere and bring 
them to school. Often teachers travel by public transport and may have to walk some distance to reach 
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their school. One can therefore envisage the difficulty a teacher might face in carrying 50 bananas to 
school. Access to fruit and vegetables may also be limited by seasonal availability.    
 
Fourthly, the process of serving the MDM does not include measurement. At no point during the 
research was anyone observed measuring food. In particular, there was no uniform difference in the 
quantity of food served to lower and upper primary students. If there was enough food, older children 
would typically be served more; however, the portion was not measured. The fixed entitlements of each 
ingredient are therefore merely abstract notions.  
 
These four issues stem from flaws in the design of the MDMS and the insufficient allocation of 
resources. The failure of NGOs to adhere to the guidelines on quantity and the menu, however, cannot 
be explained in the same manner. It is not the case that NGOs face the same public service gap as 
schools. Firstly, in the study area, district officials were allowing NGOs to follow their own menu, 
rather than holding them to account for their deviation. NGOs were allowed discretion in the delivery 
of the service, which led to the MDM not being provided as per the norms. Secondly, NGOs receive 
extra funding from donations (Section 7.6.2), which when combined with the economies of scale for 
the operation, ensure that cost is not a limitation in the centralised delivery model. Thirdly, in 
decentralised kitchens, the quantity of the food should be calculated in the morning according to 
attendance. In centralised kitchens, NGOs calculate the quantity based on the previous day’s attendance. 
As it is unlikely that the number of students attending is the same every day, the quantity of food will 
vary. One can therefore expect that on some days the quantity of food will be sufficient to meet the 
norms and on other days it will be insufficient. One can also expect that the quantitative adequacy of 
the MDM will vary between schools. 
 
6.2.4 Implications  
 
In Section 6.2.3, I showed that the quantity of food served in the MDMS does not always adhere to the 
norms. Therefore, one can expect the nutritional contribution of the MDM to be less than was calculated 
in Appendix D.1. The implications of a quantitatively inadequate MDM for overall food intake depend 
on whether the MDM is a substitute for or a supplement to food at home. I therefore examined whether 
children also consumed lunch at home and how home-cooked food compared to the MDM.2 Of the 345 
respondents in HS1 whose children consumed the MDM daily, 44 (12.9%) said that their children also 
ate lunch at home, 63 (18.4%) said their child sometimes ate lunch at home and 235 (68.7%) said their 
                                                        
2 The best way to assess substitution is to examine changes in consumption patterns after the introduction of a 
SFP. Given the near-universality of the MDMS, this was not possible. 
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child did not eat lunch at home. Reports of consumption of lunch at home were compared to food 
security (Table 6.5). A chi-square test of independence found a significant relationship between food 
security and eating lunch at home, χ2(3)=11.363, p=0.009; those consuming lunch at home were more 
likely to be food secure than those not consuming lunch at home.  
 
Table 6.5: Food Security and lunch consumption, household survey one 
Food security 
Category 
Eat lunch home Don’t eat lunch at home 
Freq. % Freq. % 
Secure 26 59.1 175 45.5 
Mildly Insecure 11 25.0 53 13.8 
Moderately Insecure 3 6.8 56 14.5 
Severely Insecure 4 9.1 101 26.2 
 
The data from the 24-hour food consumption recall indicates that the consumption of a second lunch at 
home happened less frequently in the case studies. Four students in the first household recall ate lunch 
at home; one student at CS1 ate a plate of poha (flattened rice) and three children at CS2 ate two roti. 
In all four cases, the student had consumed some form of breakfast. In the second recall, eight students 
all from CS3, consumed an additional half roti on returning from school. None of these children had 
consumed breakfast. Overall, additional food was consumed in just 12 of 406 cases. Thus, for most 
children the lunch consumed at school is the only lunch that they eat.  
 
If the MDM were a supplement, one would expect the number of meals consumed on a school day to 
be higher than on a non-school day. There is, however, only a 0.9% increase in the number of students 
consuming three meals on a school day, indicating that the MDM substitutes food at home (Table 6.6).  
 
Table 6.6: Number of meals consumed from recall 
 Number of meals consumed per day 
  
Case study  
When consumed 
MDM  
When lunch was consumed at home  
2 3 0 1 2 3 
CS1 29 32 1 0 19 14 
CS2 3 25 0 2 8 11 
CS3 57 2 0 0 10 0 
CS4 107 24 0 0 35 8 
Total Freq. 196 83 1 2 72 33 
% 70.3 29.7 0.9 1.9 66.7 30.6 
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In Section 5.2.2, I showed that for the vast majority of sampled households the food consumed at home 
was lacking in diversity. Nutritious food, such as vegetables, dal, fruit eggs and meat were consumed 
infrequently. Moreover, household recall indicated a typical lunch when children were not at school. 
At CS1 and CS2, this was two roti and half a cup of vegetables. At CS3, this was one roti and either 
one cup of kadhi or raw chilli. At CS4, two roti and one cup of kadhi was typically consumed. Although 
the exact nutritional content would vary depending on the quantities of each ingredient, across all case 
studies lunch was lacking in protein. At CS3 in particular, lunch at home was lacking in quantity and 
quality. Thus, a diverse and nutritious MDM would most likely be of greater nutritional benefit than 
the food consumed at home. It must be noted, however, that it is unclear whether the same type of food 
would be provided on a weekday in the absence of the MDMS.  
 
Qualitative accounts also indicate that the MDM commonly substitutes lunch at home. More than half 
of households in HS2 thought that the MDM helped them save time (Section 5.2.3), indicating that they 
did not cook as frequently when the MDM was provided. One third of households in HS1 and two thirds 
in HS2 thought the scheme helped them save food (Section 5.2.3), again indicating that the MDM 
substituted food consumed at home.  
 
This research has not resolved the issue of whether the MDM is a substitute or a supplement. However, 
the data indicates that for most children in the study locations, the MDM was not consumed as well as 
lunch at home. Inadequate food consumption at home was also shown in Section 5.2.2. In the context 
of the inadequate nutritional content of the MDM, this is problematic. As Khera writes: ‘insofar as the 
MDM is a substitute, the case for nutritious meals at school is even stronger’ (2006: 4746).  
 
6.2.5 Perceptions of Quantity 
 
Hitherto, the discussion of quantity has centred on whether the amount provided adheres to norms. 
Now, attention turns to whether rights-holders and their representatives considered the quantity of the 
MDM to be sufficient to meet their needs. In HS1, just over half of the respondents thought that the 
quantity was sufficient (Figure 6.4). Notably, the highest proportion of respondents reporting that the 
quantity was sufficient was in Khamnor, which is served by the centralised kitchen.  
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Figure 6.4: Perception of MDM quantity by block, household one 
 
A chi-square test of independence found significant differences between answers by location, 
χ2(6)=18.989, p=0.004183. Pairwise-testing reveals significant differences between Girwa and Kotra 
(p=0.0225) and Kotra and Khamnor (p=0.0055). Therefore, perceptions of quantity (and likely the 
actual quantity) of the MDM varied spatially. Table 6.7 shows the responses to the question and food 
security levels. A Kruskal-Wallis test found significant differences between food security category, 
H(2)=7.8877, p=0.04839; however, a significant difference was not found between any of the food 
security categories. Perceptions of quantity varied between schools. For example, at schools 12 and 14, 
no parent thought that the quantity of the MDM was sufficient, whereas all parents at schools 24 and 
36 perceived the quantity to be sufficient. There was no significant difference between caste and 
perception of quantity, H(3)= 4.6239, df = 3, 4.6239, p=0.2015. 
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Table 6.7: Quantity and food security, household survey one 
Opinion on 
quantity 
Food Security Category (number of respondents) 
Secure Mildly 
Insecure 
Moderately 
Insecure 
Severely 
Insecure 
Enough 121 31 28 43 
Not enough 34 15 15 40 
Sometimes enough 24 9 7 10 
Do not know 17 6 5 9 
No food  1 0 3 2 
 
In HS2, 118 parents (73.3%) considered the quantity of the MDM to be sufficient; a greater proportion 
than in HS1. Just 24 thought that the food was not enough (14.9%), six (3.7%) thought that the food 
was sometimes enough and 13 (8.1%) did not know. A Fisher’s exact test of independence found a 
significant difference between case studies (p=<0.001). Echoing the results from HS1, the quantity of 
the MDM was most commonly considered sufficient at CS4 (Figure 6.5). The quantity was most widely 
considered insufficient at CS2. There was no difference in perceptions of quantity by caste (p=0.7223) 
or income category (p=0.515). 
 
 
Figure 6.5: Perception of MDM quantity by case study, household survey two 
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Of the 332 students, 189 (56.9%) thought that the food at school was enough, 23 (6.9%) thought it was 
not enough and 120 (36.1%) thought that the quantity was sufficient sometimes (Figure 6.6). A Fisher’s 
exact test found a significant difference between response by case study (p=<0.001). Significant 
differences were found between CS1 and CS2 (p=0.0019), CS1 and CS4 (p=<0.001), CS2 and CS4 
(p=<0.001) and CS3 and CS4 (p=0.0019). The most satisfied students were at CS1 (Figure 6.6.). The 
most variation was found at CS4, where 76 (68.5%) thought that the meal was only sometimes 
sufficient. The results from the student survey at CS4 contrasts with the results from HS2, in which all 
adult respondents considered the food to be enough. The different responses of parents and children 
highlights the importance of considering both perspectives in research on the MDMS and SFPs more 
generally. There are no clear patterns in opinions by grade; however, the analysis is limited by sample 
size. 
 
 
Figure 6.6: Perception of MDM quantity in the student survey 
 
Qualitative data provides further insight into perceptions of quantity. In CS1, seven students complained 
about the quantity of roti, rice, kadhi and potato. The students were specific in their complaints. For 
example, one student wrote: ‘in the kadhi, there is less gram flour. In the potato vegetables, few 
vegetables are put and in our school there is no rice. [I] want rice!’. Of the 10 interviewees, eight thought 
that the quantity was insufficient; four mentioned the inadequate quantity of roti (just one or two) and 
four considered the quantity to be insufficient due to corruption, explaining that the teacher or cook 
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took food home and therefore less was given to the children. The focus group participants gave the 
same mixed answers.  
 
At CS2, 16 students mentioned insufficient quantity in their essays. In particular, students complained 
that ‘just one roti is given’. Others considered the quantity to be sufficient. For example, a grade X 
student wrote that ‘All children eat a stomach full of food’. The different perceptions of quantity may 
vary due to the different needs of the children, which have been shown in Chapter 5. Of the 10 parents 
interviewed at CS2, five thought that the quantity was insufficient, stating that children were only given 
one roti. The focus group participants had mixed opinions; in the first, participants thought that the 
quantity was sufficient and specifically mentioned the absence of corruption compared to other schools. 
In the second, although participants also perceived the school to be better than others, they noted that 
sometimes the quantity of the MDM was insufficient.   
 
At CS3, the children were positive about the quantity of food, stating that after eating their stomachs 
are full. Parents were less satisfied. Of the 10 interviewed, two were happy with the quantity of food, 
seven were unhappy and one did not know. Four mentioned that only one roti was served. For example, 
the interviewee from household 18 stated that ‘a minimum of three roti is needed, children stay half-
full’. Five of the seven households directly attributed the insufficient quantity of food to the only teacher 
at the school taking the grain intended for the scheme to her house.  
 
At CS4, most students did not mention quantity. Those that did, suggested an increase in quantity would 
be an improvement. For example, a grade VI student wrote ‘we need three spoons of rice’ and another 
student also in grade VI wrote ‘it would be a good thing to have four roti’. All interviewees and focus 
group participants were satisfied with the quantity, supporting the results from the household survey 
(Figure 6.5). Three participants mentioned that sometimes extra food was distributed among the 
children and households.  
 
Finally, observation indicated that in some schools the quantity of food available was insufficient to 
meet demand. In several schools, the children wanted second helpings but there was no more food 
available. The food was clearly insufficient in quantity in schools 22 in Kotra, schools 23 and 31 in 
Khamnor and 33 and 42 in Kumbhalgarh. In other schools, there was enough food for all those who 
wanted seconds and occasionally excess was given to animals. Observation showed quantity 
particularly varied at schools served by the centralised kitchen. Indeed, the staff at the centralised 
kitchen said that the only complaints ever received are that there is too much or too little food (IN5).  
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6.3 Quality 
 
Figures 6.1 and 6.3 show not only variation in the type and quantity of food served, but also potential 
variations in quality. To being to explore the quality of the food in the MDMS, parents and students 
were asked their opinions. In HS1, 294 respondents (71.9%) thought that the food served in the MDMS 
was ‘very good’ (Table 6.8). Kruskal-Wallis tests found no significant difference in the answers by 
block, H(3)=3.3497, p=0.3408 or by caste, H(4)= 9.166, p=0.05708. 
 
Table 6.8: Perceptions of quality, household survey one 
Block 
Opinion of the quality of the MDM (Number of parents) 
Very Good Good Fine Bad Very bad 
Girwa 75 8 5 17 0 
Kotra 67 10 5 17 1 
Khamnor 78 11 5 17 0 
Kumbalgarh 74 5 0 14 0 
Total 
Freq. 294 34 15 65 1 
%  71.9 8.3 3.7 15.9 0.2 
 
The responses from HS2 showed a similar pattern (Table 6.9), although a greater proportion considered 
the food to be ‘good’ than ‘very good’. Only two households considered the food to be ‘bad’. There 
was no difference in perceptions by caste (p=0.8605). 
 
 
Table 6.9: Perceptions of quality, household survey wo  
Case study 
Opinion of the quality of the MDM (Number of parents) 
Very Good Good Fine Bad Very bad Don’t Know 
CS1 7 20 2 0 0 2 
CS2 8 12 9 2 0 4 
CS3 5 19 7 0 0 4 
CS4 13 31 6 0 0 0 
Total Freq. 33 82 24 2 0 10 
% 21.9 54.3 15.9 1.3 0.0 6.6 
 
Most students were positive about the food served; 153 (46.2%) considered the meal to be ‘very good’ 
and no students reported that the meal was ‘very bad’ (Table 6.10). However, results were statistically 
different by case study, H(3)= 33.536, p=<0.001. Students in CS1 were the most positive about the 
food; more than 90% thought the food was ‘good’ or ‘very good’ (Table 6.10). All but one student at 
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CS3 considered the meal to be ‘good’ and 80% of students at CS2 thought that the meal was ‘good’ or 
‘very good’. At CS4, although 33.9% of students considered the food to be ‘very good’ and 47.0% 
thought that the food was just ‘fine’.  
 
Table 6.10: Frequency of student opinion of MDM quality by case study school  
Case study Very Good Good Fine Bad Very Bad 
CS1 32 23 4 0 0 
CS2 82 25 26 2 0 
CS3 0 21 1 0 0 
CS4 39 22 54 0 0 
Total        Freq. 153 91 85 2 0 
% 46.2 27.5 25.7 0.6 0.0 
 
Although useful, assessing quality in this manner does not provide any insight into why food is 
considered ‘good’ or ‘bad’. Essays, interviews and open-ended questions in surveys were therefore used 
to assess the qualitative dimensions of food. When asked their overall opinion of the scheme in HS1, 
23 participants mentioned low quality. Thirteen households specifically mentioned that the quality of 
food was bad as the food, particularly dal dhokli, was raw. For example, households seven and nine at 
school 19 commented that the food was raw. From first-hand experience, I can confirm that, due to the 
size of the dhokli, the food was indeed raw and nearly inedible (Figure 6.7).  
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Figure 6.7: Large, raw and almost inedible dal dhokli at school 19 
 
A second common complaint was that the roti were of poor quality. At CS1, students noted that the 
quality of the roti varied; ‘sometimes the roti are raw and sometimes they are burnt’. I observed that 
the quality of rotis varied due to the pressure on the one cook to produce a large number in a short 
period of time (see Section 7.4.2). The quality of rotis was a particular issue at schools where the MDM 
was provided by the centralised kitchen. Households with children at schools 24, 28, 31 and 32 
complained that the roti was hard, raw, burnt or just ‘bad’. At CS4, six students wrote that they did not 
like the rotis, because they were hard and sometimes raw or cold. Households with children at schools 
one and five also mentioned the quality of rotis had been poor when the Naandi kitchen served the food. 
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The poor quality of rotis from centralised kitchens has also been recognised elsewhere, for example in 
the 2013 JRM to Madhya Pradesh (MHRD, 2013b). When produced in mechanised centralised 
kitchens, rotis are made by machine and are not fresh, which makes them hard. Centralised production 
also means that the roti are not made according to local preference.  
 
The quality of the MDM was also perceived relative to food consumed at home. In HS1, 39 participants 
thought that the MDM tasted like the food at home and 10 said the problem was that it did not. The 
food not tasting like home was repeatedly mentioned in Girwa in reference to the food from the Naandi 
Foundation. Students at all case studies commonly wrote that there was insufficient oil, salt or spice in 
the MDM. The MDM was considered to be good quality as the variety of food served in the MDM was 
not available at home. For example, at CS4, one student wrote ‘at home, every time roti and vegetable 
is available, but here rice is available every day’. In general, participants considered that items such as 
dal, green vegetables, milk, eggs, meat and sweets were indicative of a ‘good’ diet, and the consumption 
of roti with little to no vegetables was a ‘bad’ diet. Interviewees commented that they knew their diet 
was ‘bad’.  
 
The quality of the MDM therefore varied considerably. Sometimes the food was raw, burnt and, when 
the MDMS is provided by NGOs, the rotis are hard. Quality varied however, between schools and 
depending on the meal served.  
 
6.4 Safety 
6.4.1 Illness  
 
I examined safety using household surveys, expert interviews and the analysis of newspaper articles.3 
Respondents were asked whether their child had been ill after consuming the MDM. Twenty-five of the 
428 respondents answered affirmatively, of which 12 were in Girwa (Table 6.11). In HS1, two 
respondents mentioned that illness occurred when the Naandi Foundation were supplying the food. In 
both surveys, most participants did not report their children experiencing illness because of the MDM. 
No parent expressed serious concern for the safety of the MDM served at their child’s school and no 
child wrote that they had become ill from the MDM. There was, however, an awareness that incidents 
had occurred elsewhere. For example, in the first interview at CS2, the mother stated that she knew that 
a lizard was found in the MDM when the Naandi Foundation were supplying the meal. The interviewee 
                                                        
3 Testing multiple samples of food from each school in a laboratory is the best way to examine safety. 
Unfortunately doing so was beyond the scope of this research.  
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also stated that she had heard some children had died due to the MDMS, so always ask her daughter 
about the MDM.  
 
Table 6.11: Experiences of MDM-caused illness in the first and second household surveys 
Survey Location Yes No Don’t Know 
HS1 
  
Girwa 12 90 6 
Kotra 6 94 4 
Khamnor 6 91 3 
Kumbhalgarh. 1 103 2 
Total 
 Freq. 25 378 15 
% 6.0 90.4 3.6 
HS2 
CS1 7 25 1 
CS2 4 27 7 
CS3 5 26 2 
CS4 3 35 9 
Total Freq. 19 113 19 
% 12.6 74.8 12.6 
      
 
Across India, however, the MDM sometimes causes illness. Between 2004 and 2013, 2,069 children 
are reported to have fallen ill after consuming the MDM (Barnagarwala, 2013). The highest number of 
children falling ill was in Delhi (n=525), where the MDMS is supplied by NGOs (ibid). In contrast, 
Thakur (2016) analysed media publications between 2014-2016 and found that 4,000 children had 
fallen ill in the period due to the MDM. The difference between the two figures is therefore sizable. 
Either way, both figures indicate that safety in the MDMS is a problem. I conducted an analysis of 
media articles on this topic (see Section 3.3.9) to explore what was happening in such cases. The most 
common cause of illness reported was the contamination of food by an animal, often a lizard.4 Of the 
46 articles analysed that specified the source of the food, the MDM came from an NGO in 24, a SHG 
in 15 and a school in seven. This is not to suggest NGOs are more likely to cause illness; NGOs typically 
supply the MDM in urban areas where one expects such instances to be more commonly reported in 
the media. However, it shows that the food is not always safe in any of the delivery models.  
 
                                                        
4 Specific incidents are examined in more depth in Chapter 8. 
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6.4.2 Procedures and Infrastructure 
 
Here, I consider the extent to which the safety procedures outlined in Section 4.4.5 were adhered to. 
Firstly, teachers must taste the food before it is served. I did not observe a teacher tasting the food before 
it was served to students at any point. Second, a suitable kitchen-cum-store is necessary to prevent the 
contamination of food. Table 6.12 details the progress in the construction of kitchens. There is a 
discrepancy between the number of sanctioned kitchens and the number completed, in progress or yet 
to be started. Moreover, a significant number of kitchens have not been completed. Consequently, only 
80.5% of schools in Rajasthan, 100% in Rajsamand5 and 78% in Udaipur have a kitchen. 
 
Table 6.12: Kitchen-cum-store progress from 2006-2016 (GOR, 2016b) 
Location Total sanctioned 
Progress 
Sanctioned - 
progress Completed In progress 
Yet to 
start 
Total 
Rajasthan 77,298 57,425 2,951 10,968 71,344 5,954 
Rajsamand 1,994 1,798 0 0 1,798 196 
Udaipur 4,235 
 
3,148 
 
537 
 
349 
 
4,034 201 
  
Of the 32 decentralised schools included in the sample, there was a kitchen at 28. However, observation 
showed that the presence of a kitchen does not mean that the kitchen is either suitable or used. The food 
was not prepared in the kitchen in four of the 28 schools; the meal was prepared in the open at three 
schools and in the cook’s home at one. Figure 6.8 shows the varying quality of cooking areas and figures 
6.9-6.11 indicate the varying quality of kitchens across the sampled schools.  
                                                        
5 Notably, all schools in Rajsamand are reported to have a kitchen, yet Akshaya Patra is supplying the MDM 
across Khamnor block.  
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Figure 6.8: Different cooking facilities. Top left: A clean kitchen with appropriate storage at school 
39. Top right: a fireplace, in the open and located near classrooms at school 12. Bottom left: a 
fireplace with ventilation at school 35. Top right: a gas stove next to the fireplace and open window at 
school 33. 
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Figure 6.9: A clean, adequately sized kitchen with appropriate storage at school 39 
Figure 6.10: A make-shift kitchen at school 18 
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Figure 6.11: An open sided kitchen at the third case study school 
 
The inadequate storage of ingredients was observed occasionally (Figure 6.12). All schools had 
appropriate utensils, except school 14 which reported to have had a recent break in. Schools also had 
plates. On one occasion, however, despite school 13 having plates, students were eating from scrap 
pieces of paper instead.   
 
 
 
 
               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.12: Incorrect grain storage at school 12. The containers of grain were not properly closed, 
and consequently cobwebs were found inside. Open bags of grain were left on the floor. 
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The GOR (2016b) reports that a gas connection is present in 81.2% of schools in Rajasthan, 100% of 
schools in Rajsamand and 97.4% in Udaipur. In the remaining, firewood is used. Yet, schools with a 
gas connection may choose to use firewood as it is cheaper; 13 of 32 schools were using gas, often as 
well as firewood (Figure 6.13).  
 
 
Figure 6.13: Fuel-use at school 40, Kumbalgarh. Left: a firewood stove, with a chimney above. Right: 
a gas connection. Both were in use. 
 
The GOR (2016b) reports that 95.7% of schools in Rajasthan, 97.9% in Rajsamand and 100.6% in 
Udaipur have hand-washing facilities. Data from the Rajasthan Department of Education for 2015-
2016, however, shows that a far smaller percentage of schools have hand-washing facilities (Table 
6.13). Drinking water and a functioning toilet are reportedly found in most schools. 
 
Table 6.13: Infrastructure in schools in the study area (NUEPA, 2016) 
Facilities 
Rajasthan Rajsamand Udaipur 
Number % Number % Number % 
Total number of schools 67,483 - 1,768  3,888  
Separate toilets  67,480 99.0 1,768 100 3,888 100 
Functioning toilet  66,611 98.7 1759 99.5 3702 95.2 
Hand-washing facilities 35,077 52.0 1167 66.0 2283 58.7 
Drinking water 65,308 96.8 1766 
 
99.9 3745 
 
96.3 
The presence of water, sanitation and hygiene facilities across the 43 sampled schools according to U-
DISE data is summarised in Table 6.14. Contrary to this data, teachers at nine of the sampled schools 
reported that there was no drinking water at the school. Consequently, cooks or students were forced to 
collect water from the nearest source for cooking. The U-DISE data suggest that only one school did 
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not have a toilet; however, toilets were only usable in 18 of the sampled schools. Toilets were often 
locked, filled in with rubble or were too unclean to use. Children were observed washing their hands in 
25 schools; however, in five it was clear from the behaviour of the teachers and children that this was 
atypical. Children washed their plates after lunch and sometimes before; however, this was not always 
with soap and at school 18, soil was used. At no point was a cook or teacher observed washing their 
hands. Observation therefore shows a considerable gap between a facility existing and a facility being 
used. 
  
Table 6.14: School facilities school report cards (NUEPA, 2016) 
Facilities Frequency 
Drinking Water 
Source 
Tap 6 
Hand-pump 24 
Well 1 
Other 8 
None 2 
Drinking water 
status 
Functional 32 
Not working 9 
Hand-washing 
facilities* 
Yes 4 
No 6 
 Toilets Separate Toilets 42 
No toilets 1 
All toilets functional 40 
*Two types of forms are used, of which one did not record whether there were handwashing facilities. 
 
Therefore, the infrastructure required to ensure that the MDM is cooked in clean surroundings, that the 
children and the CCHs are clean and that food cannot be contaminated is not always present. The MDM 
is often not prepared in a sanitary environment, raising concerns for food safety. In the absence of 
teachers tasting the meal and any form of safety checks, if the MDM has been contaminated it will only 
be indicated once students are taken ill.     
 
6.4.3 An Argument for Centralised Kitchens?  
 
The inadequate infrastructure at schools and the implications for hygiene and food safety is frequently 
used as a justification for centralised kitchens (e.g. Bose, 2013; Singh, 2015). Figure 6.14, an article 
from a newspaper in Udaipur, shows how the two models are compared. I can confirm from observation 
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that there are significant differences between the two types of kitchen. The hygienic mechanised 
centralised kitchens, where staff are clean, wearing aprons and hair nets contrast starkly with the 
facilities and procedures in place in the decentralised model.   
 
 
Figure 6.14: Centralised versus decentralised kitchens. From the Dainik Bhaskar (Udaipur edition), 23 
April 2016. On the left is a picture of the Akshaya Patra kitchen in Nathdwara with the caption ‘Modern 
kitchen: in one hour 40 thousand rotis’. On the right, is a decentralised kitchen with the caption ‘and in 
government [schools]: this condition’. 
 
Yet, the centralised model presents an additional safety concern; the temperature of food. The 
‘temperature of the mid-day meal when served should be maintained at 65°C. Microorganisms multiply 
at a fast pace when the food is kept… between 5°C and 60°C (and therefore, food should be served to 
children immediately after being cooked)’ (MHRD, 2015c: 9). In decentralised kitchens, food was 
typically cooked just before serving and was therefore likely to have been above 60°C, although schools 
had no means of checking the temperature. At centralised kitchens, however, food is packed early in 
the morning and remains in the container for several hours before it is consumed. Six expert 
interviewees expressed concern that during this time the temperature would reach between 5-60°C 
allowing bacteria to rapidly multiply (IA11, IA13, IG4, IG7, IN7, IO2). A state-level official stated that 
‘We have some problems to solve in MDM in centralised kitchens… They cook the MDM early and 
pack to each school between 9 and 10am. For three hours the meal is sitting there’ (IG4). A district 
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level official, however, did not see temperature as a problem, remarking that it was ‘just like tiffin’ 
(IG6).  
 
Previous studies have found the temperature of food provided by NGOs to be inadequate6. The JRM in 
Andhra Pradesh found that the food served by Akshaya Patra was between 45- 60°C and was ‘cool or 
luke warm when served’ (MHRD 2013c: 62). The JRM to Delhi found that the food was between 26-
69°C and was below 60°C in six of 14 schools (MHRD, 2013a). The Swami Sivananda Memorial 
Institute (2014) found that the MDM from a school in Delhi was between 30-45°C. Notably, several 
students at CS4 wrote in their essays that the food served was not hot. 
 
Overall, the centralised kitchen produced food in a cleaner and more hygienic environment than in the 
decentralised kitchens. This is arguably the greatest advantage of centralising the operation. However, 
the temperature and therefore the safety of the food by the time it is consumed is a concerning issue and 
is an area for future research.  
 
6.5 Preference  
 
In Section 5.3.4, I showed that the type of food served in the MDMS can determine whether students 
consume the meal. Preference also features in the standard definition of food security. To explore 
preference further, students were asked what their favourite food served in school was. The most 
popular dish varied between schools (Table 6.15).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
                                                        
6 Ideally, I would have measured the temperature of the food; however, the issue did not emerge as a problem 
until later in the research when it was too late. 
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Table 6.15: Student preference from the student survey 
Meal CS1 CS2 CS3 CS4 Total Freq. % 
Rice, dal 7 54 3 5 69 22.1 
Roti, dal 11 12 0 42 65 20.8 
Khichdi and kadhi 0 0 0 28 28 9.0 
Rice, kadhi 11 16 0 0 27 8.7 
Khichdi 5 10 5 4 24 7.7 
Roti, vegetables 0 13 4 3 20 6.4 
Sweet rice 3 0 0 15 18 5.8 
Dal dhokli 9 0 3 0 12 3.8 
Rice 3 8 0 0 11 3.5 
Other 17 5 0 16 38 12.2 
 
In their essays, students described their food preferences. At CS1, CS2 and CS3 there were no clear 
trends in preference. One insightful student at CS2 wrote ‘in our school, all children like different food, 
some like khichdi, some like dal rice’. At CS4, typically students wrote that they liked rice, vegetables 
and dal and did not like sweet rice. Preference influenced consumption. Students at CS2 and CS4 wrote 
that when food that they did not like was served, fewer children would consume the food. For example, 
a student in grade X at CS2 wrote: ‘in our school, dal and rice is delicious food and on this day the 
school children eat the food. The bad food is roti and vegetables…On this day children from 10th class 
don’t eat the food’. At CS4, students wrote that they did not eat the MDM on Saturdays when sweet 
rice was served. Some students even mentioned that when sweet rice is served, they go home.  
 
Students also preferred food consumed infrequently at home, particularly sweets and fruit. For example, 
the interviewee from household 18 in CS3 stated that their child did not go to school very often, but 
when there is special food then they go, stating when children are given sweets on Independence Day 
and Republic Day ‘children run towards school’. The link between attendance and the food served has 
also been found elsewhere. For example, the 2013 JRM for Andhra Pradesh noted that when 
‘interesting’ food such as vegetable biryani was served, more children consumed the meal (MHRD, 
2013b). Thus, children’s tastes and preferences can influence whether they choose to consume the 
MDM. Evidently, children may exercise agency not only in the decision to attend school but also in the 
decision as to whether to eat the food served.  
 
In Rajasthan, on one day each week the food served in the MDMS should deviate from the menu and 
food that reflects local tastes should be served. The extent to which local taste and preference influenced 
the food served varied. In the first round of school visits, staff at three schools (one, nine, and 16) 
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reported that they made dal dhokli frequently as the students liked the meal. However, typically it is not 
the most favoured meal. Rice, however, is liked by students but is not necessarily served that often. For 
example, at CS1 one student wrote: ‘children like kadhi and rice and dal and rice, but there is less rice 
so because of this kadhi and rice and dal and rice are made very less’. In the centralised model, 
preference is not considered. Although the students at CS4 did not like sweet rice, the centralised nature 
of the provision means that the menu remains the same. Thus, week after week students will continue 
to not consume the meal when sweet rice is served. The extent to which preference and local taste is 
reflected in the food served is therefore influenced by whether the students can provide feedback and 
whether the duty-bearers have the capacity and will to alter the menu.  
 
The previous discussion has therefore shown that preference is important in the MDMS, as it affects 
school attendance and consumption of the MDM. Evidently, the qualitative dimensions of food are 
important. 
 
6.6 Culturally Appropriate? 
 
The cultural appropriateness of the food served has been considered in the scheme’s design; the MDM 
menu is created by state governments and in Rajasthan the menu can be adapted to local taste. Issues 
arise, however, when religiously-inclined NGOs are involved in the scheme. The centralised kitchen in 
the study area is operated by Akshaya Patra, an initiative of the International Society for Krishna 
Consciousness (ISKCON) known as the Hare Krishna movement (see Section 8.6). This movement 
adheres to a Sattvic diet, which excludes onion, garlic and all meat products including eggs. The MDM 
prepared by these organisations adheres to this diet. The students in the study area receiving the meal 
from the centralised kitchen did not complain about the absence of onions and garlic, although, media 
reports from elsewhere indicate that students may object to such food (Rangarajan, 2016; The Pioneer, 
2016b). Notably, the Education Department of Chandigarh decided to reverse its decision to source the 
MDM from Akshaya Patra as the exclusion of onion and garlic, along with machine-made roti, were 
deemed unsuitable for the north Indian palate (Chhibber, 2017). Beyond taste, the exclusion of garlic 
and onion is evidently the projection of religious values onto others, as was argued by three expert 
interviewees (IN4, IN7, IA15). 
 
Of greater concern is the exclusion of eggs from the MDMS. Eggs are not only nutritious, but also have 
a longer shelf life than alternatives such as milk (Khera, 2015). Entitlements are also easier to monitor 
(ibid); it is far easier for rights-holders and their representatives to determine whether rights-holders 
have received one egg than 30g of dal. Children have also been found to like eggs (MHRD, 2013c; 
2013d; Mohanty, 2015; Sinha, 2016). The decision as to whether eggs appear on the MDM menu is 
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often not made according to nutritional need. Instead, the decision is often influenced by the religious 
beliefs of NGOs, politicians and other powerful actors (see BBC, 2015; DNA India, 2016; Economic 
and Political Weekly, 2015; Johari, 2015; Moudgal, 2015; The Hindu, 2016a; Tutika, 2016). As NGOs 
do not have to supply the MDM, enforcing the provision of eggs is difficult. For example, the 
Committee on the Welfare of SCs and STs (2013) reported that Akshaya Patra were not supplying eggs. 
In response, a representative from ISKCON stated ‘As far as serving eggs is concerned, those 
demanding it are free to get them from elsewhere’ (in Vishnoi, 2013).  
 
In Rajasthan, eggs are not on the menu in the ICDS programme or the MDMS, reportedly due to the 
influence of lobbies and NGOs (Dutta, 2015; Johari, 2015) and concern for religious beliefs (Iqbal, 
2014). Indeed, the majority of Rajasthan’s population are vegetarian (Section 3.3.2). However, 
vegetarianism has a caste-based pattern. Nationally, 30.3% of men and 31.2% of women belonging to 
general castes are vegetarian, compared to 22.1% and 23.9% of SCs and 24.0% and 24.1% of STs (GOI, 
2016d). In this study, 18.6% of the respondents in HS1 and 31.6% of those in HS2 were not vegetarian. 
Moreover, vegetarianism can be the product of circumstance rather than choice (Khera, 2015). Indeed, 
in HS3 when asked whether their child would eat eggs if they were provided in the MDMS, 117 people 
(86.9%) answered yes, of which 33 had previously identified themselves as vegetarian. Despite eggs 
being culturally appropriate for most respondents, none of these children will receive eggs.  
 
NGOs involved in the MDMS ‘should not use the programme for propagation of any religious practice’ 
(MHRD, 2006: 17). The refusal to provide eggs, onion and garlic is, however, the propagation of a 
religious practice. Moreover, the CESCR defines cultural acceptability as the ‘non-nutrient-based 
values attached to food and food consumption’ (1999: paragraph 11). The involvement of NGOs in the 
MDMS does not lead to rights-holders being forced to consume food that is inappropriate. It does, 
however, lead to the prevention of the consumption of culturally acceptable (and nutritious) food. The 
refusal to provide eggs is the projection of the values attached to food held by a small number of duty-
bearers onto rights-holders. Importantly, this is at the potential expense of the well-being of rights-
holders. Moreover, it highlights that the choice of food served in the scheme is not necessarily made 
according to nutrition and the culture of those receiving the food, but instead may be determined by 
religion. Reflecting Fraser’s work (Section 2.4.2), the system directing the MDMS may appear non-
political; there are observed dietary needs which are fulfilled by a meal that is supposedly in line with 
the guidelines. However, the case of eggs highlights that this process can be highly political. Whilst 
there may be an underlying discourse that animal products are not necessary, ultimately the needs of 
rights-holders does not factor into this decision. Instead, the views and agendas of more powerful actors 
ensure that needs are not sufficiently discussed or addressed. 
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6.7 Conclusion  
 
In sections 6.2.1-6.2.5, I have shown the inadequacies in the quantity, quality and safety of the MDM 
served in the study area. However, I have shown that these vary considerably over time, space and 
between children. These variations are a product of multiple factors: the failure of government officials 
to ensure adequate infrastructure; the limited capacity of duty-bearers at the school-level to fulfil their 
duties in the context of inadequate financial, food or human resources; and the agency and discretion 
of teachers and cooks. Notably, due to this variation and without thorough and frequent monitoring at 
the school-level, it is hard to determine whether rights-holders receive their entitlements and the extent 
to which nutritional needs are met.  
 
Throughout this chapter, I have also shown flaws in the centralised delivery model. The centralised 
kitchen was not supplying food according to the menu or government norms. Although centralised 
kitchens may appear to be a more hygienic delivery model, the centralised model introduces a new 
safety concern: temperature. Finally, in Section 6.6 I argued that the involvement of NGOs in MDMS 
may result in the provision of food that is not in line with local culture.   
 
The findings presented in this chapter have also shown the importance of the qualitative dimensions of 
food consumption. I have shown that quality and preference affect consumption and therefore the 
impact of the scheme. In this Chapter, I have repeatedly drawn on the words and opinions of students; 
the rights-holders themselves. I have shown that one can gain considerable insight into the 
implementation of the MDMS from students. The findings here, therefore support Kent’s (2010) 
argument that the views of students need to be listened to in SFPs.  
 
Two larger conclusions can be drawn from the findings presented in this chapter. Firstly, in its current 
form the MDMS is a missed opportunity. The MDM is an important part of children’s food intake. 
However, the inadequate quantity and the failure to adhere to the norms reduces the nutritional value 
of the meal. Second, uncertainty in the MDMS extends beyond the number of rights-holders (Chapter 
5) to the food served. The quantity of food received by each rights-holder is unknown, and therefore so 
too is the nutritional value of the MDM. The temperature and overall safety of the food is another 
unknown. In consequence, the provision of a safe MDM that adheres to norms cannot be guaranteed.  
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Chapter 7 
 
The Duty Bearers  
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
Duty-bearers are the second part of a rights system (Kent, 2005). For the provision of entitlements 
and thus the realisation of rights, duty-bearers must fulfil their duties. Understanding the involvement 
of duty-bearers in a rights-based scheme is therefore imperative to comprehending why or why not 
entitlements are fulfilled. In Section 4.5, I outlined that the duty-bearers in the MDMS are the multiple 
layers of government and those responsible for directly implementing the scheme at the school-level. 
Studying both sets of actors would require extensive fieldwork in block offices and in schools. Given 
the time constraints of PhD fieldwork, I focussed on the latter. Furthermore, it is the duty-bearers at 
the school level that ultimately determine whether entitlements are provided, yet, the duties of these 
actors are rarely discussed. Typically, discussions of the administrative structure of the MDMS group 
these actors together, with little to no further exploration (e.g. Si and Sharma, 2008; Sikligar 2011). 
In particular, the involvement of NGOs in the form of PPPs has not been empirically examined 
(Section 2.5.4). In this chapter, I therefore focus on the duty-bearers responsible for providing the 
MDMS at the school-level. I examine who the duty-bearers are and the duties that they have. I also 
examine whether these duty-bearers have the capacity to fulfil their duties, what determines this 
capacity and what the implications are for the provision of entitlements. In turn, I examine the roles 
of SMCs, teachers, cooks, the community and NGOs. 
 
7.2 School Management Committees 
 
The GOR (2016a) report that a SMC has been established in every one of Rajasthan’s schools. Indeed, 
all teachers in the sampled schools reported the existence of a SMC. Yet, SMCs were found to have 
a limited role in the MDMS in the study area. Only 16 teachers reported that the SMC had monitored 
 
223 
the MDMS in the past year. Only 26 teachers reported that SMCs met the required once a month; the 
remaining 17 reported a lower frequency (Table 7.1). Meetings were reported to occur most 
frequently in Girwa and the least frequently in Khamnor. At no point during the research did I observe 
a SMC meeting being held, indicating that the frequency of meetings may have been lower than 
reported.  
 
Table 7.1: Frequency of SMC meetings 
Frequency of meetings Girwa Kotra Khamnor Kumbhalgarh. 
Total 
Freq. % 
At least once per month 11 5 4 6 26 60.5 
Once every two months 0 3 1 3 7 16.3 
< six times per year  0 3 5 2 10 23.3 
 
Only three respondents mentioned that they, or someone in their family, were on the SMC. 
Participants did not perceive the SMC as the institution to complain to if there was a problem with 
the MDMS; of the 430 people in HS1, only 18 (4.2%) reported that they would complain to the SMC 
(see Section 8.3.1). 
 
Three NGO employees in Udaipur reported that SMCs in the district were not functioning effectively 
or, at times, at all (IN2, IN3, IN6). One stated that some people are unaware that they are listed as 
SMC members (IN3). This trend has been found elsewhere. For example, a study in Delhi found that 
only 10% of SMC members were aware of their membership (The Central Square Foundation and 
Accountability Initiative, 2014). Those that are on the SMC also do not necessarily fulfil their duties. 
For example, the Central Square Foundation (2015) noted that no School Development Plans were 
created by SMCs in Udaipur and Jaipur districts. The Central Square Foundation and Accountability 
Initiative therefore concluded that a key problem with SMCs is the ‘gap between policy intent and 
on-the-ground implementation’ (2015: 8).  
 
SMCs have overall responsibility for the implementation of the MDMS at the school level (GOR, 
2016a). Yet, I found SMCs had little involvement in the MDMS in the study area. Clearly, if a SMC 
is not functioning as intended, either the duties of the SMC are not fulfilled or they become the 
responsibility of another duty-bearer, most probably teachers. 
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7.3 Teachers  
 
The MDMS is widely considered to place a ‘burden’ on teachers, diverting their attention away from 
teaching and consequently reducing the quality of education that students receive (e.g. Choudhari, 
2013; Jain and Shah, 2005; Times of India, 2014). The MHRD explicitly addressed this in the 2006 
guidelines stating:  
 
There persists a widely-held belief that provision of cooked meals disrupts classroom 
processes: that teachers spend too much time in supervising the cooking operations 
to the detriment of academic timetables. This has resulted in a general lack of 
enthusiasm for the programme in some States…Teachers should, therefore, under no 
circumstances, be assigned responsibilities that will impede or interfere with 
teaching learning [sic]. (24) 
 
In the meeting of the Empowered Committee in October 2014, the Government of Bihar requested 
that the MDMS become centralised in Bihar to relieve teachers of their burden. The Additional 
Secretary of the MHRD replied that ‘the role of teacher is to taste the meal and ensure that it is served 
by the cook-cum-helpers in an orderly manner. Thus, it does not put extra burden on the work of the 
teacher’ (MHRD, 2014b). Following the review of the street-level bureaucrat literature in Chapter 2, 
one may predict that if too much is asked of teachers, their ability to perform their duties will be 
reduced. Given the potential influence on the implementation of the MDMS, in the following 
discussion, I examine the role of teachers in the MDMS in the sampled schools and whether the 
MDMS places a burden on them.  
 
All the teachers interviewed stated that the MDMS was beneficial for students. The precise objectives 
and benefits of the scheme were not, however, consistently recognised. Twenty-three teachers 
(53.5%) listed that the objectives of the MDMS were to increase enrolment and attendance and to 
improve nutrition. Eleven thought that the scheme was for those not getting enough food at home, 
eight thought that the scheme was to improve health and six thought it was to avoid classroom hunger 
and to benefit poor children. Although teachers recognised that the scheme had positive objectives 
and benefited their students, many were against the involvement of teachers. Fourteen teachers 
thought that the scheme placed a burden on them and consequently reduced the time that they could 
spend teaching. Teachers also disliked the responsibility they had for the scheme, fearing blame if 
something went wrong (see Section 8.4). Six teachers consequently argued that the MDMS should 
be provided by a separate agency. For example, a teacher at school two stated that the MDMS ‘is 
economically good for those families who can't afford the quality of food. But it is a burden for 
teachers. If there is management then it can make it better for children as teachers can concentrate on 
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education’. A district official in Rajsamand (IG6) also argued that another agency should provide the 
MDMS to relieve teachers of the burden. Three expert interviewees also stated that the burden placed 
on teachers as a problem (IA1, IA14, IO2). For example, a scholar researching the MDMS (IA14) 
argued that the burden resulted in teachers looking for shortcuts in the provision of the meal. These 
shortcuts can be interpreted as coping strategies, adopted in the context of work pressures.   
 
Teachers have two duties towards the MDMS: to provide a wholesome meal and to do so in the spirit 
of togetherness (MHRD, 2006: 23). Yet, these duties are ends; they do not detail the means. In 
practice, ensuring the provision of a quality MDM involves considerable work. I observed teachers 
instructing the cook as to the food to prepare, ensuring there was sufficient fuel, overseeing the 
serving of food, supervising students and completing records on attendance, grain use and 
expenditure. Teachers must also purchase the raw ingredients and taste the meal. Many tasks must 
therefore be completed to ensure that the seemingly simple end of providing a wholesome meal is 
fulfilled. As noted elsewhere (Drèze and Goyal, 2003; Jain and Shah, 2005; Khera, 2006), completing 
these tasks takes time. The time taken is further increased by flaws in the scheme’s functioning (Jain 
and Shah, 2005). For example, at CS1 the gas cylinder had not been replaced, requiring the teacher 
to spend time sourcing a new cylinder. Teachers may also face difficulties providing the MDM when 
the budget is delayed; 15 teachers reported delays and the teacher at school 17 reported that they had 
to pay for the scheme from their own money until the money was received, a trend noted to occur 
elsewhere in the MDMS (IO2). Those teachers that can and are willing to pay for the MDMS use 
their own money as a coping strategy to deal with the delayed receipt of funds. 
 
The time teachers spent on the MDMS, however, varied between teachers and schools. One teacher 
at each school is appointed the ‘Mid-day-meal in charge’, meaning that teachers are not affected by 
the scheme to the same extent. A problem arises in single-teacher schools, where teachers must 
complete all the teaching, administrative tasks and MDM-related activities alone. Indeed, it is known 
that teachers in India are required to perform extensive and time-consuming administrative tasks, 
including the maintenance of numerous registers (Mooij, 2008). Six of the 14 teachers that 
complained about the burden of the MDMS were from schools where there were just one or two 
members of staff. In these schools, teachers already had a considerable amount of responsibility and 
could not manage to fulfil their duties. For example, the teacher at school 14 stated that ‘In this school 
there is only one member of staff and I am busy in official work and so cannot give enough time to 
the students’. The MDM had not been served at school 14 for several weeks on our first visit and was 
served variably thereafter. The capacity of a teacher in a single-teacher school to provide the MDM, 
to educate and to perform administrative duties is therefore limited. This is a cause for concern as 
single-teacher schools are not uncommon; they account for 17.0% of government schools in 
Rajasthan, 16.4% in Rajsamand and 22.3% in Udaipur (NUEPA, 2016). Indeed, a district official in 
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Udaipur (IG8) noted that delivering the MDMS in single-teacher schools was a problem in the region. 
Single-teacher schools are also often in remote areas, making the provision of a MDM that adheres 
to the GOI’s norms more difficult due to limited access to markets. Moreover, schools in remote areas 
are less likely to be inspected (IN6). Thus, the MDMS is often implemented poorly in single-teacher 
schools in remote areas. Indeed, five of the six schools not serving food at all or serving inadequate 
food were such schools.  
 
The narrative that the MDMS creates a burden should not, however, be assumed. Teachers at three 
schools (six, seven, 33) mentioned that at least one teacher was engaged in MDM-related tasks for 
the duration of the day and thus could not teach. Although the duties teachers are obligated to perform 
are not insignificant, they do not take the entire day and therefore these reports appear to be 
exaggerated. Moreover, I observed that many teachers were engaged in neither teaching nor activities 
relating to the MDMS. Instead, teachers were observed chatting, drinking tea, reading the paper or 
leisurely completing records; a trend found more widely in India (Kremer et al. 2005; PROBE team, 
1999 in Kingdon, 2007).  
 
Teachers must also accept responsibility to provide the MDMS as per the norms. Implicit in this is 
that teachers do not act for their own personal gain. Corruption is defined here as ‘behaviour that 
deviates from the formal duties of a public role (elective or appointive) because of private-regarding 
(personal, close family, private clique) wealth or status gains’ (Nye, 1967: 419). Corruption by 
teachers in the MDMS typically takes the form of teachers either inflating enrolment and attendance 
figures or taking the dry food home (IO2, IA3, IA14). I have already shown in Section 5.3.2 that 
enrolment and attendance figures were sometimes inflated. Respondents in four locations mentioned 
that teachers took the food home (the catchment areas for schools five, six, 10, and 19). Expert 
interviewees (IA3, I02) also noted that there was corruption in the scheme, although emphasised that 
this was petty corruption, particularly relative to the PDS.   
 
The personality of teachers also determines whether they fulfil their duties. Indeed, examples already 
presented in Chapter 5 show that the extent to which teachers felt a duty towards their students and 
the MDMS varied. For example, at CS2, the midday-meal-in-charge was providing food to older 
students as they had recognised that the students needed the MDM. At CS4, the head-teacher had 
personally tried to increase attendance and to prohibit discrimination. In contrast, at school 14 the 
teacher had stopped providing the MDM. School 15 was closed due to the absence of the teacher. At 
school 19 the teacher was inflating figures and nearly inedible food was also being served. In addition, 
at school 21 the teacher was reading the newspaper and no MDM was served. Notably, these four 
schools were all in Kotra. Parents recognised the influence of teachers’ personality on the MDMS; 
some thought that teachers were ‘good’ and therefore the MDMS was good (mentioned by at least 
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one household in the catchment areas for schools 17, 20, 26, 30, 37). Others thought that the teachers 
were ‘not good’ (schools 31, 32, 43). Experts also noted the influence of teachers’ personality and 
attitude (IA3, IA10, IA15, IO2). Teachers have agency to act (albeit within structural constraints); 
those who accept responsibility for the MDMS and their students and are motivated to act may use 
this agency to try to implement the scheme well. Those without such responsibility and motivation 
may put little to no effort into the implementation of the scheme.     
 
Teachers in government schools in India are typically street-level bureaucrats; they ‘interact with 
citizens in the course of the job and have discretion in exercising authority’ but often ‘cannot do the 
job according to ideal conceptions of the practice because of the limitations of the work structure’ 
(Lipsky, 2010: xvii). The duties of teachers in the MDMS, combined with existing administrative and 
teaching duties, and limited access to financial and food resources, may limit the capacity of teachers 
to provide a MDM that adheres to norms. However, the demands and enablements of teachers vary 
spatially and by school; capacity to fulfil duties is especially limited for teachers in single-teacher 
schools. The fulfilment of duties by teachers is, however, not only the product of structure; teachers 
must accept responsibility to implement the MDMS as per the norms. Personality and personal 
motivation are critical factors in the acceptance of responsibility. If the monitoring of the scheme is 
insufficiently frequent, rigorous or effective and accountability is limited (see Chapter 8), the 
influence of personality and capacity persists, to the potential detriment of the scheme. Structural 
inequalities allow teachers to influence the implementation of the MDMS. Depending on the 
personality of the teachers, this ‘room for manoeuvre’ can positively, or as is more typical, negatively 
impact the scheme. 
 
7.4 Cook-Cum-Helpers 
7.4.1 Who are they? 
 
In 2015-2016, 25.5 million CCHs were employed in the MDMS (MHRD, 2016i). Table 7.2 presents 
the gender and caste composition of the CCHs in Rajasthan. As shown, most CCHs are female. The 
expected preference for disadvantaged groups is less clear. The proportion of cooks belonging to SCs 
is lower than the percentage of SCs in the population (17.85%) and the proportion of STs employed 
is only slightly higher than in the population (13.5%) (GOI, 2011a). Most cooks belong to OBCs 
(54.2%). It is unknown whether this pattern is the result of discrimination towards cooks from 
SCs/STs. Discrimination towards cooks in the scheme has been found to exist (see Section 2.2.4). 
Indeed, I encountered caste-based discrimination towards a cook on one occasion; the mother at 
household four at school six reported that their child could not eat the MDM as the cook was from a 
ST and the family were Rajput (a higher caste).  
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Table 7.2: The employment of CCHs in Rajasthan (GOR, 2016b) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7.3 presents the gender, caste and age of cooks included in the cook survey. Again, most cooks 
were female. A high proportion of STs were employed in the sampled schools, likely due to the higher 
proportion of STs in the study area (Section 3.2.4). The results show no preference by age, but 
importantly indicate that the MDMS can be a source of employment for older people, particularly 
women.  
 
Table 7.3: The gender, caste and age of the cooks surveyed 
 Number of 
CCHs 
Gender  
Male  3 
Female  29 
Caste 
ST 13 
SC 1 
OBC 10 
General 7 
Age 
(years) 
15-24 5 
25-34 7 
35-44 6 
45-54 7 
55-64 5 
65+ 1 
 
Of the 31 cooks interviewed, 17 stated that they had been selected as they needed the work. Of these, 
six specifically mentioned that they needed the work as they were widows. Another 10 answered that 
they were selected because they were a good cook. Of the 15 teachers who could provide a reason for 
the choice of the CCH, 11 stated it was due to the CCHs need (widow, poor or low-caste) and four 
Caste  
Male Female Total 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
SC 1,079 9.3 10,558 90.7 11,637 10.1 
ST 3,627 17.9 16,680 82.1 20,307 17.6 
OBC 5,243 8.4 57,374 91.6 62,617 54.2 
Minority 389 9.0 3,932 91.0 4,321 3.7 
Others 1,661 9.9 15,079 90.1 16,740 14.5 
Total 11,999 10.4 103,623 89.6 115,622 100.0 
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stated it was due to the CCH’s ability. The preferential employment of the needy was therefore 
occurring in the study area; however, cooking ability was also considered. 
 
7.4.2 Duties 
 
CCHs are required to complete many tasks. Tasks observed or frequently referred to were: cleaning 
the cooking area, cleaning the grain, collecting firewood, preparing ingredients, cooking and serving 
the food and washing utensils. The cooks in 18 schools reported that they knew what to cook each 
day as they followed the government menu, whereas 11 were told what to cook by the teacher. Tasks 
took between four and six hours to complete and were required to be performed six days per week 
for 10 months of the year. The working conditions are often unpleasant; cooking on an open fire in 
an insufficiently ventilated kitchen in the midday heat. Indeed, on many occasions I had to stop 
observing the cooking process as the kitchen was unbearably hot.   
 
The workload of CCHs is increased by flaws in the allocation and distribution of resources. Firstly, 
the duties of the cook are often greater than they can fulfil. As per the MDMS guidelines (MHRD, 
2009), if there are 1-25 students enrolled in a school, the one CCH should be employed. Two CCHs 
should be employed at schools with 26-100 students, and an additional CCH should be employed for 
every additional 100 students. The small number of CCHs can make following the GOR’s menu 
difficult. For example, in Rajasthan, CCHs are required to make roti and dal on a Tuesday and Friday. 
In a school with 25 students, the one CCH would be required to make between 50-75 rotis. It is 
impossible for the CCH to cook the rotis to ensure that they are fresh and simultaneously serve the 
food. Cooks are therefore forced to adjust the process. Adjustments I observed during the research 
were cooking fewer rotis, cooking larger rotis, cooking two rotis at the same time, serving cold rotis 
and not serving rotis at all, instead preferring dishes such as dal dhokli and khichdi (Section 6.2.1). 
A further tactic is to enlist the help of students. I observed children assisting with serving or serving 
the meal without adult help in 17 schools. (Figure 7.1). It is not only teachers who must use coping 
strategies to cope with the demands placed on them; CCHs must also establish routines and devices 
‘to cope with uncertainties and work pressures, [which] effectively become the public policies they 
carry out’ (Lipsky, 2010: xiii).  
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Figure 7.1: Students serving the MDM at school 35, Kumbhalgarh block 
 
Second, the workload of CCHs is often increased by the employment of fewer cooks than is necessary. 
The PAB approves the number of CCHs to be employed in each state. In Rajasthan, the number of 
engaged CCHs is lower than the approved number, i.e. there are not as many cooks as there should 
be per the number of students (Table 7.4). Noticeably, the number of engaged CCHs in 2014-2015 
was used as the number of approved CCHs in 2015-2016, despite both the number of institutions and 
the number of enrolled students increasing between the two years (GOR, 2016b).  
 
 
 
 
231 
Table 7.4: Number of CCHs in Rajasthan and the study districts 
(GOR, 2015a; GOR, 2016b) 
Year Number of CCHs  Rajasthan Rajsamand Udaipur 
2014-
2015 
Approved 136,009 2,334 9,114 
Engaged 119,071 2,427 6,814 
Approved-Engaged 16,938 -93 2,300 
Percentage Engaged 87.5 104.0 74.8 
2015-
2016  
Approved 119,071 2,417 6,814 
Engaged 115,622 2,427 6,712 
Approved-Engaged 3,449 -10 102 
Percentage Engaged 97.1 100.4 98.5 
 
In total, eight of 33 sampled schools (23.5%) had the correct number of CCHs; the remaining had 
fewer.1 The inadequate employment of cooks against the approved number also occurs elsewhere, for 
example, it is mentioned in the JRM reports for Assam (MHRD, 2013h), Bihar (MHRD, 2013b), 
Delhi (MHRD 2013c), Jammu and Kashmir (MHRD, 2012a), Madhya Pradesh (MHRD, 2013d) and 
Odisha (MHRD, 2012b) and in the 2016 PAB Appraisals for 18 states/UTs. In the reports, no 
explanation is offered for the difference between the number of approved and engaged CCHs; it is 
unclear whether SMCs/teachers have not tried to employ the required number of CCHs or that they 
have been unable to. Inadequate human resources add to the demands being placed on CCHs and the 
necessity for them to use coping strategies.  
 
Thirdly, inadequate infrastructure at the school level further increases the workload of CCHs. For 
example, if firewood is used, then CCHs typically must collect it. If there is no on-site drinking water 
(Section 6.4.2), the CCH must collect water from elsewhere.  
 
Fourthly, although all CCHs identified someone that could replace them if they were ill (typically a 
female relative) this did not necessarily occur in practice. No food was served at school 12 when the 
cooks did not attend. A replacement CCH was not provided at CS1 when the cook was absent. Instead, 
the older female children prepared the food (Figure 7.2). Essays show that the incident was not a one 
off. For example, a female student in grade VII wrote: ‘sometimes the cook does not come, so we 
have to make food’. A younger male student in grade V wrote: ‘our cook sometimes doesn’t come to 
school to make food and our older ‘sisters’ make food’. The absence of a cook leading to irregularity 
has been noted elsewhere, for example by the Secretary for SE&L (MHRD, 2015a).  
                                                        
1 Full details are provided in Appendix F.1.  
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Figure 7.2: Students become CCHs at CS1. The older female students sitting in the kitchen, eating 
the khichdi they had prepared due to the absence of the CCH. 
 
Finally, CCHs are often expected to perform their duties without sufficient training. The GOR 
(2016b) reports that 8,000 CCHs in Rajasthan have not been trained. Moreover, the GOR does not 
discuss the frequency of training. The turnover rate of CCHs can be high; six of the 31 CCHs 
interviewed in this study had been employed for less than one year. It was therefore unlikely that all 
CCHs had been trained. No cook mentioned having received training. Perhaps consequently, cooks 
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often did not know the purpose of the MDMS; nine stated that the purpose of the scheme was to give 
the children food and 10 did not know the purpose. Only seven cooks identified at least one objective, 
including increasing enrolment, removing classroom hunger and improving health.  
 
7.4.3 Payment and Benefits  
 
The MDMS is an important source of employment, particularly for women and the needy. Yet, the 
payment that CCHs receive is small. The GOI does not perceive CCHs to be government employees 
and therefore they do not receive the generous salary associated with government jobs. In Rajasthan, 
CCHs receive the minimum monthly honorarium of INR 1,000, approximately INR 40 per working 
day. The cook at school 35 was paid less (INR 900) as the teacher deducted INR 100 because the 
grain was cleaned elsewhere. The wage for CCHs is thus far lower than the minimum wage in 
Rajasthan (INR 197) and the wages of those employed under the MGNREGA (INR 181) (The Indian 
Express, 2016d). Moreover, CCHs do not receive any of the additional benefits associated with 
government jobs, such as a pension, medical insurance and maternity benefits.   
  
In Section 7.4.1, I showed that some of society’s most marginalised are employed as CCHs. The 
payment they receive, however, is insufficient to ensure their well-being, including food security. The 
situation of the cooks at CS2 highlights this all too clearly. The respondents at household two and 20 
were both cooks at the school. The first lived with her husband and three children, belonged to a SC 
and was illiterate. She had a monthly household income of INR 6,000. The household was mildly 
food insecure at the time of HS2; she rarely experienced anxiety about food but sometimes ate food 
she did not want to. The second was a 35-year-old mother of six. She belonged to a ST, was illiterate 
and had a monthly income of INR 9,000. Her household was severely food insecure. The third cook 
was a 75-year-old man who lived with his wife and was the breadwinner. Although not sampled in 
the household survey, we conducted the HFIAS with him and found that his household was severely 
food insecure. A greater wage would surely go some way to ensuring stable access to food for these 
cooks, thereby reducing their food insecurity.  
 
Payment is particularly insufficient for widows, for whom the honorarium is the main source of 
income. Several of the cooks in the sample were widows and articulated the struggle they faced due 
to their low wage. On one occasion at CS2, I was stopped by three women walking past who were 
CCHs at the school in the next village. After hearing I was researching the scheme, they proceeded 
to tell me that the salary was too small to live on. One woman explained that she was a widow and 
had to raise two children on the INR 1,000 salary and an often-late INR 500 from her state widow 
 
234 
pension. There was an overwhelming consensus among cooks, teachers and experts that the payment 
to CCHs was insufficient, particularly relative to their workload.   
 
Low payment also affects the scheme’s implementation. Teachers at schools two, three and 17 
reported that due to the low payment, they found finding a permanent cook difficult. The payment 
also affected the attitude and motivation of some cooks. For example, the cook at school two was a 
widow. In the context of the low payment, she considered her responsibility to be to only prepare the 
food. Therefore, once the food was cooked she went home, leaving students to serve the meal. The 
economic situation of the cooks, not helped by the low wage, can also lead to cooks taking raw or 
left-over food home. This was reported to occur at schools one, five, six, seven and 22. This 
constitutes corruption and has the potential to reduce the quantity of food that rights-holders receive. 
However, this corruption must be understood as the exercise of agency in the context of wider 
structures, namely inadequate pay and connected to this, unmet food needs at home.  
   
Not only is the payment for CCHs insufficient, it is often delayed. Twenty-five of the 31 cooks 
surveyed reported that their payment was delayed by several months. The block monitoring reports, 
showed that payment was delayed in 73 of 107 schools (68.2%) in Girwa and 16 of 43 schools 
(37.2%) in Kumbhalgarh. Delays in payments to CCHs have been found elsewhere in Rajasthan 
(GOR, 2016a; Institute of Development Studies Jaipur, 2014) and across India, for example in Andhra 
Pradesh (MHRD, 2016a), Chhattisgarh (MHRD, 2016b), Gujarat (MHRD, 2016c), Karnataka 
(MHRD, 2016e) and Uttar Pradesh (MHRD, 2016h). Payments are typically delayed by three to six 
months. Several interviewees (IG4, IO1, IO2, IA1) including an official at the state level attributed 
the problem to delays in the flow of funds from the district and block level. Contrary to guidelines, 
in Rajasthan CCHs are paid in cash rather than by bank transfer, which delays payment further.  
 
The Empowered Committee discussed the low payment to CCHs in their 2014 meetings. In the 
February meeting, the Education Minister of Bihar stated that the payment of INR 1000 is ‘very 
meagre’ and should be ‘at least on par with [the] Minimum Wages Act’ (MHRD, 2014b: 2). In 
response, the Minister of State for HRD, Dr Shashi Tharoor ‘clarified that cook-cum-helpers are 
engaged on a part-time basis in the schools. Therefore, they are not covered under the Minimum 
Wages Act’ (ibid). The issue was raised again in the October meeting. The Director of the MDMS 
reported that states were requesting the GOI to increase the minimum payment. The now former 
minister for HRD, Smriti Zubin Irani suggested that states increase the payment from their own 
resources (MHRD, 2014b). The low payment to CCHs can therefore be seen to stem from the GOI’s 
view that the work is part-time and that any increase in wages is the responsibility of state 
governments. Arguably, however, in the words of one interviewee (IA15), there is ‘something else at 
play’; patriarchal thinking that these women are ‘otherwise unemployable’, are ‘cheap labour’ and 
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that they should be ‘happy with what they have got’ (IA15). Indeed, when I asked a district official 
in Rajsamand whether the loss of the employment for CCHs in the centralised model was a problem 
(see Section 7.6.4), he replied that the ‘employment doesn’t matter much’ as they are only getting 
INR 33 which is even less than NREGA’ (IG2). The official was evidently unaware of the importance 
of the employment that the MDMS generates.  
 
Poor payment is not only found in the MDMS. Gupta (2012), in his analysis of the ICDS and Mahila 
Samakhya2, wrote that ‘it is cruelly ironic that, by not paying these women a living wage, the state 
perpetuated the structural violence that it was employing these women to help their sisters overcome’ 
(272). The same conclusion can be reached for the MDMS. Preference in the employment as CCHs 
is given to poor and disadvantaged women, on the implicit assumption that employment would 
improve their economic situation. Yet, CCHs in Rajasthan are not paid enough to ensure that these 
benefits occur. Ironically, CCHs are not paid enough to ensure their food security.  
 
The inadequacy of training is also not confined to the MDMS. One interviewee (IA15) commented 
how in the ICDS scheme women do not receive sufficient training as it is assumed they know how to 
care for children. Palriwala and Neetha (2009; 2010; 2011) argued that the refusal to recognise 
anganwadi workers as regular government employees stems not only from a neoliberal drive to 
minimise costs and a failure to address the causes of malnutrition, but also from a ‘gendered 
familialism’; care is seen as familial and female and is therefore devalued and diminished. This can 
clearly be extended to the MDMS; women are expected to know how to cook and are therefore 
inadequately trained and paid. The Mid Day Meal Workers’ Federation of India argue that ‘cooking, 
child care and health care’ are all perceived as women’s work which is done for free at home and thus 
‘these schemes are an extension of these social concepts used for exploitation’ (2015:11). 
Employment in the MDMS is expected to empower, but the conditions of employment ultimately 
prevent such empowerment.  
 
Overall, CCHs in the MDMS occupy an ambiguous position. CCHs are paid by the government to 
implement a government scheme. Although CCHs ‘interact with citizens’, and ‘cannot do the job 
according to ideal conceptions of the practice’, they typically lack the third component of Lipksy’s 
definition of street-level bureaucrats, ‘discretion in exercising authority’ (2010: xvii). The food to be 
cooked and the activities to be performed are typically decided by teachers, not cooks. The payment 
to cooks is also inadequate and often late, which affects the implementation of the MDMS and the 
well-being of cooks. Overall, CCHs have arguably the greatest influence on the food served, yet are 
undervalued and under-paid.  
                                                        
2 A scheme that uses education as a tool for female empowerment. 
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7.5 The Community  
 
The GOI emphasise the need for community involvement in the MDMS (Section 4.6.5). Experts also 
noted the value of community involvement (IA1, IA3, IA6, IN7). In the study area, however, there 
was no formal means through which the community could be involved in the MDMS. Therefore 
unsurprisingly, I found minimal community involvement in the scheme. In 25 schools, teachers 
reported that parents sometimes asked about the meal. However, only two households reported that 
they were involved in the scheme: the respondent at household nine at school eight reported that they 
tasted the food once a month as they were a member of the SMC and the respondent at household one 
at school 26 reported that the teacher frequently called them to taste the food, because their house 
was close to the school. Other households reported that they only when to school when asked to by 
the teachers or on special occasions. At no point during the research did we observe a parent at school 
monitoring the MDMS. Even the GOR’s own data indicates minimal community involvement. 
According to the GOR (2016b), the community tasted the food in just 10 schools in Udaipur district 
and in no schools in Rajsamand District. The additional form of community involvement, Utsav Bhoj 
Yojana was not observed during the fieldwork and were not mentioned by anyone.  
 
Qualitative data highlights several reasons why parents are not more closely involved in the MDMS. 
Firstly, participants did not perceive themselves to have the power to visit the school and monitor the 
MDMS. For example, the first interviewee at CS1 stated that she had never been to investigate the 
food as ‘I am a low caste woman and people will say I have no right. People will object’. Parents felt 
that due to their position they could not approach the school to taste the food (see Section 8.3.2). This 
can be interpreted as ‘invisible power’ (Gaventa 1980; 2003; VeneKlasen and Miller, 2002), which 
affects people’s perceived place and relative superiority and inferiority. Secondly, there are practical 
barriers to involvement. Some parents could not visit their child’s school due to work commitments 
and others did not visit the school as it was a considerable distance away. Thirdly, beyond the SMC 
there was no formal means such as a rota to organise community involvement. The capacity of the 
community to become involved in the MDMS is particularly restricted in the centralised model 
(Section 8.3).  
 
The theoretical duties of the ‘community’ in the MDMS therefore do not reflect their capacity to 
become involved in the MDMS. Parents, particularly women, are assumed to have the time, ability, 
desire and power to be involved in the scheme. In the study area, this was not the case, resulting in 
minimal parental involvement. Using the HRBAP, one can view the community as not having either 
the sufficient authority or organisational resources to be involved in the scheme.   
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7.6 NGOs  
7.6.1 Who are they?  
 
PPPs in the MDMS are typically considered to be a success (Section 2.5.4) and the MHRD (2016h) 
considers Rajasthan to be the exemplary implementer. Yet, the number of kitchens in Rajasthan has 
decreased over time as NGOs have been asked to cease operations due to their inadequate MDM 
provision. Between 2009 and 2016, the number of kitchens in Rajasthan decreased from 25 to 11 
(Table 7.5). The number of schools covered by centralised kitchens decreased by 67.3% in this period 
and the number of students decreased by 69.7%.  
 
Table 7.5: The number of centralised kitchens in Rajasthan and their coverage  
(data from GOR, 2009; 2010; 2011; 2012; 2013a; 2014; 2015a). 
Year Kitchens NGOs Schools Students 
2009-10 25 11 8,017 Not stated 
2010-11 22 7 7,800 Almost 700,000 
2011-12 20 Not stated 7,961 732,289 
2012-2013 20 7 8,284 745,568 
2013-2014 21 5 8,344 668,921 
2014-2015 6 4 3,064 211,855 
2015-2016 6 4 2,623 221,619 
  
By the end of 2013, eight organisations had stopped providing the MDM in Rajasthan. The largest of 
these was the Naandi Foundation. The Foundation signed a MOU with the Government of Rajasthan 
in October 2005 (Naandi Foundation, n.d.) and by 2013 were running 15 kitchens in the state, 
including three in Udaipur district. The kitchen in Girwa closed in December 2013 following a series 
of complaints about the quality of food. Teachers at the schools in Girwa confirmed that the food was 
improperly cooked and unclean. Media reports indicate a similar series of events happened elsewhere 
in Rajasthan (e.g. Sivakumar, 2012; The Hindu, 2013).  
 
In 2017, there are four NGOs running six kitchens in Rajasthan; Akshaya Patra run three and the 
Q.R.G Foundation, Adamya Chetana and ISKCON run one each (Table 7.6). Akshaya Patra also have 
a decentralised kitchen in Baran district, where SHGs supply the MDM under Akshaya Patra’s 
guidance (Akshaya Patra, 2017).  
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Table 7.6: Centralised kitchens in Rajasthan (GOR, 2016b) 
District Location NGO Schools Students 
Alwar Alwar QRG Foundation 407 50,000 
Jaipur Mansrovar (Jaipur) ISKCON 425 23,769 
Jagatpura (Jaipur) Akshaya Patra 1,004 91,976 
Jodhpur Jodhpur Adamya Chetana Trust 210 17,130 
Jodhpur Akshaya Patra 138 10,384 
Rajsamand Nathdwara Akshaya Patra 439 28,360 
Total 2,623 221,619 
 
As the involvement of NGOs in the MDMS has received little scholarly attention (Section 2.5.4), it 
is necessary to explore who the NGOs involved in the scheme in Rajasthan are. The QRG Foundation 
is an initiative of the electrical firm Havells and is a direct corporate social responsibility initiative. 
Further information about the initiative is not publically available.  
 
Shri Ananth Kumar, a member of the BJP and a parliamentary minister, started Adamya Chetana in 
1998. The organisation’s vision is Swami Vivekananda’s words: ‘Each soul is potentially divine. The 
goal of humanity is to realize this divinity’ (Adamya Chetana, 2017b). The organisation’s mission is 
‘to create sustainable, replicable models for social betterment of the under privilege’ and ‘to develop 
a sense of appreciation of the Indian culture and value system among the younger generation’ (ibid). 
The organisation currently supplies the MDM in three locations in Karnataka and in Jodhpur in 
Rajasthan under their Annapoorna programme (Adamya Chetana, 2017a). ‘Anna’ means food and 
‘poorna’ means complete or full. In Hindu mythology, Annapoorna is the goddess of nourishment. 
Again, little information is publically available about the scheme.  
 
ISKCON started the ISKCON Food Relief Foundation in 2004. They provide the MDM under the 
Annamrita programme, which means ‘food as pure as nectar’ (ISKCON, 2015). The organisation 
currently has 20 kitchens in eight states/UTs. The programme is guided by the idea ‘that the intake of 
food not only grants man his material survival, but also offers him values of culture and of partaking 
in the divine, for which he strives in his innermost self’ (ibid). Akshaya Patra is an initiative of 
ISKCON and is the largest supplier of the MDMS in India. The organisation began supplying the 
MDM in 2000 and now supplies food to 1.6 million children across 11 states (Akshaya Patra, 2017a). 
Akshaya Patra and ISKCON share the same story of origin:  
 
His Divine Grace A. C. Bhaktivedanta Swami Prabhupada, saw a group of children 
fighting with stray dogs over scraps of food. From this simple, yet heart-breaking 
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incident, was born a determination that no child within a radius of ten miles from 
our centre should go hungry. (ibid) 
Akshaya Patra’s vision is that ‘no child in India shall be deprived of education because of hunger’ 
(Akshaya Patra, 2016d). Their mission is ‘to feed 5 million by 2020’ (ibid).  
The MDMS’ objectives are also inconsistently recognised by NGOs. Akshaya Patra and ISKCON 
list increased enrolment as one of the scheme’s objectives (Akshaya Patra, 2017b; Akshaya Patra UK, 
2017; ISKCON, 2015). Akshaya Patra UK (2017) also perceive the MDMS as a means of addressing 
child labour, an objective not mentioned in policy. Furthermore, NGOs do not discuss the solution to 
these problems as the MDMS per se, but rather the MDMS provided by the NGOs. To illustrate, 
Akshaya Patra UK (2017) quote a physician who states: ‘I used to treat lots of children who would 
faint at the schools. But today, it has reduced. This is primarily because the children are receiving 
basic nutrition through the Akshaya Patra midday meals’. Akshaya Patra state: ‘Our Food For 
Education Programme has made a huge difference to the lives of many thousands of children’ 
(Akshaya Patra, 2017a). They also quote a technical consultant who states ‘Akshaya Patra is doing a 
yeoman’s job by feeding nutritious food to more than 1.6 million children’ (ibid). Akshaya Patra is 
therefore presented as providing a service that would not be provided otherwise. Akshaya Patra also 
state that ‘State Governments partner with NGOs like The Akshaya Patra Foundation… to increase 
the number of children they reach out to’ (ibid), implying (incorrectly) that Akshaya Patra have 
increased the coverage of the MDMS.  
 
Examining the NGOs involved in the MDMS in Rajasthan highlights two further trends worth noting. 
First, little information can be found about the two smaller organisations/ As mentioned in Section 
3.3.9, I also found a paucity of information on the NGOs in the MDMS in Delhi. There is an evident 
lack of transparency regarding the involvement of NGOs in the MDMS. Second, three of the NGOs 
providing the MDM in Rajasthan have religious ties; ISKCON and Akshaya Patra stem directly from 
a religious movement and, as indicated in their mission statement, Adamya Chetana is clearly inspired 
by religious/spiritual concerns.  
 
Akshaya Patra is the largest MDM supplier in India and operates in the study area, supplying meals 
from a centralised kitchen in Nathdwara in Khamnor block. Thus, in the subsequent discussion, I 
focus on Akshaya Patra.  
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7.6.2 Finances 
 
NGOs supplement central and state government funding with money received from tax-free 
donations. In Table 7.7, I present the income, expenditure and assets of Akshaya Patra from 2008-
2016. The scale of operations is clear; in 2015-2016, the organisation had a total income of INR 2,370 
million. Of this, 62.3% came from the national and state governments, 30.3% came from donations, 
5.5% came from non-cash income donations for fixed assets and 1.9% was from ‘other income’. 
There was a surplus of INR 38.5 million. Notably, NGOs are not supposed to make a profit from the 
MDMS (Section 4.6.3).  
 
Table 7.7: Income, expenditure, surplus and assets of Akshaya Patra from 2008-2015 in INR 
Millions (data from Akshaya Patra Annual Reports, 2009-2016) 
Financial 
Year 
Total Income Total 
Expenditure 
Surplus/ 
Deficit 
Cumulative 
Assets 
2008-2009 723.40 599.20 124.20 654.59 
2009-2010 892.66 7,68.02 124.64 820.74 
2010-2011 1,248.68 1,092.96 155.72 998.28 
2011-2012 1,362.62 1,342.05 20.57 1142.31 
2012-2013 1,588.81 1,734.73 -145.91 1,367.40 
2013-2014 1,893.91 1,948,95 -55.03 1,670.76 
2014-2015 2,370.48 2,331.98 38.50 2,020.99 
2015-2016 2,956.33 2,527.06 168.26 Not stated 
 
 
Table 7.8 details the nature of the donations received in 2013-2014 and 2014-2015. As shown, 
Akshaya Patra receives sizable donations from abroad, particularly from the US and the UK.  
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Table 7.8: Donations received by Akshaya Patra in INR Million (Akshaya Patra, 2014a; 2015) 
Donations 
Amount received  
2013-2014 2014-2015 
Purpose of 
donations 
Donations for feeding 605.88 829.56 
For fixed assets 262.63 273.72 
Trust fund receipts  199.50 367.05 
Total income from donations 1,068.02 1,470.34 
Type of 
donations 
Fixed assets -kind 2.71 2.71 
Fixed assets -cash 57.77 127.74 
Feeding- in kind 19.91 21.14 
Feeding-cash 533.27 697.26 
In-kind 
donations 
Fixed assets 2.71 2.71 
Provision and groceries 8.05 13.42 
Services 11.86 7.72 
Total  22.62 23.91 
Source of 
Donations 
Donations in India 446.39 278.43 
Donations elsewhere 213.88 234.86 
Donations in kind 21.14 19.91 
Other donations 36.98 19.96 
 
The cost of the MDM supplied by Akshaya Patra and source of income are presented in Table 7.9.  
 
Table 7.9: Cost of the MDM supplied by Akshaya Patra in INR (Akshaya Patra, 2016c; 2017b) 
  2015-2016 2016-2017 
Government contribution  4.38 6.10 
Akshaya Patra Contribution  3.013 4.09 
Total  7.40 10.19 
Suggested annual contribution per child   750 950 
 
Typically, PPPs are advocated as the private sector is considered capable of delivering the same 
service for less money or a better service for the same amount of money (Grimsey and Lewis, 2005). 
Yet, the involvement of NGOs in the MDMS presents the same costs for the GOI and state 
governments. The total cost of the MDM provided by NGOs is greater than in the decentralised 
                                                        
3 Obviously 4.38 and 3.01 totals 7.39, not 7.40; however, these are the figures given by Akshaya Patra.  
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model. NGOs face additional costs for infrastructure, transportation, management, administration and 
fundraising. Of Akshaya Patra’s current daily budget per child (Table 7.9), INR 0.51 is spent on 
fundraising, equivalent to 5% of the total budget and 12.5% of Akshaya Patra’s contribution. A further 
INR 0.34 is spent on administrative costs, equal to 3.3% of the total budget and 8.3% of Akshaya 
Patra’s contribution. Therefore, 20.8% of Akshaya Patra’s financial contribution is spent on 
sustaining the involvement of the NGO. Moreover, as I have shown in Chapter 6, the centralised 
model does not necessarily offer a better service than the decentralised model.  
 
Donations to SFPs, both financial and in-kind, are not unheard off (see Drake et al., 2016). Akshaya 
Patra’s funding is, however, unusual as the donations are to an NGO rather than a government. 
Akshaya Patra also rely on donations from corporations and individuals rather than governments or 
international institutions. The reliance on donations raises questions about the initiative’s 
sustainability as the continued ability to provide the MDM relies on donations.  
In addition to the above, there are several problems with the involvement of centralised kitchens 
which are now discussed in turn.  
 
7.6.3 Rural Areas 
 
NGOs should only provide the MDM in urban areas (Section 4.6.3); however, Akshaya Patra were 
supplying all schools in Khamnor. Of the 395 government schools in the block, only 20 are in urban 
areas (NUEPA, 2016). Akshaya Patra are therefore serving the meal to 375 rural schools directly 
violating the NFSA, the MDM Rules and thus the law. NGOs have been found supplying the MDMS 
in rural areas elsewhere. For example, both Akshaya Patra and ISKCON have been found to operate 
in rural areas in Andhra Pradesh (MHRD, 2010b; 2013h). The issue was noted in 2010 and 2013, 
indicating that no action was taken to correct the deviation from the guidelines. Evidently an effective 
accountability mechanism was not in place. NGOs supplying MDMs to rural areas is concerning for 
three reasons. Firstly, transporting the food from urban to rural locations increases the amount of time 
between food preparation and consumption. The schools do not have a thermometer and have no way 
of knowing whether the food has been kept at a safe temperature (see Section 6.4.3). Secondly, when 
the MDMS is supplied from an urban location, there is no interaction between the representatives of 
rights-holders and the NGOs. Although carrying out a service for the government, the employees of 
NGOs are not street-level bureaucrats as they do not interact with citizens. The interaction between 
those supplying and consuming the food is therefore removed in the centralised model.  Transparency 
and accountability in the scheme therefore become limited. Finally, the supply to rural areas has 
implications for local employment, which are now discussed.  
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7.6.4 Changes in Duty-bearers 
 
The involvement of NGOs in the MDMS alters the actual and perceived obligations of other duty-
bearers. When the MDM is supplied by a NGO, CCHs should still be employed to serve the meal 
(Section 4.6.2). In Rajasthan, centralised kitchens have not employed CCHs to serve the food (GOR, 
2016a). The duty therefore must be taken on by another actor. This obligation fell on the students in 
nine of the 10 schools (Figure 7.3). When children serve the MDM alone, they must lift heavy 
containers and eat their lunch last. 
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Figure 7.3: Children serving the food provided by the centralised kitchens. Top left: school 24. 
Bottom left: school 27. Bottom right: school 23. At the edge of the photo, teachers can be seen to be 
observing but not serving the MDM.  
 
 
245 
Furthermore, due to the mechanised nature of centralised kitchens, fewer people are employed. In total, 
Akshaya Patra employ 3,598 people at centralised kitchens and a further 1,538 in SHGs (Akshaya Patra 
2015). Therefore, 5,136 people were employed to feed 1,436,596 children in 10,872 schools (ibid). 
Under the decentralised model, there would be at least one cook in each school which would create a 
minimum of 10,872 jobs.4  
 
NGOs also do not preferentially employ women (Table 7.10). When SHGs are excluded, just 16.8% of 
Akshaya Patra’s employees are female. The same trend is also apparent in ISKCON’s employment 
figures. In 2013-2014, 266 of the total 1,327 employees (20%) were female (ISKCON, 2014). Several 
expert interviewees cited the loss of employment for women as a problem with the centralised model 
(IO1, IO3, IA3, IA7, IA15, IN7). One interviewee summarised the situation: ‘The employment of local 
women is lost in centralised kitchens. These women are often marginal, as others would not take the 
low wages. There are no alternative sources of employment for these women in rural areas’ (IA3).  
 
Table 7.10: Akshaya Patra employees by salary and gender for 2014-2015 (Akshaya Patra, 2015) 
 Male Female Total 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
Salary 
(INR)  
0-5,000 368 95.3 18 4.7 386 10.7 
5,001-10,000 2,099 81.9 465 18.1 2,564 71.3 
10,001-25,000 446 91.8 40 8.2 486 13.5 
25,001-50,000 84 78.5 23 21.5 107 3.0 
50,001-100,000 25 71.4 10 28.6 35 1.0 
100,001+  18 90.0 2 10.0 20 0.6 
Total 3,040 84.5 558 15.5 3,598 100 
Type of 
employ-
ment 
Regular Staff 859 86.9 130 13.1 989 15.8 
Regular Workmen  2213 79.5 570 20.5 2783 44.5 
Contract 844 90.5 89 9.5 933 14.9 
Consultants 10 76.9 3 23.1 13 0.2 
Self-help groups 43 2.8 1495 97.2 1538 24.6 
Total 3969 63.4 2287 36.6 6256 100.0 
 
Centralised kitchens also alter the spatial distribution of employment. In the decentralised model, at 
least one person is employed in every location where there is a school. In the centralised model, 
employees come from the urban or peri-urban area surrounding the kitchen. The spatial pattern of 
                                                        
4 As most schools have more than one cook, the figure would be far higher but this cannot be calculated without 
enrolment data. 
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employment shifts, to the detriment of the needy in rural locations. In Khamnor, we encountered two 
women who used to be employed as cooks at the school before Akshaya Patra began delivering the 
food (schools 28 and 30). Both women expressed their disappointment that their employment as CCHs 
had ended. 
 
When NGOs supply the MDM, teachers no longer need to procure ingredients and oversee cooking; 
hence teachers’ enthusiasm for centralised kitchens (Section 7.2). However, teachers are still obliged 
to fulfil their duties. Observation showed that teachers did not taste the food. In the absence of other 
responsibilities for the MDMS, this cannot be interpreted as a lack of capacity, but rather a product of 
agency. In fact, in Khamnor, typically teachers did not examine the food at all and students were 
required to serve the meal. If something were wrong with the food, it would require the children serving 
to notice, inform the teacher and the teacher to act before the children consumed the food. Although 
children were also observed to serve the meal in the decentralised model, the key difference is the 
absence of any adult involvement in schools in the centralised model. 
 
The involvement of NGOs can also reduce accountability, both from officials and from the community. 
Officials typically considered the food served by the centralised kitchen to be good. A district official 
in Rajsamand stated: ‘All troubles would be gone if centralised kitchens provided the food to all blocks’ 
(IG6). He went on to state that if the NGO would provide the MDM, then they could just give the money 
to the NGO. The official dismissed all the problems raised with NGO involvement (the lack of fruit, 
the provision to rural areas and the loss of employment) concluding that the ‘centralised kitchen is the 
best way’. A less senior official expressed a similar opinion; ‘Akshaya Patra make good food’ (IG7). 
He noted that ‘all schools in Khamnor have a kitchen shed, but then Akshaya Patra decided to make it’ 
and that there are no complaints about the MDM in the district. Officials had therefore entrusted the 
provision of the food to the NGO and assumed that it was universally good.  
 
The capacity for community involvement in the MDMS is further restricted in the centralised model. 
There is no mechanism for parents to interact with NGOs, and as will be shown in Section 8.4.3, most 
parents in Khamnor could not name the organisation providing the meal. One interviewee (IA6) argued 
that people ‘should get fresh food, that is monitored by the community. Not food that is just dropped 
in… with no information on quality etcetera’. Another interviewee went further, stating that the scheme 
should ‘belong to [the] beneficiary community’ and therefore the involvement of organisations such as 
Akshaya Patra was a ‘ridiculous approach’ (IA11). The lack of community involvement in the 
centralised model has also been recognised elsewhere, such as in the 2013 JRM reports for Andhra 
Pradesh (MHRD, 2013a) and Bihar (MHRD, 2013b) and by Sinha (2008). There is thus evident tension 
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in the GOI’s emphasis on the importance of community participation and their support for the use of 
centralised kitchens (e.g. in MHRD, 2010b).   
 
7.6.5 From Charity to Rights and Back Again 
 
The involvement of NGOs in the MDMS has implications for how the scheme is perceived. Within a 
RBA, development is no longer perceived as an act of charity, but as the fulfilment of rights. When the 
MDM is cooked by CCHs or SHGs, the meal is not charity; schools and SHGs have the duty to supply 
the meal and the state and national government have a duty to fund it. The involvement of NGOs, 
however, reintroduces charity. NGOs including Akshaya Patra rely heavily on charitable donations 
(Section 7.6.2) and undertake extensive campaigns to raise money from the public, both in India and 
internationally.  
 
Often these donations are linked to private companies. For example, the Indian coffee chain Café Coffee 
Day partnered with Akshaya Patra. Customers had the option to add INR 1 to their bill, to be spent on 
providing cookies to children ‘to make a school day sweeter’ (Akshaya Patra 2014b; personal 
observation). In Bangalore, in partnership with Kellogg’s, Akshaya Patra distributed cereal, milk, a 
bowl and spoon and a leaflet on the importance of breakfast to 100,000 students (Akshaya Patra, 2014b). 
In 2016, Akshaya Patra partnered with the technology firm LeEco, which pledged to provide meals for 
two children for every smartphone purchased (The Indian Express, 2016b). Akshaya Patra partnered 
with biscuit manufacturer Britannia Good Day: ‘For every smile uploaded on their web page or 
Facebook, Britannia Good Day will give away a packet of delicious cookies to a child’ (Akshaya Patra, 
2016e). Akshaya Patra also partnered with stationary brand MyCopie: ‘for every notebook sold, 
MyCopie is donating a part of their revenue to the Foundation, so that children do not have to forego 
their education due to lack of food’ (ibid). Links between Akshaya Patra and the private sector extend 
beyond India. For example, when dining at the restaurant Dishoom, one finds the following on the 
menu:  
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Figure 7.4: Akshaya Patra and Dishoom. The above is featured on the menu at the restaurant Dishoom 
(Dishoom, 2017) 
 
The links to the private sector increases the amount of money Akshaya Patra have and thus, in principle, 
benefits the MDMS. However, there are two problems with these links to the private sector. Firstly, the 
language used is often inaccurate. For example, there is the implication that because of the partnerships 
with LeEco and Dishoom a certain number of meals will be provided. This is not how the scheme 
functions. Instead, any financial donation will supplement the national and state governments’ 
contribution. The suggestion of ‘a meal for a meal’ is thus inaccurate. Moreover, implicit in the above 
particularly in the slogan used by MyCopie is the implication that without the involvement of the NGO, 
children would not receive a meal. This echoes the descriptions of NGO involvement discussed in 
Section 7.6.1. This portrayal of NGO involvement does not reflect the rights-based design of the 
MDMS. The inaccurate portrayal is also at odds with the principle of transparency; the involvement of 
NGOs and the purpose of donations are not clear.  
 
Secondly, several of the companies mentioned above are food producers. The involvement of food 
producers in the MDMS has been discussed in the media when reports of initiatives to involve 
companies provokes outcry, of which there are two primary examples. In 2008, the president of the 
Biscuit Manufacturers’ Association of India and employee of Parle Products (a large biscuit producer) 
wrote to Members of Parliament (MPs) to promote biscuits as an alternative to the MDMS (Drèze and 
Khera, 2008). In response, 29 MPs wrote to the Minister of HRD to ask him to consider the proposal 
(ibid). The move was opposed by civil society (Baru et al., 2008) and was rejected by the MHRD. In 
2014, news emerged that the GOI was holding talks with PepsiCo, again prompting outcry (Travasso, 
2014). The MHRD denied these talks were taking place (ibid) and no initiative was started. In both 
cases, outcry centred on the concern that the replacement food would be nutritionally inadequate and 
would not be in the best interest of the recipients. There was also concern that food manufacturers would 
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have access to an incredibly large market, which might influence future consumer behaviour. Yet, the 
previous discussion has shown that food companies including biscuit manufacturers are already 
involved in the scheme. The involvement of companies may also take other forms. For example, 
recently PepsiCo partnered with Akshaya Patra to raise funds for the construction of a kitchen near 
Delhi (PepsiCo India, 2016).  
 
Furthermore, in 2014-2015, INR 13.42 million donations were in the form of ‘provision and groceries’. 
During my visit to the Akshaya Patra kitchen in Jaipur, Akshaya Patra were serving dal which contained 
donated pasta. There is a lack of transparency as to the nature and origins of these groceries. The 
donation of groceries also has implications for whether food is served according to preference, cultural 
acceptability and local taste. Needless to say, pasta in dal does not typically feature in the diets of 
children in rural Rajasthan.  
 
The involvement of NGOs in the MDMS blurs the lines between rights, charity and business. As put 
by two expert interviewees, ‘You get the impression that it is charity’ (IA11) and ‘now it [the MDMS] 
is part of charity, big business’ (IN7). The reintroduction of charity firstly derives from how the NGOs 
are funded. As shown in Table 7.8, Akshaya Patra rely on charitable donations, without which their 
involvement in the MDMS would not be feasible. Secondly, the NGOs are portrayed and portray 
themselves as charitable organisations. The NGOs are typically discussed as being driven by a 
commendable and compassionate desire to provide charity (e.g. India TV News, 2015; Pieroni, 2014; 
Somasundaram, 2016). The organisations also describe themselves in this manner. For example, a video 
detailing Akshaya Patra’s involvement in the MDMS was titled ‘Akshaya Patra Foundation: 
Compassion. Food. Hope’ (Akshaya Patra, 2016d). Akshaya Patra’s 2015-2016 report was titled ‘The 
Passioneers; Bound by purpose. Driven by Passion’ (Akshaya Patra, 2016a). Even less subtly, a recent 
book about the organisation was titled ‘God’s own kitchen’ (ibid). The involvement in the MDMS is 
therefore discussed as a philanthropic act often connected to religion, rather than as a partnership with 
the government to provide an existing service. A noted advantage of RBAs is that they changed how 
development is perceived, from an act of charity to rights realisation (Section 2.3.1). Evidently this 
change does not automatically occur and can be affected by the duty-bearers involved.   
 
Echoing Fisher’s (1997) work on NGOs, the NGOs in the MDMS are seen to be ‘doing good’. 
Consequently, any criticism of these organisations is controversial, perceived as a criticism of charity, 
and sometimes the organisation’s religion. Indeed, in response to an article I wrote regarding the 
problems in the centralised model (Whittaker, 2015), one commentator wrote ‘It’s charity dear author’ 
and another emailed directly to remind me that Akshaya Patra is a ‘noble cause’ and thus the lack of 
certain items on the menu (and the denial of entitlements) was not an issue. Children are no longer seen 
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as rights-holders, but beneficiaries, who should be grateful for the food they receive as they are poor. 
Furthermore, echoing Zivetz (1991), Fisher (1997) and Ferguson (1994), perceiving these organisations 
as charity means that they are seen as distinct from the state and are thus depoliticised. The organisations 
are not seen as influenced by politics, profit or religion. Yet, I showed in Section 6.6.6 that the provision 
of food by these organisation is influenced by religious and political concerns.  
 
The involvement of NGOs is also at odds with several rights-based principles. Centralised provision 
renders the participation of the community in the monitoring of the MDMS nearly impossible. As was 
mentioned in Section 2.5.4., Drake et al. (2016: 273) stated that the involvement of organisations such 
as Akshaya Patra in the MDMS has ‘promoted community participation through fundraising and 
volunteering’. Yet, this is an abstract interpretation of both “community” and “participation”. The 
involvement of NGOs has instead been to the detriment of the participation of the community within 
which people are rights-holders. I have also shown that the portrayal of the involvement of NGOs is 
not transparent. The lack of preference for women and the needy in employment prevents the 
empowerment of CCHs. By providing the meal in rural areas, NGOs were not adhering to the rule of 
law. The NGOs are also perceived to be ‘doing good’, which limits the extent to which they are and 
can be held accountable; an issue discussed in further depth in the subsequent chapter. 
 
7.7 Conclusion 
 
Although the MDMS is the GOI directly fulfilling the right to food, the duty to provide a hot, cooked 
meal is exercised through intermediaries. These intermediaries are both employees of the state, teachers 
and CCHs, and partners of the state, NGOs. In this Chapter, I examined these intermediaries as well as 
the role of the community in the MDMS. In Section 7.2, I showed that although SMCs are considered 
to have primary responsibility for the MDMS in Rajasthan, they played a limited role in the scheme in 
the study area. When the findings presented in this chapter are considered alongside those presented in 
Chapter 6, it is clear that the involvement of duty-bearers and the duties they perform do not necessarily 
reflect the proposed responsibilities outlined in Chapter 4.  
 
I have shown that in the decentralised model, actors at the school level have a considerable influence 
on the MDM. However, following Schaffer (1984) and Gupta (2012), it is not the case that these low-
level officials can be automatically blamed for the non-fulfilment of duties. Rather, these actors should 
be considered in the wider context of the determinants of their capacity. Hupe and Buffat’s (2014) 
distinction between ‘demands’ and ‘enablements’ is useful here. Based on the empirical data presented 
in Chapters 5-7, the demands and enablements on teachers and cooks in the MDMS are as listed in 
Table 7.11.  
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Table 7.11: Demands and enablements of teachers and cooks 
Demands Enablements 
- Supply a MDM that adheres to the GOI 
guidelines and state-level menu 
- Supply a MDM that is within the budget 
provided by GOI and GOR 
- Supply a MDM that reflects local taste 
one day per week 
- Teachers to taste the food 
- Teachers to complete necessary records  
- Unofficial/informal demand to feed 
extra children (siblings and grade IV 
and above) 
- Human resources: number of CCHs, 
teachers  
- Financial: insufficient budget to supply 
food as per menu and guidelines 
- Time: to prepare and cook the MDM 
- Training of CCHs 
- Access to food: problems in the supply 
of food grain, access to markets, 
practicalities of bringing food to school 
 
 
 
Throughout this chapter, I have shown that the ‘enablements’ are often insufficient to meet the demands. 
A public service gap results (Hupe and Buffat, 2014). Resulting from this gap, teachers and cooks must 
use coping strategies to attempt to meet demand. As shown throughout this chapter and the previous 
empirical chapters, this affects the implementation of the MDMS. For example, an insufficient budget 
and/or insufficient human resources may result in non-adherence to the menu and guidelines on 
quantity. These explanations should not be seen as ‘escape hatches’, but instead as fundamental flaws 
in the scheme’s design. Yet, these actors also exercise agency; both in the extent to which they attempt 
to meet demands and the choices they make in regards to how to cope with the demands placed on 
them. For some, coping strategies might include altering the menu or inflating figures. For others, it 
may be in choosing not to serve the MDM regularly or at all.  
 
In the study area, although the community are expected to be involved in the MDMS, organisational 
arrangements are not in place to facilitate this participation. Existing power dynamics, invisible power 
between schools and parents prevents parents from exercising what can be called an imperfect 
obligation towards the MDMS; they do not feel that they have the power to monitor or comment on the 
MDMS. Consequently, the involvement of the community in the study area was found to be minimal.   
 
Although NGOs are subject to the same official demands as teachers and cooks, NGOs do not face the 
same constraints as actors at the school level. Instead, agency plays an even greater role in determining 
whether duties are fulfilled; NGOs decide how to organise their operation and what food to supply. 
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The results presented in this chapter also have implications for the extent to which the MDMS can be 
considered to reflect the principles of human rights. I have shown that the anticipated participation of 
the community does not occur frequently; in the study area, both the involvement of the SMC and the 
wider community in the MDMS were limited. The MDMS has the potential to be a source of 
empowerment for CCHs; however, this is currently undermined by the inadequate allocation and 
distribution of resources. Finally, I have shown that the choice of delivery model has implications for 
rights-based principles. Centralised provision has been shown to not always adhere to the rule of law, 
and to potentially be detrimental to participation, empowerment and transparency in the MDMS.  
 
	Chapter 8 
Claiming Rights:  
Accountability Agents and Mechanisms  
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Chapter 8  
 
Claiming Rights: Accountability 
Agents and Mechanisms  
 
 
8.1 Introduction  
 
The right to food case and the Supreme Court judgement can be interpreted as a hybrid form of 
accountability; ‘diagonal accountability’ that bridges the divide between vertical and horizontal 
accountability (Goetz and Jenkins, 2001). The PUCL on behalf of the citizens of Rajasthan used the 
Supreme Court to hold the GOI to account for their constitutional duties to protect the right to food. 
The right to food case and legal accountability within the MDMS have been widely discussed (e.g. 
Birchfield and Corsi, 2010; Guha-Khasnobis and Vivek, 2007; Hassan, 2013). Yet, internal and external 
accountability mechanisms to ensure the realisation of entitlements have not been considered. In the 
previous three chapters, I have shown that frequently duty-bearers in the MDMS did not fulfil their 
duties and thus rights-holders did not receive their entitlements. Accountability mechanisms are 
consequently necessary to detect and correct the non-fulfilment of duties. Therefore, in this chapter I 
examine accountability in the MDMS, beginning with internal accountability within the government 
followed by external accountability from rights-holders and their parents. I consider accountability in 
practice and the task of determining responsibility. The focus throughout is core accountability. A 
broader notion of accountability is whether the GOI should be held accountable for not doing more to 
tackle child malnutrition, for example in the context of budget cuts (Section 4.5.4). Of course, this 
‘expanded’ notion of accountability is important, but is not of primary concern in this chapter. 
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8.2 Internal Accountability  
8.2.1 Information 
 
Bureaucratic accountability in the MDMS involves government officials monitoring data. The 
availability of data is therefore a prerequisite for monitoring. Schools must complete and submit 
monthly forms detailing the implementation of the MDMS (Section 4.5.7). However, not all school 
records are submitted or entered at the block level. The GOR (2016a) details the monthly data 
completion rate at the state and district levels between April 2015 and February 2016. Although in April 
there was a 99% completion rate, by February, the completion rate had decreased to 71% in Rajasthan, 
81% in Rajsamand and 59% in Udaipur. There is a general decrease in the completion rate over time, 
indicating that it can take several months to submit and process the forms. Moreover, the speed of data 
entry varies geographically; data entry in Udaipur district was particularly slow. The slow data entry 
means that these forms cannot lead to the timely detection and correction of problems. The system also 
relies on teachers’ honesty and competency, without which, these reports are useless. For example, the 
monthly records from CS3 reported that the school was open for 30 days in September 2014 and 31 
days in the October 2014 and January 2015. Clearly, the question regarding the number of working 
days had been misunderstood and the teacher had written the number of days in the month. The irregular 
provision of the MDMS at this school has already been discussed (Section 5.3.5). Yet, based on the 
school’s monthly data form, no problem would be detected or corrected.  
 
Accurate data are also required at the state level. However, mismatches between the data provided using 
the Management Information System (MIS) and the data from state governments are common. Table 
8.1 compares the figures in Rajasthan. As shown, discrepancies are often sizable.  
 
Table 8.1: Discrepancies in data for Rajasthan in 2015-2016 (MHRD, 2016a) 
 MIS AWPB 
Difference 
(MIS- 
AWPB) 
Percentage 
difference MIS and 
AWPB 
Institutions 72,854 71,344 1,510 2.1 
Working Days 154 163 -9 -5.5 
Enrolled Students 4,163,220 4,999,315 -836,095 -16.7 
Number of CCHs engaged 116,181 115,622 559 0.5 
CCH honorarium 8,902 9,134 -232 -2.5 
Cooking cost 26,786 33,009 -6,223 -18.9 
Food grains 131,347 86,444 44,903 51.9 
Schools with Drinking Water 67,682 71,003 3,321 -4.7 
Schools with a Toilet Facility 69,333 71,003 1,670 -2.4 
Schools with a gas connection 30,611 57,954 27,343 -47.2 
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The implications for accountability are clear. Without complete, accurate and timely data, the 
identification and subsequent correction of problems becomes less likely.  
 
8.2.2 Monitoring  
 
Bureaucratic accountability also involves officials monitoring the implementation of the MDMS in 
schools. Since 2009, the GOI has co-ordinated JRMs to monitor the MDMS (Section 4.5.7). The 
missions involve internal (bureaucrats) and external actors (experts), although the missions can be 
considered an internal accountability measure. These missions are thorough and detect problems. For 
example, the fifth review mission to Rajasthan (MHRD, 2014b) identified several problems in the 
MDMS, including delay in the provision of cooking cost and grains and payment to cooks and 
irregularities in provision by SHGs and NGOs. In response, the state government submitted a report on 
the action taken. Of course, the suggestion of action does not mean that action was taken and that the 
problem corrected. Indeed, Section 7.4.3 showed the delayed payments to cooks continues.  
 
The frequency of JRMs has also varied over time (Table 8.2). The JRMs in 2013-2014 were the most 
comprehensive and thorough; teams measured the quantity and nutritional value of the MDM and 
assessed students’ food consumption at home. Such detailed analysis has not been replicated since.  
 
Table 8.2: The number of Joint Review Missions (MHRD, 2017b). 
Year Number of states 
covered 
2009-2010 3 
2010-2011 2 
2011-2012 8 
2012-2013 8 
2013-2014 20 
2014-2015 1 
2015-2016 9 
 
Block and district level officials must conduct inspections (Section 4.5.7) The GOR (2016b) report that 
government officials conducted 55,146 inspections between April and December 2015, which equates 
to visiting 77.3% of schools in Rajasthan. This number of inspections would be sufficient given that 
one quarter of schools should be inspected per quarter. However, this is based on the assumption that 
no school was inspected more than once. Moreover, the percentage of schools inspected also varied by 
district. In nine districts in Rajasthan, the percentage was lower than 75%; 72.6% of schools in Udaipur 
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and 65.7% of schools in Rajsamand were inspected (GOR, 2016a). Records indicate that these 
inspections can lead to the detection of problems. For example, intensive inspections in Rajasthan in 
July 2015 identified 320 schools (of 12,185) at which the MDMS was unsatisfactory (GOR, 2016a). 
Schools were labelled ‘unsatisfactory’ for several reasons, including: delayed receipt of funds for 
cooking and the CCH’s honorarium; unsatisfactory quantity of the MDM; failure to display information 
as per the RTE Act (see Section 8.3.1); and the non-availability of facilities such as gas. It is unclear 
whether a mechanism exists to ensure that schools correct the detected problems.    
 
Most teachers confirmed that inspections occur; 27 stated that government officials had visited in the 
previous year. Of the 15 that specified frequency, seven reported that visits occurred two to three times 
per year, two reported visits three to four times per year and six stated visits occurred more than four 
times per year. However, teachers at eight schools reported that officials did not visit; one school in 
Girwa, three in Khamnor and four in Kumbhalgarh. I observed one inspection; the BEEO conducting 
an inspection at school number 18. This school was located at the side of the highway and was on the 
way to work for the official. Officials at NGOs (IN6; personal communications) reported that officials 
typically did not visit remote areas. Experts also noted that the human resources required to monitor 
schools were insufficient (IN2, IG4). For example, the BEO in one block stated that they were supposed 
to monitor 10 schools per month, but there were 358 schools in the block (IG4). At this rate, it would 
take almost three years for each school to be visited. Furthermore, the MDMS is not the only scheme 
for which the BEO is responsible. The imbalance between the demands placed on low-level officials 
and their resources (both time and financial) is well-known. Indeed, Harriss and Jeffrey (2013) criticise 
Gupta (2012) for failing to consider the number of programmes for which block-level offices in his 
analysis in Red Tape. Thus, in the MDMS it is unsurprising that some schools which are difficult to get 
to are not visited more frequently. 
 
The quantity of inspections, however, says nothing about their quality. Firstly, the timing of the 
inspections is important for accurate evaluation of the MDMS. Yet, not all inspections are conducted 
during the lunch break. The MDM is typically consumed between 10:00-10:30am in the summer 
(March to early September) and 12:00-12:30pm the rest of the year. The timings recorded in the reports 
for inspections by block-level officials show that the official was unlikely to have observed the meal in 
26 of 51 inspections in Girwa and 29 of 48 inspections in Kumbhalgarh (Table 8.3).1 If officials are not 
present during lunchtime, this raises doubt as to the accuracy with which they can answer questions 
regarding whether the correct food was served and whether the food was tasted by a teacher. 
                                                        
1 Officials are considered to not have observed the meal if they reported arriving after or significantly before the 
meal was served.  
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Furthermore, officials do not always complete all questions on the monitoring forms. For example, in 
the Girwa records, the type of food served was recorded at 38 of 61 schools.  
 
Table 8.3: The number of inspections at each time (from monitoring records 2014-2015) 
Time of inspection 
Girwa Kumbhalgarh 
Summer Winter Summer Winter 
Before 9am 1 0 0 0 
9am-10am 5 0 0 0 
10am-11am 12 0 10 2 
11am-12pm 7 3 1 8 
12pm-1pm 1 5 2 3 
1pm-2pm 1 9 0 19 
2-3pm 0 3 0 1 
After 3pm 0 4 0 2 
Total  27 24 13 35 
 
The extent to which NGOs were held to account was also found to be limited. In PPPs, governments 
should ensure public accountability (Forrer et al., 2010). As shown in chapters 6 and 7, the NGO 
supplying the MDM in the study area was not adhering to the state government menu and was violating 
the NFSA by providing the MDM in rural areas. Although district officials were aware of the violations, 
the NGO was not held to account. Interviews with the district officials indicated that they did not 
perceive the deviations to be a problem. The district official considered urban areas to encompass areas 
40km from the city, amla candy to be a sufficient replacement for fruit, and the food storage to be the 
same as food being stored in a tiffin. Both officials at the district level agreed that the involvement of 
the NGO was a success and should be expanded to cover all blocks in the district (IG6, IG7).  
 
Performance evaluation is a key component of accountability in PPPs (Forrer et al., 2010) and in NGOs 
(Ebrahim, 2003). Such evaluation may be external or internal and one would expect evaluation to be 
based on the achievement of designated aims, perhaps along-side considerations of value for money. 
Although Akshaya Patra’s website features seven studies of the impact of the scheme, these are limited 
in their scope and methodology. For example, a study by Kamath et al. (2012) in Karnataka is titled 
‘Measuring the Impact of the MDM on Growth’. However, the study merely compared the nutritional 
status of children receiving a MDM from Akshaya Patra with malnutrition data from other states, and 
therefore does not show the impact of the MDMS. No evidence of upwards accountability in the form 
of performance evaluation was found. 
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Overall, although officials monitor the implementation of the MDMS in schools; the coverage and 
quality of these inspections are limited. Internal accountability in PPPs is largely absent. 
 
8.2.3 Committees  
 
Steering-cum-monitoring committees are a third form of internal accountability in the MDMS. The 
state-level committee is expected to meet every six months. The dates for these meetings are listed as 
occurring on 21 May 2012, 8 April 2013, 20 March 2014 and 16 April 2015 (MHRD, 2017b). These 
meetings occurred annually, not bi-annually. District level meetings should occur monthly. Between 
April and December 2015 one would expect there to have been nine meetings in each district in 
Rajasthan, totalling 297 meetings. Yet, only 132 meetings (44.4%) were held (Table 8.4). In Udaipur, 
just two meetings were held. The MHRD notes the infrequency of these meetings (ibid), but does not 
discuss the reasons for the infrequency or corrective actions. The extent to which these committees can 
play a role in ensuring accountability in the scheme is thus reduced and is also variable. The GOR do 
not provide details of the meetings at the block level. 
 
Table 8.4: Frequency of district steering-cum-monitoring committee meetings between April and 
December 2015 (GOR, 2016b) 
District steering-cum-
monitoring meetings in 9 
months 
Districts 
0 Jaipur, Karauli, Pratapgarh, Tonk 
1 Bhartpur, Bikaner, Humangarh, Sawai Madhopur 
2 Alwar, Jhunjhunu, Sikar, Udaipur 
3 Dholpur, Ganganer, Jalore, Jhalawar, Jodhpur, Kota, 
Nagaur 
4 Banswara, Barmer 
5 Ajmer 
6 Chitorgarh, Churu 
7 Dungarpur, Pali, Sirohi 
8 Rajsamand 
9 Baran, Bhilwara, Bundi, Dausa, Jaisalmer 
 
The national committees do not fit neatly into the categories of accountability, as these committees 
contain internal and external actors and the relationships between these actors are indicative of both 
bureaucratic and professional accountability. The NSMC is expected to meet at least every six months 
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(GOI, 2004). However, records (MHRD, 2017a) indicate that between 2009-2011 and since 2014, the 
meetings have been annual. The Empowered Committee is expected to meet every three months 
(Section 4.5.2); however, the committee met in April 2014, October 2014 and September 2016 (MHRD, 
2016b). These minutes typically take the form of the MHRD reporting to the committee members as to 
the progress and the current procedures and norms. Typically, discussions are broad and specific actions 
are not always identified.  
 
Therefore, the various committees tasked with monitoring the MDMS do not meet as often as they 
should. One can expect that the infrequency of meetings reduces the capacity of the committees to 
detect and correct problems.  
 
8.3 External Accountability from ‘Below’ 
8.3.1 Awareness  
 
For accountability to occur, ‘rights holders must know their rights’ (Kent 2010: 160). As the rights-
holders in the MDMS are children, it is necessary that their ‘representative’, typically a parent, is also 
aware of entitlements. The awareness of entitlements in the MDMS is two-fold. Firstly, there is the 
entitlement to receive a hot-cooked meal every school day. Drèze (2004b) highlights the importance of 
the MDM being perceived as an entitlement. Drèze contrasted Tamil Nadu, where a MDM is seen as a 
basic entitlement with states such as Madhya Pradesh, which does not have the same history of the 
MDMS, causing implementation to be more ‘casual’, ‘to the extent that the meal often failed to 
materialise on a particular day, without anyone making a fuss’ (ibid: 1728). In this study, respondents 
were mostly aware that their child should get a MDM and that it was a government scheme. However, 
awareness was not universal. At school 14 (CS3), the teacher had informed families that the MDMS 
was no longer running. With no other access to information, the villagers believed the teacher and no 
longer perceived the MDMS to be an entitlement.  
 
Secondly, there is the entitlement to receive food as per the state government’s menu and the GOI’s 
norms. To determine awareness of the menu, parents were asked what food was served in the MDMS. 
In HS1, 296 respondents (73.6%) listed three or more items served at school and a further 22 (5.5%) 
listed one or two items. However, no one could list what should be served on each day of the week. 
Moreover, the widespread ability to name items on the menu is perhaps unsurprising as the menu 
reflects local food habits. A further 31 households (7.7%) did not list any items, stating only that the 
food followed the government menu. The other 47 respondents (11.7%) did not know what food was 
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served at school.2 Essays indicated that students did not necessarily know the menu. It was only at the 
fourth case study school that the majority of students recited the menu, likely due to Akshaya Patra’s 
adherence to their menu (Section 6.2.1). Therefore, most rights-holders and their representatives could 
not precisely recall the menu.  
 
Only two parents referred to the GOI’s norms on quantity; at household seven at school six and 
household 33 at CS2. Both respondents knew that their child should receive 100g of grain, which they 
considered insufficient. For the rest, however, perceptions of quantity were based on perceived need; 
for example, the knowledge that one roti was insufficient to meet their child’s needs. Some parents 
could not comment on the quantity; in HS1, 37 (8.8%) did not know whether the quantity was adequate. 
Students’ perception of quantity was also based on their experience, rather than relative to the 
guidelines. 
 
Limited awareness of the MDM menu and norms is unsurprising given the limited efforts by schools 
and officials to create transparency and awareness. The GOI requires the MDM menu to be displayed 
at each school. Following the 2005 Right to Information Act, the GOI (2006) specify that the following 
information should also be displayed in schools: the quantity of food grains received and the date of the 
receipt; the quantity of grains used; the quantity of other ingredients that have been purchased and used; 
the number of children receiving the meal and the roster of community members involved in monitoring 
the scheme. The GOR (2016a) consider the display of this information to be a way of ensuring 
transparency. The GOR (2015b; 2016a) report that the menu, the MDM logo and the CCH’s honorarium 
are displayed in each school. Observation showed that this was not the case. The menu was displayed 
in 19 of the sampled schools (44.2%) and was not displayed in any of the 10 schools served by the 
centralised kitchen. Even when displayed, menus were not necessarily visible to children or parents 
(Figure 8.1). The additional information required was also not displayed. The failure to display the 
menu has also been found outside the study area. The three independent monitoring institutions in 
Rajasthan found that the menu was displayed in 232 of 316 schools (73.5%) across eight districts and 
that the additional information required was not displayed in any school (Centre for Development 
Communication Studies, 2015; Institute of Development Studies Jaipur, 2015; Shiv Charan Mathur 
Social Policy Research Institute, 2015).  
 
                                                        
2 The remaining six households or 1.5% of the sample could not answer the question as no food was served at 
their child’s school.  
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Figure 8.1: Displaying the menu. Top left: a simple form of the menu is displayed at school 39. Top 
right: A menu displayed inside the building at school 20. Bottom left: School 43: Board for the details 
of the stock of wheat, rice, dal, oil, sugar, ghee and vegetables at school 43. Clearly no information is 
displayed. Bottom right: At CS2, the menu, displayed in a visible position near the school entrance, 
notes that fruit should be served on a Tuesday. There is also space for details regarding the cook, 
although this has been left blank. 
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To generate awareness of the MDMS, state governments can also organise media campaigns. The GOR 
(2016a) report that a two-day workshop was held in Jodhpur in October 2014, the outcome of which 
was published in the media. The entire project cost INR 2 million (ibid). Yet, the nature and scale of 
the workshop or the material that resulted from the workshop are not described. Further campaigns have 
not been conducted in Rajasthan. 
 
Kent (2010) wrote: ‘One can only wonder how many children or parents in India know the actual 
content of the Supreme Court’s specifications regarding school meals (161). In this section, I have 
shown that although there was a general awareness of the entitlement to a MDM, a very small number 
of people knew the content of the Supreme Court’s specifications regarding quantity, or the GOR’s 
menu. Given the limited attempts by schools and the state government to raise awareness, the lack of 
awareness among rights-holders and their representatives is unsurprising. In the absence of information, 
not only is the capacity of the representatives of rights-holders to exercise their voice limited; so too is 
the scope of issues on which they might exercise their voice. If entitlements are known as simply the 
provision of an edible meal, then only the absence of this would prompt attempts to exercise voice. 
 
8.3.2 Accountability: In action and inaction 
 
Attention now turns to the existence and use of accountability mechanisms. Pavan (2016), reporting 
data obtained from the MHRD, stated that 280 complaints about the MDMS were received between 
2013-2015. The number of complaints varied by state (Table 8.5). Action such as suspension was taken 
against those responsible in 32 instances (ibid).  
 
Table 8.5: The number of complaints received 2013-2015 (MHRD in Pavan, 2016) 
State/UT Complaints State/UT Complaints 
Andaman and Nicobar Islands 1 Karnataka  7 
Andhra Pradesh 6 Kerala 1 
Arunachal Pradesh 1 Madhya Pradesh 14 
Assam 12 Maharashtra 14 
Chhattisgarh 8 Odisha 13 
Chandigarh 1 Punjab 4 
Bihar 49 Rajasthan 7 
Delhi 13 Tamil Nadu 1 
Goa 2 Telangana 2 
Gujarat 3 Tripura 1 
Haryana 12 Uttarakhand 5 
Himachal Pradesh 1 Uttar Pradesh 71 
Jharkhand 16 West Bengal  15 
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The GOR (2014b) report that between April and December 2013, 39 complaints were received in 
Rajasthan. The nature of these complaints and the actions taken are detailed in Table 8.6. 
 
Table 8.6: Complaints in Rajasthan in 2013 (GOR, 2014b) 
Complaint District Complaints Date Action taken  
Food Grains  Bundi  1 December  Enquiry by police 
Against 
NGO/SHG 
Ajmer 7 April and 
July  
Closure of the Naandi Foundation 
kitchen.   
Kitchen 
devices 
Dungarpur 28 2013-2014 Resolved (action not stated)  
 
Untoward 
Incident3 
Bhilwara 1 July  Dead lizard in the dal and children 
became ill. BEO fired. MDM in 
charge and headmaster suspended. 
CCH removed and replaced. 
Other Dausa 2 July, 
September  
Report submitted to the MDM 
directorate. Action taken against 
MDM in charge and head master. 
Two cooks fired.  
 
Table 8.6 indicates that there is a functioning grievance redressal system in Rajasthan; however, Table 
8.6 cannot be considered to contain all complaints received in 2013-2014. From an interview conducted 
with a district official (IG1) and the discussions with other officials, teachers and parents, it is clear that 
complaints were made about the Naandi Foundation kitchen in Udaipur. These complaints are missing 
from the data. For 2014-2016, the GOR reports that no complaints were received, indicating that either 
these accountability mechanisms are not being used or that the information is not being recorded. 
 
To examine who the rights-holders’ representatives would hold to account, respondents were asked 
who they would complain to if there were a problem with the MDMS. Table 8.7 details the total number 
of times each actor was mentioned. Of the 265 participants that would complain, 211 (79.6%) reported 
they would complain to a teacher, reflecting the position of teachers as street-level bureaucrats. 
Difficulties are likely to arise when teachers are both the source of the problem and the agent of 
accountability. For example, at CS3, households only knew to complain to the teacher; yet, it was the 
teacher who had decided to stop serving the meal. In the absence of the means to contact a block-level 
official, parents were left without an accountability mechanism and therefore without a MDMS. In this 
                                                        
3 The GOI and GOR term instances when children fall ill after consuming the MDM ‘untoward incidents’. 
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context, power most certainly had a face; the teacher used their power to prevent rights-holders from 
receiving their entitlements and to shape the sense of entitlement among rights-holders’ representatives. 
 
Table 8.7: Who participants in the first household survey would complain to in the event of a problem 
with the MDM (n=439) 
Response Girwa Kotra Khamnor Kumbhalgarh. Total Freq. %* 
Teacher 76 41 51 43 211 48.0 
SMC 13 0 1 5 19 4.3 
Cook 3 0 0 2 5 1.1 
BEO 4 3 1 2 10 2.3 
Local government  4 7 7 0 18 4.1 
NGO 0 0 2 0 2 0.5 
Don’t want to  2 18 12 3 35 8.0 
Don’t know how 12 22 17 23 74 16.8 
No need to as food good 1 3 2 1 7 1.6 
Don’t care 2 3 2 4 11 2.5 
No point 3 2 1 1 7 1.6 
Won’t complain 3 10 2 11 26 5.9 
*Note: Some respondents cited more than one person to complain to. Thus, the frequency refers to the total 
number of times each actor was mentioned.  
 
Table 8.7 also shows that the NGO was typically not perceived as the actor to complain to in Khamnor. 
Ebrahim (2003) outlined four types of participation between the public and NGOs: the supply of 
information and dialogue with the public, public involvement in the project, the negotiation of decisions 
with the NGO and finally people’s own initiatives that occur independently from the NGO such as 
protests. There are no mechanisms in place to enable the first three forms of participation. For example, 
there is no direct means for rights-holders or their parents to communicate their opinions or needs to 
NGOs. Any complaint must be made to the teacher, reported to the driver and then reported to 
management. The capacity for the final form of participation was also limited due to a lack of awareness 
of where the food was coming from. In Khamnor, the NGO was not perceived as the institution to 
complain to. Two households reported that they would complain to Akshaya Patra and named the 
organisation (Table 8.7). Beyond this, the name of the organisation was not mentioned in the household 
surveys, interviews or essays. Participants were aware that the food came from Nathdwara, however 
the name of the organisation was not mentioned.  
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Table 8.6 shows that 160 people did not cite anyone to complain to. Of these, 86 respondents stated that 
they did not want to or would not complain. Seven stated that this was because they were poor, low 
caste or illiterate and six stated it was because no one would listen to them. For example, the parent at 
household 4, school 15 asked ‘Hamari kaun sunega? Meaning Who will listen to us? The same 
sentiment was also expressed by interviewees. For example, interviewee two at CS2, stated that she 
could not complain, as teachers and cooks are in a union and would ‘scold her’. She said she would 
only complain if the whole village did. The decision as to whether they would complain was made in 
the context of existing power relations.  
 
Reflecting a common trend in government schools (Mooij, 2008), often teachers resided in a nearby 
town or city and were of a different socio-economic status and caste than their students. This, combined 
with their position of power, makes teachers more powerful than parents. This goes beyond Lukes’ third 
dimension of power; it is invisible power (Gaventa, 2006; VeneKlasen and Miller, 2002). Following 
Hayward, social structures determine the relative power of teachers and parents, affecting whether 
parents feel they have the freedom to act.   
 
A further 74 participants stated that they did not know how to complain. The absence of knowledge 
was often attributed to caste, poverty and/or lack of education. For example, the respondent from 
household seven at school 10 stated ‘we are poor people and belong to low caste so we don't know what 
to do’. At school 14, respondents at households four, five, six and eight stated they wanted to complain 
but they had no idea about it. For example, the respondent at household six stated that ‘in this village 
no one is educated so we don't have any idea about it’. Two households in the village knew they had to 
complain to the BEO, but they had no means of doing so. A lack of education combined with a lack of 
access to information meant that accountability mechanisms were unknown to some respondents, 
consequently limiting the voice of rights-holders’ representatives. Going beyond Paul’s (1992) 
conceptualisation of exit and voice, this lack of information is a product of both structure, limiting 
people’s access to knowledge, and the inaction of duty-bearers at the block, district and state level to 
increase awareness.  
 
Prompted by participants mentioning illiteracy, I analysed responses to the question of who respondents 
would complain to against literacy levels. Table 8.8 shows a greater proportion of literate people cited 
a specific person to complain to than illiterate people (67.1 % compared to 54.7%); a statistically 
significant difference, χ²(1)=5.35, p=0.0207. Of the 74 people who did not know how to complain, 62 
(83.8%) were illiterate. There was also a statistically significant difference by block, χ²(3)=30.40, 
p=<0.001; households were the most likely to complain in Girwa and the least likely to in Kotra. In 
Chapter 7, I showed that the MDMS was most poorly implemented in Kotra. Thus, where there is a 
  
266 
need for accountability mechanisms to detect and correct problems, people are less likely to complain. 
The same pattern was also found at the school level. In the six schools where the food was absent or of 
extremely poor quality (schools 12, 14, 19, 21, 42, 43), 14 of 55 parents (25.5%) reported that they 
would complain in the event of a problem in the MDMS. In the remaining schools, 225 of 340 (66.2%) 
reported that they would complain. A form of corrosive disadvantage is therefore occurring.  
 
Table 8.8: Response compared to literacy status and blocks, household survey one 
 
Cited someone 
Did not cite 
anyone 
Freq. % Freq. % 
Literacy 
Status  
Literate 98 67.1 48 32.9 
Illiterate 134 54.7 111 45.3 
Block 
Girwa 83 80.6 20 19.4 
Kotra 47 44.8 58 55.2 
Khamnor  55 59.1 38 40.9 
Kumbhalgarh  47 52.2 43 47.8 
              Total 232 59.3 159 40.7 
 
Although the above highlights significant limitations in the capability parents have to hold duty-bearers 
to account, this is not to suggest, that all parents cannot and do not complain. Some parents exercise 
their agency and act. Four households mentioned that they had complained previously. For example, 
the respondent at household one at school 15 who was also the sarpanch had previously complained to 
the teacher. The grandmother at household one at school 30 had complained to the school that the 
Akshaya Patra vans were parking at the bottom of the hill, requiring children to carry the containers up 
the hill to the school. The closure of the Naandi foundation kitchen in Udaipur also shows that effective 
accountability from below exists in the study area (see Section 7.6.1). Experiences from elsewhere in 
India also indicate that accountability from below is possible. In particular, social audits whereby the 
community assess the implementation of the MDMS have been found to be successful (Sinha, 2008) 
and are advocated by the GOI (2014b). According to the GOR (2016b), 17 social audits were conducted 
in Rajasthan in 2015-2016 in Dungarpur district, although there is no information as to the findings or 
consequent action. 
 
8.4 Determining Responsibility  
 
For accountability to occur, one must know who to hold to account; ‘If praise or blame can be allocated, 
accountability can be demanded’ (Mulgan, 2003: 23). Teachers have a duty to ensure that an adequate 
MDM is provided (Section 7.3) and teachers are typically perceived as the actor to complain to in the 
  
267 
event of a problem in the MDMS (Section 8.3). Consequently, teachers are often the ones held 
accountable, both from above and below, when the MDM causes illness. For example, in 2013 in 
Bhilwara in Rajasthan, the head teacher and three cooks were suspended after 79 children fell ill (Daily 
Bhaskar, 2013). The most extreme sanction occurred following the 2013 incident in Bihar (Section 
4.4.5), for which the headmistress was found guilty of ‘criminal negligence and culpable homicide’, 
sentenced to 17 years in jail and ordered to pay a penalty of INR 400,000 (BBC, 2016; Kumar, 2016). 
Suppliers of the MDMS may also be held to account when untoward incidents occur. Common 
responses include the suspension of officials, the termination of contracts and, in severe cases, arrests. 
For example, in 2012 in Pune, Maharashtra four people from a SHG were arrested and the SHG was 
blacklisted after more than 75 children fell ill (DNA, 2012; Shaikh, 2012). In 2013 in Mumbai, when 
more than 400 children fell ill after eating cakes, one person from a SHG and one person from the 
supplier of cakes were arrested (Narayan and Roy, 2013).  
 
Teachers and cooks may also face informal accountability from ‘below’. For example, in February 2012 
in Jharkhand, parents created a ‘ruckus’ at a school after eight children fell ill (Times of India, 2012a). 
Teachers are also held to account in the centralised model. In September 2015, after children became 
ill in Lucknow reportedly after eating the MDM provided by Akshaya Patra, ‘angry parents created 
ruckus, vandalized school property, gheraoed the school and locked the teachers inside’ (Times of India, 
2015b). Teachers are consequently often unhappy about the responsibility they have. For example, after 
children fell ill because of the MDM in Jharkhand, the Chairperson of the Jharkhand Primary Teachers' 
Association stated:  
 
Whenever anything goes wrong with midday meals, we teachers are blamed. If 
students fall sick after eating the food served in schools, teachers are sent to jail instead 
of the cook. [Others] are responsible for everything from collecting funds to cooking 
food still teachers are blamed…We will not get in the way of midday meal 
preparations. We will just stop doing anything for it. (in Kislaya, 2013)   
   
As I have shown in Chapter 7, the extent to which teachers and cooks should always be held accountable 
is questionable due to the limits on the capacity of these actors to fulfil their duties. For example, if a 
CCH cooks a meal that makes children ill, they will most likely be held to account, rather than those 
responsible for ensuring that the CCH is adequately trained and that there is sufficient infrastructure at 
the school. However, as street-level bureaucrats teachers are the ‘face’ of the MDMS, accountability is 
directed at them. The focus on teachers highlights a limitation of accountability in the MDMS; the 
implementation of the scheme is a product of the scheme’s design and the non-fulfilment of duties by 
a large range of actors who are not sufficiently held to account.  
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Determining responsibility when untoward incidents occur is, however, often difficult due to 
uncertainty as to the cause of illness. To illustrate, in December 2014, 19 students in Pune fell ill after 
consuming the MDM. Two weeks after the incident, the cause of the illness was still unclear; both 
contaminated water and food poisoning were listed as potential causes (Smart, 2014). In response, the 
principal of the school had been suspended, yet the SHG continued to serve the meal. Determining 
cause and responsibility is particularly problematic in the centralised model. A common narrative was 
found in the reports of untoward incidents in the centralised model: officials from NGOs and sometimes 
from the government argue that it is unlikely the food from the centralised kitchen caused the illness as 
the same food was served to children in other schools who did not fall ill. The narrative typically ends 
with the suggestion of another cause of illness. For example, in 2012, 60 children fell ill in Bangalore. 
In response, a representative of the supplier of the MDM, Akshaya Patra, stated ‘About 85,000 students 
in different schools were served the same food today, but only this school has complained about it’ 
(Times of India, 2012b). In February 2016 in Maharashtra, 247 children were taken to hospital after 
consuming khichdi from ISKCON. According to reports, following testing of the food, a case was filed 
against ISKCON (The Indian Express, 2016c). A few days later officials from ISKCON claimed that 
the children became ill because they had consumed food from a roadside stall and that the water from 
a well the children drank from was bad (NDTV, 2016).  
 
Determining responsibility is further complicated when additional actors are involved. Although NGOs 
should not sub-contract any part of the scheme (Section 4.6.3), in some cases private companies supply 
food. In 2014 in Lucknow, 64 children fell ill after consuming milk distributed by Akshaya Patra. The 
dairy that supplied the milk stated ‘Probably milk was not kept at the temperature required for it. The 
milk supplied to 6,000 children was taken from the same tank. Hence, there was nothing wrong with 
milk’ (Times of India, 2015a). A representative from Akshaya Patra stated the illness was probably due 
to dehydration and the consumption of milk on an empty stomach (ibid). The most serious incident 
occurred in May 2016. Three children and an ICDS employee in Uttar Pradesh died, allegedly due to 
consuming milk in the MDMS supplied by a dairy cooperative (Hindustan Times, 2016; Jaiswal, 2016; 
Qureshi, 2016). In October 2016, the Times of India (2016b) reported a case had been filed against 
Akshaya Patra, under the Food Standards and Safety Act for supplying substandard food. A 
representative of Akshaya Patra said ‘We really don't know what happened, as the same milk was 
consumed by children of other schools and they are all fine’ (in ibid).  
 
I am not suggesting that in the examples cited above the MDM provided by NGOs was the definite 
cause of illness. Rather, I consider these incidents to show that the involvement of NGOs in the MDMS 
renders accountability problematic, as it becomes more difficult to determined which actor is to blame. 
Furthermore, even when the supplier denies responsibility, the problem still lies with the centralised 
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model. The gap between production and consumption and the lack of adult supervision at the school-
level which I have discussed in previous chapters, introduces the potential for contamination and illness. 
Finally, although the centralised model of delivery is considered more hygienic than decentralised 
provision (Section 6.4.3), illness still occurs in the centralised model. This fact further debunks the 
narrative of success that surrounds the involvement of NGOs in the MDMS.  
 
8.5 Conclusion  
 
In response to Mulgan’s four questions, teachers, cooks, SHGs, occasionally NGOs and block and 
district level officials are held accountable in the MDMS. These actors are in theory accountable to 
actors above them, particularly higher levels of government, and below them to the representatives of 
rights-holders. They can be held to account for deviation from the norms. Yet, in practice, both internal 
and external accountability in the MDMS are lacking.  
 
The impact of accountability from above may be hampered by the insufficient coverage of schools and 
by inaccurate data and reporting. When adequate accountability mechanisms to detect the non-
fulfilment of duties are absent, sanctions are also absent. The inadequacies of internal monitoring in the 
MDMS indicates the need for second-order accountability; for accountability institutions to be held 
accountable (Schedler, 1999). Moreover, in the absence of effective accountability mechanisms to 
ensure schools fulfil their duties, decisions concerning the MDM consequently rest on the judgment of 
the teacher, cook and NGOs. Thus, accountability has gone beyond the core sense, and has become 
‘personal accountability’, when accountability is driven by one’s moral values (Sinclair, 1995). For 
instance, a teacher at a single-teacher school one hour from the nearest town who knows that they are 
unlikely to be held to account by parents or government officials has little incentive to provide the meal 
as per norms, except for their own acceptance of responsibility and personal accountability. It is in this 
context, that the decisions made by teachers has considerable impact on the MDM that students receive.    
 
From below, accountability is minimised by the inadequacy of formal mechanisms, a lack of awareness 
and relative socio-economic position, which varies spatially. These factors combine to make it unlikely 
for the representatives of rights holders to complain and thus for the non-fulfilment of rights to be 
detected and corrected. Accountability is particularly difficult in the centralised model, due to the lack 
of accountability mechanisms and the difficultly of determining responsibility. Using Hirschman’s 
(1970) work on exit and voice, in the MDMS there is no opportunity to exit; the public have no option 
to go to another provider. Accountability mechanisms are therefore necessary to improve the provision 
of the MDMS. For example, when the Naandi Foundation supplied an inadequate MDM, formal 
complaints from parents and schools led to the district officials in Udaipur changing the supplier. 
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In Paul’s framework (Figure 2.8), low exit is limited by high spatial barriers and a local monopoly. 
These apply to the MDMS; only government schools supply the MDM and there is a spatial barrier to 
accessing schools. Even in urban locations where it may be more feasible to change schools, one can 
expect that children will be sent to the nearest school. As parents reiterated throughout the fieldwork, 
their main concern was education rather than the food received at school and thus it seems unlikely that 
the choice of school would be based on the MDM. Moreover, to change school, one would also have 
had to have acquired knowledge as to the quality of the MDM there, which again seems unlikely. In the 
absence of effective accountability mechanisms, however, children must either consume the inadequate 
MDM or “exit” the scheme by self-excluding  
 
Low voice is characterised by: high information barriers, high legal and/or institutional barriers, high 
income barriers and low differentiability of services. As has been shown throughout this examination 
of external accountability, the representatives of rights-holders face considerable institutional and 
information barriers. Income has an implicit role, affecting school choice and access to accountability 
mechanisms and information. However, central to the influence of the factors identified by Paul (1992) 
are power dynamics. Power in the MDMS takes multiple forms. Teachers may have what can be 
categorised as third dimensional power, by affecting desires and beliefs, as was the case when the 
teacher did not serve the meal at CS3. Power may also be invisible; parents are kept from the decision-
making table. Power in the MDMS does not always have a ‘face’; power also manifests itself as a 
‘network of social boundaries that constrain and enable action for all actors’ (Hayward, 2000: 11). 
Teachers may not exert their power, but social boundaries shape the relations between teachers and 
parents. To hold teachers to account, the relatively less powerful parents must overcome these power 
dynamics to exert their voice; although difficult, this is not impossible and some do resist power 
structures.  
 
In contrast to Paul (1992), the MDMS can be characterised by high differentiability of services rather 
than low; education is highly differentiable. More powerful actors do not encounter the MDMS and 
therefore, apart from a few who act on their imperfect obligations towards a right to food, they do not 
exercise their voice. Indeed, there is a wider ignorance among the Indian middle classes towards the 
poor (Mander, 2015a), something Mander (2015b) drawing on Gupta (2012) considers social violence. 
 
Furthermore, noticeably absent from the discussion in this chapter are the voices of students themselves. 
As shown by the student essays, students can provide detailed feedback. Yet, in the sampled schools, 
no means were available for the students to provide feedback on the MDM or direct management. In 
the study area, students have little voice in the scheme. 
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Kent (2002) argued the ‘missing piece’ in India’s food rights system was accountability from the rights 
holders, stating ‘where there are no effective remedies, there are no effective rights’ (7). While 
accountability mechanisms were not entirely absent in the study area, effective accountability from both 
below and above were still ‘missing pieces’ of the rights system.  
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Chapter 9 
 
Analysis   
 
 
9.1 Introduction  
 
In this chapter, I bring together the findings from the preceding five chapters to answer the research 
questions set out in Chapter 2. I consider each sub-question in turn before examining the overall extent 
to which the MDMS reflects a rights-based approach. Finally, in the context of these findings, I briefly 
discuss three policy changes to the MDMS and their implications for the realisation of the right to food.  
 
9.2 Objectives 
 
9.2.1. A Means to What End?  
 
A key concern within both the literature on social protection and public policy is the definition of a 
problem (Section 2.8). The first sub research question consequently asked what problems and objectives 
the MDMS seeks to address. As outlined in Chapter 4, the current objectives of the MDMS are: to 
encourage attendance and improve concentration; improve the nutritional status of children; and to 
provide nutritional support in the summer in drought-affected areas (MHRD, 2006). The scheme also 
has secondary objectives, including generating employment for the needy and fostering equality. The 
MDMS cannot therefore be characterised by a single ‘search for improvement’ (Schaffer, 1984); the 
aims of the MDMS cut-across the sectors of nutrition and education. 
 
Despite the multiple objectives of the MDMS, the scheme’s objective is primarily considered to be 
educational. This is firstly reflected in the scheme’s organisational structure. The MDMS is under the 
remit of the Department of School Education and Literacy in the MHRD. In Rajasthan, the MDMS is 
the responsibility of the Department of Rural Development and Panchayat Raj, although in other states 
it is typically the responsibility of education departments. The MDMS is therefore not the responsibility 
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of the departments typically responsible for nutrition interventions. As has been shown in Chapters 4 
and 7, the emphasis on education is also found in the views of duty-bearers, including national and state 
government officials, teachers and NGOs. These duty-bearers primarily consider the objective of the 
scheme to be to increase school enrolment; however, increasing enrolment is no longer a stated 
objective. Overall, the exact end to which the MDMS is a means to is indefinite. 
 
The empirical findings also indicate potential disparities between the end (the problems the MDMS 
seeks to address) and the means (the MDMS). Firstly, the MDMS can only do so much to increase 
attendance. As shown in Chapter 5, attendance depends on the multiple barriers to education. The 
MDMS can incentivise some students to attend school more regularly, but for others, it is not enough 
to remove the demand-side barriers to education. The inadequate quality of the MDM may also render 
the meal unappealing to students. The impact of the MDMS on attendance is therefore firmly entwined 
with the right to education and the quality of the MDM. Second, the MDMS is intended to address 
classroom hunger and therefore to improve concentration at school. In Section 6.2.4, I showed that the 
MDMS is for many students the first meal of the day. It is therefore likely that many students experience 
classroom hunger in the morning. Third, the MDMS is intended to improve the nutritional status of 
children. I have shown in Chapter 5 and Appendix D.1, that the MDMS can make a significant 
contribution to the daily intake of food. Yet, in practice many students do not receive their full 
entitlements, reducing the contribution of the MDMS to dietary intake. The MDMS could be a vehicle 
to get children to consume nutritious food, including pulses, green leafy vegetables, fruit and, as 
appropriate, eggs; however, these are either not included on the menu or are not provided in a sufficient 
quantity. Overall, the MDMS is neither designed nor implemented to ensure the fulfilment of its 
objectives.   
 
9.2.2 Uncertainty 
  
The MDMS’s objectives are also vague. There are no benchmarks, targets or timeframes in place to 
determine progress. The limits of the stated objectives become clearer when compared to other SFPs. 
For example, Brazil’s SFP should meet at least 20% of the nutritional needs of children (Drake et al., 
2016) and Ghana’s SFP aims to increase the BMI of the target group to between 19-25 (Government 
of Ghana, 2010). The MDMS also contrasts with other nutrition policy in India, such as the 1995 
National Nutrition Policy which had clear targets and a timeframe (Appendix B.1). Moreover, the GOI 
has not assessed whether progress has been made towards the realisation of the scheme’s objectives 
(Section 4.2). Thus, not only are the objectives vague, the extent to which they are fulfilled is unknown.  
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9.2.3 Right to Food and Food Security 
 
The MDMS has the wider objectives of contributing to the realisation of food security and a right to 
food. The NFSA adopts a life-cycle approach, within which the MDMS is the only scheme targeted at 
children of school-going age. Yet, the MDMS only addresses one aspect of malnutrition and food 
insecurity: access to food. The wider determinants of malnutrition, such as sanitation and health are 
mentioned in the design of the scheme, but are not sufficiently incorporated. For example, a child can 
consume the MDM in a school without an adequate toilet, safe drinking water and hand washing 
facilities. The MDMS is designed with consideration for stability, providing food in drought-affected 
areas during the summer. However, it has been shown that food insecurity increased in a non-drought 
affected area during the summer. Thus, the scheme does not provide stable access to food. The failure 
to fully reflect considerations of food security in the MDMS is evident in the fact that the design of the 
MDMS did not change after the passing of the NFSA.  
 
9.2.4 Implications 
 
The result of the trends discussed above is that the MDMS is seen as a means of providing food for 
children. The complex and multidimensional nature of food insecurity and child malnutrition have 
been simplified, so that the issue has become children not having access to enough food. The complex 
issues that determine school enrolment and attendance have also been simplified, to be the product of 
access to food; if food at school is provided, then children will attend. Thus, the political problems of 
food insecurity and inequalities in access to education have been depoliticised and rendered technical, 
to which the solution is the provision of food. Instead of the state being held responsible, by providing 
a MDMS the state is seen as taking action towards the solution of these problems. Consequently, 
attention shifts to the technical issues relating to implementation, rather than larger political problems.   
 
9.3  Rights-Holders 
 
9.3.1 Defining the needy and their needs 
 
Those benefiting from rights-based social protection programmes are not labelled ‘recipients’ or 
‘beneficiaries’, but are ‘rights-holders’ (Section 2.3.2). Within a RBA, all of those in need should be 
rights-holders and particular emphasis should be placed on the vulnerable. Research question 1.ii 
therefore asked whether the needy were included in the MDMS. The NFSA does not use the language 
of ‘rights-holders’, but does specify ‘entitlements’. The NFSA also emphasises the need to provide for 
the most vulnerable and disadvantaged.  
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In contrast to most SFPs, the MDMS does not target geographically or explicitly by need. The rights-
holders in the MDMS are those in grades I-VIII/ aged 6-14 years in government and government-
assisted schools. In Chapter 4, I showed that underlying the eligibility criteria for the MDMS is the 
assumption that those in eligible schools need the MDMS. In Chapter 5, I showed that eligible students 
do typically have a need for the MDMS. This need was also recognised by the rights-holders and their 
parents. However, I also showed that the division between the eligible and ineligible in the MDMS is 
by no means perfect; those excluded from the scheme may still have need for improved food intake.  
 
Although the MDMS is not directly comparable to the US welfare system that Fraser (1987) examines, 
there are parallels. Attending eligible schools is how recipients prove that they fulfil the criteria to 
consume the MDMS. Those attending private schools are considered to not need the scheme and those 
not attending school are implicitly deemed undeserving of the food. By examining the categorisation 
of students into the eligible and ineligible as was done in Chapter 5, one finds that this categorisation 
based on assumed need does not reflect reality. Reflecting Fernandez’s (2010) characterisation of the 
division between those BPL and APL, this categorisation can be considered a political technology. In 
consequence, the MDMS becomes a technical task, to provide food to eligible students and becomes 
detached from wider issues concerning access to food and education.   
 
There is consequently a disconnect between the right to food and the MDMS. The right to food in India 
is recognised in the Constitution and in the ratification of international declarations (Section 2.3.4). 
However, the Supreme Court Orders and the NFSA give only those in eligible schools a right to the 
MDM. This is problematic if the two categories of children in need of the MDMS and children eligible 
to receive the MDM do not overlap perfectly, which I have shown to be the case. This is not to suggest 
that the MDMS should be categorically universal, i.e. available to all children, but rather that the state 
should directly provide food for all those without the means of realising the right to food. The MDMS 
should either be available to all children who lack a right to food, or another scheme must exist to meet 
the needs of those currently excluded.  
 
The identification of the need among targeted children is also problematic. In Chapter 4, I showed that 
the MDMS was initially expected to provide one third of the RDA of calories and one half of the RDA 
of protein. These figures were based on the gaps in dietary requirements assessed in a 1990-1992 
NNMB survey in eight states (GOI, 1995). The GOI has rarely mentioned these requirements since. 
Overall, the potential of the MDMS to address nutritional needs has received little attention.  
 
In Chapter 4 and Appendix D.1, I showed that if the norms are fulfilled, the MDM can make a sizable 
contribution to the daily intake of calories, protein, cereals and pulses and a smaller contribution to 
 
 
276 
vegetable and fruit intake. To reach RDAs, two conditions must be fulfilled; the supplied MDM must 
adhere to the guidelines and students must also consume at least two well-balanced, nutritious meals at 
home, as well as fruit and milk.  
 
The empirical data presented in Chapter 5 shows the limitations of this interpretation of needs. Firstly, 
needs have been simplified. Simplification first occurs in the data used to assess the calorie and protein 
gap to be filled by the MDMS, which was based on data from just eight states. Furthermore, RDAs for 
children do not account for variation in activity levels. Although the different needs of lower and upper 
primary students are reflected in the scheme’s design, further differences in need by age and gender are 
not. As shown in Chapter 4 and Appendix D.1, the theoretical contribution of the MDM to daily intake 
varies considerably by these variables. One can also expect nutritional needs to vary considerably 
depending on additional factors including health and household food consumption. The design of the 
MDMS therefore homogenises children, differentiating between lower and upper primary students only. 
Yet, in Chapters 5 and 6, I have shown that rights-holders in the MDMS are not homogenous; needs 
vary between children within each school and between children at different schools. For example, as 
shown in Chapter 5, food consumption was significantly lower and diets were less diverse in CS3, 
indicating that dietary needs in this location were higher than at the other case studies. Of course, some 
simplification and standardisation of need is required for the MDMS to be feasible; however, needs in 
the MDMS are simplified to an extent that the nutritional aims of the scheme are undermined.    
 
Secondly, the interpretation of needs is flawed. In Chapter 5, I showed that in the study area the MDM 
was typically one of only two meals consumed per day. I also showed inadequate dietary intake in most 
of the sampled households. Therefore, for most students in the study area, the MDM is an important 
source of food; making more of a contribution to daily intake than the government assumes. The 
assessment of needs is also flawed for failing to account for temporal variation. As shown in Chapter 
5, although needs for food are high in the summer, the MDM is absent in non-drought areas. 
 
Thirdly, in Chapter 4 I showed the limits in the extent to which the GOI have sought to incorporate 
needs into the design and implementation of the MDMS. There is presently no means through which 
the GOI or GOR can know whether the MDM meets dietary needs. Other than the JRMs, there is no 
attempt to assess the nutritional quality of the meal provided or the needs of students. The contribution 
of the MDMS to daily intake is therefore unknown. The implementation of the MDMS is thus largely 
detached from needs.  
  
Finally, there are two broader issues relating to the interpretation of needs in the MDMS. First, is the 
simplification of what is needed to fulfil the objectives of the MDMS and to realise the right to food 
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more broadly. In the MDMS, needs are ‘subject to a sort of rewriting operation. Experienced situations 
and life-problems are translated into administrable needs’ (Fraser, 1987: 114). The MDMS transforms 
the multi-dimensional needs of children relating to both education and nutrition into one administrable 
need; access to food. Although the Supreme Court Orders and NFSA state that this food should be 
quantitatively and qualitatively adequate; in the process of implementation, the focus becomes the 
provision of a meal. The implication is that if the MDMS does not sufficiently meet needs and is the 
only scheme directed at school-going children, then children’s right to food may remain unrealised. 
 
Second, I have shown the politics surrounding needs interpretation in the MDMS. What students need 
is determined by the GOI and state governments and perhaps is further defined by NGOs and 
connected organisations. The powerful thus define the needs of the powerless rights-holders. As 
shown, the interpretation of needs is not necessarily a depoliticised process or fair. Notably, the 
decision as to whether eggs are included in the MDMS may be made according to the religious beliefs 
and political interests of the powerful, rather than the interests and needs of rights-holders.  
 
9.3.2 Capabilities 
 
In Chapter 5, I showed that having a right to consume the MDMS does not necessarily lead to the 
realisation of that right. The consumption of the MDMS requires not only that children are rights-
holders, but that they also have the freedom to attend school, as determined by demand and supply-side 
barriers to education. Then, when at school, children must have the opportunity to and the desire to 
consume the MDM. Finally, when combined with access to food at the household level, the MDM must 
fulfil the right to food.  
 
The capability approach is useful to interpret this realisation of rights. The framework presented by 
Robeyns (2005) shown in Figure 2.2, suggests that goods and services must be converted into 
capabilities and then functionings. I suggest that this approach can be adapted and expanded to analyse 
specific goods and services in practice. One must first consider the capability to use a good or service 
(the freedom to use it) and then whether this capability is realised (the functioning of consuming the 
good). Then, one must consider how this service is converted into a functioning such as to be well-
nourished. This framework is shown in Figure 9.1. For food security to be achieved, the steps in this 
framework would need to occur consistently.  
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Figure 9.1: Applying the capability approach to the MDMS 
 
The use of the capability approach as illustrated in Figure 9.1 enables one to make several important 
conclusions about the MDMS. Firstly, by considering the process of realisation as well as the end 
provision of a service or functioning, it is clear that effective implementation requires more than the 
provision of a meal. The GOI and state governments should thus also focus on ensuring that children 
have the capability to consume the MDM. Second, the conversion of the MDM to the functioning to be 
well-nourished depends on additional capabilities, principally good health. This reinforces the point 
that food security cannot be realised by the provision of food alone. Taken together, these two points 
highlight the importance of considering multiple capabilities simultaneously. As has been shown, 
parents may choose for their children the functioning of being well-educated over being-well nourished 
by sending their children to private schools. Third, although parents and teachers may make decisions 
that affect the ability of children to convert capabilities into functionings (Biggeri and Comim, 2011), 
children also exercise agency in the MDMS. Some children decide whether to attend school and whether 
to consume the MDMS. Fourth, although firmly connected, Figure 9.1 highlights the importance of the 
qualitative dimensions of a right to food; preference, taste and food quality.   
 
Of course, the capability approach alone is insufficient to explain the realisation of rights. As has been 
shown throughout the empirical chapters, the realisation of entitlements heavily depends on whether 
the MDM is provided and the nature of the meal that is provided. It is possible for a child to have the 
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Choice to attend school/a school serving the MDM
Choice to consume the MDM, determined by:
• Preference (personal taste and quality of food)
• Discrimination
• Need- access to food elsewhere
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capability to attend school and the desire to consume the meal, but not to have the capability to consume 
the MDM. Consequently, in Section 9.4.2, I examine the factors that determine MDM implementation.  
 
9.3.2 Exclusion 
 
Three groups of children are excluded from the MDMS: children above grade VIII, children attending 
non-eligible schools and out-of-school children. It is not the case that these excluded groups are selected 
to ‘let die’ due to an inherent prejudice. Nonetheless, they are still ‘let die’; left to experience hunger, 
malnutrition and food insecurity and consequently to live ‘short and limited lives’ (Li, 2010: 1). I do 
not believe that this situation can be aptly described using the language of structural violence as Gupta 
(2012) does. Certainly, structural violence is at play, as existing social structures result in ‘unequal 
power and... un-equal life chances’ (Galtung, 1969: 171), particularly for out-of-school children. 
However, if we accept that the state has an obligation to fulfil the right to food, then responsibility for 
exclusion must too lie with the state. Echoing Harriss and Jeffrey’s (2013) opinion of Gupta’s use of 
the term structural violence, applying it to this situation would be depoliticising. By failing to ensure 
that all those without the means for fulfilling the right to food are covered by social protection schemes 
(the MDMS or otherwise), the state must be considered to be letting people die. Gupta’s characterisation 
of violence existing alongside care does however apply. The non-rights or need based targeting 
procedure results in care for some, and unequal life chances for others. The absence of a MDM is a 
corrosive disadvantage, affecting educational and nutritional status and future capabilities and freedom.  
 
Thus, exclusion in the MDMS takes two forms; exclusion from the scheme as determined by eligibility 
criteria and exclusion within the scheme, determined by the conditionality on school attendance as 
well as by irregular implementation and discrimination. The targeting procedure and attachment of 
conditionality, as well as the persistence of implementation-derived exclusion are thus at odds with a 
rights-based approach. The GOI recognises the right to food for all and denies it for some children. 
 
9.4 Duty-Bearers 
 
9.4.1 The plurality of duty-bearers 
 
I have shown that a vast number of actors have a duty in the MDMS, including officials within all 
levels of governments, actors at the school-level and external actors who guide implementation. As 
outlined in Chapter 4, most actors have perfect obligations, meaning their duties are clearly defined. 
The community, however, does not have a perfect obligation in the MDMS. Although there are 
suggested means through which the ‘community’ may be involved with the MDMS, specific duties 
are not specified. I have also shown that an additional actor is involved in the MDMS; the private 
sector. Although PPPs in the MDMS are between governments and NGOs, I have shown that the 
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private sector plays a role in facilitating PPPs. These actors are not official duty-bearers in the MDMS 
and their responsibilities towards the scheme and the right to food more broadly are unspecified.   
 
9.4.2 The Fulfilment of Entitlements 
 
Research question 1.iv asked what the norms in the MDMS are, whether they are fulfilled and the 
reasons for fulfilment or non-fulfilment. In Chapter 4, I showed that rights-holders are entitled to a 
MDM that adheres to: the calorie and protein content specified in the NFSA; the GOI’s norms on the 
quantity of ingredients and the state government’s menu. For the fulfilment of a right to food, rights-
holders must have access to food that is sufficient in quantity and quality, is safe, reflects preference 
and is culturally acceptable. In Chapter 6, I examined the extent to which these norms were realised in 
practice. I showed that the menu was often not adhered to and that the quantity and quality of the MDMS 
was often inadequate. Often rights-holders did not receive their full entitlements. I have also shown that 
although safety was not a large problem in the study area, it is a problem in both the centralised and 
decentralised delivery models.  
 
The non-fulfilment of entitlements results from gaps in the pattern of claims and duties outlined in 
Figure 4.13. The findings presented in the empirical chapters show that the capacity of teachers and 
cooks to fulfil their duties in the MDMS is often limited. Thus, the empirical evidence supports 
Jonsson’s assertion that ‘rights are violated because claim-holders lack the capacity to claim the right, 
and/or duty-bearers lack the capacity to meet their duties’ (2003: 54). The capacity of teachers and cook 
to fulfil their duties is determined by structural factors which determine the balance between demands 
and enablements (see Section 7.7). Demands are the formal requirements determined by policy which 
were outlined in Chapter 4 and the informal demands from the public. Enablements are determined by 
a range of factors including financial and human resources and timing. Often in the MDMS, the former 
is greater than the latter, resulting in a public service gap. In this context, teachers and cooks are forced 
to exercise discretion and agency to cope.  
 
The design of the MDMS produces further problems for the meeting of demands. Reflecting Gupta 
(2012) the decisions made by higher-level officials concerning programs and targets ‘that bear little 
relevance to realities on the ground’ leads to ‘subordinates faithfully executing programs on paper but 
caring little for how well they are implemented’ (48). In particular, I have shown that the norms on 
quantity and the type of food mean little in practice. In the centralised model, the number of children 
consuming the MDM each day is unknown. In both models, the food is not weighed before serving 
and lower and upper primary students do not receive uniformly different amounts. Norms of quantity 
and protein content mean little to inadequately trained cooks and teachers. The MDMS is designed 
with a focus on the individual; yet is not implemented with the accuracy required to ensure that 
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individuals always receive their entitlements. Consequently, the focus of implementation is the 
provision of a meal, not the provision of a meal that adheres to guidelines. 
 
Similarly to how the capability approach framework considers capability and freedom, for duty-
bearers at the school-level one can also distinguish between the MDM they are capable of providing 
and the MDM that they choose to provide. This framework is illustrated in Figure 9.2. Although the 
design of the MDMS does not permit much discretion (the menu and quantities are set), in practice 
discretion is necessary. For example, inadequate and delayed funding and a lack of access to markets 
results in teachers and cooks adopting coping strategies. The absence of effective monitoring expands 
the opportunity for discretion. Teachers and cooks therefore have a de facto room for manoeuvre, and 
consequently make the MDMS. This can be a positive, permitting needy children to consume the meal. 
Or, more negatively can result in corruption. The influence of both structure and agency is seen for 
example in the vignettes of corruption found throughout this thesis. Acts of corruption by CCHs may 
be a response to their inadequate payment and unmet food needs at home, or in other cases may result 
from teachers prioritising their own interests over those of their students.  
 
 
Figure 9.2: The fulfilment of duties by teachers and cooks in the MDMS 
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In consequence, the implementation of the MDMS varies considerably between schools and by 
location, as has been shown throughout the empirical chapters.  
 
9.4.3 Arbitrary Decisions?  
 
As reviewed in Section 2.2, Gupta (2012) considers the actions of low-level officials to produce 
arbitrary outcomes, causing differentiation in the services received ‘by clients who are in similar 
structural locations... who have very similar endowments of economic, social, educational, and cultural 
capital’ (24). These decisions are not based on logic and ultimately cause bureaucratic action to 
‘repeatedly and systematically’ produce ‘arbitrary outcomes in its provision of care’ (ibid: 6). In light 
of the empirical evidence presented in Chapters 5-8 and the analysis above, I do not consider Gupta’s 
concept of arbitrary decisions to be particularly helpful in analysing the MDMS. I agree with Gupta 
that decisions made by low-level officials including in the context of the MDMS are a strong 
determinant of outcomes. Understanding these decisions and the overall behaviour of street-level 
bureaucrats, is a vital part of understanding how policy is implemented. However, in the MDMS these 
decisions are not arbitrary, but are based on choices determined by some combination of capacity, 
motivation and personal interests. Moreover, the MDM does not lead to differences between those 
with similar endowments in the same manner as Gupta finds. Children at one school receive the same 
MDM as each other. Children with similar endowments at different schools may receive significantly 
different meals; however, this is not the product of arbitrary decisions. Rather, there are patterns in the 
implementation of the scheme.  
 
Harris and Jeffrey (2013) argue that instead of being arbitrary, bureaucratic functioning ‘systematically 
reflects class, caste and gender privileges’ (519). To this, I would add the importance of location. 
Location is itself connected to privilege; those living in remote locations are often from STs and are 
poor. In Chapters 3 and 5, I showed spatial variations in need; the more remote locations typically had 
a lower level of ‘development’, experienced higher levels of food insecurity and thus had a greater 
need for direct food provisioning from the state. In Chapter 6, I showed that these locations typically 
had the ‘worst’ performing MDMS, characterised by irregular provision and inadequacies in the 
quantity and quality of the MDM. One can therefore consider location to be a corrosive disadvantage 
(Wolff and de Shallit, 2007). In remote locations, access to the market is difficult, affecting the 
capacity of teachers to provide food as per the menu. These teachers are also likely to be the only 
teachers employed, further reducing their capacity to provide the MDM as per the norms. Remote 
locations are also less likely to be visited by officials and parents in such locations are less likely to 
report problems. In the absence of both internal and external accountability, personal accountability 
remains. These problems should not be seen as inevitable and used as ‘escape hatches’ to explain the 
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problems in the MDMS. Rather, they highlight problems in the allocation of duties and resources in 
the MDMS.  
 
Thus, the variations in the implementation of the MDMS should not be interpreted as the product of 
arbitrary decisions, but rather as the almost predicable outcomes of variations in demands and 
enablements and accountability.     
 
9.4.4 Street-level Bureaucrats 
 
In the MDMS, teachers at eligible schools can be classified as street-level bureaucrats. Following 
Lipsky’s (2010: 13) definition, these actors can determine ‘the nature, amount, and quality of benefits 
and sanctions provided by their agencies’ and have ‘relative autonomy’). Moreover, their working 
conditions typically meet several of the common conditions of work which Lipsky identified: resources 
are inadequate relative to the task; the goals of agencies are often ambiguous; performance related to 
goal achievement is difficult or impossible to measure. In these working conditions, teachers must 
employ coping mechanisms. It should be noted that all teachers are not automatically street-level 
bureaucrats; as Lipsky intended, the term only applies to those who meet the aforementioned 
conditions.  
 
Classifying CCHs as street-level bureaucrats, however, is less straightforward. I have shown that 
CCHs can also shape the MDM provided and are forced to use coping mechanisms. CCHs also make 
policy. Yet, crucially many CCHs lack the authority and discretion that is central to the definition of a 
street-level bureaucrat. For example, some CCHs may decide to cook a certain meal because it is easier 
for them, others will cook a simpler meal because of the ingredients made available to them and others 
will be forced to follow the instructions of the teacher. Thus, typically CCHs cannot be classified as 
street-level bureaucrats; however, the street-level bureaucracy literature is still useful for examining 
their work due to the focus on demand and enablements.  
 
9.4.5 PPPs 
 
PPPs in the MDMS are used as a fix for problems (Linder, 1999). The centralised kitchens used by 
NGOs in PPPs contrast starkly with decentralised kitchens (Section 6.4.3). PPPs in the MDMS are 
thus seen as a fix for the poor implementation of the MDMS by teachers and cooks, rather than as a 
fix for problems caused by inadequacies in the design of the MDMS and the inaction and non-
fulfilment of duties at all levels of government. I have shown that the narrative of success that 
surrounds the involvement of NGOs in the MDMS is not always justified. In Chapters 6-8, I have 
shown problems in the quantity and quality of the food provided by NGOs. I have also shown that 
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contrary to the statement made by Drake et al. (2016), that Akshaya Patra have promoted ‘community 
participation through fundraising and volunteering’, community participation is restricted by the 
centralised model.  
 
The non-fulfilment of duties by NGOs cannot be explained in the same way as teachers and CCHs. 
NGOs have considerable resources at their disposal and are thus not limited by the same structural 
constraints. The same public service gap does not prevail. Rather, the nature of the MDM provided by 
NGOs is determined by the will and interests of NGOs and the power dynamics between district and 
state-level governments and NGOs. I have shown that although NGOs may be held to account for their 
actions, external and internal accountability in the NGOs are typically limited.  
 
Contrary to the assumptions that the involvement of NGOs can fix the problems in the MDMS, this 
research has shown that NGOs are far from being a ‘magic-bullet’. The involvement of NGOs in the 
form of PPPs can have negative consequences and be at odds with a RBA. Yet, the GOI continue to 
advocate the involvement of NGOs and the large NGOs continue to expand their operations. Of 
concern, in June 2017, the MHRD issued a notification permitting NGOs running centralised kitchens 
to supply the MDM ‘in identified rural areas which have good road connectivity’(2017: 1). This thesis 
has indicated the problems with NGOs supplying food in rural areas, including for safety, employment 
and participation. Further research is required to understand the consequences of NGO involvement in 
the MDMS, particularly in rural areas.  
 
 
9.4.6 The Community 
 
The GOI expects the community to be involved in the MDMS (Section 4.6.5). In the study area, all 
types of community involvement in the MDMS were minimal. Drawing on Jonsson’s (2003) HRBAP, 
I have shown that members of the community may not accept responsibility for the MDMS, as they 
may not know that they should do something, or they may not have the authority to do anything. For 
example, members of SMCs may be unaware of their membership or may not be given the opportunity 
to exercise authority. Formal means through which parents and other members of the community may 
be involved did not exist in the study area, resulting in an absence of awareness of responsibility.  
 
Echoing the emphasis Jonsson places on the community in the realisation of child rights, I have 
highlighted that parents affect the realisation of a right to food by affecting school attendance and, on 
occasion, by stipulating whether their child can consume the MDM. Parents therefore influenced the 
capabilities of children. Therefore, the ‘community’ have a role in the realisation of rights far beyond 
their involvement in the delivery of social protection schemes.  
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9.4.7 Summary 
 
Following Jonsson, the realisation of rights depends on the capability of students and the capacity of 
duty-bearers. The influence of the two can be conceptualised as shown in Figure 9.3  
 
 
 
Figure 9.3: The realisation of a right to the MDM 
 
 
The MDM that rights-holders have the opportunity to receive is determined by the balance between 
demands and enablements and agency. Importantly, this is determined by the design of the MDMS 
and the actions of all levels of government; it is not the product of low-level officials failing to 
implement schemes perfectly. Whether children can realise their right to the MDMS is determined by 
capability and agency. Whether the MDM that is consumed can then lead to the functioning of being 
well-nourished depends on the quality of the MDM, the dietary needs of children and their ability to 
utilise the food they consume.  
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9.5 Accountability Mechanisms 
 
I have shown that the existence and use of accountability mechanisms in the MDMS are a long way 
from the ideal accountability mechanisms outlined in Section 2.6. In Chapter 8, I showed the 
inadequacies in the internal accountability in the scheme. These indicate the need for second-order 
accountability in the MDMS (Schedler, 1999). I have also shown the limits in NGO accountability to 
both patrons and internally to the NGO themselves. In the absence of effective internal accountability 
mechanisms, the role of ‘personal accountability’, when accountability is driven by one’s moral values 
(Sinclair, 1995), is heightened. In this setting, the agency and motivations of internal actors, whether 
government officials, NGOs or teachers have a greater influence on the implementation of the MDMS.  
 
In Chapter 8, I showed that external accountability from the representatives of rights-holders was 
limited. Firstly, the MDMS can be characterised by low exit and voice. The nature of the service 
delivery prevents exit, whereas third dimensional, invisible and structural power dynamics can prevent 
the representatives of rights-holders from exercising their voice (see Section 8.3). Drawing on the 
language of the capability approach once again, it is thus clear that for accountability ‘from below’ to 
occur, the representatives of rights-holders must have the capability to use an accountability 
mechanism. This capability is determined by both the availability of mechanisms and awareness of 
them. A choice must then be made to use this mechanism and exercise their voice. Both the capability 
and the choice depend heavily on power dynamics between parents and other actors, principally 
teachers.  
 
Secondly, when external actors attempt to hold duty-bearers to account, accountability is directed 
towards teachers as these are the street-level bureaucrats. Teachers may be the only representative of 
‘the state’ in a village. Yet, as has been discussed, the capacity of teachers to fulfil their duties is 
heavily influenced by the decisions and actions of other duty-bearers in the government. Therefore, 
holding teachers to account may not address the root of problems. Thus, even if parents have the 
capability and choice to complain, without an effective accountability mechanism this may not lead to 
change. 
 
Despite the limitations in accountability in the MDMS, I have also shown that actors are held to 
account. Contestation can and does occur. The key example of this is the complaints made by parents 
and teachers about the Naandi Foundation in Girwa and the subsequent decision of the district 
government to cease the partnership with the organisation. Thus, some parents have power to resist.  
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9.6 Additional Principles 
 
A rights-based programme must also encompass rights into the process (Jonsson, 2003). The second 
research question therefore asked the extent to which rights-based principles (participation, 
accountability, non-discrimination, transparency, human dignity, empowerment and the rule of law) are 
incorporated into the MDMS. Here I discuss these principles minus accountability which has already 
been explored. 
 
In Chapter 4, I showed that these principles are reflected in the design of the MDMS, even if they are 
not discussed explicitly as ‘rights-based principles’. Yet, I have shown that these principles are not 
necessarily reflected in the implementation. In Chapters 7 and 8, I showed that the “community” often 
lack the opportunity and capacity to participate in the MDMS. Transparency in the scheme is marred 
by inaccurate and insufficient data at all levels and the non-display of the menu in schools. In Chapter 
8, I showed that the rule of law is used in ‘untoward’ incidents; however, the NFSA was not found to 
be used to hold actors to account, particularly in the case of NGOs operating in rural areas. The 
adherence to the principles of human rights has also been shown to be affected by design choice. In 
particular, the involvement of NGOs has been shown to reduce transparency, complicate accountability 
and to limit participation and empowerment.   
 
Empowerment in the MDMS is expected to occur through the employment of  women from traditionally 
disadvantaged groups (SCs and STs and widows) as CCHs. Yet, the conditions of employment prevent 
empowerment from occurring. Drawing on the work of Palriwala and Neetha (2009, 2010, 2011), I 
have suggested that ‘gendered familialism’ plays out in the MDMS as well as the ICDS. Further 
research which focusses on both the everyday experiences of CCHs and how they are perceived by 
other-duty bearers is required. In particular, a multi-state study which considers experiences in states 
where CCHs are paid a higher wage would be particularly insightful. Research into the impact of the 
transition from decentralised to centralised delivery on CCHs is also necessary.  
 
One principle has been absent from the discussion in the empirical chapters: human dignity. Typically, 
dignity is treated as ‘an intuitive notion that is by no means utterly clear’ (Nussbaum, 2011: 29). Indeed, 
the NFSA aims to provide access to food ‘to live a life with dignity’, yet, at no point in the NFSA or in 
the guidelines on the MDMS is the concept of dignity expanded upon. It is thus necessary to further 
consider human dignity in the context of food provisioning. Kent (2005) conceptualised dignity in the 
context of a right to food. Kent draws on the assertion in Comment 12 that the right to food is more 
than a ‘minimum package of calories, proteins and other specific nutrients’ (CESCR, 1999: paragraph 
7). Kent (2005) argued that human rights are about ‘upholding human dignity, not about meeting 
physiological needs’ (46) and goes on to state that:  
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Simply delivering pre-packaged meals in the way one might deliver feed pellets to livestock 
cannot fulfil the right [to food]. That sort of approach would be incompatible with human 
dignity. Delivering such meals might be sensible in a short-term emergency, but it cannot 
be a means for realizing the human right to adequate food in the long run. (55) 
 
Kent also argued that for dignity people must have the opportunity to have one’s voice heard, through 
institutionalised recourse mechanisms. 
 
This study indicates that human dignity includes ensuring the provision is not stigmatised or seen as for 
the ‘poor’ and an act of charity, but is seen as a right. Human dignity involves ensuring that rights-
holders and their representatives have their voices heard, enabling them to access their entitlements, 
rather than face the consumption of unpalatable food. Human dignity also involves ensuring that rights-
holders can consume the meal in a dignified manner; for example not consuming the meal from scraps 
of paper as at school 13 (Section 6.4.2). It should not be the case that the ‘hungry can’t be choosers’; 
those in need should be seen as rights-holders, entitled to adequate and acceptable food. Rights-holders 
and their representatives therefore should be able to exercise control over the food they consume and 
not be treated as passive recipients. 
 
9.7 A Rights-Based Approach? 
 
In the MDMS, there are two rights. The first is the right to a MDM established by the Supreme Court 
Orders and the NFSA. The second is the right to food, recognised by adherence to international 
declarations and within the Indian constitution. The overarching aim of this research was to explore the 
everyday realisation of rights in the MDMS.   
 
Recognising that there is not a single RBA, one must consider what a RBA looks like in the MDMS. 
As outlined in Chapter 4, the NFSA, the MDM Guidelines and national orders and notifications outlined 
who the rights-holders are, what they are entitled to, who the duty-bearers are and the duties that they 
have. The importance of accountability mechanisms is also recognised, although these are less clearly 
defined in national-level documents as they are expected to be designed at the state level. Rights-based 
principles are also incorporated into policy, even if the right to food is not explicitly mentioned.  
 
The design and implementation of the MDMS does not, however, always reflect a commitment to rights. 
Most significantly, those excluded by the targeting procedure and the conditionality of school 
attendance are not covered by any other scheme and therefore the state does not fulfil their right to food. 
Although the MDMS is importantly a legal right; rights are only partially reflected in the scheme itself.  
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I have also shown that entitlements are often not realised due to limits in the capabilities of rights-
holders to realise their rights and the non-fulfilment of duties. I have shown that this stems from 
problems in both the design and implementation of the MDM.  
 
The potential of the MDMS to contribute to the realisation of the right to food is limited as the scheme 
is not designed to address the multiple causes of malnutrition and food insecurity. As Schaffer argues, 
a dichotomy between policy and implementation obliterates the ‘need or occasion for discussing or 
bringing to account, all aspects of the actual construction of policy practice’ including allocations and 
calculations, strategies, therapies and other technologies, ‘which would be highly doubtful…were they 
ever brought to question’ (160). By examining the MDMS as public policy, I have shown that in its 
present form the capacity of the MDMS to realise the right to food is highly doubtful. First, targeting 
and conditionality means that the scheme does not provide food for all school children in need, with 
evident negative implications for excluded children. Second, the scheme does not meet needs during 
school vacations in non-drought-affected areas; with negative implications for the food intake and 
experiences. Third, the design and implementation of the scheme is detached from the actual and dietary 
needs of children, which raises uncertainty as to the capacity of the scheme to fulfil dietary needs. 
Finally, the GOI pays insufficient attention to the determinants of food security beyond access to food.  
 
The GOI and state governments are officially committed to ‘making live’, but inadequacies in the 
strategy and the allocation and distribution of resources means that children continue to be ‘let die’. 
Some continue to face malnutrition and food insecurity due to the absence of the state whereas others 
continue to face the same problems due to inadequacies in the care that they receive.  
 
Overall, this thesis has shown that although the MDMS is firmly rights-based, in its present form the 
right to entitlements in the MDMS are often unfulfilled and the right to food remains far from realised.  
 
9.8 Looking Ahead 
 
The findings presented in this thesis provide insight into the implications of potential changes in the 
MDMS. Here, I discuss three. First, several politicians have proposed that the MDMS should be 
replaced with pre-packaged food, beginning with Chief Minister Mayawati of Uttar Pradesh in 2007, 
followed by the Minister for Women and Child Development Renuka Choudhary in 2008 and the food 
processing minister Harsimrat Kaur Badal in 2014 (Mukul, 2014; Sethi, 2008; Vishnoi, 2016). In 2016, 
the Chief Minister of Rajasthan, Vasundhara Raje, wrote to the MHRD with a proposal to introduce 
pre-packaged food into the MDMS. The Chief Minister requested the amendment of the MDMS Rules, 
which specify that ‘hot cooked food’ must be served (Times of India, 2016b). Although the MHRD did 
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not accept these proposals, some state governments or at least some officials within them evidently 
wish to introduce pre-packaged food in the MDMS. These proponents of pre-packaged food perceive 
it as more hygienic and more nutritious than the hot-cooked meal and thus a technical solution to the 
scheme’s problems (Vishnoi, 2016). While it is unclear exactly what form the packaged food would 
take, one can envisage numerous challenges in its provision. For example, a shift to pre-packaged food 
would render schools entirely dependent on delivery and there would still be the potential for the food 
to be unhygienic and unsafe as the meal would require cooking or heating.  
 
The proposed shift to pre-packaged and processed food in the MDMS would most likely involve large 
private companies producing the food. Reflecting the discussion in Section 7.6.5, there are increasing 
links between the government, the private sector and NGOs. For example, in May 2017 Akshaya Patra 
held an event to launch the movement ‘Nourish India, Educate India’, at which the key guests included 
the Minister for Women and Child Development, Maenka Gandhi, and representatives from Nestlé, 
Pepsico and GlaxoSmithKline (Kaul, 2017). At the event, Maneka Gandhi argued that food for 
malnourished children should be considered medicine (not food) and that young children in the ICDS 
should be provided with high-calorie nutrient sachets which contain crushed peanuts and sugar 
alongside fortified biscuits (Financial Express, 2017; Sampath, 2017). The provision of pre-packaged 
food would likely turn the MDMS into a profit-making scheme for private companies. The lines 
between charity, business and rights therefore look to become increasingly blurred.  
 
Moreover, as has been reiterated throughout this thesis, the realisation of the right to food is about more 
than nutrition; qualitative adequacy, preference and cultural appropriateness are extremely important. 
It is difficult to see how the provision of pre-packaged food could account for local variations in 
preference and culture. The provision of pre-packaged food also raises concern for dignity (Kent, 2005). 
Overall, seeing food as medicine directly counters how food is perceived in a RBA.  
 
Second, the GOI is planning to introduce fortified wheat and oil and double iodised salt into the MDMS 
and other food-based schemes by December 2019 (Dhawan, 2016; Mitra, 2017). Although fortified 
food is already provided in some states, this is the first nation-wide introduction. According to the Food 
Safety and Standards Authority of India who launched the plan with the Ministry of Women and Child 
Development, fortification is intended to ‘fill the gap’ between micronutrient intake from food at home 
and needs (Mitra, 2017). The move to consider the micronutrient content of the MDMS and the needs 
of the rights-holders is, on the one hand, welcome. As has been shown, the GOI have not sufficiently 
considered micronutrients in the MDMS. On the other hand, there is reason for caution. In this thesis, I 
have shown the uncertainty surrounding the levels of child malnutrition in India and the nutritional 
content of the MDMS. Accurately ‘filling the gap’ in micronutrient needs would therefore require the 
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GOI to conduct extensive research on the nutritional status of children and the nutritional value of the 
MDM. Without such research, fortification would, just like the MDMS, be an indefinite attempt to meet 
unspecified needs.  
 
Taken together, the proposed move to using pre-packaged food and the policy to fortify food in India’s 
food-based schemes, can be interpreted as increasing nutritionism within food policy in India. 
Nutritionism is the paradigm in which food and its relationship with people is defined only by nutrients 
(Scrinis, 2002; 2008). Kimura (2013: 164), drawing on Scott (1998), argued that nutritionism, ‘helps 
one to “see like a state.” It makes a complex food problem legible, manageable, and controllable by 
simplifying it into a matrix of biomedical parameters’. Maneka Gandhi’s call to see food as medicine 
renders food as no more than the sum of its nutrients; the ‘layered meanings and values that go well 
beyond nutritional properties and contributions to physical well-being’ (Kimura, 2013:3) are ignored. 
Both pre-packaged food and fortified food are a technical and apolitical approach to malnutrition in 
India and to the problems in India’s food schemes. Pre-packaged food presents a means of addressing 
the problems in the MDMS without tackling any of the causes, including an inadequate budget, 
inadequate infrastructure and inefficient monitoring, which require a critical consideration of the actions 
of the GOI and state level governments. In this approach, the definition of needs would become even 
further detached from the actual and perceived needs of rights-holders. 
 
Finally, on 28 February 2017, the GOI issued a notification that linked the MDMS to Aadhaar, India’s 
biometric identification system. In the notification, the GOI stated that: ‘Individuals desirous of availing 
the benefits under the [MDM] Scheme offered at the Schools are required to furnish proof of possession 
of Aadhaar number or undergo Aadhaar authentication’ (GOI, 2017). Children not registered in the 
Aadhaar system and thus not in possession of an Aadhaar card will not be entitled to receive the MDM. 
The notification also stipulated that CCHs must be registered under the scheme to be employed. Other 
schemes in India, including the PDS have also been linked to Aadhaar. 
 
The rationale for linking the MDMS to Aadhaar is improved delivery and transparency: the notification 
states that the link to Aadhaar ‘simplifies the Government delivery processes, brings in transparency 
and efficiency, and enables beneficiaries to get their entitlements directly to them in a convenient and 
seamless manner’ (GOI, 2017). Implicit in this statement is the assumption that Aadhaar can prevent 
corruption in the MDMS and that the problems in the MDMS stem from a lack of transparency and 
efficiency. It is, however, difficult to see how forcing children and CCHs to register under Aadhaar 
would address any of the problems in the MDMS indentified in this thesis.  
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The link between the MDMS and Aadhaar has been opposed (e.g. Bhatty and Sinha, 2017; Economic 
and Political Weekly, 2017; Hindustan Times, 2017; Khera, 2017) for several reasons. Firstly, linking 
Aadhaar and the MDMS is practically problematic as it requires the biometric system to work and to 
be accessible to all. Yet, authentication failures are common, estimated to be 37% in Rajasthan (Yadav, 
2016). In fact, the study block of Kotra made the news as people had to climb trees to get the signal 
required to validate their biometric information to access the PDS (Pillai, 2017). This raises the question 
of what happens if children cannot register due to authentication problems; if they do not have the 
capability to register. Second, the use of biometric data raises issues regarding the privacy and consent 
(Bhatty and Sinha, 2017). Third, linking Aadhaar and the MDMS is wholly problematic from a rights-
based perspective. Any initiative which denies the right of eligible children to a MDM is against the 
orders of the Supreme Court, the NFSA and the overall duty of the state to fulfil the right to food. Thus, 
research which explores the impact of Aadhaar on the realisation of rights is required. 
 
These changes in policy on the MDMS and India’s other food-based schemes look set to have 
significant implications for the realisation of a right to food. There is consequently the need for 
continued research on the task of realising a right to food in India.  
 
 
 Chapter 10 
Contributions and 
Conclusions 
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Chapter 10 
 
Contributions and Conclusions 
 
 
10.1 Empirical Contributions 
 
To examine the everyday realisation of rights in the MDMS, I undertook fieldwork across four blocks 
in Rajasthan. I devised a mixed-methods research design which generated extensive quantitative and 
qualitative data, including more than 700 household surveys, 349 student surveys and 83 interviews. 
My research is therefore based on a larger sample of households and students than most studies of the 
MDMS (see Appendix B.9). The fieldwork also covered a greater geographical area than most studies 
of the MDMS. Furthermore, this research did not focus on single issues such as changes in enrolment 
or attendance as is typical in studies of the MDMS, but took a far broader approach to explore the design 
and implementation of the scheme. This is the first study which has thoroughly explored the scheme 
from a rights-based perspective.  
 
From this extensive research, I have provided a comprehensive and detailed insight into the MDMS. 
These insights were discussed in detail in the previous chapter. Overall, I have uncovered the 
complexities in the realisation of rights in the MDMS. In doing so, I have provided a detailed insight 
into the background of rights-holders and have contributed new insights into the food needs of rights-
holders and the processes of inclusion and exclusion in the MDMS. I have also provided original insight 
into the actions of duty-bearers and the existence and use of accountability mechanisms in the scheme. 
I have provided the first detailed insight into the involvement of PPPs in the MDMS and have shown 
that the narrative of success that surrounds the involvement of NGOs does not reflect reality.  
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10.2 Methodological Contributions 
 
In this thesis, I have introduced a new way of examining rights-based social protection schemes, which 
considers the components of a rights system both on ‘paper’ and in practice alongside the extent to 
which rights-based principles are adhered to and rights are realised. I have examined all three stages of 
the policy process as described by Schaffer (1984): the setting of agendas, proceduralisation and the 
allocation of resources, as well as the distribution of resources (Harris, 1991). Put more simply, I have 
examined who is supposed to get what in the MDMS, whether this occurs and what determines the 
provision and realisation of entitlements. To do this, I have taken a realisation-focussed approach to 
rights, ‘looking outwards from the lived realities of people, so that analytical efforts are anchored to 
their substantiation, not their promise’ (Pritchard et al., 2014: 8). This approach has included examining 
the experiences of rights-holders and their representatives as well as the experiences of duty-bearers, 
particularly teachers and cooks. The empirical insights generated show the value in adopting this 
approach. 
 
This research also provides insight into conducting research with children. The importance of 
considering the views of children in research has been increasingly recognised (see Section 3.3.7). Kent 
(2010) specifically argued the need for the views of children to be considered in discussions of rights-
based SFPs. My research confirms the importance of doing so. I have shown that children are capable 
of providing detailed insights into SFPs. Furthermore, I have shown that as their views affect MDM 
consumption, one must gain insight into their views to understand rights realisation. I have also shown 
that essays and surveys are valuable methods to assess the views of literate children and can be used 
successfully in India. I have also shown that children, especially older children, are capable of reporting 
their own food consumption and therefore that 24-hour food-consumption recall is a valid measure to 
use with children.  
 
I have also used a novel multi-method assessment of food security, which combines qualitative and 
quantitative methods. In doing so, I have shown the value of using the FCS and the HFIAS in India. I 
have, however, also shown the limits and problems in applying the FCS method in South Asia, 
particularly the problems that arise from milk consumption. I have also confirmed that food and food 
security are personal and subjective and therefore need to be studied through qualitative measures. I 
have shown that surveys, focus groups and interviews are appropriate methods to do so.  
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10.3 Theoretical Contributions and Conclusions 
 
10.3.1 Operationalising the Capability Approach 
 
Much of the academic discussion of the capability approach is theoretical. Here, I focussed on 
capabilities in practice. I sought to examine the MDMS using the capability approach and in turn reflect 
on what the analysis of the MDMS might add to the approach. The capability approach proved a useful 
means of considering whether and why children with a right to consume the meal do so. Drawing on 
Robeyns’ (2005) characterisation of the flow from goods to functionings, I showed that to realise the 
right to the MDMS, children must have the capability to do so and then must choose to do so. I propose 
that whether the consumption of the MDM could lead to the functioning to be food secure and well-
nourished depends on a number of different factors, including the quality of the MDM served and the 
child’s health.  
 
Taking this further, the capability approach provides useful language with which to describe the 
processes that determine whether having a right leads to the achievement of functionings. Adapting the 
conceptualisation of the approach by Robeyns (2005), I propose that the following provides a useful 
basis for the analysis of the links between rights-based social protection schemes and functionings.   
 
 
Figure 10.1: Conceptualisation of rights-based social protection schemes 
Right to a good/service
Capability
Capable of accessing 
good/service
Functioning
Use or consumption of the good
End functioning
e.g. to be well-nourished, to be 
educated
Conversion Factors
• Personal- e.g. Metabolism, physical health
• Social- social norms and power relations
• Environmental- e.g. climate, environment
Choice
• Influenced by preference and social 
influences
• A product of social history and psychology
Conversion Factors
• Personal- e.g. Metabolism, physical health
• Social- social norms and power relations
• Environmental- e.g. climate, environment
Provision of the good/service
Duty-bearers must have the 
capacity to fulfill their duties
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This approach firstly allows researchers to consider the gaps between rights and realisation more 
carefully. In particular, it forces one to consider rights-holders as agents and as actors within wider 
structures. Secondly, the above introduces the consideration of individuals and social variability which 
is central to the capability approach (Crocker, 2008) into the analysis of social protection. Thus, when 
applied to a scheme such as the MDMS, the capability approach enables one to make sense of patterns 
of consumption and to explore how these might vary depending on existing inequalities and power 
relations.  
 
The approach shown in Figure 10.1 could be applied to other SFPs. For example, from Poppendieck’s 
examination of the school lunch programme in the US, it is clear that typically students had the 
capability to consume a school lunch, but many chose not to, prioritising taste and social acceptability 
over accessing a free meal. Evidently, the functioning of being well-nourished may not always be 
prioritised. The approach might also be applied to other social protection schemes in India and 
elsewhere. For example, in the TPDS, one might ask whether eligible recipients have the capability to 
receive their full entitlements from the ration shop, whether they choose to do and what determines 
both capabilities and choice. 
 
The capability approach adds to the conceptualisation of rights by forcing one to focus on multiple 
capabilities and rights. Rights exist simultaneously and may often be nested. For example, the right to 
a MDM cannot be realised without other capabilities and rights, such as to receive an education. 
Capabilities are also useful for considering how the provision of a social protection scheme might lead 
to a functioning. For example, in the MDMS it is clear that further capabilities and functionings beyond 
receipt of the MDM must be achieved for the MDMS to contribute to the functioning of being well-
nourished. The capability approach highlights the plurality of capabilities and rights, broadening a 
rights-based perspective which might easily focus on a single right. 
 
The additions to the conceptualisation of the capability approach by Wolff and de Shalit (2007) are also 
useful for thinking about rights. Although I hesitate to advocate the introduction of more phrases into 
the capability approach, their concept of secure functionings and Nussbaum’s (2011) term ‘capability 
security’ adds an important temporal consideration to discussions of rights. Rights and the capabilities 
to realise them must be stable over time. Thus, approaches to realising rights must ensure temporal 
stability. The concepts of fertile functionings and corrosive disadvantages are also useful in analysing 
problems and solutions, for example, in characterising being well-nourished as a fertile functioning or 
location as a potentially corrosive disadvantage. Nevertheless, although enabling fertile functionings 
and dismantling corrosive disadvantages should be a consideration for governments, it is hard to see 
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how these could be the focus of government action as Nussbaum, (2011) and Wolf and de Shalit (2007) 
suggest. 
 
The capability approach alone, however, is insufficient to examine the realisation of rights due to the 
focus on the opportunity rather than process aspect of freedom (Sen, 2002; 2009). For example, to draw 
on Kent’s (2005) description again, delivering pre-packaged meals as one might deliver feed pellets to 
livestock may lead to the functioning of being well-nourished. The process, however, is devoid of 
dignity and participation. Furthermore, drawing on the influence of preference and taste on consumption 
of the MDMS found in this study, this form of delivery may affect whether students choose to consume 
the meal. Thus, alongside capabilities and outcomes, one must also consider the process and adherence 
to rights-based principles. 
 
10.3.2 The Everyday Realisation of Rights 
 
For a rights-based system to work, three conditions must be fulfilled: rights-holders must be able to 
claim their rights, duty-bearers must be able to fulfil their duties and accountability mechanisms must 
be in place to ensure that the duty-bearers can be held to account for the non-fulfilment of duties. By 
the end of Chapter 2, the complexity of this system was evident. From the findings presented in Chapter 
4-8 and the analysis presented in Chapter 9, broader conclusions can be made about rights realisation. 
 
First, for the right to food to be realised, all those without the means of fulfilling their own right to food 
must be covered by social protection schemes. These rights-holders must then have the capability to 
realise their right. Second, duty-bearers must fulfil their duties. This capacity depends on the balance 
of demands and enablements. Third, effective monitoring and internal and external accountability 
mechanisms must be in place to ensure that this capacity is enacted on and rights are realised. I have 
shown that the realisation of rights requires more than duty-bearers being held to account; 
accountability must be directed towards those responsible. Finally, careful attention must be paid to the 
nature of rights and whether the right to social protection is in line with broader rights-based objectives. 
For social protection schemes to lead to the realisation of a right to food, the entitlements they provide 
must collectively enable the realisation of a right to food.   
 
Thus, for any rights-based social protection scheme, the following questions need to be asked:  
 
1. Who are the rights-holders and are all those in need rights-holders? 
2. Do rights-holders have the capability to realise their rights and what determines their     c   
capabilities?  
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3. Who are the duty-bearers and what are their duties? 
4. Do duty-bearers have the capacity to fulfil their duties and what determines this capacity?  
5. What accountability mechanisms exist and are used and what determines their use?  
6. Do these accountability mechanisms ensure the detection and correction of problems?  
7. To what extent is the social protection scheme capable of fulfilling broader rights and leading 
to functionings?  
    
To answer these questions, one must consider all stages of the policy process. The wider structures and 
influences on agency must also be considered. As part of this, I have shown the importance of taking a 
geographical approach to examining the realisation of rights. As Carmalt (2007: 80) states: the ‘basic 
tenets of geographic analysis-physical access, the importance of local context, and viewing violations 
as deprivations of physical space—apply to human rights across the board’. I have shown empirically 
how these factors influence the realisation of rights and thus the importance of considering spatial as 
well as social and temporal variations in the realisation of rights.  
 
10.3.3 The Potential and Pitfalls of Rights-based Approaches 
 
As reviewed in Section 2.3.1, a vast amount of literature has focussed on the ‘potentials’ and ‘pitfalls’ 
of RBAs. This research has provided additional insight into several of these.  
 
First, echoing the ‘potentials’ outlined by Hickey and Mitlin (2009), RBAs add clarity and rigour to the 
conceptualisation of both problems and solutions due to the emphasis placed on government 
responsibility. Even if one might consider the steps taken by the GOI to realise a right to food to be 
inadequate, the recognition of the right to certain schemes has ensured that the vast majority of India’s 
poor receive some form of entitlements. When rights are legally recognised, development is 
transformed from the recognition that the state should do something, to the legal obligation that it must. 
I have shown, however, that numerous actors comprise the ‘state’ and that these actors do not 
necessarily share the same understanding of the purpose of social protection schemes. I have also shown 
that in practice numerous actors beyond the state affect social protection schemes. In the MDMS, NGOs 
have a perfect obligation to provide the MDM and the community and the private sector are involved 
in the implementation of the scheme, but do not have clearly defined perfect obligations. Moreover, 
non-state actors may not have an obligation, but may shape the realisation of rights. For example, 
parents may influence whether children can attend school and consume a school lunch. Thus, although 
the focus of RBAs is and should be the state, for the realisation of rights to occur, it is also necessary to 
understand how other actors affect the realisation of rights.  
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Second, a rights-framework provides a solid basis for legal challenges to government decisions. For 
example, rights can be (and at the time of writing are being) utilised to challenge the link between 
Aadhaar and social protection schemes including the MDMS. Once a right has been established, 
violations of this right can be legally challenged.  
 
Third, in RBAs recipients become active claimants. Those receiving entitlements are not termed 
‘beneficiaries’, but instead are rights-holders. Consequently, these rights-holders have a claim on duty-
bearers. However, as Hickey and Mitlin (2009) identify, the agency of the poor and marginalised can 
be exaggerated. Indeed, in India the initial right to food case was conducted on behalf of the people of 
Rajasthan, not by them. As shown in this thesis, existing power dynamics combined with other factors 
such as education and awareness can limit the capability of rights-holders and their representatives to 
hold duty-bearers to account and to claim their rights. Thus, in RBAs, the capability of rights-holders 
to claim their rights and to hold duty-bearers to account should not be assumed. 
 
Fourth, to ensure the fulfilment of rights, accountability mechanisms must be in place. However, I have 
shown the plurality of duty-bearers that may be involved in a scheme and the multiple levels and ways 
in which duties might be unfulfilled. This complicates determining blame and the process of 
accountability. In the MDMS, although accountability mechanisms focus on the schools, the actions of 
teachers and cooks exist within the wider structure of the demands placed on them and the enablements 
determined by the actions of the government at all levels. Thus, RBAs require not only that 
accountability mechanisms exist and can be used, but that these mechanisms are directed at those 
ultimately responsible for the non-fulfilment of rights. 
 
Finally, RBAs are considered to politicise development. Problems are seen as the product of failures of 
duty-bearers and thus actions by duty-bearers are the solution. However, the politicisation of the 
problem does not automatically lead to politicisation throughout a scheme. Although the right to food 
case politicised the issues of malnutrition and food insecurity in India, politicisation cannot be assumed 
to have trickled down into the social protection schemes which resulted. I have shown that the MDMS 
is often implemented in a manner which depoliticises the problems the scheme is intended to address, 
the needs of rights-holders, the interpretation of needs and the problems in the MDMS itself. Rights-
based social protection schemes and the political technologies and strategies states employ in them, 
should be examined and interrogated to the same extent as other development initiatives and public 
policy (reviewed in Section 2.8).  
 
Overall, I consider the potentials of RBAs to far outweigh the pitfalls. Grounding SFPs and social 
protection schemes in RBA means that the existence of a scheme cannot be altered due to the whim of 
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governments or donor agencies. However, adopting a RBA is insufficient; conditions must be 
established to ensure that the right can be realised. Moreover, this process of realisation should adhere 
to the principles of human rights.  
 
10.5 Realising the Right to Food 
 
Increasingly, having access to adequate and acceptable food is recognised not as a privilege, but as a 
human right to be fulfilled primarily by the state. The potential for social protection schemes to 
contribute to the realisation of a right to food and the importance of grounding social protection schemes 
in rights have also been increasingly recognised. In this thesis, I have shown the value of rights-based 
social protection schemes and the value in examining social protection schemes from the perspective 
of a right to food. However, through examining India’s school lunch programme, I have shown that the 
establishment of rights to social protection is just one part of the realisation of the right to food. For a 
right to food to be realised, social protection schemes must collectively be capable of fulfilling the right 
for those without the means to do so themselves. Duty-bearers must then fulfil their duties and rights-
holders must be capable of realising their rights. Overall, this thesis has shown the need to go beyond 
accepting a scheme as ‘rights-based’ to consider the messiness of the everyday realisation of rights. As 
‘the right to food is fully in’ (Eide, 2005: 91), there is a pressing need for further scholarship which 
explores the everyday realisation of a right to food through social protection schemes in differing 
contexts.  
 
 
 301 
 
 
Appendix A 
 
Hunger, Malnutrition and Food Insecurity  
 
A.1 Hunger  
 
Hunger refers to an inadequate intake of food relative to needs. The prevalence of hunger is most 
commonly determined using data from the FAO. The FAO estimate is based on a minimum calorie 
cut-off, approximately 1,800 calories, for ‘light physical activity’ (FAO, 2008). As has been widely 
discussed (e.g. de Haen et al., 2011; Headey and Ecker, 2013; Hickel, 2015; Massett, 2011; Svedberg, 
2000; 2008; 2011; 2013), the FAO methodology is imperfect. The figures are determined using 
potentially inaccurate national data and the estimation is based on only light activity. For example, 
the FAO (2015) estimate that 194.6 million people in India are undernourished (a term they use 
synonymously with hunger). However, many people in India require more than a minimum of 1,800 
calories. For example, an average rickshaw cyclist requires between 3,000-4,000 calories per day 
(Hickel, 2015). Thus, it is likely that the number of hungry people in India is higher than the FAO 
estimate.  
 
A.2 Malnutrition 
A.2.1 Protein Energy Malnutrition 
 
Protein-energy malnutrition (PEM) refers to an inadequate intake of food. Despite the name, 
individuals with PEM may have an adequate intake of protein, but due to an inadequate total intake 
of food, the protein is used as metabolic fuel (Bender, 2002). BMI is used to indicate PEM in adults 
using the established cut-offs listed in Chapter 2. BMI is calculated by dividing weight in kilograms 
by height in meters squared. BMI and the associated cut-offs are not without their limitations and are 
not universally accepted for all populations (see Burkhauser and Cawley, 2008; Mascie-Taylor and 
Goto, 2007). However, BMI is still widely used and, in lieu of a superior alternative, is reported in 
this thesis. In children under the age of five, PEM is indicated by height and weight-for-age and 
weight-for-height (Section 2.2.1). There are two severe forms of PEM; marasmus and kwashiorkor 
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(see Bender, 2002).  
A.2.2 Micronutrient Deficiencies 
 
Drawing on Bender (2002), Black et al. (2013), Gragnolati et al. (2006), Müller and Krawinkel 
(2005), in Table A.1, I summarise the causes and consequences of common micronutrient 
deficiencies. Table A.1 indicates the significance of micronutrient deficiencies for growth and 
development. 
Table A.1: Summary of Micronutrient deficiencies 
Deficiency Causes  Consequences  
Iron Low consumption, poor 
absorption or blood loss  
Anaemia (fatigue, dizziness and palpitations), 
low-birth weight or premature delivery and 
maternal mortality, impaired physical and 
cognitive development in children  
Iodine Inadequate intake Low birth weights, goitre and impaired child 
development  
Vitamin A Inadequate intake (vitamin A 
or carotene), poor absorption, 
increased metabolic demand  
Impaired vision, blindness, impaired immune 
system and thus an increased susceptibility to 
infection  
Zinc Inadequate intake (often due to 
consumption of unleavened 
wholemeal bread), loss due to 
sweat  
Impaired growth and development (delayed 
puberty), lowered appetite and decreased 
immunity  
 
A.2.3 The Causes of Malnutrition 
 
The first 1000 days of a child’s life are extremely important for nutrition. Poor intrauterine growth 
rate leads to children having a low birth weight (LBW) (<2500g) (Black et al., 2013; Gillespie and 
Haddad, 2003; Kramer, 1987). After birth, nutrition continues to be important although vulnerability 
varies. As Martorell (1999: 289) summarised:  
 
Childhood malnutrition flourishes during periods of vulnerability. One such period 
is in utero… [LBW] newborns are at high risk for serious morbidity and mortality 
during infancy…There follows a brief period of relative well-being after birth, even 
in settings of marked poverty, but only if babies are breastfed. At some point in early 
infancy, by three to six months generally, growth rates begin to falter dramatically, 
particularly before one year of age. By the time children are two or three years of 
age, many are underweight and stunted’.  
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Young children are thus particularly vulnerable to malnutrition. Martorell (1999: 289-290) 
outlined why: 
 
One reason is that growth rates in the first few years are higher than at other times 
after birth, and thus adverse factors have a greater potential for causing growth 
retardation early in life than at later years. Young children have high nutritional 
requirements per kilogram of body weight, in part because of their needs for growth. 
Another reason for the vulnerability of young children is that their immunological 
systems develop and mature with time; young children are more susceptible to 
frequent and severe infections than older children with mature immune systems. Yet 
another reason for the vulnerability of young children is that they are less able to make 
their needs known and are more vulnerable to the effects of poor parenting.  
 
Thus, child malnutrition is determined by a combination of factors. Poor maternal health including 
stature and nutrition increases the chance of children having a LBW (Black et al., 2013; Gillespie and 
Haddad, 2003; Kramer, 1987; Ramakrishnan et al., 1999; Victora et al., 2008). Correct feeding 
practices, ‘exclusive breastfeeding for the first six months of life and continued breastfeeding through 
the second year of life’ (Black et al., 2008: 250), also determine child growth and health (Arifeen et 
al., 2001; Ruel et al, 1999). Nutritional status is also determined by the environment in which children 
live. Poor sanitation increases the chance of ingesting pathogens that cause infections and can lead to 
diarrhoea which then limits nutrient absorption and causes dehydration and appetite loss (Gillespie 
and Haddad, 2003). Open defecation can result in poor health due to diarrhoea and chronic 
enteropathy1, which decreases nutrient absorption and growth (Spears, 2016). Improvements in 
hygiene, water and sanitation have therefore been found to significantly reduce the rates of morbidity 
and the severity of other diseases (Esrey et al.,1991). 
 
It is possible for catch-up growth to occur in later childhood and adolescence (Golden, 1993; Himaz, 
2009; Hirvonen, 2014; Outes and Porter, 2013; Tanner, 1986). Hirvonen (2014) therefore calls for 
‘re-thinking the policy recommendation where nutritional interventions are only targeted to young 
children’ (68). For all, adolescence is a period of rapid growth and therefore adequate nutrition is also 
very important in adolescence (Black et al., 2013). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
1 A disease of the small intestine, caused by ingested faecal material (Humphrey, 2009). 
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A.2.4 The Consequences of Child Malnutrition  
 
Child malnutrition has profound effects on child development. Unless compensatory growth occurs, 
then poor nutrition in early childhood leads to stunted growth and thus a reduced stature in adulthood 
(Gigante et al., 2009; Gillespie and Haddad, 2003; Victora et al., 2008). Undernutrition detrimentally 
affects cognitive development (Brown and Pollitt, 1996), by ‘causing direct structural damage to the 
brain and by impairing infant motor development’ (Victora et al., 2008: 343). Undernutrition 
therefore detrimentally affects educational performance. For example, Martorell (1996 in Gillespie 
and Haddad, 2003: 9) found that undernutrition could reduce IQ by up to 15 points. Undernutrition 
also increases the risk of children dropping out of school (Gillespie and Haddad, 2003). Due to the 
impacts on health and education, malnutrition has a profoundly negative effect on economic 
productivity (Gragnaloti et al., 2005; Ramachandran, 2014). The World Bank estimate that 
malnutrition causes productivity losses to individuals equivalent to more than 10% of lifetime 
earnings and that the gross domestic product (GDP) lost to malnutrition can be as high as 2-3% (2006: 
2). In total, Black et al. attribute ‘more than a third of child deaths and more than 10% of the total 
global disease burden to maternal and child undernutrition’ (2008: 254).  
 
A.2.5 Food Security 
 
As Pritchard et al. wrote, a nutritional perspective ‘provide[s] little basis for asking how and why 
these outcomes occur. For this, the metabolic notion of under-nutrition needs expanding into the 
social scientific concept of food security’ (2014: 13). ‘Food security’ became part of official discourse 
at the 1974 World Food Conference, where the term was defined as the ‘availability at all times of 
adequate world food supplies of basic foodstuffs’ (United Nations [UN], 1975). Since then, the 
concept has ‘evolved, developed, multiplied and diversified’ (Maxwell, 1996: 155), as has been 
widely discussed (e.g. Davis et al., 2001; Jarosz, 2011; Maxwell, 1996). To summarise, in the 1970s, 
food insecurity was conceptualised as a supply issue to which the best policy response was to increase 
food availability through production. However, it became clear that hunger could exist despite 
adequate production and supply (see Sen, 1981). In the 1980s, hunger began to be understood as the 
product of production, labour, trade and transfer-based entitlements; people’s ability to acquire food 
through legal means. Thus, after Sen, discussions of food security recognised economic and social 
access as well as availability, and the scale of focus changed from national production to the 
household and the individual. Since then, the importance of livelihood security, vulnerability, 
nutrition security and qualitative factors including quality, cultural acceptability, preference and 
dignity have been recognised (Davis et al., 2001; Maxwell 1996). For this reason, food security is 
today commonly understood to be ‘when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access 
to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active 
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and healthy life’ (FAO, 1996). As outlined in Table 2.7, food security is considered to have four 
‘pillars’. Drawing on Sen, food insecurity is when the total food derived from entitlements is 
insufficient to meet needs (HLPE, 2012). Food insecurity is ‘both the inability to secure an adequate 
diet today (i.e. hunger) and the risk of being unable to do so in the future’ (ibid: 22).   
 
Even though this definition of food security is now established, scholars, particularly sociologists and 
geographers, have shown that the term is still often used to refer to food availability and production. 
Mooney and Hunt (2009) consider this to be a ‘flat key approach’ to hunger, an approach that obscures 
the causes of food insecurity (Midgely, 2013). In contrast, a ‘sharp key approach’ acknowledges 
access and emphasises low-cost, low-technology production and national self-sufficiency (Mooney 
and Hunt, 2009). Cloke (2013) therefore considers food security a meme; ‘a vehicle for conveying 
and performing a set of socio-cultural beliefs relating to a neoliberal view of global food production’ 
(622), an idea supported by the analysis of food security discourse and policy by Kirwan and Maye 
(2013), Lang & Barling (2012), Nally (2015; 2016) and Tomlinson (2011). Collectively, this body of 
work highlights the need to consider how the term ‘food security’ is used and why. 
 
The conceptualisation of food security has also changed over time in India. After Independence in 
1947, food security initiatives focussed on increasing grain production (Acharya, 2009), achieved in 
the 1970s largely through the Green Revolution (Ramachandran, 2016). However, persistently high 
levels of malnutrition led the government to realise that national food production was not the sole 
determinant of food security (Acharya, 2009). Consequently, government policy began to address 
poverty and to consider household and individual food security (ibid). To ensure food access, the GOI 
launched the ICDS scheme in 1975 and the PDS in 19922 (Ramachandran, 2014). In 1993, the GOI 
launched a National Nutrition Policy which expanded these two schemes. In 1995, the GOI launched 
a National Plan of Action on Nutrition and the MDMS. The National Food Security Mission was 
introduced in 2007 to increase production. Schemes also exist to address the utilisation dimension of 
food insecurity, including The School Health Programme (part of the 2005 National Rural Health 
Mission) and Swachh Bharat Abhiyan (Clean India Campaign) launched in 2014.  
 
To further ensure access to food, the National Advisory Council (NAC)3 of the United Progressive 
Alliance (UPA) government drafted a National Food Security Bill in 2011 (Kotwal et al., 2011). An 
amended version of the Bill was passed on 2 September 2013, becoming the National Food Security 
Act. The extent to which the NFSA addresses food security generated much discussion. 
                                                        
2 These schemes and the other policies referred to in this section are described in Appendix B.4  
3 The NAC was established by the Congress-led UPA coalition government in 2004 to implement the 
government’s Common Minimum Programme, which aimed to address the needs of India’s poor.  
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Suryanarayana (2013) criticised the Act for not being based on an explicit concept of food security. 
The Right to Food Campaign (2013) argued that the Act over-emphasised grains and failed to 
consider nutrition and dietary diversity. Saxena (2012; 2016) argued that the Act gives inadequate 
attention to the non-food determinants of nutrition, particularly sanitation. Indeed, by focussing on 
access only, the NFSA reflects only one dimension of food security. More generally in discussions 
of food security in India particularly in the media, one finds a tendency for ‘food security’ to be used 
to refer to production and distribution, particularly through the PDS (e.g. The Economic Times, 2016; 
The Hindu, 2016). Even, Mander and Parulkar (2016), who acknowledge the plethora of definitions 
of food security, only discuss agricultural issues under the heading of food security. Thus, the use of 
the term ‘food security’ in India is often narrower than the FAO’s conceptualisation of the term.  
 
A.2.6 Food Sovereignty 
 
Connected to the right to food is the concept of food sovereignty. ‘Food sovereignty’ was officially 
introduced at the 1996 World Food Summit by the international peasant’s movement La Vía 
Campesina. Although the definition of food sovereignty has changed over time (Agarwal, 2014; 
Jarosz, 2014), food sovereignty is now commonly defined as ‘the right of peoples to healthy and 
culturally appropriate food produced through ecologically sound and sustainable methods, and their 
right to define their own food and agriculture systems’ (Declaration of Nyéléni, 2007). Yet, extensive 
debate concerns what food sovereignty and means in practice (e.g. Agarwal 2014; Bernstein, 2014; 
Burnett and Murphy, 2014; Claeys, 2012; Edelman, 2014; Patel, 2009; Rosset, 2013; Trauger, 2013). 
Moreover, little has been said about food sovereignty in specific places (Desmarais and Wittman, 
2014) or might mean for people who do not grow their own food such as urban residents (Dickinson, 
2013; Patel et al. 2013 are notable exceptions). Dickinson (2013) found that food stamps in the US 
gave beneficiaries little control over what they could eat and Patel et al. (2013) argued that recipients 
of India’s food schemes are treated as passive with no control over the food that they receive. Beuchelt 
and Virchow (2012) and Edelman et al. (2014) consider the right to food to be more useful than food 
sovereignty as it applies to all and is more legitimate as it has already been recognised internationally 
and nationally and is more feasible. Jarosz (2014), however, advocates seeing the two concepts as 
relational, connecting issues of food access, with nutrition, justice, ethics and responsibility. Although 
the focus of this thesis is the right to food not food sovereignty, the latter concept is still useful for 
considering control in India’s food schemes.  
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A.3 Food Insecurity and Malnutrition in India, Rajasthan and 
the Study Districts  
 
A.3.1 Introduction 
In this section, I provide further insight into food insecurity and child malnutrition in India. I expand 
on the data presented in Chapter 3 to show the spatial and social patterns in child malnutrition in 
India, Rajasthan and the study districts and the determinants. In doing so, I aim to provide a more 
detailed insight into the context in which the MDMS exists and functions.  
 
A.3.2 Food Insecurity  
 
As detailed in Chapter 3, there have been three state-level assessments of food security in India: 
Athreya et al. (2008), Athreya et al. (2010) and Menon et al. (2008). The first uses data from the 
Census (2001) and the third National Family Health Survey (NFHS-3), the second and the third use 
data from NFHS-3 and the National Sample Survey (NSS) (2004-2005). The indicators used in each 
are detailed in Table A.2. 
 
Table A.2: Indicators used in the indices of food security in India 
Study Focus Indicators 
Athreya et 
al. (2008) 
Food 
(in)security 
in rural India 
- The percentage of population consuming less than 1,890 Kcal/day 
- The percentage of households without access to safe drinking water  
- The percentage of households without access to toilets within the 
premises 
- The percentage of ever-married women who are anaemic 
- The percentage of women (15– 49 years) with chronic energy 
deficiency 
- The percentage of children (6 –35 months) who are anaemic  
- The percentage of children (6–35 months) who are stunted. 
Athreya et 
al. (2010) 
Food 
(in)security 
in urban 
India 
- The percentage of urban population consuming less than 1890 
Kcal/ day 
- The number (per 1000) of urban male workers not in regular 
employment 
- The number, (per 1000) of urban female workers not in regular 
employment, 
- The percentage of urban households without access to toilets  
- The percentage of ever-married urban women (15-49 years) with 
any anaemia.  
- The index supplements these with additional variables to create 
different variants. Variant one, which is the preferred variant and 
thus the results are focused on here, also includes the percentage of 
urban children (6-35 months) with any anaemia and the percentage 
of urban children (6-35 months) who are stunted. 
Menon et 
al. (2009) 
State hunger 
index 
- The proportion of the population consuming an inadequate quantity 
of calories 
- The proportion of children under five who are underweight  
- The mortality rate of children under five 
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The results from Athreya et al. (2010) are presented in Chapter 3. To further understand the pattern 
of food insecurity in India, the results from Athreya et al. (2008) are shown in Figure A.1. Athreya et 
al. (2008) found that seven states (Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Karnataka, Andhra 
Pradesh, Orissa and Bihar) had a high level of food insecurity and two states (Chhattisgarh and 
Jharkhand) had a very high level. Rajasthan had a moderate level. 
 
 
Figure A.1: Map of rural food insecurity in India from Athreya et al. (2008: 91) 
 
Menon et al. (2008) created a state hunger index. Of the 17 states for which data was analysed, four 
states were considered to have a ‘serious’ level of hunger, 12 to have an ‘alarming’ level and one 
(Madhya Pradesh) to have an ‘extremely alarming’ level of hunger (Figure A.2). Rajasthan fell into 
the alarming category.  
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Figure A.2: State hunger index by Menon et al. (2008) 
 
From these three assessments, it is clear that Rajasthan has high levels of food insecurity, although 
not the highest levels.  
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A.3.3 Stunting, Wasting and Underweight  
  
 
Data Sources 
In Chapter 3, I provided a brief overview of the rates of child malnutrition in India and indicated the 
different findings of the main nutrition surveys. Here, I elaborate on the problems with the Indian 
malnutrition data. Examining the extent of malnutrition in India is complicated by a lack of 
comprehensive and comparative data (Dandona et al., 2016; John and Menon, 2015; Misra, 2015). 
The most comprehensive surveys are the NFHSs. The third was conducted in 2005-2006 and the 
fourth in 2014-2015. The release of the results for the fourth has, however, been slow and staggered. 
The Rapid Survey on Children (RSOC) was conducted by the GOI and UNICEF in 2013-2014 and 
focuses specifically on children. The release of the results was delayed until 2016. In the media, many 
attributed the delay to political reasons (for example: Angre, 2015; Rowlatt, 2015; The Economist, 
2015b). Two Indian Human Development Surveys were also conducted, in 2004-2005 and 2011-
2012, which covered a range of topics. At the sub-national level, there have been three Annual Health 
Surveys (AHS) which focus on nine states. These were supplemented by a Clinical, Anthropometric 
and Bio-chemical (CAB) survey in 2014. Four District-Level Health Surveys (DLHS), have also been 
conducted, most recently in 2012-2013. Finally, a one-off HUNGaMA survey was conducted in 2011 
by the Naandi Foundation. As shown in Table A.3, the surveys have different reference groups, 
limiting the extent to which the results from the surveys can be compared. 
 
Here, I use data from the RSOC, NFHS-3 and NFHS-4 and the 2014 CAB. The NFHS was used to 
permit comparison over time. Yet, due to the slow release of the NFHS-4 data and the specific focus 
of the RSOC on children, the RSOC was also used. The AHS was used to provide data on BMI and 
anaemia, as it collected data at the district level and provided information on children up to 18 years 
of age.  
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Spatial Patterns  
 
The prevalence of each indicator of PEM varies by state. The prevalence of underweight children was 
shown in Chapter 3. Figure A.3 presents the degree of stunting, from the RSOC1. Prevalence ranged 
from 19.4% in Kerala to 51% in Uttar Pradesh. In Rajasthan, 36.4% of under-fives were stunted.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A.3: Percentage of under-fives in India that are stunted  
(data from GOI and UNICEF, 2016) 
 
 
Figure A.4 shows the prevalence of wasting, which does not follow the same pattern. Prevalence of 
wasting ranged from 5.1% in Sikkim to 19.1% in Andhra Pradesh. In Rajasthan, 14.1% of under-
fives were experiencing wasting. 
                                                        
1 Due to the slow release of NFHS-4 data, at the time of the creation of Figures A.3 and A.4 the RSOC data 
covered the largest number of states and was therefore used.  
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Figure A.4: Percentage of under-fives in India who are wasting  
(data from GOI and UNICEF, 2016) 
 
Overall, PEM is prevalent in Rajasthan, although it is not the worst state for child malnutrition. The 
prevalence of the three measures of PEM, however, vary across Rajasthan. Figures A.5-7 show the 
prevalence of each indicator by district. As shown, the prevalence of stunting and underweight 
children is particularly high in Udaipur district. Using the NFHS-4 data, of 33 districts, Rajsamand 
has the sixteenth highest level of stunting, the ninth highest level of wasting and the seventeenth 
highest level of underweight children. Udaipur district has the fourth highest level of stunting, the 
eighth highest level for wasting and the third highest level of underweight children. Thus, levels of 
PEM are particularly high in Udaipur district. 
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Figure A.5: Percentage of children under five who are stunted in Rajasthan (data from IIPS, 2016) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A.6: Percentage of children under five who are wasted in Rajasthan (data from: IIPS, 2016). 
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Figure A.7: Percentage of children under five who are underweight (data from: IIPS, 2016) 
 
Figures A.3-A.7 show that child malnutrition is prevalent in Rajasthan and particularly in the study 
districts. Thus, by the time children in the study area attend school, a large proportion are suffering 
from PEM. In the following two sub-sections, I detail the rates of malnutrition among children of 
school-going age.  
 
A.3.4 BMI  
 
Malnutrition in older children is assessed using BMI. The RSOC reports BMI in girls aged 10-18 
only. Nationally, 77.2% of girls aged 10-14 and 44.7% of girls aged 15-18 have a below normal BMI 
(<18.5). Figure A.8 shows the prevalence across states. Comparing Figure A.8 with Figure A.3, it is 
clear that some states such as Bihar and Jharkhand have both a high prevalence of stunted children 
and girls with a below normal BMI. However, Rajasthan and particularly Goa have especially high 
levels of girls with below normal BMIs. In Rajasthan, 74.4% of adolescent girls (10-18 years) had a 
BMI of less than 18.5, compared to the national average of 62.5% (GOI, 2016c). The percentage was 
even higher in rural areas at 77.3%. 
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Figure A.8: Percentage of girls (10-18 years) with BMI < 18.5  
(data from GOI and UNICEF, 2016) 
 
The AHS provides insight into the nutritional status of children aged 5-18, albeit in just nine states. 
Figure A.9 shows the percentage of children between 5-18 years with a below normal BMI for age. 
As shown, Rajasthan has the second highest level; 32.5% of children in this age group are 
undernourished.  
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Figure A.9: Percentage of children (5-18 years) who are undernourished (<2sd)  
(Data source: GOI, 2014a).  
 
The AHS results indicate that in the study districts undernutrition is prevalent among 5-18 year olds. 
Udaipur has the eighth highest level of undernourishment (39% of 5-18 year olds) and the fifth highest 
level of severe undernourishment (19.5%) (<3 standard deviations below normal). Rajsamand has the 
twelfth highest level of undernourishment (36.6%) and the seventh highest level of severe 
undernourishment (18.0%). These results indicate that severe levels of undernourishment are 
particularly high in the study districts. Table A.4 shows the percentage of adults aged 15-49 with a 
below normal BMI. As shown, the study districts have higher levels that the state and national 
averages.  
 
Table A.4: Percentage below normal BMI (Data from: IIPS, 2016) 
Location 
Percentage with a Below 
normal BMI (15-49 years) 
Women Men 
India Total 22.9 20.2 Rural 26.7 23.0 
Rajasthan  Total 27.0 22.7 Rural 29.9 25.1 
Rajsamand  Total 28.6 26.6 Rural 31.2 30.5 
Udaipur Total 37.7 38.7 Rural 43.1 42.1 
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A.3.5 Anaemia 
 
It is also necessary to consider the prevalence of micronutrient deficiencies, of which anaemia (a lack 
of iron) is the most commonly measured deficiency. The AHS found that anaemia was prevalent 
among children. The proportion of 5-9 year olds with anaemia ranged from 78.5% of the age group 
in Chhattisgarh to 95.1% in Uttarakhand. The prevalence among 10-17 year olds ranged from 74.5% 
in Odisha to 91.1% in Uttarakhand. Data on anaemia from the NFHS-4 and AHS are shown in Table 
A.5. Once again, the study districts have higher levels than India and Rajasthan. Notably, anaemia is 
particularly prevalent among children in Rajsamand district.  
 
Table A.5: Levels of Anaemia 
Location  
Percentage anaemic 
6-59 
months 
(NFHS-4) 
5-9 
years 
(AHS) 
10-17 
years 
AHS 
All women 
15-49 
(NFHS-4) 
Anaemia 18-59 
(AHS) 
Men Women 
India Total 58.4 - - 53.0 - - 
Rural 59.4 - - 54.2 - - 
Rajasthan Total 60.3 85.7 81.4 46.8 83.0 82.6 
Rural 61.6 85.8 82.2 49.0 83.8 83.4 
Rajsamand Total 75.9 88.8 84.6 62.0 87.3 86.6 Rural 76.5 87.3 84.4 63.3 88.2 86.4 
Udaipur Total 79.1 81.8 79.8 69.7 84.5 84.7 Rural 80.5 82.0 82.2 74.3 86.2 84.5 
 
Thus, approximately 80-89% of children of school-going age in Rajasthan and the study districts 
suffer from anaemia.  
 
A.3.6 Social Patterns 
 
The prevalence of undernutrition therefore varies between and within states and is typically higher in 
rural areas (Ramachandran, 2014). Rates of undernutrition vary socially as well as spatially. Whilst 
the RSOC report concludes that there are no significant differences by gender in the prevalence of 
stunting, wasting and underweight children (GOI and UNICEF, 2016), typically a higher proportion 
of girls suffer from anaemia (GOI, 2014a). Typically, although not always, a higher proportion of 
adult women than men have a below normal BMI (IIPS, 2016). The trends in rates of malnutrition 
and other social groupings are clearer. At the national level, the results from the RSOC (Table A.6) 
showed strong trends in malnutrition by caste, religion, wealth and maternal education.  
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Table A.6: Malnutrition in under-fives in India (GOI, 2016c) 
Characteristic  
Percentage of under-fives experiencing 
indicator 
Stunting Underweight Wasting 
Caste 
SC 42.4 32.7 15.5 
ST 42.3 36.7 18.7 
OBC 38.9 29.3 14.8 
Other 33.9 23.6 13.6 
Religion 
Hindu 38.6 29.7 15.5 
Muslim 42.1 30.5 13.4 
Christian  32.2 21.9 15.4 
Sikh 28.7 17.4 10.7 
Jain 20 15.9 11.9 
Buddhist 26.7 26.2 22.0 
Wealth 
Index 
Lowest 20% 50.7 42.1 17.0 
Top 20%  26.7 18.6 13.0 
Mother’s 
Education 
No Education 48.7 37.9 15.3 
< Primary 44.1 34.3 15.2 
Primary 39.8 30.9 15.2 
Middle 35.4 25.8 15.2 
Secondary 31.3 22.4 14.5 
Higher Secondary 26.3 18.7 14.5 
 
Although data on religion, wealth and maternal education are not available at the state level, caste-
based trends in the rates of PEM are evident in Rajasthan. As shown in Table A.7, the prevalence of 
malnutrition is far higher among children belonging to SCs and STs than other castes.  
 
Table A.7: PEM by caste in Rajasthan (data from GOI and UNICEF, 2016) 
Caste Percentage of under-fives who are Stunted Wasted Underweight 
SC 44.3 15.3 35.0 
ST 45.9 22.8 44.5 
OBC 32.2 12.0 27.3 
Other 31.0 11.1 27.7 
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There are also other groups that are particularly vulnerable to undernutrition. These include: ‘those 
belonging to the unorganized sector, such as landless workers and artisans, single-woman headed 
households, the destitute, children in especially difficult circumstances like street and working 
children, disabled and old people without caregivers, migrant workers’ (Ramachandran, 2014: 8).  
 
A.3.7 Determinants  
 
The variation in the levels of malnutrition can broadly be explained by the variation in the underlying 
determinants of malnutrition. Using the conceptual framework of the determinants of child 
malnutrition shown in Chapter 2 (Figure 2.2), these causes can be grouped as household food intake, 
care for mothers and children and health care.2 The following examines these determinants in the 
Indian context.  
 
Food Intake 
Despite rising incomes and expenditure in India since the 1980s, the NSSs show that average calorie 
consumption has declined. In 1983, the average daily intake was 2221 kcal in rural areas and 2089 
kcal in urban areas (GOI, 2014c). Average intake reached the lowest level in 2009-2010 at 2020 kcal 
in rural areas and 1946 kcal in urban areas. By 2011-2012 intake had increased to 2099 kcal and 2058 
kcal, but was still lower than the 1983 levels (ibid). The National Nutrition Monitoring Bureau 
(NNMB) of the National Institute of Nutrition (NIN) in Hyderabad has conducted nutrition surveys 
in 10 states3 since 1975. The NNMB also find an average decline in consumption by 500kcal/CU/day, 
ranging from a decline of 885 kcal in Karnataka to 218 kcal in Gujarat (NIN, 2012: 42).  
 
Heated debate surrounds the reason for this decline, a full review of which is provided by Pritchard 
et al. (2014: 34-39). Following this review, it is likely that the decrease in consumption is due to 
decreased calorie needs resulting from decreased physical activity (Deaton and Drèze, 2009; Desai et 
al., 2016a; Ramachandran, 2016), voluntary decisions to spend money on non-food items (Banerjee 
and Duflo, 2011) and increased pressure on household budgets due to other costs such as education 
(Basu and Basole, 2013). The NNMB surveys also found decline in the consumption of main food 
groups between 1975 and 2012; in rural areas cereal intake decreased by 137g, roots and tubers by 
6g, milk and milk products by 21ml, sugar and jaggery (cane sugar) by 9g and other vegetables by 6g 
(Ramachandran, 2016).  
                                                        
2These explanations can, of course, be grouped in other ways, as done by Desai et al., (2016a); Menon et al., 
(2009) and Walton (2009).  
3 The NNMB surveys are conducted Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, 
Maharashtra, Odisha, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal. Rajasthan is not included.  
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At the aggregate level, consumption in Rajasthan looks favourable compared to the national average. 
Average calorie intake in 2011-2012 in Rajasthan was 2408 kcal in rural areas and 2320 kcal in urban 
areas, higher than the national averages of 2233 kcal and 2206 kcal c: 38-40). Per capita protein intake 
was 68.4g in rural Rajasthan and 62.7g in urban Rajasthan compared to 56.5g and 55.7g nationally. 
Yet, between 1993-1994 and 2011-2012, the amount of protein consumed in Rajasthan decreased by 
11g; the greatest reduction in any state. Compared to the national average, roots and tubers, pulses, 
vegetables, meat, egg and fish make a smaller contribution to food intake in Rajasthan than elsewhere 
(GOI, 2014c).  
 
Moreover, food intake varies considerably between groups. The NSS compares expenditure on food 
and cereals and the daily intake of calories, protein and fat with monthly per capita expenditure 
(MCPE) which is taken from the NSS consumer expenditure survey. Generally, in rural areas 
expenditure on food and cereals decreases as total monthly expenditure increases. In Rajasthan, for 
the first fractile4, 51% of expenditure is on food, peaking at 56.4% for the third fractile and declining 
to 31.7% for the twelfth. The same pattern is also found in urban areas; declining from 57.2% to 
24.1%. Expenditure on cereals declined from 15.5% to 2.2%. Although the expenditure on food 
declines as overall monthly expenditure increases, food intake increases. Figures A.10 and A.11 show 
that the consumption of calories and protein is nearly twice as high in the twelfth fractile than in the 
first.  Fat intake also increased, from 29.6g in rural areas and 40.7g in urban areas in the first fractile 
to 121.5g and 132.5g in the twelfth fractile. The differences between the first and twelfth fractile are 
considerable; in rural areas, the lowest fractile consume almost half the number of calories, slightly 
over half the amount of protein and one third of the amount of fat as the top fractile. 
 
 
                                                        
4 The GOI (2014b: 12) divides expenditure groups into fractiles. The first fractile is between 0-5% of the 
population, meaning 0-5% of the population with the lowest ranked MCPE. The second between 5-10%, the 
third between 10-20% increase in tens until the eleventh and twelfth fractiles which refer to the 90-95% and 
95-100% of the population. Thus, the first fractile has the lowest MCPE and the twelfth the highest.  
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Figure A.10: Calorie consumption by MCPE Fractile in Rajasthan (data from: GOI, 2014c: A-95).  
 
 
Figure A.11: Protein consumption by MCPE Fractile in Rajasthan (data from: GOI, 2014c: A-95). 
 
Overall, Figures A.10 and A.11 show that food intake is particularly inadequate among the poor (those 
with the lowest MCPE).   
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Care 
Child malnutrition in India has been repeatedly shown to be determined by maternal nutrition 
(Ramalingaswami et al., 1997; Sanghvi et al., 2001; Subramanian et al., 2009) and maternal care and 
feeding practices (Brennan et al., 2004; Kumar et al., 2006; Ramalingaswami et al., 1997). Poor child 
feeding practices have been shown to be related to the mother’s nutritional knowledge (Malhotra, 
2012) and overall, maternal education has been found to affect child nutrition (Mishra and Retherford, 
2000; Mittal et al., 2007; Radakrishna and Ravi, 2004). Maternal and child nutrition is also affected 
by the intra-household distribution of food which may be affected by autonomy, education and gender 
(Gragnolati et al., 2005). The gendered distribution of food in the favour of males is noted to occur 
(for example: Chaudhury, 1984; Levinson 1974), although it does not always occur (Ghosh, 1986; 
Griffiths, et al., 2002). Child nutrition is also influenced by birth order and birth interval; later children 
and children born closer together are more likely to be malnourished (Basit et al., 2012; Harishankar 
et al., 2004; Mishra and Retherford, 2000).  
 
The prevalence of these determinants of child malnutrition are typically higher in Rajasthan than the 
national average. Nationally, of the 68.7% of children weighed within 24 hours of birth, 18.6% had a 
LBW, whereas in Rajasthan, of the 57.8% weighed, 23.2% had a LBW (GOI, 2016). As shown in 
Table A.8, good child feeding practices are far from being practiced by all, and, with the exception 
of frequency of feeding, are practiced less in Rajasthan than nationally. 
 
Table A.8: Feeding Practices in India and Rajasthan (GOI, 2016c) 
Feeding Practice  India Rajasthan 
Percentage of children under two fed within one hour of birth 44.6 38.6 
Percentage exclusively breastfed for the first five months 64.9 49.9 
Percentage receiving complementary foods at 6-8 months 50.5 45.9 
Percentage aged 6-23 months fed minimum number of times5 36.3 45.8 
Percentage aged 6-23 months with minimum dietary diversity6 19.9 14.5 
 
Health 
Malnutrition in India is also determined by the health environment, including access to safe water 
and sanitation (Ramalingaswami et al. 1997; Smith and Haddad, 2015; Spears, 2013). The Census 
(GOI, 2011) found that 53.1% of people had no latrine and the RSOC found that 45.5% of people 
practice open defecation. Malnutrition is also linked to health care facilities, including care for 
pregnant women and new mothers and infants. The RSOC shows the coverage and use of these health 
                                                        
5 Breastfed at least twice a day for children 6-8 months old and three times for 9-23 months 
6 Four or more food groups 
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facilities is inadequate and is lower in Rajasthan than nationally (Table A.9). The health environment 
is also worse in Rajasthan. As was shown in Chapter 3 (Table 3.4) open defecation and poor sanitation 
facilities are more common in Rajasthan than nationally and more common in the study districts than 
in the state.  
 
Table A.9: Available and use of health facilities in India and Rajasthan (GOI, 2016c) 
Percentage of India Rajasthan 
Women receive post-natal care within 24 hours 39.2 9.5 
New-borns receive check-up within 24 hours 33.6 9.9 
Children aged 12-23 months fully immunised 65.3 60.7 
Aganwadi open for at least 25 days in previous month 62.6 56.4 
Children aged 0-35 months availed of anganwadi services 49.2 33.7 
Children aged 36-71 months availed of anganwadi services 44.2 22 
Pre-school children attending anganwadi centre 38.7 15.5 
Children 0-59 months receiving deworming in past 12 months 27.6 19 
Children 0-59 months receiving iron/folic acid in past 12 months 13.4 4.3 
Children 0-59 months receiving vitamin A in past 12 months 45.2 27.3 
 
There are clear social patterns in maternal nutrition, caring practices, access to and use of health 
services and the health environment. As shown in Table A.10, poor feeding practices, limited access 
to medical care and inadequate access to sanitation are more likely to be experienced in rural areas, 
by SCs and STs and by the poorest. 
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Child malnutrition is thus not only caused by inadequate food intake. Ramachandran (2014), using data 
from the NFHS-3, found that undernutrition in adult males and females is highly correlated (r=0.9510) 
‘indicating common causal factors like insufficient income/access to food’ (2014: 92). However, 
Ramachandran found that the correlation between undernourished women and undernourished children 
(<5 years), is weaker (r= 0.77) indicating that ‘factors other than food intake are the cause of poor 
nutrition status among children’ (ibid). Ramachandran also finds positive correlations between 
underweight children under five and the proportion of the population falling in the lowest income 
quartile (r = 0.76), females with no education (r=0.67), and toilet facilities at home (r= 0.73 (ibid: 94-
95).  
 
It is the high levels of these underlying determinants that cause high levels of malnutrition in India and 
the persistence of the Indian enigma (Ramalingaswami et al., 1997). For example, Coffey (2015) reports 
that ‘42.2% of Indian women are underweight when they begin pregnancy compared with 16.5% of 
African women’ (3302). Although neither women in Africa or India gain a lot of weight during 
pregnancy, ‘because of pre-pregnancy deficits, Indian women end pregnancy weighing less than 
African women do at the beginning’ (ibid). Higher rates of open defecation in India have also been 
attributed to causing the differences between stunting in the two regions (Spears, 2013).  
 
A.4 Conclusion  
 
The problem of malnutrition is multi-dimensional and inter-generational. As put by Ramachandran et 
al. (2008: 15):  
 
When poor and weak mothers give birth to children in the absence of family, community 
and institutional support, an intergenerational process of poor health, nutrition and 
education is set in motion in which the majority of Indian children are willy-nilly caught. 
These very handicaps have a long-term effect.  
 
Addressing hunger and malnutrition therefore requires a multi-dimensional response. In particular, the 
above shows the importance of the third dimension of food security, utilisation. Addressing the 
problems of hunger and malnutrition requires more than merely increased access to food; the underlying 
and basic determinants (Figure 2.2) must also be addressed. Moreover, the above shows the importance 
of the life-cycle approach taken in the NFSA. Although the first 1000 days are the most important from 
a nutritional perspective, adequate nutrition throughout the life-cycle is also required.  
                                                        
10 All correlations reported in this paragraph are significant at 99.9%.  
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The data and trends explored in this appendix therefore have implications for the research context. First, 
it has been shown that certain groups are more likely to suffer from malnutrition and poor food intake. 
These are the same groups that are likely to be enrolled in government school and to be out-of-school. 
Second, high levels of malnutrition among school-aged children in Rajasthan have been shown. The 
need for effective nutrition interventions in the study state and districts has therefore been shown. 
Finally, the above has shown that the efforts to address malnutrition must consider all the determinants 
of malnutrition. Increased access to food in the MDMS is not enough; the other determinants of 
malnutrition must also be addressed.    
 
 
 328 
 
 
Appendix B 
 
Chapter 2 
 
B.1 A Recent History of India’s Policy on Nutrition and Food Security  
 
National Nutrition Policy, 1993 
The National Nutrition Policy was launched in 1993. Recognising the prevalence of PEM and 
micronutrient deficiencies and the multi-dimensional problem of nutrition, the Policy outlined 
measures to tackle nutrition, including the expansion of ICDS to cover the remaining 2,388 blocks in 
the country by 2000. The Policy also stated:  
 
‘with the objective of reducing the incidence of severe and moderate malnutrition 
by half by the year 2000 A.D. a concerted effort needs to be made to trigger 
appropriate behavioural changes among the mothers. Improving growth 
monitoring between the age group 0 to 3 years in particular with closer 
involvement of the mothers, is a key intervention’ (GOI, 1993: 7).  
 
The policy also aimed to reduce LBWs to less than 10% by 2000. To do so, the Policy asserted that 
supplementary nutrition should be expanded beyond the first trimester, up to and including the major 
period of lactation. To ensure food security, the policy asserted that food grain production should be 
increased to at least 230 million tonnes by 2000. The Policy also asserted that a National Nutrition 
Council would be created, over which the Prime Minister would preside.  
 
National Plan of Action on Nutrition, 1995 
The National Plan of Action on Nutrition, launched in 1995, sought to increase ‘awareness of energy 
and micronutrient deficiencies’ and to empower ‘household and communities to tackle them through 
existing resources’ (GOI, 1995a); 13). The Plan recognised the problems of malnutrition, determined 
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by maternal status, intrauterine growth rate and the inadequacies in the intake of calories, protein and 
micronutrient intake.   
The Plan outlined the history of nutrition policy in India since Independence, as occurring in 
four phases: medical/clinical, food production and technology. community development and 
the multi-sectoral approach, which began with the launch of ICDS. 
 
The Plan outlined the following aims, to be achieved by the year 2000:  
- ‘Reduction in moderate and severe malnutrition among pre-school children by half 
- Reduction in chronic under nutrition and stunted growth in children 
- Reduction in incidence of low birth weight to less than 10 percent 
- Elimination of blindness due to vitamin ‘A’ deficiency 
- Reduction in iron deficiency anaemia among pregnant women to 25% 
- Universal iodization of salt for reduction of iodine deficiency disorders to 10% 
- Giving due emphasis to Geriatric Nutrition  
- Production of 250 million tonnes of food grains 
- Improving household food security through poverty alleviation programmes  
- Promoting appropriate diets and healthy lifestyles’ (ibid; 13)  
 
The Plan also outlined the general and specific objectives and plans of action across different sectors: 
agriculture, civil supplies and public distribution, education, forestry, maternal and child health, food, 
food processing industries, health, information and broadcasting, labour, rural development, urban 
development, welfare and women and child development. For example, the general objective of 
agriculture was to ‘ensure national level food security including adequate buffer stocks and nutritional 
considerations in Agriculture Policy’. For women and child development, the objective was to ‘ensure 
‘appropriate development of human resources both through direct nutrition interventions for specially 
vulnerable groups as well as through various development policy instruments’ (ibid: 15, 40).  
 
National Rural Health Mission, 2005 
The GOI launched the National Rural Health Mission (NRHM) on 12 April 2005 to provide 
accessible, affordable and quality health care to the rural population, especially the vulnerable groups’ 
(GOI, 2013). The NRHM also sought to reduce the maternal mortality rate from 407 to 100 per 
100,000 live births, infant mortality from 60 to 30 per 1000 live births and the total fertility rate from 
3.0 to 2.1 by 2012 (GOI, 2005 5). The NRHM also sought to ensure: 
- ‘Universal access to public services for food and nutrition, sanitation and hygiene and 
universal access to public health care services with emphasis on services addressing 
women’s and children’s health and universal immunization 
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- Prevention and control of communicable and non-communicable diseases, including locally 
endemic diseases.  
- Access to integrated comprehensive primary health care.  
- Population stabilization, gender and demographic balance.  
- Revitalize local health traditions & mainstream AYUSH [Ayurveda, Yoga and Naturopathy, 
Unani, Siddha and Homoeopathy]  
- Promotion of healthy life styles’ (ibid: 15)  
The mission focused primarily on 18 states; Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, 
Himachal Pradesh, Jharkhand, Jammu and Kashmir, Manipur, Mizoram, Meghalaya, Madhya 
Pradesh, Nagaland, Orissa, Rajasthan, Sikkim, Tripura, Uttaranchal and Uttar Pradesh. The Mission 
involved the introduction of a trained voluntary community health worker (Accredited Social Health 
Activist or ASHA) in every village in 18 priority states (ibid).  
 
In 2013, a National Urban Health Mission (NUHM) was launched, which along with the NRHM, 
falls under an overarching National Health Mission (GOI, 2013a).  
 
National Food Security Mission, 2007 
The National Food Security Mission (NFSM) was launched on 29 May 2007. The Mission aimed to 
increase the production of rice by 10 million tons, wheat by 8 million tons and pulses by 2 million 
tons by the end of the Eleventh Plan (2011-12)’ (GOI, 2009: 1). Overall, the Mission had four 
objectives: 
 
1. ‘Increasing production of rice, wheat and pulses through area expansion and productivity 
enhancement in a sustainable manner in the identified districts of the country; 
2. Restoring soil fertility and productivity at the individual farm level; 
3. Creation of employment opportunities; 
4. Enhancing farm level economy (i.e. farm profits) to restore confidence amongst the farmers’ 
(GOI, 2009:1).  
  
For the 12th five year plan (2012-2017), the new objective is an ‘additional production of food grains 
of 25 million tons of food grains comprising of 10 million tons rice, 8 million tons of wheat, 4 million 
tons of pulses and 3 million tons of coarse cereals by the end of 12th Five Year Plan’ (GOI, 2012: 1). 
The objectives still include restoring soil fertility and enhancing the farm level economy.  
 
School Health Programme 
The School Health Programme (SHP) is part of the NRHM. The Programme has several components 
(GOI, n.d.), including: health screening, care and provision including screening for anaemia and 
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nutritional problems; immunisation; micronutrient management in the form of weekly iron-folate 
tablets and vitamin A in ‘needy cases; de-worming; health promotion including counselling, yoga 
and physical services; capacity building; monitoring and evaluation and the Midday meal.  
 
Swach Bharat Abhiyan (Clean India Campaign) 
Launched in October 2014, Swach Bharat Abhiyan seeks to improve the cleanliness of India, 
particularly by ending open defecation by October 2019. The scheme is not the first sanitation 
campaign undertaken by the GOI; the Total Sanitation Campaign was launched in 1999, renamed 
Nirmal Bharat Abhiyan in 2012. As part of the overall Swach Bharat Abhiyan, the GOI launched a 
campaign for Swachh Bharat: Swachh Vidyalaya (Clean India: Clean Schools); ‘A key feature of the 
campaign is to ensure that every school in India has a set of functioning and well maintained water, 
sanitation and hygiene facilities’ (GOI, 2014d: 1). The GOI recognised the link between sanitation 
facilities and nutrition, stating that ‘hygiene in school also supports school nutrition. The simple act 
of washing hands with soap before eating the school mid day meal assists to break disease 
transmission routes’ (ibid: 1).  
 
The National Food Security Act, 2013 
The National Food Security Act (NFSA) was originally proposed as a Bill in 2011 and, after 
amendments, was officially passed in September 2013. The NFSA is ‘An Act to provide for food and 
nutritional security in human life cycle approach, by ensuring access to adequate quantity of quality 
food at affordable prices to people to live a life with dignity and for matters connected therewith or 
incidental thereto’ (NFSA, 2013). The Act entitles ‘persons belonging to the eligible households’ to 
up to 5kg of subsidised grain per month (3.2). Eligible households are entitled to grain at a price ‘not 
exceeding rupees 3 per kg for rice, rupees 2 per kg for wheat and rupee 1 per kg for coarse grains for 
a period of three years from the date of commencement of this Act’ (schedule I). The prices ‘shall 
extend up to seventy-five per cent. of the rural population and up to fifty per cent. of the urban 
population’ (ibid). Under the heading of ‘women empowerment’, the Act states: ‘the eldest woman 
who is not less than eighteen years of age, in every eligible household, shall be head of the household 
for the purpose of issue of ration card’ (13.1). 
 
The scheme also entitles every pregnant woman and lactating mother, to a:  
 
a) meal, free of charge, during pregnancy and six months after the child birth, through the 
local anganwadi, so as to meet the nutritional standards specified in Schedule II; and 
b) maternity benefit of not less than rupees six thousand, in such instalments as may be 
prescribed by the Central Government’ (4.a.b) 
 
For children, the Act states: 
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a) in the case of children in the age group of six months to six years, age appropriate meal, 
free of charge, through the local anganwadi so as to meet the nutritional standards specified 
in Schedule II: 
 
Provided that for children below the age of six months, exclusive breast feeding shall be 
promoted; 
 
b) in the case of children, up to class VIII or within the age group of six to fourteen years, 
whichever is applicable, one mid-day meal, free of charge, everyday, except on school 
holidays, in all schools run by local bodies, Government and Government aided schools, so 
as to meet the nutritional standards specified in Schedule II 
 
(2) Every school, referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (1), and anganwadi shall have facilities 
for cooking meals, drinking water and sanitation: Provided that in urban areas facilities of 
centralised kitchens for cooking meals may be used, wherever required, as per the guidelines 
issued by the Central Government... 
 
8) In case of non-supply of the entitled quantities of food grains or meals to entitled persons 
under Chapter II, such persons shall be entitled to receive such food security allowance from 
the concerned State Government to be paid to each person, within such time and manner as may 
be prescribed by the Central Government. 
 
In Chapter Xii, ‘Provisions for Advancing Food Security’ the Act states:  
 
The Central Government and the State Governments shall, while implementing the 
provisions of this Act and the schemes for meeting specified entitlements, give special 
focus to the needs of the vulnerable groups especially in remote areas and other areas which 
are difficult to access, hilly and tribal areas for ensuring their food security. (30)  
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B.2 Supreme Court Orders from the Right to Food Case 
The following provides selected contents of the Petition to the Supreme Court and the MDM-related 
content of the Supreme Court Orders.  
B.2.1 Petition Under Article 32 Of the Constitution of India Seeking 
Enforcement of Right to Food  
(PeopleÔs Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 196 of 2001) 
The petition raises the following questions of law public importance which need to be adjudicated 
by this Hon'ble court.  
A. Starvation death is a natural phenomenon while there is a surplus stock of food grains in the 
Government godown. Does the right to life mean that people who are starving and who are 
too poor to buy food grains ought to be given food grains fee of cost by the State from the 
surplus stock lying with the State, particularly when it is reported that a large part of it is 
lying unused and rotting? 
B. Does not the right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution of India include the right to 
food? 
C. Does not the right to food, which has been upheld by the Hon'ble Court, imply that the State 
has a duty to provide food especially in situations of drought, to people who are drought 
affected and are not in a position to purchase food? 
The facts leading to the petition are as under: 
3. That there are innumerable cases of starvation deaths reported across the country. Starvation deaths 
are caused largely due to non-availability of food over a long period of time. Owing to the topography 
of our Country, there are certain areas that are drought prone and are in the grip of severe drought 
year after year. Consequently, there is no food available in the public distribution system outlets, and 
prices at commercial shops are exorbitant, making it impossible for people to purchase food grains. 
The relief measures provided, in case of drought and famine, are far from adequate and increasing 
numbers of people have been falling victim to starvation deaths. According to the Government of 
India figures, out of thirty-six crore people living below the poverty line, there are more than five 
crore people who have been victims of starvation. The petitioner craves leave to refer to and rely upon 
the said records at the time of hearing of this petition. 
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11. That the petitioner submits that there is no shortage of food in the country. Food grains are in 
surplus and are in fact rotting in godowns and warehouses of the Respondent No. 2. It is submitted 
that there are times when these grains are destroyed exported at throwaway prices or even allowed to 
be eaten by rodents instead of distributing them to starving people. 
18. Meanwhile, close to 50 million tonnes of grain are lying idle in public godowns in Rajasthan and 
across the country. There is so much grain the Government’s reserves that the Respondent no. 2, the 
Food Corporation of India has run out of storage space. In some cases, there is barely a distance of 
75 kilometres between the location of these godowns and the places where starvation is rampant, 
people are malnourished, and cattle are dying. 
21. Even in ordinary years, hunger and undernutrition are widespread in Rajasthan. According to the 
National Family Health Survey (1998-99(, for instance: 
a More than half of all children below 3 years are undernourished. 
b About half of all adult women suffer from anaemia. 
26. In any organised society, the right to live as a human being is not ensured by meeting only the 
animal needs of man. It is secured only when a man is assured of all facilities to develop himself and 
is freed from all those restrictions that inhibit his growth. All human rights are designed to achieve 
this object. The Right to Life guaranteed in any civilised society implies the right to food, water, 
shelter, education, medical care and a decent environment. These are basic human rights known to 
any civilised society. The civil, political, social and cultural rights enshrined in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and Convention or under the Constitution of India cannot be exercised 
without these basic human rights. [Chameli Singh v State of UP (1996) 2 SCC 549.] 
Per Bhagwati J: We think that the right of life includes the right to live with human dignity 
and all that goes along with it, namely, the bare necessaries of life such as adequate nutrition, 
clothing and shelter over the head and facilities for reading, writing and expressing oneself 
in diverse forms, freely moving about and mixing and commingling with fellow human 
beings. Franic Caralie v Union of Territory of Delhi (1981) 1 SCC, 608. 
38. The Government of Rajasthan is providing subsidised food to only some BPL (below poverty 
line) families. This Petitioner has visited many villages where not a single BPL family has been 
provided with subsidised food. The official entitlement of BPL, families to subsidised food is 20 kg 
of wheat per household per month at Rs. 4.60 per kg. This provision is hopelessly inadequate for the 
following reasons: 
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45. Not only is shortage of resources as an unacceptable excuse, it is also untrue and misleading. 
Close to 50 million tonnes of grain (mainly wheat and rice) are lying idle in public godowns across 
the State and the country. In some cases, there is barely a distance of 75 kms between the location of 
these godowns and the places where starvation is rampant. There is an urgent human need, 
supplemented by practical considerations, to utilise a substantial portion of these food stock... 
B.2.2 Supreme Court Order Of November 28, 2001 
 
I. After hearing learned counsel for the parties, we issue, as an interim measure, the following 
directions: 
 
3. Mid Day Meal Scheme (MDMS)  
i. It is the case of the Union of India that there has been full compliance with regard to the 
Mid Day Meal Scheme (MDMS). However, if any of the States gives a specific instance of 
non-compliance, the Union of India will do the needful within the framework of the 
Scheme. 
ii.  We direct the State Governments/ Union Territories to implement the Mid-Day Meal 
Scheme by providing every child in every Government and Government assisted Primary 
Schools with a prepared mid day meal with a minimum content of 300 calories and 8-12 
grams of protein each day of school for a minimum of 200 days. Those Governments 
providing dry rations instead of cooked meals must within three months start providing 
cooked meals in all Govt. and Govt. aided Primary Schools in all half the Districts of the 
State (in order of poverty) and must within a further period of three months extend the 
provision of cooked meals to the remaining parts of the State. 
iii. We direct the Union of India and the FCI to ensure provision of fair average quality grain 
for the Scheme on time. The States/ Union Territories and the FCI are directed to do joint 
inspection of food grains. If the food grain is found, on joint inspection, not to be of fair 
average quality, it will be replaced by the FCI prior to lifting. 
 
B.2.3 Interim Order of May 2, 2003 
 
Regarding Mid Day Meal, on 28th November, 2001, this Court directed the State Government/Union 
Territories to implement the Mid Day Meal Scheme (MDMS) by providing every child in every 
Government and Government assisted Primary Schools with a prepared mid day meal with a 
minimum content of 300 calories and 8-12 grams of protein each day of school for a minimum of 200 
days. It was further directed that those Governments which provide dry rations instead of cooked 
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meals, within three months start providing cooked meals in all Govt. and Govt. aided Primary Schools 
in all half the Districts of the State (in order of poverty) and must within a further period of three 
months extend the provision of cooked meals to the remaining parts of the State. Some States in 
implementation of the said direction are supplying cooked mid day meal to the students. We are, 
however, told that despite the fact that 1½ years has passed, some of the States have not even made a 
beginning. Particular reference has been made to States of Bihar, Jharkhand and Uttar Pradesh. It is 
not in dispute that in these three State even beginning has not been made whereas some of the other 
States are fully implementing directions for supply of cooked Mid Day Meal. Counsel for Uttar 
Pradesh and Jharkhand could not give any satisfactory reason for non-implementation. No reply or 
affidavit was filed by the said State. In so far as the State of Bihar is concerned, Mr. B.B. Singh has 
drawn our attention to the affidavit filed by Secretary and Relief Commissioner, Relief and 
Rehabilitation Department, Government of Bihar, inter alia stating that the State Government 
proposes to implement this scheme in few blocks on a pilot basis through panchayat, pending 
settlement of the issue regarding funding of conversion cost and to establish the capacity of the 
panchayat raj institution to supply hygienic cooked meals to all eligible students on a regular basis, 
without compromising teaching activities. The affidavit could not be more vague than what it is. 
When they propose to start, in how many districts they propose to start, what scheme has been 
formulated and every other conceivable detail is missing from the affidavit. We are told that there are 
38 districts in the State of Bihar. For the present, we direct the said State to implement the cooked 
Mid Day Meal Scheme in terms of the directions of this Court in at least  
10 District, which may be most poor according to the State’s perception.  
 
We also direct the State of Uttar Pradesh, Jharkhand and other States to make a meaningful 
beginning of the cooked Mid Day Meal Scheme in at least 25% of the District, which may be most 
poor.  
 
B.2.4 Order Of April 20, 2004 
 
... The petitioner has also made a reference to the announcement made by the Prime Minister 
extending the mid-day meal scheme upto 10th Standard during his address to the Nation on 15th 
August, 2003. The suggestion is that extension should be made operational at the earliest. In reply, it 
has been contended that once the mid-day meal scheme at primary level is consolidated, the question 
of extension of the scheme upto 10th Standard can be taken up in a phased manner. In this connection, 
it has been pointed out that the views of various States have been asked in regard to the cost and 
logistic requirements for the extension of the scheme upto 10th Standard. 
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 ...Having regard to the aforesaid, in respect of cooked mid-day meal scheme, we issue the following 
directions: 
1. All such States and Union Territories who have not fully complied with the order dated 28th 
November, 2001 shall comply with the said directions fully in respect of the entire 
State/Union Territory, preferably, on the re-opening of the primary schools after a long 
vacation of 2004 and, in any case, not later than 1st September, 2004. 
2. All Chief Secretaries/Administrators are directed to file compliance report in regard to 
directions No.1 on or before 15th September, 2004. 
3. The conversion costs for a cooked meal, under no circumstances, shall be recovered from the 
children or their parents. 
4. In appointment of cooks and helpers, preference shall be given to Dalits, Scheduled Castes 
and Scheduled Tribes. 
5. The Central Government shall make provisions for construction of kitchen sheds and shall 
also allocate funds to meet with the conversion costs of food-grains into cooked mid-day 
meals. It shall also periodically monitor the low take off of the food-grains. 
6. In respect of the State of Uttaranchal, it has been represented that the scheme is being 
implemented in all the schools. It would be open to the Commissioners to inspect and bring 
it to the notice of the Court, if it is otherwise. 
7. In drought affected areas, mid-day meal shall be supplied even during summer vacations. 
8. An affidavit shall be filed by the Government of India, within three months, stating as to 
when it is possible to extend the scheme upto 10th Standard in compliance with the 
announcement made by the Prime Minister. The affidavit shall also state the time frame 
within which the Government proposes to implement the recommendations of Abhijit Sen 
Committee in respect whereof the modalities have been discussed with the concerned 
Ministries and Planning Commission. 
9. Attempts shall be made for better infrastructure, improved facilities (safe drinking water etc.), 
closer monitoring (regular inspection etc.) and other quality safeguards as also the 
improvement of the contents of the meal so as to provide nutritious meal to the children of 
the primary schools. 
The issue as to the implementation of this scheme will be considered in the month of September, 
2004. 
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B.3 Rights-based Policies in India 
 
Right to Information Act, 2005 
The National Campaign for People’s Right to Information was launched in 1996, stemming from the 
work of the social movement Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan in Rajasthan (Association for the 
Empowerment of Workers and Peasants). The Campaign was established primarily to campaign for 
a national law on the right to information (Baviskar, 2010). Between 1996 and 2005, nine states 
established mechanisms to provide a right to information (ibid). In June 2005, a national right to 
information law was passed, which came into force in October of the same year. The Act gives Indian 
citizens the right to obtain information from public authorities. The Act was the first legislation to 
strongly use rights-based language (Chopra, 2014).  
 
The National Rural Health Mission, 2005 
The NRHM was described in Appendix B.1. Here, however, it necessary to point out that the mission 
is rights-based; access to health services has been framed as a right (Chopra, 2014). 
 
Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, 2005 
The Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) was passed in 2005 
and was the product of interactions and negotiations between state and non-state actors (Chopra, 
2011). The Act was launched in 2006 in 200 districts and launched in all districts in April 2008. The 
Act provides 100 days of employment to rural households per year and embodies the right to work 
(Chopra, 2014). The Act is inherently rights-based; rural households express their demand for work 
through the local government and the government has a duty to provide this work at a minimum wage 
(ibid).  
 
The Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest 
Rights) Act, 2006 
The Recognition of Forest Rights Act provides a framework to establish the rights of forest dwellers, 
who have resided in forests for generations without recorded rights. The Act was passed in 2006 and 
came into force in 2007.  
 
The Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, known as The Right to 
Education Act (RTE) 2009  
Passed in 2009, the RTE Act established free and compulsory education to children aged between 6 
and 14 years. The Act came into force in 2010. The Act established the duty of the government to 
provide free education.  
   B.
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 pe
r k
g o
f c
oa
rse
 gr
ain
.   
An
tod
ay
a A
nn
a Y
oja
na
 
(A
AY
) 
20
00
 
Ra
tio
n c
ard
 to
 th
e p
oo
res
t o
f B
PL
 
ho
us
eh
old
s, 
en
titl
ing
 th
em
 to
 
ad
dit
ion
al 
foo
d g
rai
n. 
35
kg
 of
 pe
r h
ou
seh
old
 pe
r m
on
th 
at 
sp
ec
ifi
ed
 pr
ice
s. 
 
An
na
pu
rn
a A
nn
a Y
oja
na
 
20
00
 
Sp
ec
ial
 ra
tio
n c
ard
s t
o t
he
 de
sti
tut
e 
ov
er 
65
 ye
ars
 of
 ag
e t
ha
t d
o n
ot 
rec
eiv
e a
no
the
r p
en
sio
n. 
10
kg
 of
 gr
ain
 pe
r m
on
th 
thr
ou
gh
 th
e 
PD
S. 
Su
pp
lem
en
tar
y a
nd
 
Sc
ho
ol 
Fe
ed
ing
 
(P
ro
mo
tio
na
l) 
M
idd
ay
 M
ea
l S
ch
em
e 
(M
DM
S)
 
19
95
 
Fr
ee
 ho
t, c
oo
ke
d l
un
ch
 to
 ch
ild
ren
 in
 
cla
ss 
I t
o V
III
 or
 ag
ed
 si
x t
o 1
4 i
n i
n 
go
ve
rnm
en
t a
nd
 go
ve
rnm
en
t-a
ssi
ste
d 
sch
oo
ls.
  
Fr
ee
 m
idd
ay
 m
ea
l e
ve
ryd
ay
 (e
xc
ep
t 
sch
oo
l h
oli
da
ys
). 4
50
 ca
lor
ies
 an
d 1
2g
 
of 
pro
tei
n f
or 
low
er 
pri
ma
ry 
an
d 7
00
 
ca
lor
ies
 an
d 2
0g
 of
 pr
ote
in 
for
 up
pe
r 
pri
ma
ry 
stu
de
nts
. 
IC
DS
 
19
75
 
Fo
od
 fo
r c
hil
dre
n u
nd
er 
the
 ag
e o
f 
six
 an
d f
or 
pre
gn
an
t a
nd
 la
cta
tin
g 
mo
the
rs.
  
Ch
ild
ren
 be
low
 th
e a
ge
 of
 si
x s
ho
uld
 
rec
eiv
e f
oo
d e
qu
al 
to 
50
0 c
alo
rie
s a
nd
 
12
-15
g o
f p
rot
ein
. P
reg
na
nt 
an
d 
lac
tat
ing
 w
om
en
 sh
ou
ld 
rec
eiv
e 6
00
 
ca
lor
ies
 an
d 1
8-2
0g
 of
 pr
ote
in.
 
M
aln
ou
ris
he
d c
hil
dre
n s
ho
uld
 re
ce
ive
 
80
0 c
alo
rie
s a
nd
 20
-25
g p
rot
ein
. 
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    T
yp
e 
Sc
he
me
 
Ye
ar
 la
un
ch
ed
 
Pu
rp
os
e  
 
Be
ne
fit
s 
Co
nd
iti
on
al 
Ca
sh
 
Tr
an
sfe
r 
(P
re
ve
nt
ati
ve
) 
Ja
na
ni 
Su
ra
ks
ha
 Y
oja
na
 
(JS
Y)
  
 
Na
tio
na
l M
ate
rni
ty 
be
ne
fit
 sc
he
me
 
lau
nc
he
d 1
99
5 a
nd
 
the
n m
od
ifi
ed
 in
to 
JS
Y 
in 
20
05
.  
Pr
ov
ide
s a
 fi
na
nc
ial
 in
ce
nti
ve
 fo
r 
wo
me
n t
o g
ive
 bi
rth
 in
 a 
he
alt
h 
fac
ilit
y. 
 
In 
low
 pe
rfo
rm
ing
 st
ate
s (
tho
se 
wi
th 
a 
low
 nu
mb
er 
of 
ins
titu
tio
na
l 
de
liv
eri
es)
, m
oth
ers
 re
ce
ive
 14
00
 IN
R 
in 
rur
al 
are
as 
an
d 1
00
0 i
n u
rba
n a
rea
s. 
In 
hig
h p
erf
orm
ing
 st
ate
s, 
mo
the
rs 
rec
eiv
e I
NR
 70
0 i
n r
ura
l a
rea
s o
nly
. 
He
alt
h w
ork
er 
als
o r
ec
eiv
es 
IN
R 
60
0 
in 
rur
al 
are
as 
an
d I
NR
 40
0 i
n u
rba
n 
are
as.
 
Un
co
nd
iti
on
al 
ca
sh
 
tra
ns
fer
s (
pr
ote
cti
ve
) 
Th
e I
nd
ira
 G
an
dh
i 
Na
tio
na
l O
ld 
Ag
e P
en
sio
n 
Sc
he
me
 (I
GN
OA
PS
) 
19
95
 
Pe
ns
ion
s t
o B
PL
 se
nio
r c
itiz
en
s 
(ab
ov
e 6
0) 
wi
th 
no
 m
ea
ns
 of
 
su
bs
ist
en
ce
. 
IN
R 
20
0 p
er 
pe
rso
n p
er 
mo
nth
 fo
r 
tho
se 
be
tw
ee
n 6
0 a
nd
 79
 ye
ars
, 
Rs
.50
0 f
or 
tho
se 
ab
ov
e t
he
 ag
e o
f 8
0. 
Na
tio
na
l F
am
ily
 B
en
efi
t 
Sc
he
me
 (N
FB
S)
 
19
95
 
Ca
sh
 to
 B
PL
 fa
mi
lie
s o
n t
he
 de
ath
 
of 
the
 pr
im
ary
 br
ea
dw
inn
er 
ag
ed
 18
 
to 
60
.  
Pa
ym
en
t to
 B
PL
 fa
mi
lie
s o
f I
NR
 
20
,00
0 a
fte
r t
he
 de
ath
 of
 th
e p
rim
ary
 
ea
rne
r.  
 U
nc
on
dit
ion
al 
ca
sh
 
tra
ns
fer
s (
pr
ote
cti
ve
) 
co
nt
inu
ed
 
Ind
ira
 G
an
dh
i N
ati
on
al 
W
ido
w 
Pe
ns
ion
 Sc
he
me
 
(IG
NW
PS
) 
19
95
 
M
on
thl
y p
en
sio
n t
o B
PL
 w
ido
ws
 
ab
ov
e t
he
 ag
e o
f 4
0. 
IN
R 
30
0 r
up
ee
s p
er 
mo
nth
, IN
R 
50
0 
rup
ee
s f
or 
tho
se 
ab
ov
e t
he
 ag
e o
f 8
0. 
 
Ind
ira
 G
an
dh
i N
ati
on
al 
Di
sab
ilit
y P
en
sio
n 
Sc
he
me
  
19
95
 
BP
L, 
ab
ov
e 1
8 a
nd
 w
ith
 m
ore
 th
an
 
80
% 
dis
ab
ilit
y. 
 
IN
R 
30
0 p
er 
mo
nth
, IN
R 
50
0 f
or 
tho
se 
ab
ov
e t
he
 ag
e o
f 8
0. 
Un
co
nd
iti
on
al 
ca
sh
 
tra
ns
fer
s (
pr
ote
cti
ve
) 
co
nt
inu
ed
 
Pr
ad
ha
n M
an
tri
 A
wa
as
 
Yo
jan
a (
pre
vio
us
ly 
Ind
ira
 A
wa
as
 Yo
jan
a) 
 
19
85
 
Gr
an
t to
 B
PL
 ho
us
es 
to 
co
ns
tru
ct 
a 
ho
us
e o
r u
pg
rad
e a
 ka
cc
ha
 (n
on
-
bri
ck
) h
ou
se.
   
IN
R 
70
,00
0 o
r 7
5,0
00
 in
 hi
lly
/re
mo
te 
are
as.
  
Co
nt
rib
ut
or
y s
oc
ial
 
ins
ur
an
ce
 
(p
re
ve
nt
ati
ve
) 
Ra
str
iya
 Sw
as
thy
a B
im
a 
Yo
jan
a 
(R
SB
Y)
  
20
08
 
He
alt
h i
ns
ura
nc
e f
or 
BP
L 
ho
us
eh
old
s a
nd
 sp
ec
ifi
c c
ate
go
rie
s 
of 
wo
rke
rs 
inc
lud
ing
 st
ree
t 
Ho
sp
ita
lis
ati
on
 co
ve
rag
e u
p t
o I
NR
 
30
,00
0 p
er 
fam
ily
 pe
r y
ea
r, f
or 
a 
reg
ist
rat
ion
 fe
e o
f I
NR
 30
.  
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ve
nd
ors
, d
om
est
ic 
wo
rke
rs,
 
ric
ks
ha
w 
pu
lle
rs 
an
d r
ag
 pi
ck
ers
.  
Ty
pe
 
Sc
he
me
 
Ye
ar
 la
un
ch
ed
 
Pu
rp
os
e  
 
Be
ne
fit
s 
Co
nt
rib
ut
or
y s
oc
ial
 
ins
ur
an
ce
 
(p
re
ve
nt
ati
ve
) 
co
nt
inu
ed
 
Pr
ad
ha
n M
an
tri
 Su
ra
ks
ha
 
Bi
ma
 Y
oja
na
 
20
15
 
Ac
cid
en
t in
su
ran
ce
 fo
r d
ea
th,
 fu
ll 
an
d p
art
ial
 di
sab
ilit
y. 
Fo
r I
NR
 12
 pe
r a
nn
um
, re
ce
ive
 
pa
ym
en
t in
 th
e e
ve
nt 
of 
de
ath
 (l
os
s o
f 
us
e o
f b
oth
 ey
es,
 ha
nd
 or
 fo
ot 
or 
us
e 
of 
on
e e
ye
 an
d o
ne
 ha
nd
 or
 fo
ot 
(2 
lak
h),
 lo
ss 
of 
us
e o
f o
ne
 ey
e o
f h
an
d o
r 
foo
t (1
 la
kh
).  
 
Pr
ad
ha
n M
an
tri
 Je
ev
an
 
Jy
oti
 Y
oja
na
 
20
15
 
Li
fe 
ins
ura
nc
e f
or 
the
 de
ath
 of
 an
 
ad
ult
 be
tw
ee
n 1
8-5
5 y
ea
rs 
old
 
Pa
y p
rem
ium
 IN
R 
33
0 p
er 
an
nu
m 
an
d 
in 
the
 ev
en
t o
f d
ea
th 
IN
R 
2 l
ak
h i
s 
pa
id 
to 
the
 no
mi
ne
e. 
 
 
At
al 
Pe
ns
ion
 Yo
jan
a 
(A
PY
)  
  
20
15
 
Pe
ns
ion
 sc
he
me
 fo
r u
no
rga
nis
ed
 
sec
tor
 w
ho
 ar
e n
ot 
pa
rt o
f a
ny
 ot
he
r 
so
cia
l s
ec
uri
ty 
sch
em
e. 
 
Re
ce
ive
 a 
fix
ed
 pe
ns
ion
 on
 re
tir
em
en
t 
be
tw
ee
n I
NR
 10
00
 an
d 5
00
0 p
er 
mo
nth
 de
pe
nd
ing
 on
 th
e e
xte
nt 
of 
the
ir 
co
ntr
ibu
tio
n. 
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   B.
5 I
nd
ia’
s F
oo
d-
Ba
sed
 Sc
he
me
s 
Ta
ble
 B
.2:
 A
 ta
bu
lat
ed
 bi
bli
og
rap
hy
 of
 se
lec
ted
 lit
era
tur
e o
n I
nd
ia’
s f
oo
d-b
ase
d s
oc
ial
 pr
ote
cti
on
 sc
he
me
s 
Pu
bli
ca
tio
n 
Lo
ca
tio
n 
Sa
mp
le 
Siz
e 
Ou
tco
me
 
Fi
nd
ing
s  
PD
S  
Dr
èz
e a
nd
 K
he
ra 
(20
13
) 
Ind
ia 
NS
S 2
00
9-2
01
0 
Po
ve
rty
 
Es
tim
ate
 th
at 
the
 PD
S r
ed
uc
es 
the
 po
ve
rty
-ga
p i
nd
ex
 of
 ru
ral
 
po
ve
rty
 by
 18
% 
to 
22
%.
  F
igu
res
 ar
e m
uc
h l
arg
er 
for
  
sta
tes
 w
ith
 a 
we
ll-
fun
cti
on
ing
 PD
S s
uc
h a
s T
am
il N
ad
u (
61
% 
to 
83
%)
 an
d i
n C
hh
att
isg
arh
 (3
9%
 to
 57
%)
.  
Ka
us
ha
l a
nd
 M
uc
ho
mb
a 
(20
15
) 
Ind
ia 
NS
S 1
99
3-4
, 
19
99
-20
00
, 
20
04
-20
05
 
 
Co
ns
um
pti
on
 
Co
ns
um
pti
on
 pa
tte
rns
 ch
an
ge
d i
n f
av
ou
r o
f t
he
 su
bs
idi
sed
 gr
ain
s 
an
d c
ert
ain
 m
ore
 ex
pe
ns
ive
 so
urc
es 
of 
ca
lor
ie,
 an
d l
ow
ere
d 
co
ns
um
pti
on
 of
 ch
ea
pe
r c
oa
rse
 gr
ain
s. 
No
 ef
fec
t o
n c
alo
rie
, p
rot
ein
 
an
d f
at 
int
ak
e. 
So
me
 in
co
me
 sp
en
t o
n n
on
-fo
od
 ite
ms
.  
Kh
era
 (2
01
1) 
Ra
jas
tha
n 
38
8 H
Hs
, 8
 
vil
lag
es 
 
Co
ns
um
pti
on
   
Do
es 
no
t a
ffe
ct 
the
 to
tal
 le
ve
l o
f c
ere
al 
co
ns
um
pti
on
, b
ut 
ca
us
es 
a 
sh
ift
 aw
ay
 fr
om
 co
ars
e g
rai
ns
. 
Ki
sh
ore
 an
d C
ha
kra
ba
rti
 
(20
15
) 
Ind
ia 
5 r
ou
nd
s o
f N
SS
 
su
rve
ys
 
Co
ns
um
pti
on
  
Re
for
ms
 in
 T
PD
S i
nc
rea
sed
 th
e q
ua
nti
ty 
of 
ric
e p
urc
ha
sed
 un
de
r 
PD
S a
nd
 po
or 
ho
us
eh
old
s u
se 
the
 m
on
ey
 sa
ve
d o
n r
ice
 ex
pe
nd
itu
re 
to 
pu
rch
ase
 no
n-c
ere
al 
foo
d i
tem
s. 
 
Ko
ch
ar 
(20
05
) 
9 s
tat
es 
 
NS
S 1
99
3 a
nd
 
19
99
–2
00
0. 
  
Co
ns
um
pti
on
  
Gr
ea
ter
 in
co
me
 tr
an
sfe
rs 
did
 no
t le
ad
 to
 gr
ea
ter
 ca
lor
ie 
co
ns
um
pti
on
.  
Kr
ish
na
mu
rth
y e
t a
l. (
20
14
) 
Ch
ha
ttis
ga
rh 
NS
S 1
99
9-2
00
0 
an
d 2
00
4-2
00
5 
Co
ns
um
pti
on
 
Inc
rea
sed
 th
eir
 co
ns
um
pti
on
 of
 pu
lse
s, 
an
im
al-
ba
sed
 pr
ote
in,
 an
d 
pro
du
ce
 re
lat
ive
 to
 ho
us
eh
old
s i
n d
ist
ric
ts 
bo
rde
rin
g 
the
 st
ate
 as
 th
e a
va
ila
bil
ity
 of
 su
bs
idi
ze
d r
ice
 ex
pa
nd
ed
. 
Ra
dh
ak
ris
hn
a e
t a
l. (
19
97
) 
An
dh
ra 
Pr
ad
esh
 
NS
S d
ata
 19
86
-
18
87
 
Po
ve
rty
 an
d 
Nu
tri
tio
n 
M
ini
ma
l im
pa
ct 
on
 po
ve
rty
 an
d n
utr
itio
na
l s
tat
us
, a
nd
 ev
en
 th
at 
wa
s a
t a
 hi
gh
 fi
na
nc
ial
 co
st.
  
Ra
hm
an
 (2
01
6) 
Od
ish
a 
8 d
ist
ric
ts 
Co
ns
um
pti
on
 
W
ith
 un
ive
rsa
l P
DS
: m
ac
ron
utr
ien
t c
on
su
mp
tio
n i
nc
rea
sed
 by
 
32
%,
 di
eta
ry 
qu
ali
ty 
im
pro
ve
d b
y 3
7%
 an
d r
ati
on
 of
 m
ac
ron
utr
ien
t 
int
ak
e t
o R
DA
 in
cre
ase
d b
y 1
7%
.  
Ta
roz
zi 
(20
05
) 
An
dh
ra 
Pr
ad
esh
 
NF
HS
 19
92
-93
 
Nu
tri
tio
n  
Inc
rea
sed
 pr
ice
s o
f r
ice
 in
 th
e P
DS
 (d
ec
rea
se 
in 
su
bs
idy
 eq
uiv
ale
nt 
to 
5%
 of
 th
e t
ota
l h
ou
seh
old
 bu
dg
et)
. D
id 
no
t le
ad
 to
 w
ors
e 
nu
tri
tio
na
l o
utc
om
es 
me
asu
red
 as
 w
eig
ht-
for
-ag
e. 
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   Pu
bli
ca
tio
n 
Lo
ca
tio
n 
Sa
mp
le 
Siz
e 
Ou
tco
me
 
Fi
nd
ing
s  
PD
S a
nd
 M
DM
S 
 
 
 
 
Hi
ma
ns
hu
 an
d S
en
 (2
01
3a
) 
Ind
ia 
NS
S 
Po
ve
rty
 
Po
ve
rty
 re
du
cin
g i
mp
ac
t in
cre
ase
d: 
lif
ted
 1.
3%
 of
 th
e p
op
ula
tio
n 
ab
ov
e t
he
 po
ve
rty
 lin
e i
n 1
99
3-1
99
4, 
2.6
% 
in 
20
04
-20
05
 an
d 4
.6%
 
20
09
-20
10
.  
Hi
ma
ns
hu
 an
d S
en
 (2
01
3b
) 
Ind
ia 
NS
S 
Co
ns
um
pti
on
 
Ca
lor
ie 
int
ak
e d
ec
lin
ed
 by
 15
% 
be
tw
ee
n 1
99
3-1
99
4 t
o 2
00
9-2
01
0, 
bu
t th
is 
de
cli
ne
 w
as 
on
ly 
8%
 fo
r th
os
e w
ho
 bo
ug
ht 
PD
S c
ere
als
 
an
d o
ve
r 2
0%
 fo
r th
os
e w
ho
 di
d n
ot.
 T
hu
s, 
the
y c
on
sid
er 
tha
t 
wi
tho
ut 
the
 PD
S, 
the
 pr
op
ort
ion
 of
 pe
op
le 
co
ns
um
ing
 fe
we
r t
ha
n 
18
00
 ca
lor
ies
 pe
r d
ay
 w
ou
ld 
inc
rea
se 
fro
m 
les
s t
ha
n 4
0%
 of
 th
e 
po
pu
lat
ion
 to
 50
%.
   
PD
S a
nd
 M
GN
RE
GS
 
Jh
a e
t a
l. (
20
11
) 
AP
, M
H,
 R
J 
7,1
24
 H
Hs
 
Co
ns
um
pti
on
 
Sig
nif
ica
nt 
im
pa
cts
 of
 bo
th 
PD
S a
nd
 N
RE
GS
 sc
he
me
 on
 th
e i
nta
ke
 
of 
pro
tei
n, 
en
erg
y a
nd
 m
icr
on
utr
ien
ts,
 ho
we
ve
r, t
his
 va
rie
s b
y s
tat
e. 
IC
DS
 
Ag
arw
al 
et 
al.
 (2
00
0) 
 
Va
ran
asi
, 
Ut
tar
 Pr
ad
esh
 
49
 vi
lla
ge
s, 
41
17
 bi
rth
s 
 
Nu
tri
tio
n 
(m
ate
rna
l w
eig
ht 
an
d b
irt
h w
eig
ht)
 
Th
e I
CD
S s
up
ple
me
nte
d m
oth
ers
 +1
00
g m
ore
 in
 pr
eg
na
nc
y a
nd
 
bir
th 
we
igh
t w
as 
hig
he
r b
y 5
8 g
 th
an
 un
-su
pp
lem
en
ted
 IC
DS
 
mo
the
rs.
 14
.4%
 of
 th
e w
om
en
 w
ho
 re
ce
ive
d I
CD
S s
up
ple
me
nta
tio
n 
ha
d a
 L
BW
, c
om
pa
red
 to
 20
.4%
 of
 th
os
e n
ot 
rec
eiv
ing
 th
e 
su
pp
lem
en
tat
ion
.  
Bh
asi
n e
t a
l. (
 20
01
) 
De
lhi
 
1,2
43
 ch
ild
ren
 
Nu
tri
tio
n 
Ch
ild
ren
 at
ten
din
g a
ng
an
wa
dis
 w
ere
 nu
tri
tio
na
lly
 be
tte
r-o
ff 
tha
n 
tho
se 
tha
t w
ere
 no
t. A
 m
ult
ipl
e l
og
ist
ic 
reg
res
sio
n d
id 
no
t f
ind
 
an
ga
nw
ad
i a
tte
nd
an
ce
 to
 ex
pla
in 
the
 di
ffe
ren
ce
 in
 nu
tri
tio
n. 
Ka
nd
pa
l (
20
11
) 
Ind
ia 
NF
HS
-3 
Nu
tri
tio
n 
Co
ntr
oll
ing
 fo
r p
lac
em
en
t d
esi
gn
, IC
DS
 in
cre
ase
s h
eig
ht-
for
-ag
e 
sco
res
 by
 6%
. 
Jai
n (
20
15
) 
Ind
ia 
DH
S 2
00
5-2
00
6 
Nu
tri
tio
n 
Inc
rea
sed
 he
igh
t 1
 cm
 (0
.4 
z-s
co
re)
 fo
r g
irl
s a
ge
d 0
-2 
ye
ars
. 
Fin
din
gs
 si
mi
lar
 fo
r b
oy
s, 
bu
t le
ss 
rob
us
t.  
Lo
ks
hin
 et
 al
. (2
00
5) 
Ind
ia 
NF
HS
 da
ta 
19
92
, 1
99
8- 
ap
pro
xim
ate
ly 
90
,00
0 H
Hs
 pe
r 
su
rve
y 
Nu
tri
tio
n 
Li
ttle
 ov
era
ll e
ffe
ct.
 O
nly
 si
gn
ifi
ca
nt 
po
sit
ive
 ef
fec
t w
as 
on
 bo
ys
’ 
stu
nti
ng
 in
 19
92
. D
isa
gg
reg
ate
d r
esu
lts
 fo
un
d s
ign
ifi
can
t n
eg
ati
ve
 
im
pa
ct 
in 
the
 po
or 
No
rth
ern
 st
ate
s a
nd
 N
ort
h-e
ast
ern
 st
ate
s. 
 
Im
ple
me
nta
tio
n 
Sta
tes
 w
ith
 th
e b
igg
est
 ne
ed
 (h
igh
 ra
tes
 of
 ch
ild
 m
aln
utr
itio
n) 
ha
d 
the
 lo
we
st 
co
ve
rag
e a
nd
 bu
dg
et 
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   Pu
bli
ca
tio
n 
Lo
ca
tio
n 
Sa
mp
le 
Siz
e 
Ou
tco
me
 
Fi
nd
ing
s  
Pr
inj
a e
t a
l. (
 20
08
) 
Ha
rya
na
 
60
 IC
DS
 
ce
ntr
es,
 40
8 
ch
ild
ren
, th
eir
 
mo
the
rs 
 
Im
ple
me
nta
tio
n 
(ad
vic
e) 
 
Ad
vic
e o
n b
rea
stf
ee
din
g g
ive
n t
o 1
79
 (4
3.8
%)
 m
oth
ers
 an
d a
dv
ice
 
on
 co
mp
lem
en
tar
y t
o 1
39
 (3
4.1
%)
  
Sa
iye
d a
nd
 Se
sh
ad
ri 
(20
00
) 
 
Gu
jar
at 
61
0 c
hil
dre
n 0
-
36
 m
on
ths
 
Nu
tri
tio
n 
Ut
ilis
ati
on
 of
 al
l s
erv
ice
s s
ign
ifi
ca
ntl
y i
mp
rov
ed
 nu
tri
tio
na
l s
tat
us
, 
me
asu
red
 us
ing
 he
igh
t-f
or-
ag
e, 
we
igh
t-f
or-
ag
e a
nd
 w
eig
ht-
for
-
he
igh
t. F
ull
 ut
ilis
ati
on
 al
so
 de
cre
ase
d t
he
 fr
eq
ue
nc
y a
nd
 du
rat
ion
 of
 
ep
iso
de
s o
f i
lln
ess
.  
Sa
xe
na
 an
d S
riv
ast
av
a (
20
09
) 
Ind
ia 
NF
HS
-3 
da
ta 
Nu
tri
tio
n  
Ch
ild
ren
 in
 ar
ea
s w
ith
ou
t a
n a
ng
an
wa
di 
are
 m
ore
 lik
ely
 to
 be
 
un
de
rno
uri
sh
ed
, a
s a
re 
ch
ild
ren
 w
ho
 ha
ve
 no
t s
ee
n a
n a
ng
an
wa
di 
wo
rke
r i
n t
he
 pr
ev
iou
s t
hre
e m
on
ths
 co
mp
are
d t
o t
ho
se 
tha
t h
av
e. 
W
he
the
r t
he
 ch
ild
 re
ce
ive
d e
arl
y c
hil
dh
oo
d c
are
 at
 th
e a
ng
an
wa
di 
sig
nif
ica
ntl
y a
ffe
cts
 nu
tri
tio
na
l s
tat
us
.  
M
GN
RE
GS
 
Da
s a
nd
 Si
ng
h (
20
14
) 
Ind
ia 
Di
str
ict
 le
ve
l 
ho
us
eh
old
 
su
rve
y 
Ch
ild
ren
’s 
ed
uc
ati
on
 
No
 si
gn
ifi
ca
nt 
im
pa
ct 
on
 ch
ild
ren
’s 
ed
uc
ati
on
. N
eg
ati
ve
 im
pa
ct 
on
 
gir
ls’
 ed
uc
ati
on
, a
lth
ou
gh
 no
t s
ign
ifi
ca
nt.
  
De
ini
ge
r a
nd
 L
iu,
 (2
01
3) 
An
dh
ra 
Pr
ad
esh
 
4,0
00
 
ho
us
eh
old
s 
Co
ns
um
pti
on
 
Pr
ote
in 
an
d e
ne
rgy
 in
tak
e s
ign
ifi
ca
ntl
y i
nc
rea
sed
. 
W
ea
lth
 
Ac
cu
mu
lat
e n
on
-fi
na
nc
ial
 as
set
s i
n t
he
 m
ed
ium
-te
rm
. 
Jh
a e
t a
l. (
20
11
) 
An
dh
ra 
Pr
ad
esh
, 
M
ah
ara
sh
tra
, 
Ra
jas
tha
n 
7,1
24
 
ho
us
eh
old
s 
Co
ns
um
pti
on
 
Sig
nif
ica
nt 
im
pa
cts
 of
 bo
th 
PD
S a
nd
 N
RE
GS
 sc
he
me
 on
 th
e i
nta
ke
 
of 
pro
tei
n, 
en
erg
y a
nd
 m
icr
on
utr
ien
ts,
 ho
we
ve
r, t
his
 va
rie
s b
y s
tat
e. 
 
Kl
on
ne
r a
nd
 O
ldi
ge
s (
20
14
) 
 
NS
S a
nd
 
dis
tri
ct-
wi
se 
rol
lou
t o
f 
sch
em
e 
Co
ns
um
pti
on
 
La
rge
 ef
fec
ts 
on
 fo
od
 co
ns
um
pti
on
 am
on
g S
C/
ST
 ho
us
eh
old
s a
nd
 
sm
oo
the
d 
co
ns
um
pti
on
 a
cro
ss 
sea
so
ns
. I
nc
rea
sed
 b
y 
as 
mu
ch
 a
s 
30
% 
in 
sp
rin
g. 
Po
ve
rty
 
Ha
lve
d p
ov
ert
y f
or 
SC
/ST
 ho
us
eh
old
s. 
Ku
ma
r a
nd
 Jo
sh
i (
20
13
) 
 
NS
S 2
00
9 
Po
ve
rty
 
Re
du
ce
d p
ov
ert
y l
ev
el 
by
 4%
. 
Co
ns
um
pti
on
 
Co
uld
 in
cre
ase
 co
ns
um
pti
on
 of
 ce
rea
ls 
an
d n
on
-ce
rea
ls 
du
e t
o 
inc
rea
sed
 in
co
me
. O
bs
erv
ed
 di
ve
rsi
fic
ati
on
 of
 di
ets
. D
ecr
ea
sed
 
un
de
rno
uri
sh
ed
 an
d n
utr
itio
n-d
efi
cit
 ho
us
eh
old
s b
y 8
-9%
. 
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   Pu
bli
ca
tio
n 
Lo
ca
tio
n 
Sa
mp
le 
Siz
e 
Ou
tco
me
 
Fi
nd
ing
s  
Na
ir 
et 
al.
 (2
01
3) 
Ra
jas
tha
n 
52
8 h
ou
seh
old
s, 
10
56
 
pa
rti
cip
an
ts 
 
Nu
tri
tio
n 
Ho
us
eh
old
s p
art
ici
pa
tin
g 
in 
M
GN
RE
GA
 w
ere
 le
ss 
lik
ely
 to
 h
av
e 
wa
ste
d 
inf
an
ts.
 P
os
sib
ly 
du
e t
o i
nc
rea
sed
 b
irt
h 
we
igh
t r
ath
er 
tha
n 
inc
rea
sed
 in
fan
t f
ee
din
g. 
Stu
nti
ng
 di
d n
ot 
dif
fer
.  
Ra
vi 
an
d E
ng
ler
 (2
01
5) 
An
dh
ra 
Pr
ad
esh
 
10
64
 
ho
us
eh
old
s, 
19
8 
vil
lag
es 
Inc
om
e 
Sig
nif
ica
ntl
y i
nc
rea
sed
 m
on
thl
y p
er 
ca
pit
a f
oo
d a
nd
 no
n-f
oo
d 
ex
pe
nd
itu
re.
 R
ais
ed
 th
e p
rob
ab
ilit
y o
f h
av
ing
 sa
vin
gs
.  
Co
ns
um
pti
on
 
Sig
nif
ica
nt 
red
uc
tio
n i
n t
he
 nu
mb
er 
of 
me
als
 fo
reg
on
e. 
W
ell
-be
ing
  
Re
du
ce
d d
ep
res
sio
n. 
Pe
ns
ion
s  
Du
tta
 et
 al
. (2
01
0) 
Ka
rna
tak
a a
nd
 
Ra
jas
tha
n 
4,0
70
 
ho
us
eh
old
s 
Co
ve
rag
e 
A 
lar
ge
 pr
op
ort
ion
 re
ac
h t
he
 vu
lne
rab
le.
 C
om
pa
red
 to
 PD
S, 
so
cia
l 
pe
ns
ion
s h
av
e l
ow
 le
ve
ls 
of 
lea
ka
ge
. E
ith
er 
du
e t
o l
ac
k o
f 
dis
cre
tio
n i
nv
olv
ed
 or
 th
e s
ma
ll t
ran
sfe
r. 
Gu
pta
 (2
01
3) 
Ch
ha
ttis
ga
rh 
an
d J
ha
rkh
an
d 
60
 pe
op
le 
Ov
era
ll p
erc
eiv
ed
 
im
pa
ct 
On
e i
n t
wo
 fe
lt t
he
 na
tio
na
l o
ld 
ag
e p
en
sio
n h
elp
ed
 m
ee
t e
sse
nti
al 
ne
ed
s, 
bu
t th
at 
the
 am
ou
nt 
wa
s i
ns
uff
ici
en
t. S
ch
em
e f
un
cti
on
ed
 
wi
th 
litt
le 
co
rru
pti
on
. L
im
ite
d b
y b
an
kin
g s
ys
tem
 an
d d
ela
ys
. 
M
ate
rn
ity
 B
en
efi
ts 
Li
m 
et 
al.
 (2
00
9) 
Ind
ia 
Tw
o n
ati
on
wi
de
 
dis
tri
ct-
lev
el 
ho
us
eh
old
 
su
rve
ys
 
(+
60
0,0
00
 in
 
ea
ch
) 
He
alt
h a
nd
 ca
re.
 
Sig
nif
ica
nt 
eff
ec
ts 
on
 in
cre
asi
ng
 an
ten
ata
l c
are
 an
d i
n-f
ac
ilit
y 
bir
ths
. D
ec
rea
sed
 pe
rin
ata
l a
nd
 ne
on
ata
l d
ea
ths
. 
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   B.
6 S
ch
oo
l-f
ee
din
g P
ro
gr
am
me
s 
 
Ta
ble
 B
.3:
 D
eta
ils
 of
 se
lec
ted
 SF
Ps
 (D
rak
e e
t a
l., 
20
16
) 
Co
un
try
 
Na
me
 of
 SF
P 
M
od
e 
Ta
rg
eti
ng
 
Nu
mb
er
 of
 
re
cip
ien
ts 
Fo
cu
s 
En
er
gy
 %
 
RD
A 
Pr
ote
in 
%
 R
DA
  
Bo
tsw
an
a  
 
Na
tio
na
l S
ch
oo
l 
Fe
ed
ing
 Pr
og
ram
me
 
OS
F (
1 m
ea
l, 2
 in
 re
mo
te 
are
as)
 
Un
ive
rsa
l 
33
3,0
00
 
Ag
ric
ult
ure
, 
Ed
uc
ati
on
  
33
 
29
 
Br
az
il 
Pr
og
ra
ma
 N
ac
ion
al 
de
 
Al
im
en
taç
ão
 E
sc
ola
r 
(P
NA
E)
 
OS
F-
 br
ea
kfa
st,
 lu
nc
h o
r 
sn
ac
k  
Un
ive
rsa
l 
42
.3 
mi
llio
n 
(20
14
) 
Ag
ric
ult
ure
 
58
 
65
 
Ca
pe
 V
erd
e 
Na
tio
na
l S
ch
oo
l 
Nu
tri
tio
n
Pr
og
ram
me
  
OS
F 
Un
ive
rsa
l 
85
,07
9 (
20
11
-
20
1) 
Ed
uc
ati
on
 
28
 
22
 
Ch
ile
* 
Pr
og
ra
ma
 de
 
Al
im
en
tac
ion
 E
sc
ola
r 
(P
AE
)  
OS
F b
rea
kfa
st 
an
d/o
r lu
nc
h 
Ind
ivi
du
al 
1.8
5 m
illi
on
 
(20
12
) 
Ed
uc
ati
on
, h
ea
lth
 
an
d n
utr
itio
n  
15
 
18
 
Cô
te 
d’I
vo
ire
* 
 
Pr
og
ra
mm
e I
nté
gr
é 
de
P
ér
en
nis
ati
on
 de
s 
Ca
nti
ne
s S
co
lai
re
s 
(P
IP
/C
S)
 
OS
F 
Ge
og
rap
hic
 
26
5,0
00
 (2
00
9) 
Ag
ric
ult
ure
, 
Ed
uc
ati
on
 
55
 
51
 
Ec
ua
do
r 
Sc
ho
ol 
Fo
od
 
Pr
og
ram
me
 
OS
F b
rea
kfa
st 
(so
me
 
sch
oo
ls 
als
o p
rov
ide
 
for
tif
ied
 m
ilk
 an
d b
isc
uit
s) 
Un
ive
rsa
l 
1.7
8 m
illi
on
 
(20
11
) 
 
Ed
uc
ati
on
 
19
 
24
 
Ind
ia*
 
M
idd
ay
 M
ea
l S
ch
em
e 
OS
F 
Un
ive
rsa
l 
11
9.4
 m
illi
on
 
(20
06
) 
Ed
uc
ati
on
 
35
 
28
 
Gh
an
a 
Th
e G
ha
na
 Sc
ho
ol 
Fe
ed
ing
 Pr
og
ram
me
  
OS
F 
Ge
og
rap
hic
 
(S
ch
oo
ls)
 
1.6
4 m
illi
on
 
Ag
ric
ult
ure
, 
Ed
uc
ati
on
, H
ea
lth
 
an
d n
utr
itio
n 
- 
- 
Ke
ny
a 
HG
SM
 
Ho
me
 G
row
n S
ch
oo
l 
M
ea
ls 
Pr
og
ram
me
  
OS
F 
Ge
og
rap
hic
 
76
2,7
15
 (2
01
3) 
Ed
uc
ati
on
 
34
 
 
30
 
Ke
ny
a 
NM
K 
N
ja
a 
M
ar
uf
uk
u 
K
en
ya
 
OS
F 
Ge
og
rap
hic
 
63
,00
0 (
20
13
)  
  
Ag
ric
ult
ure
 
34
 
 
30
 
*T
he
 de
tai
ls 
for
 In
dia
 ar
e a
lso
 ta
ke
n f
rom
 D
rak
e e
t a
l. (
20
16
). A
s s
ho
wn
 in
 C
ha
pte
r 4
 an
d 5
 re
sp
ec
tiv
ely
, th
e s
ch
em
e i
s n
ot 
pu
rel
y f
or 
ed
uc
ati
on
al 
pu
rpo
ses
 an
d i
s n
ot 
en
tir
ely
 un
ive
rsa
l.  
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   B.
7 O
ut
co
me
s o
f S
FP
s  
Ta
ble
 B
.4:
 A
 ta
bu
lat
ed
 bi
bli
og
rap
hy
 of
 th
e l
ite
rat
ure
 on
 th
e o
utc
om
es 
of 
SF
Ps
: a
 no
n-e
xh
au
sti
ve
 re
vie
w 
St
ud
y 
Lo
ca
tio
n 
Sa
mp
le 
 
Fo
rm
  
Ou
tco
me
 
Fi
nd
ing
s 
Ah
me
d 
an
d 
De
l 
Ni
nn
o (
20
02
) 
Ba
ng
lad
esh
 
60
0 H
Hs
 
Co
nd
itio
na
l 
TH
Rs
 
   
En
rol
me
nt 
 
+4
2%
 fo
r g
irl
s, 
+2
8%
 fo
r b
oy
s. 
 
At
ten
da
nc
e 
70
% 
in 
sch
oo
ls 
rec
eiv
ing
 fo
od
, 5
8%
 in
 th
os
e n
ot.
 D
rop
ou
t ra
tes
 - 6
% 
for
 
be
ne
fic
iar
y s
tud
en
ts 
an
d 1
5%
 fo
r n
on
-be
ne
fic
iar
ies
. 
Pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 
Te
st 
sco
res
 l
ow
er 
for
 b
en
efi
cia
rie
s, 
lik
ely
 d
ue
 t
o 
so
cio
-ec
on
om
ic 
ba
ck
gro
un
d 
Ah
me
d (
20
04
) 
Ba
ng
lad
esh
 
+5
00
0 
HH
s, 
16
48
 
stu
de
nts
 
Fo
rti
fie
d 
bis
cu
its
 
  
En
rol
me
nt 
+1
4.5
% 
At
ten
da
nc
e 
+1
.3 
da
ys
 pe
r m
on
th.
 
Dr
op
ou
ts 
- 7
.5%
. 
Pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 
+ 1
5.7
 po
int
s t
est
 sc
ore
s 
Nu
tri
tio
n 
BM
I +
0.6
2 
Al
de
rm
an
 
an
d 
Bu
nd
y (
20
11
)  
Ug
an
da
 
No
t s
tat
ed
 
TH
R 
an
d O
SF
 
Pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 
 + 
ma
th 
sco
res
 ch
ild
ren
 ag
ed
 11
-14
.  
No
 c
ha
ng
e 
in 
lite
rac
y 
tes
ts.
 A
t t
he
 p
rim
ary
 le
ve
l, 
on
ly 
TH
R 
ha
d 
a 
sig
nif
ica
nt 
im
pa
ct 
on
 te
sts
.  
Nu
tri
tio
n 
Re
du
ce
d 
pre
va
len
ce
 o
f a
na
em
ia 
in 
gir
ls 
ag
ed
 1
0-1
3 
rec
eiv
ing
 sc
ho
ol 
fee
din
g i
n U
ga
nd
a c
om
pa
red
 to
 a 
co
ntr
ol 
gro
up
. 
OS
F i
nc
rea
sed
 th
e h
eig
ht 
of 
sib
lin
gs
 by
 0.
36
 SD
. T
HR
 ha
s n
o e
ffe
ct.
 
Al
de
rm
an
 e
t 
al.
 
(20
12
) 
Ug
an
da
 
31
 ca
mp
s 
OS
F 
an
d 
TH
Rs
 
   
En
rol
me
nt 
No
 ov
era
ll i
nc
rea
se,
 bu
t 9
% 
inc
rea
se 
in 
ch
ild
ren
 ag
ed
 6-
13
 w
ho
 st
art
ed
 
sch
oo
l. 
At
ten
da
nc
e 
+ 8
-12
 pe
rce
nta
ge
 po
int
s a
ge
d 1
0-1
7 i
n t
he
 m
orn
ing
 
+ a
tte
nd
an
ce
 gi
rls
 fr
om
 O
SF
  
+ e
ffe
ct 
bo
ys
 10
-17
 ye
ars
 fr
om
 T
HR
S  
+ i
mp
ac
t o
f b
oth
 on
 af
ter
no
on
 at
ten
da
nc
e e
xc
lud
ing
 10
-13
 ye
ar 
old
s f
or 
TH
Rs
. 
Bu
tte
nh
eim
 e
t a
l. 
(20
11
) 
LA
O 
4,5
00
 H
Hs
 
TH
R 
an
d O
SF
 
En
rol
me
nt 
 
Li
ttle
 ev
ide
nc
e. 
TH
R 
an
d O
SF
 in
cre
ase
d e
nro
lm
en
t in
 tw
o l
oc
ati
on
s, b
ut 
no
t a
 th
ird
. 
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   St
ud
y 
Lo
ca
tio
n 
Sa
mp
le 
 
Fo
rm
  
Ou
tco
me
 
Fi
nd
ing
s 
Ge
lli 
et 
al.
 (2
00
7) 
32
 co
un
tri
es 
su
b-S
ah
ara
n 
Af
ric
a  
47
15
 
sch
oo
ls 
TH
R 
an
d O
SF
  
En
rol
me
nt 
+2
8%
 fo
r g
irl
s, 
+2
2%
 fo
r b
oy
s. 
Af
ter
 th
e 
fir
st 
ye
ar,
 in
cre
ase
 o
nly
 
su
sta
ine
d f
or 
gir
ls 
rec
eiv
ing
 bo
th 
OS
F a
nd
 T
HR
.  
Ge
lli 
(20
15
) 
- 
TH
R 
an
d O
SF
 
En
rol
me
nt 
+1
0%
 (O
SF
 ha
vin
g a
 st
ron
ge
r e
ffe
ct 
in 
the
 fi
rst
 ye
ar)
 
Gr
an
tha
m-
M
cG
reg
or 
et 
al.
  
(19
98
) 
Jam
aic
a 
20
0 
ch
ild
ren
 
Br
ea
kfa
st 
Pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 
Un
de
rno
uri
sh
ed
 ch
ild
ren
 pe
rfo
rm
ed
 be
tte
r a
fte
r b
rea
kfa
st,
 no
 ch
an
ge
 fo
r 
ad
eq
ua
tel
y n
ou
ris
he
d c
hil
dre
n. 
 
Gr
ille
nb
erg
er 
et 
al.
 (2
00
3) 
Ke
ny
a 
55
4 
ch
ild
ren
 
OS
F (
sn
ac
k) 
Nu
tri
tio
n 
+ a
pp
rox
im
ate
ly 
0.4
kg
 fr
om
 su
pp
lem
en
ts 
(m
ea
t, m
ilk
)  
Ka
zia
ng
a e
t a
l. 
(20
09
; 2
01
2) 
Bu
rki
na
 Fa
so
 
22
08
 H
Hs
 
OS
F a
nd
 TH
R 
 
   
En
rol
me
nt 
+ 6
% 
for
 gi
rls
 re
ce
ivi
ng
 bo
th 
OS
F a
nd
 T
HR
s. 
No
 si
gn
ifi
ca
nt 
ch
an
ge
 in
 
en
rol
me
nt 
of 
bo
ys
 w
as 
no
t s
ign
ifi
ca
nt 
At
ten
da
nc
e 
+ i
n h
ou
seh
old
s w
ith
 la
rge
 la
bo
ur 
su
pp
ly,
 de
cre
ase
d i
n t
ho
se 
wi
th 
a s
ma
ll 
lab
ou
r s
up
ply
 
Nu
tri
tio
n  
TH
Rs
 in
cre
ase
d w
eig
ht 
of 
the
 si
bli
ng
s (
1-5
 ye
ars
 ol
d) 
by
 0.
38
 SD
. O
SF
 
ha
d n
o i
mp
ac
t. 
Kr
ist
jan
ns
on
 et
 al
. 
( 2
00
7) 
Re
vie
w 
of 
18
 
stu
die
s  
 
SF
Ps
  
   
At
ten
da
nc
e, 
 
+4
-6 
da
ys
 pe
r y
ea
r 
Pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 
Sig
nif
ica
nt 
po
sit
ive
 im
pa
ct 
on
 ar
ith
me
tic
. R
esu
lts
 fr
om
 in
tel
lig
en
ce
 te
sts
 
are
 in
co
nc
lus
ive
.  
Nu
tri
tio
n  
+ 0
.39
kg
 ov
er 
19
 m
on
ths
 in
 ra
nd
om
ize
d c
on
tro
lle
d t
ria
ls.
 +0
.71
kg
 ov
er 
11
.3 
mo
nth
s i
n b
efo
re 
an
d a
fte
r s
tud
ies
. 
Jac
ob
y (
19
96
) 
 
Pe
ru 
35
6 
ch
ild
ren
 
Br
ea
kfa
st 
Nu
tri
tio
n 
Sig
nif
ica
nt 
inc
rea
se 
in 
die
tar
y i
nta
ke
s: 
en
erg
y (
15
.2%
), p
rot
ein
 
(16
.1%
), i
ron
 by
 60
%,
 an
d i
mp
rov
ed
 ra
tes
 of
 at
ten
da
nc
e. 
At
ten
da
nc
e 
Re
po
rte
d b
y t
ea
ch
ers
  
Jac
ob
y e
t a
l. 
(19
98
) 
Pe
ru 
+2
00
 
Br
ea
kfa
st 
Nu
tri
tio
n 
Inc
rea
sed
 in
tak
es 
of 
en
erg
y, 
pro
tei
n, 
zin
c, 
iro
n, 
vit
am
in 
A,
 iro
n. 
De
cli
ne
 
in 
an
ae
mi
a f
rom
 66
% 
to 
14
% 
in 
six
 m
on
ths
 
M
cE
wa
n (
20
13
) 
Ch
ile
 
87
27
 
pri
ma
ry 
sch
oo
ls 
OS
F 
En
rol
me
nt,
 
att
en
da
nc
e 
No
 ef
fec
t d
ue
 to
 hi
gh
er 
ca
lor
ie 
me
als
 (b
ut 
ba
sel
ine
 en
rol
me
nt 
alr
ea
dy
 
hig
h a
nd
 no
 da
ta 
on
 ca
lor
ie 
co
ns
um
pti
on
 an
d r
ed
ist
rib
uti
on
).  
Pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 
Hi
gh
er 
ca
lor
ie 
me
als
 ha
d n
o e
ffe
ct 
on
 te
st 
sco
res
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   St
ud
y  
St
ud
y a
re
a 
St
ud
y Y
ea
r 
Sa
mp
le 
 
Fo
cu
s 
Po
we
ll e
t a
l. (
19
98
) 
Jam
aic
a 
40
7 
Br
ea
kfa
st 
   
At
ten
da
nc
e 
+2
.3%
 (4
 da
ys
) 
Pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
  
+ 
0.1
1 S
D 
for
 th
e y
ou
ng
est
 ch
ild
ren
 ar
ith
me
tic
. N
o e
ffe
ct 
on
 re
ad
ing
/ 
sp
ell
ing
. 
Nu
tri
tio
n 
sm
all
 b
ut 
sig
nif
ica
nt 
inc
rea
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B.8 FAO Modules on Rights-based SFPs  
 
The FAO (2008: 150-157) modules and associated questions for rights-based school-feeding 
programmes are as follows:   
 
Module 1: Food and Nutrition Security Situation 
- What are the main food and nutrition problems? 
- Which population groups are most affected? 
- Where are these located?  
- What are the principal causes of these problems? 
- Which food and nutrition problems affect school-age children, by age and gender?  
- Where are these problems most severe?  
- What livelihood characteristics do the households have to which food insecure and 
vulnerable children belong? 
 
Module 2: Policy, Legislative and Budgetary Framework 
- What is the policy basis for the SFP? Is school-based feeding seen as a nutrition programme 
or a social relief programme?  
- How does the SFP relate to policy priorities? 
- What legislative mandate exists for the programme?  
- What budgetary appropriations are made, and are these included in the regular budget or a 
special budget? 
- What is the funding history in terms of budgetary allocations and expenditures?  
- Which are the budgetary contributions, obligations or commitments of the different levels 
of government to the programme? 
 
Module 3: Institutional Framework of the Programme 
- Which institutions at national and local levels are responsible for designing, implementing, 
managing and monitoring the SFP? 
- What is the capacity of these institutions in their respective roles? Are their roles clearly 
mandated? How strong are inter-institutional linkages and coordination? 
- Are their mechanisms in place that effectively allow rights holders’, representatives and 
other duty bearers to hold these institutions accountable for non or poor performance? 
 
Module 4: Normative Basis of the Programme 
What are the programme norms and standards with respect to:  
- Intended beneficiaries? 
- National nutrition guidelines (RDAs for energy and nutrients), approved national menu 
options, food diversity, conformity with local eating habits? 
- Provision of nutritional benefits? 
- Food delivery and handling (food types, school-based infra-structure (kitchen, food storage, 
eating space), trained kitchen staff, food preparation hygiene)? 
- Associated school-based infrastructure: access to clean drinking water, basic sanitation? 
- Food quality and safety? 
- Food acquisition: sources of food acquisition; use of commercial foods; protection from 
marketing of processed foods in school? 
- Associated curricular and non-curricular activities? 
- Per child allocation of funds? 
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• Handling of funds and accounting of expenditures? 
 
Module 5: Social Control Mechanisms  
- Is there a social control instrument to monitor the implementation and quality of the 
Programme? In case there is, what is the mandate of this council or committee? What is its 
composition? How are the members selected or appointed? Is there direct representation of 
parents, local producers and of the different duty bearers?  
- What are the instruments available to the council/committee to promote remedial actions in 
programme implementation, or to promote compensation for a violation, in case it is needed? 
 
Module 6: Recourse Instruments and Institutions 
- Are there any claim or recourse instruments available to students and parents in case the 
public sector does not meet its obligations under the programme?  
- Which institution(s) is (are) in charge of receiving, analysing and providing an official 
response to claims that are received? 
 
Module 7: Programme Design 
- Is the programme designed to address one or more major food/nutrition problem that affects 
a majority of children? 
- What are the intended food-based and non-food based impacts of the programme? Do these 
intended impacts reflect a holistic approach, recognising linkages among the fulfilment of 
several rights over and above the right to adequate food, like the rights to education, health, 
enjoyment of leisure, etc.?  
- How does the programme propose to contribute to decreasing the food and nutrition 
problems among school-age children? Does the programme have other, non-food objectives, 
for example, increased school enrolment, enhancement of active learning capacity, 
improved school attendance, increase children’s access to non-curricular learning activities, 
reduce school drop-out rates, or greater understanding of broader social problems? 
- Is the programme designed to target children who suffer most from food and nutrition 
problems and food related diseases – celiac disease, diabetes, etc.? 
- What criteria and indicators are used for targeting (individual, geographic, nutritional status, 
etc.)? Are targeting criteria well described and do these reflect equality of access to the SFP? 
How well are duty bearers at different levels, and rights holders’ representatives aware of 
and understand these criteria? Did rights holders’ representatives participate in establishing 
these criteria? If entry and exit criteria are involved, how well are these understood by duty 
bearers and rights holders? 
- Does the programme design anticipate community participation in programme decision 
making and/or implementation, and if so, in what ways? What mechanisms for joint decision 
making and monitoring of school feeding guidelines are in place, and are these effective? 
What will be done to maintain constant communication between duty bearers and the 
community? 
- How are programme costs at the school level covered? Is the community required to 
contribute, and if so, in what form(s) and did the community participate in deciding what its 
contribution should be? Are there fluctuations in funding availability, and if so, how does 
this impact on delivery? 
 
Module 8: Programme Duty Bearers  
- Do duty-bearers (national authorities, local/community authorities, school authorities/staff 
and, somewhat differently, parents) understand their responsibilities and is there evidence 
they act accordingly? Have duty-bearers been asked to account for their performance?  
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- Do rights holders’ representatives understand the responsibilities of different duty bearers? 
Do duty-bearers and rights-holders’ representatives understand the norms?  
- Does the programme routinely assess duty bearers’ capacity to assume their responsibilities, 
and makes efforts to strengthen capacities? If so, what capacities are strengthened and does 
this lead to better performance? If patterns of violations are identified, are there measures to 
adopt remedial procedures or, at least, review these patterns? 
 
Module 9: Programme implementation  
- To what extent does programme implementation conform to norms and standards – see 
Module 4 above? Where are there divergences, and what explains this? Is there evidence 
that efforts were made in the past to bring programme implementation closer in line with 
norms and standards? 
- Are there differences in implementation processes and procedures among geographic areas, 
and if so, what explains these differences? Is there evidence that efforts were made to correct 
this? 
- How well is the targeting scheme applied, and how effective is it in ensuring programme 
coverage of the intended target groups? Are under-coverage and leakage rates high or low? 
Are there geographic differences in programme coverage rates, and if so, what explains this? 
Is there evidence that efforts have been made to improve effective coverage rates of the 
target groups, and if so, with what results? 
- Does programme monitoring take place, and if so, at what level(s) and who participates in 
programme monitoring? What purpose(s) does programme monitoring serve? Is there 
evidence that monitoring results have had an impact on changing programme design and/or 
implementation, or external to the programme on policy formulation, institutional changes 
and/or legislative priorities? Is the acquisition of food items for the programme made from 
local agricultural producers? In case it is not, what are the implications of these “food 
imports” for local eating habits and production? What is the impact of these purchases on 
local food and nutritional security? 
 
Module 10: Programme Impacts 
- What are the programme impacts, and how do these compare with programme objectives? 
Are there unforeseen programme impacts, and who do these affect? Are there negative 
programme effects, and if so, who do these affect? Is there evidence that participation in the 
programme has led to empowerment of non-programme persons, and if so, who has 
benefited and in what ways?  
- Do programme impacts differ among various geographic areas, and if so, what may explain 
this? Were efforts made, for example by changing the programme design, to correct this? 
- Do programme impacts differ by gender, age group, or socio-economic levels? If so, what 
may explain this, and is there evidence that efforts were made to correct this? 
- Is there evidence that the programme impacts are in line with the priorities of the 
community? 
- Are the programme design and the implementation process flexible enough so that the 
programme can adjust to future needs and changing priorities? Is it likely that the availability 
of programme resources will outlast a given political mandate? Will part of the programme 
be institutionalised in sector activities, or be incorporated in sector plans? Are human and 
other resources likely to be sufficient to sustain the programme and its desirable impact 
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B.9 Literature on the MDMS  
 
B.9.1 Introduction  
Table B.5 presents the details of studies on the MDMS. This is an exhaustive list; however, excluded 
are: literature that could not be accessed (Pathania and Pathania, 2006); literature that discussed the 
scheme in the context of other interventions only (Chhabra and Rao, 2014; Fiedler et al., 2012; 
Radhika et al., 2011; Rah et al., 2013); and literature that discusses the scheme superficially, in 
passing or does not contribute new knowledge (Alim et al., 2012; Bajaj, 2012; Baru, 2008; 
Shrivastava et al., 2014). As shown in Table B.5, some studies had methodological limitations 
(Deodhar et al., 2010; Josephine and Raju, 2008; Kaushal, 2009) and others failed to present evidence 
to support the conclusions made (Shalini et al., 2014; Sharma et al., 2010). These studies are included 
in Table B.5, but are deemed of low quality and therefore are not included in the review of the MDMS 
presented in Chapter 2.  
After detailing the studies on the MDMS, I then present the studies on the outcomes of the MDMS 
(Table B.6) and the implementation of the scheme (Table B.7). These tables supplement the review 
provided in Sections 2.6.3 and 2.6.4. 
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Appendix C 
 
Chapter 3 
 
 
C.1 Sampled Locations  
 
Table C.1: Employment at the sampled locations (GOI, 2011) 
  
Location Work 
Main 
work 
Marginal 
work 3-6 
Marginal 
work 0-3 Cultivator 
Agricultural 
Labourer 
Household 
Industries Other 
1 3056 2569 468 19 2 241 204 2609 
2 2886 2743 101 42 8 33 94 2751 
3 1074 1001 71 2 8 5 65 996 
4 1074 1001 71 2 8 5 65 996 
5 1688 1488 194 6 534 55 65 1034 
6 89 56 29 4 21 2 0 66 
7 269 242 20 7 142 0 24 103 
8 195 20 136 39 41 151 1 2 
9 1345 1099 231 15 970 23 4 348 
10 1345 1099 231 15 970 23 4 348 
11 2306 2247 54 5 1 8 66 2231 
12 1902 1289 606 7 207 359 51 1285 
13 1902 1289 606 7 207 359 51 1285 
14 190 14 149 27 2 186 2 0 
15 930 609 198 123 912 7 3 8 
16 985 623 244 118 682 188 0 115 
17 2608 1137 1160 311 1712 839 7 50 
18 640 171 462 7 251 325 3 61 
19 1215 605 570 40 379 716 8 112 
20 1686 1431 157 98 1401 181 6 98 
21 175 9 166 0 169 4 0 2 
22 838 804 34 0 480 347 0 11 
23 625 582 37 6 6 13 32 574 
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Location Work 
Main 
work 
Marginal 
work 3-6 
Marginal 
work 0-3 Cultivator 
Agricultural 
Labourer 
Household 
Industries Other 
24 843 764 73 6 2 2 82 757 
25 1218 989 223 6 494 313 75 336 
26 689 39 441 209 359 98 1 231 
27 1060 711 216 133 180 72 32 776 
28 1060 711 216 133 180 72 32 776 
29 433 275 135 23 120 19 101 193 
30 1870 747 751 372 1178 254 12 426 
31 1498 819 361 318 285 424 64 725 
32 194 152 22 20 26 46 0 122 
33 866 467 344 55 470 136 3 257 
34 908 448 389 71 401 238 18 251 
35 866 467 344 55 470 136 3 257 
36 351 179 158 14 125 153 34 39 
37 542 517 22 3 399 18 3 122 
38 697 507 144 46 187 99 17 394 
39 625 147 475 3 153 389 2 81 
40 412 187 223 2 332 30 6 44 
41 900 368 476 56 533 186 18 163 
42 382 195 182 5 217 136 7 22 
43 908 448 389 71 401 238 18 251 
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C.2 List of schools 
 
Table C.3 details the types of school sampled: Primary (grades I-V), upper primary (I-VIII), 
secondary are(I-X) and senior secondary (I-XII). 
 
Table C.3: Sampled schools 
School Block Type Scho
ol 
Block Type 
1 Girwa Primary 22 Kotra Upper primary 
2 Girwa Upper primary 23 Khamnor Upper primary 
3 Girwa Senior Secondary 24 Khamnor Secondary 
4 Girwa Upper Primary 25 Khamnor Primary 
5 Girwa Secondary 26 Khamnor Upper primary 
6 Girwa Primary 27 Khamnor Primary 
7 Girwa Secondary 28 Khamnor Girls’ Upper primary  
8 Girwa Primary 29 Khamnor Primary (Shiksha Karmi) 
9 Girwa Senior Secondary 30 Khamnor Upper primary 
10 Girwa Primary 31 Khamnor Upper primary 
11 Girwa Madarsa 32 Khamnor Primary 
12 Kotra Upper primary 33 Kumbhal. Secondary 
13 Kotra Girls’ Upper primary 34 Kumbhal Senior Secondary 
14 Kotra Primary 35 Kumbhal Primary 
15 Kotra Primary (Shiksha Karmi) 36 Kumbhal Upper Primary 
16 Kotra Senior Secondary 37 Kumbhal Primary 
17 
Kotra 
Senior Secondary 38 Kumbhal 
Primary (with upper 
primary UPS) 
18 Kotra Primary 39 Kumbhal Primary 
19 Kotra Upper primary 40 Kumbhal Primary (Shiksha Karmi) 
20 Kotra Primary 41 Kumbhal Primary 
21 Kotra Primary 42 Kumbhal Primary 
22 Kotra Upper primary 43 Kumbhal Primary 
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C.3 School Survey 
 
The following questions were asked at each school.    
 
About the school  
1. Type of School 
2. School category 
3. How many students are enrolled? 
4. How many students dropout per year? 
5. How many students are attending today? 
6. How many classes are in the school? 
7. How many classrooms are there? 
 
The Midday Meal Scheme 
8. How many children are eating the meal today? 
9. Where is the food cooked? 
10. How long has the food been cooked in this location?   
11. How many cooks does the school employ 
12. Why was/were the cook(s) selected? 
13. How much is the cook paid per month? 
14. How many days per week is the meal provided? (Max.6) 
15. Has the MDM been served regularly for the last 12 months? 
16. How many pupils eat the MDM? 
17. Do any children go home for lunch instead 
18. Do any additional children come to the school to have the MDM? 
19. Is the meal provided during the summer vacation? 
20. How many pupils eat the MDM in the summer vacation (if it is provided)? 
21. Do all children sit together to eat? 
22. Are all children served at the same time? 
23. Are all the children served by the same person? 
24. Are all children given the same amount of food? 
25. How much grain is the school allocated per month? 
26. How much of this grain is utilised 
27. What is the budget per child per day? 
28. Is the budget sufficient 
29. Have there ever been any problems receiving the money? 
30. What happens if the money is not sufficient/delayed? 
31. In the past 12 months, how often has the meal been monitored? 
 
Facilities 
32. Does the school have a separate kitchen for cooking? 
33. Does the school have a separate storage facility for the food? 
34. Is clean drinking water available at the school? 
 
Food 
35. What food is provided each day? (record for each day of the week) 
36. Is the same food served each week? 
37. How often are green vegetables served? 
38. How often is fruit served? 
39. Where are the other ingredients bought? 
40. Have children ever been ill after eating the food? 
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Participation and accountability 
 
41. Who decides what food is cooked? 
42. Is there a school management committee? 
43. Who is on the school management committee? 
44. How often does the committee meet? 
45. Do parents ever ask about the MDM? 
46. Do the parents ever complain about the MDM? 
47. If parents have a complaint about the food, what can they do? 
48. If teachers have complaints about the food, what can they do? 
 
Impacts 
49. Has the MDM affected any of the following: Enrolment, attendance, performance, 
children’s health, children’s families, relationship between students, employment of low 
caste women? (If yes, then how?) 
50. What is your opinion of the Midday Meal Scheme? 
 
 
C.4 Cook Survey 
 
One cook in each school was asked the following questions. 
 
1. Number of cooks at the school 
2. Age 
3. Caste 
4. How many months/years have you been cooking the MDM at this school? 
5. Who selected you for this job? 
6. Why were you selected? 
7. How many days per week do you cook the meal? 
8. How much money are you paid per month? 
9. Is the salary sufficient?  
10. Is the money paid on time?  
11. Who cooks the meal if you are ill? 
12. How do you know what to cook each day? 
13. Do you give all children the same amount? 
14. Do the children all sit together to eat the MDM? 
15. In your opinion, what is the main purpose of the MDM? 
16. What is your opinion of the MDM? 
17. Has the MDM affected any of the following: Enrolment, attendance, performance, 
children’s health, children’s families, relationship between students, employment of low 
caste women? (If yes, then how?) 
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C.5 Observation Checklist 
 
The following details were recorded at each school: 
 
1. Name of the school 
2. School number 
3. Location 
4. Panchayat 
5. Block 
6. Date 
7. Name of the observer 
8. Provider of the MDM  
9. Where is the food cooked? 
10. At what time was food cooked? 
11. At what time was the food served? 
12. How long did it take to serve the meal? 
13. Where is the food eaten?  
14. What food is being served today? 
15. How many students are eating the meal? (male, female) 
16. How many cooks are present?  
17.  Are the following facilities available: kitchen shed, clean cooking area, gas cooker, space 
for food storage, clean drinking water and a toilet?  
18. Is the menu displayed? 
19. Was the food tasted before being served? 
20. Are children involved in food preparation?  
21. Are there enough plates? 
22. Do children wash their hands before eating? 
23. Are children involved in the serving of the meal?  
24. Do all students eat the meal? 
25. Do any children go home at lunchtime? 
26. Do extra children come at lunchtime? 
27. Do students eat all the food they are given?  
28. Are second helpings available? 
29. Do children eat a second helping? 
30. Do all children sit together to eat? 
31. Do all children eat at the same time? 
32. Are all children served by the same person? 
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C.6 Household Survey  
 
C.6.1. Household Survey 1 
 
A. Respondent and household details1 
1. Name 
2. Age 
3. Gender 
4. Position in household  
5. How many people are in your household? (adults, children) 
6. How many members of the Household are employed? 
7. What type of employment do they do? 
8. What is their level of education? 
9. What is the religion of the household? 
10. Is the household vegetarian? 
11. Caste 
12. How many children above the children between 6-14 attend school 
13. What type of school does your child/do your children attend? 
 
 
B. Midday Meal Scheme 
14. How many children in this household receive food at school? 
15. How many days per week does your child eat the meal provided at school? 
16. What food does your child get at school? 
17. For your child, is the food at school a snack or meal? 
18. Excluding the food at school, how many meals does your child eat per day? 
19. How many snacks does your child eat per day? 
20. Does your child also eat lunch at home? 
21. Does your child take food from home to school with them? 
22. Is the quantity of the food provided at school enough?   
23. Is the food provided at school healthy? 
24. Do you consider the quality of the meal to be: very good, good, fine, bad, very bad or don’t 
know?  
25. Has your child ever been ill after eating the MDM? 
26. Has your child ever experienced any discrimination within the MDM? If yes, then please 
explain what happened. 
27. Overall, are you very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the meal, or 
are you not sure? Please explain the reasons for your answer.  
28. Has the MDM affected any of the following areas: Child’s enrolment at school; Child’s 
attendance at school; Child’s performance at school; child’s health; the other children in the 
household; other members of the household; the amount of food available in the household; 
the amount of money the household has; household food expenditure; household non-food 
expenditure; the equality of children; the employment of low caste women; relationship 
between different castes. 
29. Has the MDM had any further outcomes that are not listed? 
30. Do you participate in the school management committee? 
31. If there were a problem with the food being provided, what would you do? 
 
 
                                                        
1 Closed questions were standardised and coded, for example (0) No (1) Yes and (2) Sometimes. This is true 
of all surveys. 
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C. Questions for those eligible but not receiving the midday meal 
For those in an eligible school but not taking the meal. 
 
i. Has your child ever eaten the meal provided at school? 
ii. Why does your child not eat the meal at school? 
 
For those in school, but one not eligible for the meal (private school) 
i. Has the absence of the MDM in your child’s school affected your child or your household? 
If yes, In what way has your child been affected? 
ii. Do you wish the MDM were provided in your child’s school? Why?  
 
For those not in school 
i. Why does your child not attend school? 
ii. If the school were to offer a free meal to children not in school, would your child take it? 
iii. Please explain the reasons for your answer 
 
D. Safety Nets  
32. Do you get food through the Public distribution system? 
33. What type of card do you have?  
34. Have you used ICDS?  
35. Does anyone in this household receive a pension from the Indira Gandhi National Old Age 
Pension Scheme 
36. Has anyone in this household benefited from the National Maternity Benefit scheme? 
37. Have this household ever benefited from the National Family Benefit Scheme? 
38. Does anyone in this household have a MGNREGA job card? 
 
E. Food 
39. In the past 7 days, on how many days did you eat the following types of food? How 
frequently? Where did the food come from? 
a. Main staples: Wheat, maize 
b. Pulses 
c. Vegetables 
d. Fruit 
e. Meat, fish, eggs 
f. Milk: Milk, yoghurt and other dairy 
g. Sugar 
h. Oil 
i. Condiments: Spices, tea, coffee, salt 
 
40. In the past for weeks did you experience... 
i. Did you worry that your household would not have enough food? 
ii. were you or any household member not able to eat the kinds of foods you preferred 
because of a lack of resources? 
iii. Did you have to eat a limited variety of foods due to a lack of resources? 
iv. Did you or any household member have to eat some foods that you really did not want 
to eat because of a lack of resources to obtain other types of food? 
v. Did you or any household member have to eat a smaller meal than you felt you needed 
because there was not enough food? 
vi. Did you or any household member have to eat fewer meals in a day because there was 
not enough food? 
vii. Was there ever no food to eat of any kind in your household because of lack of 
resources to get food? 
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viii. Did you or any household member go to sleep at night hungry because there was not 
enough food? 
ix. Did you or any household member go a whole day and night without eating anything 
because there was not enough food? 
 
C.6.2. Household Survey 2  
 
A. Respondent and Household  
1. Name 
2. Age 
3. Gender 
4. What is your relationship to the head of the household? 
5. What is the religion of the household? 
6. Is the household vegetarian? 
7. Caste 
8. How many people live in this household? (adults, children) 
9. Adult Household Members. List the: name, age and occupation of all adult members 
10. Child members. List the: age, gender, whether they attend the case study school, how many 
days they attend school and on how many days they eat the MDM.  
 
B. Midday Meal Scheme 
11. Is the quantity of food provided in the MDM scheme enough?   
12. Is the food provided healthy? 
13. Do you consider the quality of the meal to be: very good, good, fine, bad, very bad or don’t 
know? 
14. Has your child ever been ill after eating the MDM? 
15. Has your child ever experienced any discrimination within the MDM? 
16. Because of the MDM:  
a. Did any of your children start going to school? 
b. Do your children go to school more often? 
c. Has your child performed better at school? 
d. Has your child’s health improved? 
e. Does your child eat less at home? 
f. Is there more food at home? 
g. Do the rest of the family eat more at home? 
h. Is there more money at home? 
i. Is less money spent on food? 
j. Do you have more time to work? 
k. Is there a better relationship between the children 
 
C. Food Consumption 
17. Food consumption score 
18. 24 hour food recall: food items, quantity, source, cooking method 
19. HFIAS 
20. Safety nets- same questions as household survey one  
 
D) Standard of Living 
21. Which of the following applies to your house? 
• House type: pucca, semi-pucca, kaccha 
• Toilet: Own flush toilet, public/shared flush, shared/public pit, no facility 
• Lighting: electricity, kerosene/gas/oil, other 
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• Main fuel for cooking: Electricity/ liquid petroleum gas/ biogas, coal/ charcoal/ 
kerosene, other 
• drinking water: private pipe/handpump/well, Public tap/handpump/well, other  
• Separate room for cooking 
• Ownership of house 
• Ownership of agricultural land: (1) 5> acres (2) 2.0-4.9 acres (3) <2 acres or acreage 
not known (4) No agricultural land 
• Ownership of irrigated land 
• Ownership of livestock 
• Do you own any of the following: car/tractor, Moped/motorcycle/scooter, telephone, 
Refrigerator, colour television, bicycle, electric fan, radio/transistor, black and white 
television, water pump, cart, mattress, pressure cooker, chair, cot/bed, table, clock/watch 
22. What is the monthly income of this household 
23. In the past seven days, how much money did you spend on the following: Cereals and cereal 
substitute, Pulses and their products, Milk and their products, oil, Egg, fish and meat, vegetables, 
fruit, sugar, salt/spices, food/beverages consumed outside of the home, pan/tobacco/intoxicants.  
24. How much money did this household spend in the last 30 days on the following:  fuel/light, rent, 
taxes, medical costs (non-institutional), conveyance, payments to others for a service, 
Miscellaneous goods including entertainment 
25. How much money did this household spend in the last 365 days on the following: 
clothing/footwear/bedding, education, medical care (institutional), durable goods.  
 
C.6.3 Household Survey 3  
 
A. Respondent  
1. Name 
2. Gender 
 
B. The Midday meal scheme 
1. Is the food provided at school tasty? 
2. Is the food provided at school like home-cooked food? Why? 
3. Does your child take a plate/empty tiffin to school? 
4. Does your child sit with members of the same caste at school? Why? 
5. Does your child sit with members of the same caste to eat the MDM? Why? 
6. How many times a day do you cook at home? 
7. How many times a day do you eat at home? 
8. On a Sunday, overall does your child eat: (1) More than they do at school (2) Less than they 
do at school (3) The same amount (4) Don’t know 
9. Is the MDM served here during the summer vacation? 
10. If no, do you wish it was being served? 
11. In the summer, does your child eat: 1) More than they do during school time(2) Less than 
they do during school time (3) The same 
12. In the summer vacation, does the amount of food in the household change? 
13. Does the lack of MDM during the summer have any impact on your child or your 
household? Please explain 
14. Would having the MDM in the summer make any difference? 
15. If eggs were served at school, would your child eat them? 
 
C. Food consumption 
16. FCS  
17. Food consumption recall  
18. HFIAS 
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C.7 Measuring Food (In)security 
 
As Jones et al. (2013) wrote: ‘the diversity of food security measurement tools currently available 
provides a rather dizzying array of options’ (484). Jones et al. group these as follows:  
 
1. National-level estimates of food security 
a. Prevalence of undernourishment 
b. Global Hunger Index 
c. Global Food Security Index 
 
2. Global monitoring and early warning systems 
a. Famine Early Warning Systems Network 
b. Vulnerability analysis and mapping methodology 
 
3. Household food access 
a. Household consumption and expenditure survey 
b. The dietary diversity proxy. 
c. Food Consumption Score (FCS) 
d. Household Dietary Diversity Score. 
 
4. Measures based on participatory adaptation 
a. Coping Strategies Index 
b. Household economy approach 
 
5. Direct, experience-based measures 
a. United States Household Food Security Survey Module (HFSSM) 
b. Household Food Insecurity Access Scale (HFIAS) 
c. Household hunger scale. 
d. Latin American and Caribbean Household Food Security Scale  
 
6. Food utilisation 
a.  Anthropometry 
 
The focus of the primary research is household-level food insecurity, points 3-5 in the above. Whilst 
a focus on individual-level food insecurity using anthropometric measurements would have been 
useful and is certainly needed to assess child malnutrition and the impact of the MDMS, it was beyond 
the scope of this PhD. Table C.4 reviews the measures of household food security. Due to the focus 
of this study on the Indian context, the US HFSSM and the Latin American and Caribbean Household 
Food Security Scale are not included in the review.  
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In addition to the above, one can also assess diets using dietary energy intake, typically determined 
by recording and weighing all food consumed. However, this method is technical and time-
consuming. Moreover, as reviewed by Wiesmann et al. (2006), several studies have found that proxy 
indicators such as dietary diversity correlate with dietary energy intake (Ogle, 2001; Torheim et al., 
2004) and dietary diversity and food frequency positively correlate with indicators of food quality 
(Hatløy et al., 1998; Torheim et al, 2004). Therefore, measures of dietary diversity can be used instead 
of measures to assess dietary energy intake. 
 
Despite the increasing recognition of the need to measure the multiple dimensions of food security 
beyond dietary diversity, these measures fail to adequately measure the sufficiency, acceptability and 
stability of food (Coates, 2013; Jones et al., 2013; Webb et al., 2006). In response, Coates (2013) 
proposed a suite of indicators, including measurements of calories, dietary diversity and food access 
alongside unspecified scales of cultural acceptability and safety. The extent to which scores and 
indexes alone can measure food security is, however, questionable. Food, food security and 
particularly adequacy and acceptability, are personal and emotional and have been considered better 
studied through qualitative measures that account for subjectivity (Maxwell, 1996; Sridhar, 2008). In 
this study, I therefore used multiple methods to assess and explore food (in)security. 
 
The goal here was to examine the quality of food consumption and food security status. As the sole 
purpose of the research was not to assess food security, the measure of food security needed to be 
incorporated into household surveys. During the first stage of the research, where breadth was the 
aim, 24-hour food consumption recall was not feasible. Household consumption and expenditure 
surveys were tested in the pilot study, but were found to be too time-consuming and not welcomed 
by participants. Based on the strengths and weakness of the measures outlined in Table C.4, the most 
suitable methods and the ones used in this study were the food consumption score and the HFIAS. 
The FCS method was selected to provide insight into both food consumption and dietary diversity 
and the HFIAS was used to assess experiences of food security. In the second and third stage of the 
research, 24-hour food consumption recall was used. Recognising the limits of scales (Coates, 2013), 
food security was also examined in interviews and focus groups. I detail the implementation of the 
HFIAS and 24-hour food consumption recall in Chapter 3. Due to the complexity of using the FCS 
in South Asia, there is need for further discussion of the measure and how it was used here.  
 
Food Consumption Score 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, the use of the FCS in the South Asian context rather than in sub-Saharan 
Africa is complicated by the greater dietary diversity in South Asia. For this study, milk consumption 
was particularly problematic. Milk should be given a weight of four unless used in small quantities 
such as a teaspoon in tea in which case it should be treated as a condiment with a weight of zero 
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(WFP, 2008). In the example given by the WFP (2008) of the use of the method in Laos, on average 
milk was only consumed after a score of 55 was reached and was consumed six times per week once 
a score of 84 was reached. However, milk featured frequently in the diets of the respondents in this 
study. In HS1, milk was consumed daily by 209 participants (49.6%) and had been consumed during 
the previous seven days by 303 participants (72%). A weighting of four therefore radically changes 
the FCS, adding 28 for almost half of the participants who consumed milk daily. Using the standard 
cut-offs, the daily consumption of milk and no other food group would indicate a borderline 
adequate/inadequate diet. Moreover, the overall weighting of four ignores the different extent of 
consumption. Milk is expensive and for most households that buy milk, it is consumed in tea only. 
The quantity of milk consumed in tea is more than a teaspoon and should not be discounted as a 
condiment. However, the quantity of milk consumed is far less than for those who consume milk by 
the glass, possible for those who are wealthy or have their own source of production. To address this 
issue, a small amount of consumption (in tea only) was given a weight of two and a full consumption 
(by the glass) was given a weight of four. The decision was based on whether the household bought 
or produced their own milk which was recorded as part of the FCS, which was cross-referenced with 
the food consumption recall.  
 
As shown in Table C.5, how milk is weighted significantly changes how diets are classified. For 
comparison, the HFIAS results indicated that 46.3% of the sample were food secure, 14.1% were 
mildly insecure, 16.5% were moderately food insecure and 22.2% were severely food insecure. Thus, 
to calculate the scores used to correlate the measure with HFIAS scores, the weighting of two and 
four are used.  
 
Table C.5: The impact of the weight given to milk for FCS categories, household survey one 
Cut-offs 
Weight 4 Weight 2, 4 Weight 0 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
Standard 
  
Poor 12 2.8 12 2.8 13 3.0 
Borderline 107 24.9 123 28.7 290 67.6 
Acceptable 310 72.3 294 68.5 126 29.4 
Modified 
  
Poor 76 17.7 80 18.6 125 29.1 
Borderline 65 15.2 95 22.1 263 61.3 
Acceptable 288 67.1 254 59.2 41 9.6 
 
Using the standard and modified cut-offs is also problematic in the Indian context. Not only are the 
overall scores higher due to milk consumption, the cut-offs are also influenced by sugar and oil 
consumption. In HS1, 90.3% of households consumed sugar daily and 94% consumed sugar six or 
seven days per week. In HS2, 84% consumed oil daily and 86% consumed six or seven times per 
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week. Whilst the clear majority consume these items daily, daily consumption was not ubiquitous 
among the households and therefore the modified cut-offs (see Section 3.3.5) could not be used. 
 
Furthermore, the use of the FCS in India is complicated by the prevalence of vegetarianism. Including 
the food group of meat/fish/eggs and giving it a weight of four can radically alter the score. However, 
given the nutritional properties of these food groups, the inclusion of this food group is still important 
for indicating food consumption. I have therefore did not exclude the category from the method or 
analysis. However, I would caution against comparing any FCS results between states/UTs due to the 
differential consumption of these products. The absence of meat from the diets of the majority of 
respondents means that greater emphasis should be placed on the frequency at which other sources 
of protein, especially pulses, were consumed. 
 
To provide insight into the overall pattern of consumption, Figure C.1 displays the average 
consumption pattern for each score from the first household survey. The data has been smoothed and 
condiments have been excluded due to the frequency that they were consumed and their insignificance 
to nutritional intake. The pattern at the high-end of FCS score dips as a consequence of averaging 
frequency across a smaller sample. As shown, the consumption of staples, sugar and oil is relatively 
stable across the sample, whereas pulse, vegetable, fruit and milk consumption varies considerably, 
with the frequency of consumption increasing as the score increases.  
 
 
 
 
Figure C.1: Stacked FCS results, household survey one 
 
These limitations introduce uncertainty in using the score-based categories of consumption. To 
adequately determine the cut-offs appropriate for North Indian dietary patterns, one would need to 
compare FCS results with a nutritional analysis of dietary intake; a substantial piece of research by 
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itself. Therefore, here I have not used the categories of consumption typically used in the FCS method. 
Without these scores, the measure can still assess food consumption. 
 
Comparing Methods 
 
As reported in Section 3.3.5, the FCS score and the HFIAS score results were significantly correlated. 
To compare methods further, the results from the cluster analysis were compared to the results from 
the HFIAS categories. As detailed in Section 5.2.2, in the FCS data from HS1, cluster one had the 
least diverse consumption, followed by cluster four, three and cluster two which had the most diverse 
consumption. One would not expect there to be perfect overlap between the results from the HFIAS 
and the cluster analysis as they were measuring different things. Indeed the results in Table C.6 
indicate that the overlap was not perfect for the intermediate clusters. However, there is an overall 
trend; those that had the least diverse diets were the most food insecure. As shown in Table C.6, only 
8.3% of cluster one were food secure compared to 55.1% of cluster two.  
 
Table C.6: HFIAS category and cluster results, household survey one 
HFIAS category Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
Secure 3 8.3 54 55.1 43 37.4 98 56.3 
Mildly Insecure 7 19.4 18 18.4 15 13.0 20 11.5 
Moderately Insecure 4 11.1 21 21.4 17 14.8 28 16.1 
Severely Insecure 22 61.1 5 5.1 40 34.8 28 16.1 
 
A chi-square test of independence also found a significant relationship between cluster and HFIAS 
category, χ2 (9)=71.576, p=<.001. The results from pairwise comparisons are shown in Table C.7. 
These support the findings shown in Table C.6; at the extremes, the clusters and HFIAS categories 
overlap.  
 
Table C.7: Pairwise comparisons HFIAS category and clusters, household survey one 
Pairwise comparisons P value 
Secure/Mildly Insecure p=0.0052 
Secure/Severely Insecure p=<0.001*** 
Secure/moderately insecure p=0.227 
Mildly/moderately insecure p=0.639 
Mildly/severely insecure p=<0.001*** 
Moderately/severely insecure p=<0.001*** 
 
The cluster analysis of the FCS results from HS2 showed that those in cluster one had the least diverse 
diets and those in cluster two had the most diverse (Section 3.3.5). The results presented in Table C.8 
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show clear overlap between dietary diversity and HFIAS category; those with the least diverse diets 
had higher levels of food insecurity than those with more diverse diets.   
 
 
Table C.8: Cluster analysis and HFAIS category, household survey two 
HFIAS Category Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
Secure 1 2.8 11 34.4 5 5.6 
Mildly insecure 2 5.6 6 18.8 20 22.5 
Moderately Insecure 4 11.1 7 21.9 21 23.6 
Severely Insecure 29 80.6 8 25.0 43 48.3 
 
A chi-square test also showed non-independence between clusters and HFIAS categories, 
χ2(6)=37.45, p=<0.001. Pairwise comparisons are shown in Table C.9. The distribution of clusters 
was significant for all HFIAS categories, except for mildly and moderately insecure.  
 
C.9: Pairwise comparisons HFIAS categories and clusters, household survey two 
Pairwise comparisons P value 
Secure/Mildly Insecure p=0.01** 
Secure/Severely Insecure p=<0.001*** 
Secure/moderately insecure p=0.02* 
Mildly/moderately insecure p=0.852 
Mildly/severely insecure p=0.014* 
Moderately/severely insecure p=0.027* 
 
 
Therefore, in the FCS data from both HS1 and HS2, the clusters of food consumption are significantly 
related to HFIAS categories; those with the least diverse diets are most likely to be food insecure and 
those with more diverse diets are less food insecure/food secure. The similarities between the results 
indicates the validity of the measures. 
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C.8 Student Survey 
 
Class: 
Age:  
 
1. How many days per week do you go to school? 
2. Do you eat breakfast before coming to school? Yes. No. Sometimes 
3. Do you eat the food at school? Yes. No. Sometimes 
4. Do you bring tiffin to school from home? Yes. No. Sometimes 
5. How many times per day do you eat? 
6. Do you get enough food at school? Yes. No. Sometimes 
7. Is the food at school... very good, good, fine, bad or very bad? 
8. What is your favourite meal that is served at school? 
9. Do you eat less food on a Sunday? Yes. No. 
10. Do you eat less food in the summer holiday? Yes. No.   
 
C.9. Essay 
 
 
 
Figure C.2: Example of a student’s essay from CS1 
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Appendix D 
 
Chapter 4 
 
 
D.1: Recommended Daily Allowances and the MDMS 
 
The theoretical contribution of the MDM to diets can be calculated by comparing recommended 
dietary allowances (RDA) and the quantities that should be provided in the MDMS. The results are 
shown in Table D.1. Children in the age group 10-12 years could be in lower primary (LP) or upper 
primary (UP) and thus the contribution to both are presented. As shown, in theory, the MDM 
contributes between 20.5%-35% of a child’s daily calories and between 29.7-59.7% of protein. The 
fulfilment of one third of calories and one half of protein would only occur for children between 4-6 
years. The contribution would be lower for children with a high activity level as their RDAs would 
be higher.  
 
Table D.1: RDA for Indian children (NIN, 2011) and contribution of MDMS 
Group Age (years) Energy 
RDA 
(kcal) 
Contribution of 
MDM to 
calories (%) 
Protein 
(g) 
Contribution 
of MDM to 
protein (%) 
Children 
4-6 1350 33.3 20.1 59.7 
7-9 1690 26.6 29.5 40.7 
Boys 
10-12 (LP)  2190 20.5 39.9 30.1 
10-12 (UP) 2190 32.0 39.9 50.1 
Girls 
10-12 (LP) 2010 22.4 40.4 29.7 
10-12 (UP) 2010 35.0 40.4 49.5 
Boys 13-15 2750 27.3 54.3 36.8 
Girls 13-15 2330 30.0 51.9 38.5 
 
It should be noted that the quality of protein varies due to the composition of amino acids; eggs and 
then human milk are the highest quality proteins and milk, meat and fish are good quality proteins 
(Gopalan et al., 2014). The protein value of cereals can be enhanced by the intake of vegetables, 
particularly leafy vegetables (NIN, 2011). The quantity of protein required therefore varies depending 
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on the quality of the protein consumed. Whilst this should be remembered, here only the protein 
content as stated in Gopalan et al. (2014) and by the GOI are considered.  
 
The specified quantity of each food group needed for a balanced diet (NIN, 2011) and the potential 
contribution of the MDM are shown below in Table D.2. The MDM contributes the most to cereal 
and pulse intake and less to vegetable and fat intake. Precise contributions vary by age and, in children 
aged 10 and above, gender.  
 
Table D.2: RDA of food groups (NIN, 2011) and MDMS contribution 
 
Age Group 
(Years)  
  
Cereals Pulses Vegetables  Fat and Oil 
RDA 
(g) 
MDM 
(%) 
RDA 
(g) 
MDM 
(%) 
RDA 
(g) 
MDM 
(%) 
RDA 
(g) 
MDM 
(%) 
4-6 120 83.3 30 66.7 150 33.3 25 20 
7-9 180 55.6 60 33.3 200 25 30 16.7 
10-12 
  
  
  
Boys 
(LP) 
300 33.3 60 33.3 300 16.7 35 14.3 
Girls 
(LP) 
240 50 60 50 300 25 35 21.4 
Boys 
(UP) 
300 41.7 60 33.3 300 16.7 35 14.3 
Girls 
(UP) 
240 62.5 60 50 300 25 35 21.4 
13-15 
  
Boys 420 35.7 75 40 300 25 45 16.7 
Girls 330 45.5 60 50 300 25 40 18.8 
 
 
Based on the menu in Rajasthan (Section 4.4.2), lower primary students should receive 600g of grain, 
80g of dal, 200g of vegetables and 30 of oil and fat per week under the decentralised model. The 
quantities are the same under the centralised model, with the exception of dal which would be 60g. 
At the upper primary level, students would receive 900g of grain, 120g of dal, 300g of vegetables 
and 45g of oil and fat under the decentralised model. The quantities would be the same for the 
centralised menu, although the quantity of dal would be 90g. The proportion of the RDA of energy, 
protein and calories met by the MDM across the six days when the meal is served is shown in Table 
D.3   
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Table D.3: Percentage of RDA met by the MDM across the six days when the MDM is served 
Food  
Age group (years) 
4-6  7-9 
10-12  13-15 
Boys 
(LP) 
Boys 
(UP) 
Girls 
(LP) 
Girls 
(UP) Boys Girls 
Energy (decent.) 33.4 26.7 20.6 30.4 22.4 33.1 24.2 28.6 
Energy (cent) 32.6 26.1 20.1 29.7 21.9 32.3 23.6 27.9 
Protein (decent.) 51.8 35.3 26.1 49.5 25.8 48.8 36.3 38.0 
Protein (cent.) 59.5 40.6 30.0 45.1 29.6 44.5 33.1 34.6 
Cereal 83.3 55.6 33.3 50.0 41.7 62.5 35.7 45.5 
Pulse (Decent.) 44.4 22.2 22.2 33.3 22.2 33.3 26.7 33.3 
Pulse (Cent.)  33.3 16.7 16.7 25.0 16.7 25.0 13.3 16.7 
Vegetable 22.2 16.7 11.1 16.7 11.1 16.7 16.7 16.7 
Fat 13.3 11.1 9.5 21.4 9.5 21.4 16.7 18.8 
Fruit 16.7 16.7 16.7 16.7 16.7 16.7 16.7 16.7 
 
 
Tables D.4 and D.5 show the proportion of the RDA of calories and protein that would be fulfilled 
by the MDM in Rajasthan, according to the recalculated values presented in Table 4.4. The proportion 
of calories ranges from 18.9-37.3% and protein from 23-81.%.  
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The RDA of micronutrients is shown in Table D.6. Based on the discussion of micronutrients in 
Gopalan et al. (2014), Vitamin B1 (Thiamine) is not considered as Indian diets are typically lacking 
in this only when highly polished rice is consumed, which is not the case in the study area. Vitamin 
B6 (Pyridoxine) is not considered as the content of this in Indian food has not been systematically 
studied. Vitamin B12 is not considered as deficiencies are not widespread in India. Phosphorus is not 
considered as sufficient amounts can be obtained from a poor cereal-based diet and thus deficiencies 
are rare. Zinc is not considered as the outcomes of zinc deficiency are unclear. 
 
Table D.6: RDA of certain nutrients (NIN, 2011). 
Nutrient 
Age Group (Years) 
4-6 7-9 10-12 13-15 
Boys Girls Boys Girls 
Calcium (mg) 600 800 800 800 800 800 
Iron (mg) 13 16 21 27 32 27 
/B-Carotene (µg) 3200 4800 4800 4800 4800 4800 
Riboflavin (mg) 0.8 1.0 1.3 1.2 1.6 1.4 
Niacin (mg) 11 13 15 13 16 14 
Vitamin C (mg) 40 40 40 40 40 40 
Dietary folate (mg) 100 120 140 140 150 150 
Magnesium (mg) 70 100 120 160 165 210 
 
 
The micronutrient content of the MDM would vary significantly depending on the inclusion of fruit 
and vegetables. Table D.7 shows the micronutrient value of roti, rice, dal and common vegetables 
and fruit. The figures firstly indicate the importance of vegetable and fruit consumption for 
micronutrient intake. Second, the figures show the significance of the choice of vegetable. For 
example, green leafy vegetables such as spinach and drumstick leaves are extremely high in vitamin 
A.  
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Thus, the micronutrient content of the MDM varies significantly depending on the vegetable and fruit 
included. Here, by way of indication of the potential contribution, Table D.8 shows the proportionate 
contribution of the MDM if roti and cauliflower and tomato were served (half a serving of each). The 
contribution if shown for the lower primary level. The meal supplied a small proportion of calcium, 
carotene and folic acid.  
 
Table D.8: Contribution MDM to nutrient intake at the lower primary norms (%) 
 
Nutrient 
Age Group (years) 
4 to 6 7 to 9 Boys 10-12 Girls10-12 
Calcium (mg) 11.4 8.5 8.5 8.5 
Iron (mg) 40.5 32.9 25.1 19.5 
Vitamin A(B-Carotene) (µg) 3.9 2.6 2.6 2.6 
Riboflavin (mg) 26.3 21.0 16.2 17.5 
Niacin (mg) 42.3 35.8 31.0 35.8 
Vitamin C (mg) 141.4 141.4 141.4 141.4 
Dietary folate (mg) free 15.6 13.0 11.1 11.1 
Magnesium (mg) 203.6 142.5 118.8 89.1 
 
 
The potential contribution of the MDMS to RDAs is therefore variable, varying by gender, age, food 
group and micronutrients. Although the scheme can make a sizable contribution to cereal and pulse 
intake, the contribution to the intake of vegetables and fat/oil is far lower. The contribution to certain 
micronutrients is also low and heavily depends on the choice of vegetable and the inclusion of fruit. 
Based on the above, the RDAs would be fulfilled if students were consuming at least two other meals 
at home that were high in protein, fat and vegetables.  
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D.2 MDM Delivery Models 
 
Table D.9: MDM delivery models across India by number of schools 2015-2016 
(Data source: AWPBs for 2016-2017). 
State/UT 
PRI/GP/ 
Local Body 
SMC/ 
VEC/WEC SHG NGO Trust Other Total 
Andhra Pradesh 0 0 44425 1018 151 0 45594 
Arunachal Pradesh 0 3424 4 0 0 0 3428 
Assam 256 57097 0 591 0 0 57944 
Bihar 668 67195 0 2751 0 0 70614 
Chhattisgarh 52 741 43290 671 0 220 44974 
Goa 0 0 1496 0 0 6 1502 
Gujarat 33025 0 0 3264 0 0 36289 
Haryana 1344 2545 7021 4 22 0 10936 
Himachal Pradesh 0 15386 0 0 0 0 15386 
Jammu and  
Kashmir 0 23136 0 0 0 0 23136 
Jharkhand  0 40584 0 388 0 0 40972 
Karnataka 0 49997 0 5840 0 0 55837 
Kerala 0 0 0 0 0 12358 12358 
Madhya Pradesh 415 4751 78277 2171 0 669 86283 
Maharashtra 965 75865 6973 1441 7 1409 86660 
Manipur 0 3369 0 0 0 0 3369 
Meghalaya 0 11849 0 0 0 0 11849 
Mizoram 0 2581 0 0 0 0 2581 
Nagaland 0 2060 0 0 0 0 2060 
Orissa 0 42264 17912 297 2311 0 62784 
Punjab 0 20276 0 0 0 0 20276 
Rajasthan 0 65769 1847 3728 0 0 71344 
Sikkim 0 388 269 65 0 14* 736 
Tamil Nadu 0 0 0 0 0 43047 43047 
Telangana 0 3076 24424 961 74 449* 28984 
Tripura 1 0 113 0 0 6442 6556 
Uttarakhand 0 0 0 0 0 17686 17686 
Uttar Pradesh 149366 3586 497 8356 0 5740 167545 
West Bengal 3809 833 78138 892 0 0 83672 
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State/UT 
PRI/GP/ 
Local Body 
SMC/ 
VEC/WEC SHG NGO Trust Other Total 
Andaman and  
Nicobar Islands 0 0 0 0 0 338 338 
Chandigarh 0 0 0 0 0 119 119 
Dadra and  
Nagar Haveli 0 0 0 0 0 283 283 
Daman and Diu 0 0 0 0 0 99 99 
Delhi 0 0 0 3003 0 0 3003 
Lakshadweep 39 0 0 0 0 0 39 
Pondicherry 0 447 0 0 0 0 447 
Total 
Freq. 189940 497219 304686 35441 2565 88879 1118730 
% 17.0 44.4 27.2 3.2 0.2 7.9 100 
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D.3 Interview Codes 
 
Table D.10: Interview Codes 
Interview 
Number 
Type of 
interviewee 
Code Interview 
Number 
Type of 
interviewee 
Code 
1 Other 
(Bureaucrat) 
IO1 22 Academic IA4 
2 Academic IA1 23 Other 
(Bureaucrat) 
I02 
3 Academic IA2 24 Academic IA5 
4 NGO IN1 25 Academic IA6 
5 Government 
(District) 
IG1 26 Academic IA7 
6 NGO IN2 27 Academic IA9 
7 Government 
(District) 
IG2 28 Academic IA10 
8 Government 
(District) 
IG3 29 Other IO3 
9 NGO IN3 30 Government 
(National) 
IG11 
10 Government 
(State) 
IG4 31 Activist IA11 
11 NGO IN4 32 Academic IA12 
12 NGO IN5 33 Academic IA13 
13 NGO IN6 34 Other 
(Journalist) 
I04 
14 Government 
(Block) 
IG5 35 NGO IN6 
15 Government 
(District) 
IG6 36 NGO IN7 
16 Government 
(District) 
IG7 37 NGO IN8 
17 Government 
(District) 
IG8 38 NGO IN9 
18 Government 
(Block) 
IG9 39 Academic IA14 
19 Government 
(Block) 
IG10 40 NGO IN10 
20 Government 
(Block) 
IG111 41 NGO IN11 
21 Academic IA3 42 Academic IA15 
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E.2: Enrolment in the sampled schools 
 
Table E.2: Gender of the students enrolled in the sampled schools (NUEPA, 2016) 
 
 
 
School Total Male Female  School Total 
Male Female 
 No. %  No. %    No. % No. % 
1 242 121 50 121 50 23 118 62 52.5 56 47.5 
2 52 24 46.2 28 53.8 24 168 143 85.1 25 14.9 
3 109 29 26.6 80 73.4 25 22 6 27.3 16 72.7 
4 77 33 42.9 44 57.1 26 117 71 60.7 46 39.3 
5 167 85 50.9 82 49.1 27 55 23 41.8 32 58.2 
6 46 19 41.3 27 58.7 28 81 41 50.6 40 49.4 
7 254 128 50.4 126 49.6 29 27 14 51.9 13 48.1 
8 53 26 49.1 27 50.9 30 73 32 43.8 41 56.2 
9 248 206 83.1 42 16.9 31 81 46 56.8 35 43.2 
10 70 46 65.7 24 34.3 32 32 15 46.9 17 53.1 
11 54 41 75.9 13 24.1 33 73 38 52.1 35 47.9 
12 100 100 100.0 0 0.0 34 146 92 63.0 54 37.0 
13 70 0 0.0 70 100.0 35 57 28 49.1 29 50.9 
14 41 31 75.6 10 24.4 36 141 89 63.1 52 36.9 
15 43 20 46.5 23 53.5 37 108 49 45.4 59 54.6 
16 214 115 53.7 99 46.3 38 126 20 15.9 106 84.1 
17 131 84 64.1 47 35.9 39 18 9 50.0 9 50.0 
18 209 114 54.5 95 45.5 140 63 24 38.1 39 61.9 
19 50 32 64.0 18 36.0 41 44 19 43.2 25 56.8 
20 162 93 57.4 69 42.6 42 59 33 55.9 26 44.1 
21 48 39 81.3 9 18.8 43 39 25 64.1 14 35.9 
22 224 132 58.9 92 41.1       
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E.3 Hindi Translations  
 
Chapter 5 
• A grade VIII student at CS1 wrote: ‘Mai guar se tiffin nahin laati hun. Yeh fayda hai aur jo 
garib bacche hote hai unke ghar par khaana naa milte is liey unko fayda milta hai’ meaning ‘I 
do not bring a tiffin from home, this is the benefit and for poor children who do not have food 
available at home, this is the benefit’. p.146. 
• The mother at household 12 said: ‘MDM se sabhi parivar ko fayda hai. Garib bacchon ko garm 
poshak khaana mil jaata hai jo ghar par nahin mil paata hai’ meaning ‘all families benefit 
from the MDM. For poor children, hot nutritious food is available which is not available at 
home. p.147 
• One student wrote: ‘hamare vidyalay meh dur se aane wale bachon ke liey bhojan bahut laabh 
dayak hai. Kyonki hamare vidhyalay meh bacche panch km dure se aate hai’ meaning ‘for 
those children coming from far away the meal is very beneficial. Because in our school children 
come from five kilometres away’. p.147. 
• A grade VII student at CS3 wrote: ‘Agar skul ka khaana band ho jaey to hamko naksaan hai… 
mid de mil se yah prabhav padta hai ki garib bacchon ke ghar par sabji roti nahin mil paati ho, 
to vah dopahar ka bhojan skul meh kha sakte hai’ meaning ‘If school food stopped, then there 
would be a loss for us… from the mid day meal there is the effect that for poor children, if there 
is no roti or vegetable in their home, they can eat at school’. p.147. 
• The interviewee at household nine stated ‘khaana khaane ke liey hi jati hai’ meaning ‘[she] only 
goes for food’ and the interviewee at household 12 stated ‘Agar accha khaana aur roz khaana 
milega to bacche zyada se zyada skul jaenge’ meaning ‘If good food and, daily, food is available 
then more children will go to school’. p.151. 
• A girl in grade VII at CS1 said ‘Mai roz khana khati hun par kabhi-kabhi ghar se khakar aati 
hun, jab mai skul meh nahin kahti hun’ meaning ‘I eat the food every day, but sometimes I 
come from home after eating, then I don’t eat’.p.153 
• For example, one boy from CS2 said ‘Mai saptah meh ek bar hi khana khata hun,…mujhse 
vidyalay ka khana pasand nahin aur mai nahin khati hun’ meaning ‘I eat the food just once a 
week because I do not like the food and I do not eat it’. p.153. 
• As one student in grade ten wrote ‘Skul meh ek se das tak klas sabhi ke diye jaate hai, jo 
hamare liey labhdaapak hai’ meaning ‘In school, from class one to class ten everyone is given 
food, so for us there is a benefit’.p.167/8. 
• For example, one a female student in grade X stated ‘Mai roz khana khati hun’ meaning ‘I eat 
the food daily’. p.168. 
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• For example, a boy from grade X wrote: ‘Hamare vidyaalay meen… accha khana banata hai, 
lekin mai subah ghar se vidyaalay aane se pahalee khaanaa khaake aattee hun. Isliey mai 
vidyaalay mem khaanaa nahin khaataa hun…. Sirf dal chawal acche banate isliey mai dal 
chawal hi khata hun’ meaning ‘In our school, good food is made but I eat in the morning at 
home before coming to school, therefore I do not eat food at school. Only dal rice is good, 
therefore I just eat dal and rice’.p.168. 
 
Chapter 6 
• As one student wrote ‘phal dete hain, lekin do hafte meh ek bar dete hai, kabhi nahin dete, kabhi 
har mangalvar ko dete hai’, meaning ‘[they] give fruit, but once in every two weeks, sometimes 
[they] don’t give and sometimes [they] give every Tuesday’. Students at CS4 confirmed fruit was 
not served. For example, a student in class VI wrote ‘hamare khaane meh, phal-fruit nahin aate 
hai, isliey hamare khaane meh kela, angoor, ciku, aati chahiey’ meaning ‘in our food, there is no 
fruit, therefore in our food, there should be banana, grapes and chiku’. p.190 
• Student 28 wrote ‘kadhi meh besan kam hota hai. Aloo ki sabji meh aloo kam daalte hai. Aur 
hamare vidhyalay chawal nahin hai. Chawal chahiey’ meaning ‘In the kadhi, there is less gram 
flour. In the potato vegetables, few vegetables are put and in our school there is no rice. Want 
rice!’. p.197. 
• At CS2, students particularly complained that just ‘ek-ek roti dete hai’ meaning ‘just one roti is 
given’. p.198. 
• For example, a grade VI student wrote ‘hamko tin chammach chawal chahiey’ meaning ‘we need 
three spoons of rice’ and another student also in grade VI wrote ‘to roti hamen char milte to acchi 
bat ho’ meaning ‘it would a good thing to have four breads’. p.198. 
• At case studies one and two there was no clear trends in preference. This was captured by one 
insightful student at CS2 two, who wrote: ‘hamare vidhyalay meh sabhi bacce alag-alag khana 
pasand karte hai, koi roti-dal, koi khichdi, koi dal chawal… khana pasand karta hai’ meaning 
‘In our school, all children like different food, some like khichdi, some like dal rice’. p.212. 
• For example, a grade X student at CS2 wrote: ‘hamare vidyaalay meh swadisht khaana dal 
chawal hai…is din vidyaalay ke bacche khana khaate hai…kharaab khaana roti sabji… hai. Is 
din Xth kaksha ke bacce khana nahin khaate hai’ meaning ‘in our school, dal and rice is delicious 
food and on this day the school children eat the food. The bad food is roti and vegetables…On 
this day children from 10th class don’t eat the food. p.212. 
• The interviewee at household 18 at CS3 stated that their child did not go to school very often, but 
when there is special food then they go, stating ‘15 august ya 26 janvari ko bacchon ko mithai 
dete hai, eise moke par bacche skul ki taraf bhagte hai’ meaning of 15th august [independence 
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day] or 26th January [Republic Day] children are given sweet, on such occasions children run 
towards school’. p.327. 
•  At CS1 one student wrote: ‘bacchon ko kadhi chawal evan dal chawal pasand hai lekin chwal 
kam hone ke karan kadhi chawal evan dal chawal bahut kam banate hai’ meaning ‘children like 
kadhi and rice and dal and rice, but there is less rice so because of this kadhi and rice and dal and 
rice are made very less’. p.2123. 
 
Chapter 7 
• A female student in grade VII wrote: ‘kabhi bai ji nahin aate hai to khaana hamen bana parta 
hai’ meaning ‘sometimes the cook does not come, so we have to make food’. This was confirmed 
by a younger male student in grade V who wrote: ‘hamari baiji kabhi kabhi skul meh khana 
nahin banaane aati aur hamari didi bana dete hai’ meaning ‘our cook sometimes doesn’t come 
to school to make food and our older ‘sisters’ make food’.p.226. 
 
 
 403 
 
E.4 Food Consumption and Food Security 
E.4.1 Food Consumption in Household Survey Two 
 
Table E.4 presents the results from the food consumption survey in HS2 by case study. All 
respondents consumed staples daily; however, the consumption of the other food groups varies across 
the case studies. For all food groups, the lowest frequency of consumption was found at CS3.   
 
Table E.4 FCS frequency by case study, household survey two 
Food Group  
Case 
Study 
Number of times consumed past 7 days 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Pulses 
CS1 1 3 16 15 3 2 0 2 
CS2 5 9 17 8 2 0 0 0 
CS3 13 14 6 0 0 0 0 0 
CS4 5 18 4 13 0 0 0 0 
Vegetables 
CS1 1 0 13 9 5 2 3 9 
CS2 0 3 5 10 3 1 0 19 
CS3 8 17 5 2 1 0 0 0 
CS4 3 23 18 6 0 0 0 0 
Fruit 
CS1 19 17 3 0 1 0 0 2 
CS2 18 21 0 0 0 0 0 2 
CS3 32 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CS4 21 26 3 0 0 0 0 0 
Meat/fish 
CS1 24 17 1 0 0 0 0 0 
CS2 38 9 0 2 0 0 0 2 
CS3 30 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CS4 40 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Milk/dairy 
CS1 1 0 1 2 3 0 0 35 
CS2 2 0 1 1 1 1 1 34 
CS3 23 0 2 1 3 0 0 4 
CS4 2 0 0 2 2 0 9 35 
Sugar 
CS1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 40 
CS2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 41 
CS3 2 0 2 0 5 0 2 22 
CS4 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 47 
Oil 
CS1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 39 
CS2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 41 
CS3 0 1 11 8 4 0 1 8 
CS4 0 0 0 2 4 2 2 40 
Condiments 
CS1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 41 
CS2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 41 
CS3 0 0 1 1 1 0 3 27 
CS4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 50 
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E.4.2 Number of Meals per day 
 
Table E.5: The number of meals consumed per day by location 
Data Source Location 
Number of meals including the MDM 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
HS1 
Girwa 0 1 54 18 25 1 
Kotra  0 7 47 45 2 0 
Khamnor  0 0 59 23 4 0 
Kumbhalgarh  0 0 54 54 4 0 
Total  0 8 214 140 35 1 
Household 
recall 
CS1 1 2 43 47 0 0 
CS2 0 5 17 38 0 0 
CS3 0 4 93 2 0 0 
CS4 0 1 143 28 0 0 
Total 1 12 296 115 0 0 
Student survey 
CS1 0 2 24 35 1 0 
CS2 0 10 45 55 20 7 
CS3 0 0 15 7 0 0 
CS4 0 0 52 58 0 0 
Total  0 12 136 155 21 7 
Student recall  
CS1 2 3 46 73 0 0 
CS2 2 0 24 76 0 0 
CS3 0 0 40 0 0 0 
CS4 0 1 110 12 0 0 
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E.4.3 Food Insecurity in Household Survey One by Location 
 
Table E.6 shows the percentage of households in each location experiencing food insecurity 
 
Table E.6: Food Insecurity by location, household survey one 
Location 
Percentage of 
households that were 
food insecure Location 
Percentage households 
that were food 
insecure 
1 33.3 23 100 
2 10 24 30 
3 10 25 80 
4 10 26 30 
5 0 27 0 
6 63.6 28 30 
7 9.1 29 10 
8 30 30 80 
9 10 31 60 
10 70 32 66.7 
11 0 33 80 
12 0 34 30 
13 37.5 35 50 
14 80 36 40 
15 90 37 60 
16 100 38 100 
17 62.5 39 90 
18 66.7 40 70 
19 70 41 80 
20 63.6 42 80 
21 70 43 100 
22 20   
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E.5 Impact 
 
Tables E.7 and E.8 show the correlation between answers in HS1 and HS2 respectively. All 
correlations are significant (p=<0.001).  
 
Table E.7: Correlation between answers, household survey one 
 Enrol 
-ment 
Attend 
-ance 
Perform- 
ance 
Health Other 
Children 
Food 
at 
home 
Money 
home 
Caste 
relations 
-ships 
Enrolment 1.00 0.99 0. 0.58 0.49 0.51 0.53 0.48 
Attendance 0.99 1.00 0.77 0.59 0.50 0.52 0.54 0.48 
Performance 0.78 0.77 1.00 0.61 0.62 0.54 0.54 0.52 
Health of 
child 0.58 0.59 0.61 1.00 0.71 0.72 0.71 0.47 
Food at home 0.51 0.52 0.54 0.72 0.87 1.0 0.94 0.55 
Money at 
home 0.53 0.54 0.54 0.71 0.84 0.94 1 0.59 
Caste 
relationships 0.48 00.48 0.52 0.47 0.59 0.55 0.59 1 
 
 
Table E.8: Correlation between answers, household survey two 
 Enrol- ment 
Attend- 
ance 
Perform- 
ance 
Health Food 
home 
Money 
home 
Caste Time  
Enrolment  1.00                     0.88               0.82  0.68              0.68               0.54 0.34                 0.35
Attendance 0.88                              1.00            0.86 0.66              0.66               0.57 0.32                0.35
Performance 0.82                     0.86              1.00  0.71              0.71               0.59 0.40                 0. 0.44 
Health of 
child  0.68                     
              
0.66               0.71 1.00 0.67               0.61  0.43                0.50
Food at 
home  0.54                     
          
0.57              0.59 0.54              1   0.76 0.70                 0.70
Money at 
home  0.47                     0.46               0.48  0.76 1 0.81                 0.66
More time 0.34                     0.32              0.40 0.43              0.43              0.70 1.00 0.73 
Caste 
relationships  0.35                     0.35             0.44 0.50              0.50              0.70 0.73                 1.00
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E. 6 Variation number working days from AWPB 
 
Table E.9: Expected and Actual working days April-December 2015 
State Expected Actual % State Expected Actual % 
Andhra Pradesh 160 160 100 Nagaland 173 121 69.9 
Arunachal Pradesh 160 158 98.75 Odisha 164 163 99.4 
Assam 144 144 100 Punjab 174 172 98.9 
Bihar 178 137 77.0 Rajasthan 163 163 100 
Chhattisgarh 166 160 96.4 Sikkim 187 187 100 
Goa 153 151 98.7 Tamil Nadu 158 158 100 
Gujarat 167 161.36 96.6 Telangana 157 157 100 
Haryana 173 183 105.8 Tripura 166 166 100 
Himachal Pradesh 177 183 103.4 Uttar Pradesh 173 160 92.5 
Jammu and Kashmir 193 162 83.9 Uttarakhand 174 172 98.9 
Jharkhand 188 183 97.3 West Bengal 166 152 91.6 
Karnataka 167 166 99.4 AN  150 150 100 
Kerala 138 133 96.4 Chandigarh 178 176 98.9 
Madhya Pradesh 167 160 95.8 DN  160 160 100 
Maharashtra 151 150 99.3 DD 145 146 100.7 
Manipur 169 154 91.1 Delhi 165 152 92.1 
Meghalaya 172 167 97.1 Lakshadweep 148 147 99.3 
Mizoram 170 170 100     
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E.7 Out-of-School Children 
 
Determining the number of out-of-school children in India is difficult due to variations in figures 
(Table E.10). The 2011 Census found 38.1 million children aged 6-13, 18.3% were out-of-school, of 
which 32 million had never attended an education institution (GOI, 2011). Even when the figures are 
adjusted to account for the census being conducted at the beginning of the school year, it is still 
estimated that 29 million 6-13 year olds are out-of-school (UNESCO, 2016). The 2014 National 
Sample Survey on Out-of-School Children, a study commissioned by the GOI, found that 6.04 million 
children between 6-13 years were out-of-school, equating to 2.97% of this age group (Social and 
Rural Research Institute, 2014). Using the data from household surveys, UNICEF (2014) calculated 
that 17.8 million children between 5-13 years were out-of-school. Using NSSO 2014 data, UNESCO 
found that between 19.04-19.25 million 6-13 year olds were out-of-school, equivalent to 9.4% of the 
age group (2016: 46). Using the Unified District Information System for Education (U-DISE) data, 
UNESCO calculate that between 16.04 and 17.64 million 6-13 year olds were out-of-school, 
equivalent to 7.88% and 8.61% of the age group respectively. Estimates of the number of out-of-
school children therefore vary by more than 30 million (Table E.10).  
 
Table E.10 Varying estimates of the number of out-of-school children in India (in UNESCO, 2016) 
Survey Out-of-school children (millions) Percentage of 
6-13 year olds 
6-10 years 11-13 years 6-13 years 
Census (2011) 28.6 9.5 38.1 18.3 
Census (2011) age adjusted 17.5 11.5 29.0 13.9 
SRRI (2014) 3.4 2.7 6.1 2.97 
NSSO (2014) 13.65-13.97 5.28-5.39 19.04-19.25 9.4 
U-DISE 7.14-10.24 7.40-8.90 16.04-17.64 7.88-8.61 
 
Reasons for these large differences include different definitions of what constitutes an out-of-school 
child, flaws in data collection and estimation processes, unreliable reporting from schools and a varied 
schooling system across India which means that enrolment ages and when the school year vary 
(Bhatty, 2015; UNESCO, 2016). 
 
The question of which data source is the more reliable and should be used therefore arises, and does 
not have a simple answer. U-DISE data is annual and can be accessed for free; however, the data does 
not contain information on children’s socio-economic background, other than caste and religion 
(UNICEF, 2016). Consequently, household surveys are needed to verify the data and collect more 
detailed information (ibid). The Census covers every household (Kurian, 2015) and thus provides 
information on vulnerable households that might be excluded from other surveys (UNICEF, 2016). 
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However, Census data is only collected every 10 years. The data from the Social and Rural Research 
Institute (2014) collected data on social groups, however the sample was just 99,929 households 
across 640 districts. 
 
Whilst recognising these limitations, in Section 5.6.4, I use Census data to show the number of out-
of-school children in Rajasthan as Census data contains information for the district as well as state 
level. To show the profile of those out-of-school, I use data from the National Sample Survey on Out-
of-School Children by the Social and Rural Research Institute (2014). Although the data is surely 
limited and, I believe, does not reflect the true extent of out-of-school children in India, it does provide 
a useful insight into the profile of those out-of-school, which are corroborated by other authors and 
sources of data (UNICEF 2014a; UNICEF 2014b;).  
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Appendix F 
 
Chapter 6 
 
 
F.1 Adherence to the Menu 
 
Here, I examine the expected frequency (EF) and observed frequency (OF) of each meal on the menu. 
Expected frequency is the number of times a meal is expected to be served based on the days (e.g. if 
schools were surveyed on three Thursdays, the expected frequency for khichdi is three). Observed 
frequency is the number of times the meal was served. I also report whether the meal was served on the 
correct day. Table F.1 presents the results for schools under the decentralised model of MDM delivery. 
In general, khichdi was served more often than expected, whilst the other meals were served less 
frequently than expected. In total, a meal listed on the state menu was served on 50 of 70 days; however, 
the correct meal was served on the correct day on just 23 days (32.9%). Meals not on the menu were 
served on 20 occasions; far more frequently than the one day a week on which food should be served 
according to local taste. Of the meals not on the menu, dal dhokli was served most commonly (11 
times). No food was served on four occasions and rice, namkeen, roti and kadhi, rice and kadhi and rice 
and potato were all served once.   
 
Table F.1: Food served at sampled schools in observation 
  Roti, 
vegetables 
Rice, dal, 
vegetables 
Roti, dal Khichdi 
EF* OF EF OF EF OF EF OF 
Round 1 8 3 9 2 11 8 4 9 
CS1  3 5 4 2 4 1 3 3 
CS2 2 5 2 0 5 1 2 2 
CS3 6 2 2 3 4 2 1 2 
Total 19 15 17 7 24 12 10 16 
 
The results from the case study records are presented in Table F.2 According to the records, the food 
was served as per the menu on 5 of 21 days (23.8%) at CS1 and on 34 of 54 days (63.0%) at CS2. As 
mentioned in Section 6.2.1, the greater adherence at CS2 however is due, at least in part, to inaccurate 
records. For eight days, our observation overlapped with the records. On one of the eight days, the food 
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reported in the records was incorrect; roti and vegetables were recorded but actually dal dhokli was 
served. The monitoring reports conducted by the block officials in Girwa and Kumbhalgarh were also 
analysed to assess the extent to which the trends found were applicable to other schools (Table F.2). 
Overall, the correct food was served on 25 of 36 occasions (69.4%). Roti and dal were served far less 
frequently than expected and khichdi was served almost the correct number of times. Meals not on the 
menu were served on 8 days (22.2%). Dal dhokli was served six times, rice and kadhi once and dal bati 
once. However, there are significant limitations in the monitoring reports and thus the data taken from 
them. Firstly, the food being served is often not recorded. In the Girwa records, the food was recorded 
36 out of 109 times. Secondly, according to the reports, all monitoring in Girwa block was conducted 
on a Wednesday or Thursday. Given the previously identified tendency to serve these items, this limits 
the insight that can be gained from the records. 
 
Table F.2: Menu adherence according to records 
 Roti, 
vegetables 
Rice, dal, 
vegetables 
Roti, dal Khichdi 
EF OF EF OF EF OF EF OF 
CS1 Records 7 8 4 0 7 8 3 1 
CS2 Records 18 22 9 6 18 18 9 5 
Girwa records 0 1 0 1 17 8 19 18 
Total 55 57 38 18 62 42 28 29 
 
Three key trends emerge from the data presented above. Firstly, there is significant deviation from the 
state-level menu. Some variation is to be expected; however, overall the correct food was served on the 
correct day on 57 days of 145 days (39.3%). When the results from the monitoring records are removed, 
the correct food was served on just 18 of 70 days (25.7%). Secondly, the results in Table F.1 and Table 
F.2 show the tendency to serve certain foods instead of others. Overall, roti and vegetables and khichdi 
were served the expected number of times, whereas roti and dal and particularly rice and dal were 
served far less frequently than expected. Thirdly, in all cases the observed frequency is lower than the 
expected frequency. This difference is due to meals not on the menu being served. Of the food not on 
the government menu, dal dhokli was served the most frequently. The school, cook and household 
surveys indicated that certain schools may cook dal dhokli even more frequently than the above 
suggests. The teachers or cooks at schools one, nine, 10 16, 18 and 19 said that they made dal dhokli 
frequently. In the surveys, households with children going to schools 15 and 19 reported that dal dhokli 
is nearly always made. Interviewees at CS3 also reported that dal dhokli was typically served. The 
frequently serving of dal dhokli is likely due to the fact that it is easy to make and does not require 
vegetables. 
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Centralised Model 
 
The same calculations were conducted for the schools served by centralised kitchens. Table F.3 shows 
the results from Khamnor. It should be noted that when dal and roti were served, rice was served as an 
additional item and when khichdi was served it was accompanied by kadhi and roti. When compared to 
the GOR’s menu, overall, roti and dal were served more frequently than expected, khichdi and 
particularly roti and vegetables were served less often than expected. The correct food was served on 4 
of 31(12.9%) days during the school visits.  
 
Table F.3: Food served in the centralised model (observed) 
 Roti, 
vegetables, 
rice 
Roti, dal, 
sweet rice 
Roti, dal or 
dal bati 
Khichdi Roti and 
vegetables 
 EF OF EF OF EF OF EF OF EF OF 
Round 1 5 2 1 0 2 6 2 2 0 0 
Cs4 7 10 3 4 3 4 4 3 3 0 
Total 12 12 4 4 5 10 6 5 3 0  
 
The records from CS4 and schools 25 and 29 were also analysed to provide insight into temporal 
patterns. The results are shown below in Table F.4. 
 
F.4 Food served in the centralised model (records) 
 Roti, 
vegetables, 
rice 
Roti, dal, 
sweet rice 
Roti, dal or 
dal bati 
Khichdi Roti and 
vegetables 
 EF OF EF OF EF OF EF OF EF OF 
CS4 137 98 66 40 73 158 65 56 66 32 
School 25 75 65 37 28 40 79 33 37 38 8 
School 29 64 32 30 0 35 120 29 10 30 20 
Total 276 195 133 68 148 357 127 103 134 60 
 
 
The records show all meals were served less than expected with the exception of roti and dal. The type 
of meals on the menu were served on 783 of 817 days (95.8%); however, the correct meal was served 
on the correct day on 163 of 817 days (20.0%). Overall, from the results displayed in tables F.3 and F.4 
show a low adherence to the menu in the centralised delivery model. This pattern of results can be 
explained by the centralised kitchen using their own menu as is discussed in Section 6.2.1.  
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